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MEMOIRS OF SPAIN

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VOL. I.

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MDCCCXXIV

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
OF

SPAIN

DURING THE REIGNS OF

PHILIP IV. AND CHARLES II.

FROM 1621 TO 1700.



JOHN DUNLOP,

AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF FICTION, ETC.

VOL. I.

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MEMOIRS

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PHILIP IV. AND CHARLES II.

FROM 1661 TO 1700.

JOHN DUNLOP.

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PREFACE.

THERE seem to be only three reasons that, in this country, can induce to the composition of Histories and Memoirs, or excuse their publication ;—the power and talent of drawing novel and philosophical reflections from the incidents of the period chosen ;—access to such materials and documents as may throw a new and additional light on historic facts and characters ; or, lastly, the circumstance that the events of the time selected have not previously been detailed in any connected form, which may be easily accessible to an English reader. It is on this last ground alone that I have ventured to give to the public the following Memoirs of the Reigns of Philip IV. and Charles II. of Spain, with whom ended the Austrian dynasty.

Watson and Thomson's Histories, it may be recollected, conclude with the death of Philip III. in 1621 ; and Coxe begins his *Memoirs* in the year 1700, with the accession of the House of Bourbon to the Spanish throne. An historic interval has thus been left, comprising nearly a century, of which scarcely any account, so

far as I know, has been given in the English language, —those who have written general histories of Spain always passing over this period in a few hurried pages. My sole object is to fill up for the English reader this space, which seems to me to have hitherto remained almost a total blank in Spanish story : and I hope that the ensuing narrative may, perhaps, be accepted as a Supplement to the Biographies of Watson, or an Introduction to the Memoirs of Coxe.

Even in the Spanish language, there exists not any detailed and continued account of the events of these unfortunate reigns. The Spaniards seem to have shrunk in shame¹ from recording the losses and humiliations which their country suffered in the middle and close of the 17th century.

It is a mistake, however, to suppose that there are extant no native and contemporary authorities whatever.²

¹ “Declinò pues,” says Ortiz, a recent native historian, “puy sensiblemente la vasta Monarquia ; y callaron atontos los historiadores como huyendo la necesidad de traer à la memoria lo que veian y apenas creian. Enmudeciò pues la historia de España tambien en los dos Reynados de Felipe IV. y Carlos II, viendo continuaba nuestra decadencia, hasta quedar España al nivel de los menos poderosos estados de Europa. Este silencio nos ha privado de saber no solo las causas de nuestra decadencia, sino tambien de los acontecimientos civiles y militares del siglo 17.” (*Compendio Cronologico de la Historia d’España*, t. vi.)

² “For the domestic portion of this (Philip IV.) and much of the following reign, there are no native contemporary authorities extant, at least we know of none. Our only Spanish authority is Ortiz.” (*Hist. of Spain and Portugal*, t. v. p. 93. ap. *Lardner’s Cyclopædia*.) This is the most recent English History of Spain, and the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV, and Charles II, are discussed in twenty-four brief pages.

The work of Céspedes, who was a writer of the time, gives a very full history of the early years of the reign of Philip IV.; and though there may be no continued account of the remainder of his life, insulated portions of it have been very amply treated of by contemporary authors, as Palafox in his *Sitio de Fuenterabia*; Malvezzi, *Sucesos en el Anno 1639*; Libertino, *Movimientos de Cataluña*; and Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan d'Austria*. These, and many others of a similar description, I have employed in the compilation of the following volumes. But it has been justly remarked by Varillas,¹ that in all Spanish histories and memoirs, the columns are of porphyry and jasper; and while reading the works I have just mentioned, we are almost persuaded that they are the records of an age of splendour and glory,—not of humiliation or decline.

Those French authors who professedly treat of this period of the Spanish annals, as Desormeaux (*Abregé Chronologique de l'Histoire d'Espagne*) and Vayrac (*Revolutions d'Espagne*), cannot be relied on, either for candour, or for accuracy in the relation of facts. Some writers, however, on periods of French history coeval with the reigns of Philip and Charles of Spain, are more to be trusted; and I have been much indebted to Vassor and Griffet's Histories of Louis XIII, and Reboulet's History of Louis XIV.

In all that relates to Spanish affairs in Italy, there are ample sources of information in the works of contemporary authors, as Capriata's, *Guerre d'Italia*, Gualdo's

¹ *Politique de la Maison d'Autriche.*

Guerre d'Europa, and Brusoni's *Historia d'Italia*. On the subject of the insurrection of Naples, in the time of Masaniello, I have found the Italian memoirs altogether overwhelming.

It must be remarked, however, that at least the Italian and Spanish authorities become much more scanty, as also less authentic, for the reign of Charles II. than of his predecessor, and I have, in consequence, been compelled occasionally to have recourse to inferior or less genuine materials, as D'Aulnoy's *Memoires Secrets de la Cour d'Espagne*, and the *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*, attributed to Gregorio Leti.

Besides this deficiency of materials, I am sufficiently aware of the disadvantages of a subject in which I shall have only to record an almost unvaried train of disaster—the imbecility of Kings—the corruption of courts—and the rule of worthless favourites, naturally terminating in the utter prostration and ruin of a once noble and splendid monarchy. But every period of history bears its profit; and that of Spain, in the 17th century, shews how mighty empires may be rendered poor and wretched, and teaches us that they may be brought to destruction by despotism and indolence, as surely (though perhaps not so quickly) as by excess of freedom and popular commotion.

I have found a still farther difficulty in imparting to the subject the interest of unity of action. Spain, though humbled, had still a wide spread empire, and in all its warlike operations, there was a multiplicity of simultaneous efforts and objects. The leading political incident, indeed, is the elevation of the House of Bourbon, on the

ruins of that of Austria, to the rank of the preponderating power in Europe : and some historical episodes, as the Revolution of Portugal, and Revolt of Catalonia, which contributed their share to this important result, are singly interesting. But the multifarious and complicated wars in Italy and the Netherlands—protracted sieges of insignificant towns—battles of small armies—petty leagues, and lengthened negotiations, of which the effect on the general issue is neither immediate nor obvious, may sometimes weary those who have been accustomed in their own days, at the end of the last, and beginning of the present century, to such sudden and stupendous events—such decisive conflicts, both in Europe and Asia. To them the historic journey may appear tedious, unless at every step their “ tread is on an empire’s dust.”

While thus sufficiently apprized of these disadvantages in the subject I have chosen, I am still more fully aware of the defects in its execution. If, nevertheless, the ensuing narrative obtain any share of public encouragement, I shall probably hereafter add a third volume, on the state of Literature and the Fine Arts in Spain during the period of which the civil history is here meant to be related.

The decline of elegance, or elevation of sentiment, in literature, is as painful as a view of the degradation of a great monarchy. And it cannot be denied, that, under the influence of Gongora in poetry, and Gracian in prose, taste and language in Spain had decayed with its political grandeur : yet Calderon rendered the middle of the 17th century the most splendid era in the dramatic lite-

rature of Spain ; and it was unquestionably the brightest age of the Fine Arts—the age of the noble Velasquez, and the soft Murillo.

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MEMOIRS OF SPAIN, &c.

CHAPTER I.

ACCESSION OF PHILIP IV.—STATE OF SPAIN—OLIVAREZ.

Perituraque regna.—Virgil. Georg.

THE rapid conquest of the Palatinate by the Spanish army, under the Marques Spinola, and the decisive battle of Prague, which the Emperor gained by means of the treasures of Spain, brightened the last days of Philip III. with a transient lustre. But the constitutional melancholy inherent in the Castilian line—the taint of the blood of Joanna—predominated over all the excitement of victory and its exhilarating consequences. The gloom which had overcast the mind of the king could not be dispelled by the most brilliant successes ; and those triumphs which, towards the close of his reign, diffused universal joy throughout Spain, conveyed no gladness to the breast of its desponding monarch.

In order to revive his spirits by a change of scene, his ministers and courtiers had persuaded their dejected sovereign to undertake a journey into Portugal, at that time an appendage to the Spanish crown. On this expedition the king was accompanied by his confessor, by several of

his grandees, and by the Prince of Asturias, afterwards Philip IV. He entered Portugal by Elvas, and was everywhere received with the greatest demonstrations of joy throughout the tributary kingdom. At his pompous approach to the capital, an innumerable multitude of vessels, built in the shape of various fishes and sea monsters, covered the golden Tagus; while on land, triumphal arches were on all sides erected. From this tinsel pride, the king was only led to form too high an estimate of the opulence of the nation, and to overrate its capability of enduring taxation.¹ Though accustomed to ostentatious spectacles, he was astonished at this unparalleled display of magnificence, and was heard to declare, he never knew before that he was so great a monarch.² But neither the acclamations of the crowd, nor the gorgeous exhibition of Lusitanian wealth, could rouse his drooping spirits. During his stay of some months at the Portuguese capital, he appeared little in public, and shunned all scenes of splendour or festivity. Believing that his end approached, and being desirous to establish his family in peace and tranquillity, he summoned the Cortes to Lisbon. The assembly was held with much pomp, and was attended by the Duke of Braganza and his son. On this occasion the king was magnificently attired, and his heir-apparent, who was arrayed in a white satin garb, embroidered with gold, came forth all waving with plumes and glittering with gems. The Cortes were easily induced to swear fealty to this resplendent prince as their future sovereign—an oath which soon proved to have been an idle and empty ceremony.

On his return to Madrid, it appeared that the mental despondency of the king was partly occasioned by bodily infirmities, or was, at least, closely connected with a decay

¹ Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. ii.

² Watson's *History of Philip III.*

of the vital functions. An erysipelas, accompanied by a calenture or intermitting fever, which seized him in the end of February 1621, exhausted his bodily strength, and depressed his spirits with a yet deeper gloom. His physicians, who had long attempted to encourage him with the hope of recovery, subscribed at length to the opinion which their royal patient had invariably held of his approaching dissolution. On the 21st of March he was able to rise with the intention of giving audience to Bassompierre the French envoy, who had come to Madrid on the affairs of the Valteline ; but having fallen into a swoon, he was conveyed to his couch, which he never again left.¹ During the following day he had a great accession of fever, and on the 29th his recovery being deemed altogether hopeless, he desired, as the last act of life, to see and bless his children. He told the prince, his eldest son, that he had now summoned him into his presence, in order that he might behold the vanity of a diadem, and learn to prepare for eternity. As the future sovereign of Spain, he recommended to his protection the Infants Don Carlos, and Don Ferdinand, who was afterwards styled the Cardinal Infant, and whom he had designed to be Archbishop of Toledo, when he should arrive at the proper age for exercising the ecclesiastical functions. The Infanta Maria was also called into his presence ; and while feeling and confessing the emptiness of all human greatness, he implored his son, with the fond lingering inconsistency of regal vanity and paternal affection, never to desert her till he had made her an Empress. He had also sent for the Princess of Asturias, who was now so soon to become the Queen of Spain ; but she fainted on entering the chamber of the expiring monarch, and was reconducted to her own apartments. The king was much moved on hearing of

¹ *Mem. de Bassompierre*, t. i. ; ed. Cologne, 1703.

this mark of sensibility in the daughter of Henry the Great. Having conveyed to her the warm expression of his regard and tenderness, he gave all his children a blessing, and dismissed them amidst earnest supplications both for their temporal prosperity and eternal welfare.

During his long sickness, Philip had made frequent confession of his sins, and in this last moment he implored, with much agitation, the Divine forgiveness for the supine indolence of his reign, and for those steps of his government in which he had strayed from the will and law of God. It is reported that, amid other poignant reflections, the remembrance of his cruel and impolitic expulsion of the Morescoes gave also a sting. At this solemn hour, Father Jerome of Florence, a Jesuit, to whose exhortations he had often listened with reverence and comfort, approached the couch of the penitent, and relaxing the severity of those discourses which he had held to him in health and prosperity, reminded him of the exemplary purity of his past life, and the zeal he had manifested during his reign for the interests of the true religion. The anguish of repentance was at length allayed, and those tremors of fear and of hope, which had so long swayed the breast of the king, having subsided into a gentle calm, he expired in the plenitude of that tranquil assurance, which the faith he followed and professed seems so admirably calculated to inspire.¹

¹ The circumstances of Philip's death are related as above by Watson (*Hist. of Reign of Philip III.*) from a letter addressed in 1621 to Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador in England, which is preserved in Birche's Collection in the British Museum. Miniana, in his Continuation of Mariana, gives nearly a similar account, which is farther confirmed by Cespedes (*Historia de Felipe IV.* lib. i. c. 18.), and by the Additions to Malvezzi's History of Philip III., published by Yañes (Madrid 1723), and by Siri in his *Memorie Recondite*, t. v. A different story, however, is current with regard to

Immediately after the demise of Philip III., which occurred on the 31st of March, his successor retired to the royal convent of St Jerome, whence, on the 9th of May, he made his solemn entrance into Madrid, to take possession of the still splendid inheritance be-
the cause of his death, and which, though it appears highly absurd and improbable, is tolerably well authenticated. Bassompierre relates that, on the first Friday of Lent, the king being engaged in council with despatches, and the day being cold, a furiously heated brasier was placed in the apartment. His Majesty neither found fault nor complained, and sat till large drops of perspiration were falling from his forehead. The Marquis de Pobar, who was present, requested the Duke of Alva, one of the gentlemen of the chamber, to remove the brasier, the heat of which was evidently inflaming the royal countenance. But Alva said that this was the duty of the Summiller de Corps (Lord Chamberlain), an office at that time held by the Duke d'Uzeda. The Marquis was sent to search for him at his apartments, but he could not then be found, and before he arrived the king was so grilled, that he was seized on the following morning with fever and erysipelas (*Mem. de Bassompierre*, t. i. p. 326; ed. Cologne 1703). Bassompierre was at Madrid at the time of Philip's death, and the anecdote of the brasier was related to him, as he informs us, by the Marquis de Pobar. The story is also told by the Countess d'Aulnoy in her Travels, as reported to her in a conversation with the Countess of Lemos, a daughter of the Duke of Lerma. When Madame d'Aulnoy met with her in 1679, she was an old gossiping Dowager of seventy-five, and must consequently have been about seventeen at the time of the king's death. From her high rank, she probably had access to know something of the interior of the palace; and it is possible that, when Philip had fallen into a state of great debility, his indisposition may have been aggravated by some occurrence of the description related. It has been told as authentic by Desormeaux (*Abregé Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*), and by Gaillard (*Hist. de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*), and has found its way into the biographical dictionaries and jest-books. All the Spanish historians are highly indignant at the anecdote, which they treat as a contemptible French invention; (See Ortis, *Compendio Chronol. de Hist. d'España*, t. vi., &c.)

queathed to him by his ancestors. The *Calle Mayor*, by which he proceeded from the monastery to his palace, was spread with tapestry and carpet. The officers of the household and grandees of the realm preceded him, and immediately before him walked the Duke d'Infantado, with his head uncovered, and bearing in his hand the drawn sword of Castile. Philip himself was carried along on a platform with a canopy, which was supported by the batons of the thirty-two Regidores of the city, dressed in carnation-coloured cloth, embroidered with silver. His equerries were ranged on each side; and behind him marched the Corregidor of Madrid, the captains of the Guard, and the members of the Council of State.¹

The prince who now ascended the throne by the name of Philip IV., was the eldest son of his weak though pious predecessor, by Margaret of Austria, daughter of Charles Archduke of Gratz. He had reached the age of sixteen at the period of his succession to the Spanish crown, having been born in April 1605 at Valladolid, where the king had a superb palace, and where the court was then residing in consequence of some displeasure or disgust conceived against the citizens of Madrid. The Duke of Lerma, at that time prime minister, was appointed his governor (Ayo), but the Duke was too much occupied with affairs of state to devote much attention to the education even of a royal pupil; and the charge of his instruction was devolved on his preceptor Garceran Alvanell, a Catalonian ecclesiastic, who was afterwards Archbishop of Grenada.² When only seven years of age, a matrimonial contract was concluded in the prince's

¹ *Mem. de Bassompierre*, t. i. p. 354.

² Mendez Silva, *Noticia de los Ayos y Maestros de los Principes de Castilla*, p. 104; ed. 1654.

name with Elizabeth of France,¹ daughter of Henry the Great, at the period when the confederacy against the German and Spanish branches of the House of Austria was dissolved by the death of that monarch. The reconciliation of Spain with her ancient rival, at that time under the regency of Mary of Medici, was celebrated and confirmed by this alliance, as also by a treaty of marriage between Louis XIII. and an Infanta of Spain who was subsequently so well known by the name of Anne of Austria. Four years after these contracts had been concluded, his Catholic Majesty proceeded to Burgos, where the marriage between Louis XIII. and the Infanta was celebrated by proxy; while, at the same time, the Prince of Asturias was united to his bride by the performance of a similar ceremony at Bourdeaux. The two princesses were exchanged with much pomp, and a great attendance of Grandees, on the banks of the Bidassoa, which separates the two kingdoms. The new Princess of Asturias was received at Burgos by the King of Spain, and was thence conducted in full state to Madrid. In the reception of the princess, destined one day to become their queen, the Spanish grandees surpassed all their former exhibitions of a similar description, by the splendour of their processions and equipages; while the populace in the different towns through which she passed, greeted her arrival amongst them, by bull-fights, illuminations, and masquerades.²

At the formation of the prince's household, after his

¹ She is frequently called Isabella: the names at that time seem to have been considered as the same.

² Though the graver solemnities of the marriage were completed in 1616, its less public ceremonies were deferred, as the accurate Spanish historians acquaint us, till the evening of the 25th of November 1620, at the royal residence of the Pardo. (Cespedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.*, lib. i. c. 16; Flores, *Reynas d' España*, t. ii. p. 923.)

marriage, the Duke of Lerma was appointed Mayordomo mayor, or high steward, with reversion of the office to his son the Duke of Uzeda.¹ Both these noblemen, however, had the misfortune to incur the dislike of their young master. Philip III., while Prince of Asturias, had rejected the severe but politic counsellors placed around him by his father, and had thrown himself into the arms of the mild and compliant Lerma. From his example, or perhaps from that policy which seems so often to divide the interests of the reigning sovereign and of the heir-apparent, the present prince spurned his father's favourite to cast himself at the feet of one of the gentlemen of his chamber, the overbearing and haughty Olivarez.

The dislike of the young prince to the Duke of Lerma, as also to his son and successor Uzeda, held him, during his boyhood, at a distance from public affairs. It was only about four months previous to the decease of his father, that he was first introduced into the councils of state, in order that he might learn to appreciate the importance of his duties, and know how to discharge them. This was but a short initiation; and Philip was thus called, in the earliest stage of inexperienced youth, to sustain the weight of an immense and tottering empire.

At the accession of Philip IV., the Spanish monarchy had much declined from that supremacy which it had so long held among the nations. Its territory indeed was but little diminished, and if power could be measured by extent of dominion, Spain was still the most potent kingdom in Europe. But its energy was in a great measure spent, and its resources were nearly drained. The feebleness of age had strangely and unaccountably fallen on it, and its languishing condition formed a political problem among all the statesmen of the time.

In every country there is an epoch of exhaustion as

¹ Cespedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.* lib. i. c. 3. ed. 1634.

well as of excitement, and in the political constitution not less than in the bodily frame, the period of depression quickly follows on that of excitation. The growth of the Spanish monarchy had been rapid and gigantic,—more so, perhaps, than that of any sovereignty, except the Grecian empire of Alexander. But its sudden increase of power had been somewhat forced and premature. It was produced by the matrimonial alliances of its sovereigns, by accidental discoveries which opened as if by miracle the gates of dominion, and by the pre-eminent talents of a few individuals, who, within a short compass of time, rose in constellation on Spain—Ferdinand the Catholic, with his illustrious queen Isabella, Gonsalvo de Cordova, Cardinal Ximenes, and the Emperor Charles. Its progress in power was not accompanied by a corresponding expansion of intellect, or advancement in knowledge. The time of its supremacy was consequently brief, and the decay which it suffered during the short reign of Philip III., was more swift than any recorded in the history of the decline or fall of empires.

But though Spain had thus sunk, in the space of a few years, the causes of its depression may be traced through a much longer period, and may even be found in the era of its augmentation and prosperity. Their influence was not felt at the moment, but they were in early operation, and a canker was gnawing the root, while the branches seemed to spread in their most flourishing and palmy state. Spain had not enjoyed, but abused her strength ; and if the maxim be just, that an immeasurable ambition is the ruin of nations, never was country better entitled to destruction.¹ As early as the reign of Charles V., the kingdom had been emptied both of men and treasure to sup-

¹ Gluttons, says Quevedo, who are greedy of provinces, always die for want of digestion. No surfeit so dangerous as that of dominion. (*La Fortuna con Seso.*)

port foreign wars, which were carried on for German interests, and which, though on the whole successful, conferred little benefit on Spain. These contests were followed by the less glorious, and still more sanguinary, campaigns in the Netherlands. Such long protracted wars, with the prodigious armaments which were fitted out, and the expensive intrigues and negociations carried on in France and England during the reign of Philip II., drained the kingdom of its wealth. Even after that monarch had renounced the sovereignty of the United Provinces, the claim of the Infanta Isabella and her husband, the Archduke Albert, still required to be supported by Spanish armies and by Spanish gold.

The discovery of America and its mines, ought naturally to have given fresh vigour to industry and commerce; and it undoubtedly promoted them for a time.¹ Nor was their subsequent declension occasioned by any exhaustion of the mines themselves, which were rather in a state of improvement at the commencement of the 17th century. Nor, as some writers have supposed, were useful arts and agriculture relinquished by the Spaniards as of one accord, and on a system which no nation could ever adopt. But, borne away by political events, their energy was diverted from domestic industry, the truest source of national wealth and greatness, to foreign colonization and adventure. The discovery of treasures which they believed to be inexhaustible, and the example of immense and rapid fortunes acquired in America and the Indies, produced a contempt of tillage, and even for manufactures, the profits of which were comparatively inconsiderable and distant. Dazzled by the gold of Mexico, the artist flung

¹ I am aware that the opinion that the American mines proved in any way prejudicial to industry in Spain, is now, though I think erroneously, discarded as obsolete and untenable. (Humboldt's *Political Essay on New Spain*.—Miller's *Philosophy of History*, &c. &c.)

away his tools, and the husbandman forsook his plough.¹ Instead of labouring for themselves, the Spaniards sent to their neighbours, not only for numberless superfluities, but even for many of the necessities of life. Persons, too, of a certain rank and birth, however poor they might be, were precluded, by the prevailing notions, from procuring a subsistence by the exercise of the mechanic arts. But in the New World they could, without shame, devote themselves to pursuits, which in their own country might not be prosecuted without degradation. Nor did the produce of the mines afford any compensation for the injury they thus occasioned. Expended in chimerical projects of foreign ambition, and schemes to destroy the peace of other nations, the tide of wealth which flowed from the Western World into Spain, rushed through the land like a torrent, without fertilizing it.

The extent, too, of the Spanish empire, and the distance of its various dependencies, was another cause of its decline. In all ages, the ruins of empires have bespoke the evils of overgrown dominion. The improvement of remote possessions is never sufficiently attended to, while on their account the interests of the parent state are frequently neglected. Voiture likens the Spanish monarchy to an enormous and unwieldy vessel, of which the prow was in the Atlantic, and the stern in the Indian Ocean. Never was the aphorism, *mole ruit suâ*, more applicable than to its tottering magnitude. A king and ministry at Madrid, could not promptly and effectually regulate the affairs of Italy, the Netherlands, the East Indies, and America. All these viceroyalties suffered by the inevi-

¹ Gli Spagnuoli, says Navagero, non solo in questo paese di Granata, ma in tutto 'l resto della Spagna medesimamente, non sono molto industriosi, ne piantano, ne lavorano volentieri la terra ; ma si danno ad altro ; e più volentieri vanno alle Indie ad acquistarsi facoltà, che per tali vie. (*Viaggio fatto in Ispagna*, sect. 54.)

table abuses of delegated authority, and were seldom vivified by the presence of their princes. The whole life, indeed, of Charles V. had been a continued journey ; but the Escorial was the fit habitation of his son, and Philip enjoined to his successors a constant residence in Spain. Slowness does not seem to have been the political character of the Spaniards previous to their extended dominion ; but torpor naturally pervaded parts so far removed from the heart of the empire. All the proceedings at Madrid were dilatory, and no provision was ever made for any event which seemed to be at a tolerable distance. Others followed the example of the court, and delay became the sole policy of the prince, the ministry, and the governors of provinces.

Whatever institutions were favourable to liberty, had been suppressed or undermined in the reign of Charles V., and freedom was at length utterly destroyed by his despotic and bigoted son. The evil effects, indeed, were not felt during the reigns of these princes. The skill and vigour with which both wielded the arbitrary power they had possessed themselves of, gave a temporary energy to the government, that failed when the sceptre passed into the hands of their imbecile successors. There were none of those talents or virtues in the nation which are the offspring of freedom. Despotism, and the terrors of the Inquisition, diminished the security of property. To grow rich, was to be exposed to the suspicion of Judaism, which might bring the wealth of individuals within the grasp of that tribunal. Industry was thus discouraged, and capital was withdrawn to the colonies, or diverted from productive employment to some form in which it could be enjoyed without molestation.

It was at a time when complaints already began to prevail all over the kingdom, of the neglect of agriculture, and stagnation of manufactures, that Philip III. resolved on the fatal measure of the expulsion of the Morescoes.

Most of that race had indeed returned to Africa after the conquest of Grenada, but many still remained, in consequence of the marriages they had contracted, the establishments they had formed, and the difficulty of transporting the materials in which their wealth chiefly consisted. These remnants of the ancient conquerors of Spain were the chief cultivators of the soil in the Mediterranean districts of the kingdom, and were not only the most skilful husbandmen, but the most ingenious mechanics in the Peninsula. They exercised various useful arts which were essential to the comfort and convenience of life, but which at that period were almost unknown to the Christians. They practised the manufacture of silk and paper; they excelled in the irrigation of their lands, and the cultivation of mulberry trees, sugar-cane, rice, and cotton, all of which had been introduced by them. Hence, while the Spanish villages over Castile and Leon had fallen to decay, those of the Moors in the narrow strip of Valencia and Grenada increased and flourished, and the fields assumed under their skilful labour the aspect of a luxuriant garden.¹

¹ Navagero, who visited Grenada in 1526, while Venetian envoy to the Emperor Charles, gives us some information on the state of the Moors during the period which elapsed between the conquest of Grenada, and the final expulsion of the race by Philip III. Describing the city of Grenada, he says, "Per una porta picciola si entra in un luogo detto l'Alcazeria, che è un luogo serrato nel mezzo di due porte, e con molte stradette per ogni parte, tutte piene di botteghe nelle quali stanno i Moreschi a vender sete, ed infiniti lavori di diverse maniere, e cose varie; ed è come una merceria, ovvero un Rialto appresso a noi; perchè in vero ha infinite varietà di cose, et massime di sete lavorate in gran somma. * * * Da ogni parte intorno Granata, tra i molti giardini che vi sono sì nel piano come ne i colli, vi si veggono, anzi sono, (ancorchè non si veggano, per gli arbori), tante casette di Moreschi sparse qua e là che messe insieme fariano un' altra città non minor di Granata. Vero è, che il più son piccole, ma tutte hanno le sue acque, e rose, moschette, e

Their prosperity, however, was viewed with a jealous eye by the government of Spain and its Christian natives, who saw with envy the fairest portion of their soil occupied by a detested race, whom they still regarded as unbelievers. Most of them, indeed, had submitted to baptism, but the sincerity of their conversion was doubted, and it was suspected that they followed in secret the law of Mahomet. An antipathy naturally existed between the followers of a faith which, as modified in Spain, placed its chief merit in an ascetic abstinence during life, and the votaries of a superstition which carried its prospective sensuality beyond the tomb. It was also alleged that Spanish rebels, traitors, and reprobates of every denomination were wont to seek refuge and concealment, and often to find protection, among the Morescoes; and as this race, though long subdued, still looked on themselves as the lawful masters of the country, it was to be dreaded that they might co-operate openly or secretly with the French, the English, the Africans, or any other enemies of Spain, and thus hold the kingdom in constant disquiet, suspicion, and alarm. The Spaniards could not have failed to recollect that in the most vigorous era of their monarchy the remnants of the Moors had defied them from the strongholds of the Alpuxaras; and even now it was suspected that they had renewed their correspondence with the African princes and the Grand Signior, whom they urged to invade the Peninsula, promising to rise in favour of the Mahometans at the first signal.

The Spanish Government was not insensible to the mirti, ed ogni gentilezza: e mostrano, che a tempo che era in man de i Mori, il paese era molto piu bello di quel che ora non è. * * * I Moreschi son quelli che tengono tutto questo paese lavorato, e piantano tanta quantità d'arbori, quanta vi è." (Lettere a G. Ramusio, Let. 5. See also Navagero *Viaggio fatto in Spagna*.) After the revolt, however, of the Alpuxaras, the Moorish population became more dispersed than at the time of Navagero's visit.

benefits which the Morescoes conferred on arts and agriculture ; but the king and his ecclesiastical advisers, of whom the chief was the Archbishop of Valencia, supposed that as soon as the Africans were expelled, the Spaniards would occupy their place and enjoy their prosperity. Seeing that the Moors could work for much lower wages, and were satisfied with smaller profits in trade than were requisite for the subsistence of the natives, they imagined that their countrymen were thereby excluded from employment, and reduced to indigence. But as the Spaniards wanted both the industry and ingenuity of the Morescoes, they could not supply the loss of their skill and exertions. As in most places the Moorish population had lived detached from the Christians, with little friendly intercourse, in towns and villages by themselves, and as they spoke a language with which the natives were unacquainted,¹ none of them had acquired their arts. Nor had they any subsequent opportunity of learning them. For, though the king and his ministers wished that a few of the Morescoes should remain for a time in order to teach the Christian inhabitants the arts which they so successfully exercised, they refused to stay behind their countrymen, and all embarked for Africa, carrying along with them the machinery and manufactures, which De Vega contemptuously calls “ their barbarous treasures.”² Their absence caused a void which the high-spirited Spaniard was little disposed to fill. The very circumstance that agriculture and arts had been practised by misbelievers, deterred an old Christian from their exer-

¹ Parlano i Moreschi la loro antica, e natia lingua Moresca, e pochi sono quelli che vogliano imparar lo Spagnuolo. Sono molto inimici degli Spagnuoli, da i quali anche non sono molto ben trattati. Le donne vestono tutte alla Moresca, che è abito molto fantastico. (*Lettere de Navagero*, 5.)

² *Corona Tragica*.

cise, and his aversion to such occupations was increased by his hatred and contempt for those whom he had been accustomed to see engaged in employments which he considered as degrading. The lands being thenceforth allowed to lie waste, or being unskilfully cultivated, the fairest regions of Valencia and Grenada soon became as unproductive as Leon or Castile.

It would have been far wiser to have endured the risk of Moorish insurrection, or African invasion, than thus to have sapped the foundations of national prosperity by the removal of so many hands and so much capital from industry. Yet Spain, exulting in her blind fanaticism, and in a policy both selfish and timid, never for a moment supposed that her visible decline, which so immediately followed the exile of the Morescoes, had been occasioned by the loss of a million of industrious subjects. Their expulsion, on the contrary, was hailed with thanksgiving and congratulations; and so late as the reign of Philip IV., Velasquez painted a triumphal picture, accounted his masterpiece, in the centre of which he placed Philip III. in the act of giving command to a party of soldiers, who drive on a group of Moors to an embarkation, which awaits them in one extremity of the canvas; and at the bottom of the picture was this inscription,—*Philippo III. Hispan. Regi, ob eliminatos feliciter Mauros, Philippus IV. trophæum hoc erigit an. 1627.*—Cervantes, in his *Persiles* and *Sigismonda*, extols the measure, in which he foresees all possible advantages to Spain; and Lope de Vega, in his *Corona Tragica*, fixes on this as the leading and most brilliant incident in the reign of the Third Philip.¹

¹ Por el Tercero santo, el mar profundo
Al Africa pasó, sentencia justa,
Despreciando sus barbaros tesoros,
Las ultimas reliquias de los Moros.

Nothing, however, impresses us more strongly with a conviction of the indolence and torpor of the Spanish race, than that the expulsion of these strangers should have been attended by the fatal consequences which it unquestionably produced. Elsewhere it would have occasioned no loss or disadvantage, or would have been followed only by such temporary inconvenience as ensued in France on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In any other country of Europe, the arts of the Morescoes would have been acquired by the natives long before their exile ; and if their expulsion occasioned a momentary stagnation, agriculture and manufactures would both have speedily revived with renovated vigour. But even from the time of the ancient Celtiberians, the inhabitants of this peninsula had been disinclined to labour, and indisposed to every species of exertion, except in war. One of the old Spanish novelists has mentioned as a characteristic of his countrymen, that they thought it better to be idle and fare poorly, than to labour and live well. The romances of the 16th and 17th centuries, which, though perhaps a little overcharged, only present, like other works of fiction, a highly coloured picture of the manners of the age, paint in the strongest light the indolence of the lower classes, which led them to prefer mendicity and pilfering to the exercise of a trade ; and also the ridiculous pride of those *Hidalgos* who, while in want of provisions, and every necessary of life at home, strutted with immense whiskers, broad ruffles without a shirt, and long rapiers, through the streets of Madrid or Toledo.¹ “The peasantry,” says Madame D’Aulnoy (who travelled in Spain in the middle of the 17th century), “will more willingly endure hunger and all severi-

¹ *Guzman Alfarache*, ii. 2. *Vida del Escudero Marcos Obregon*. *Vida del Gran Tacano*, &c.

ties of life, than work, as they tell you, like mercenaries and slaves. Thus pride, seconded by sloth, prevents them from tilling and sowing their land, which remains uncultivated, unless some more laborious and worldly-minded strangers undertake the task, and thus carry off the gains, while the sorry peasant sits in his chair, thrumming an ill-tuned guitar, or reading some mouldy romance.”¹ A great proportion, too, of the lower orders trusted for subsistence to the distributions of alms at the palaces of bishops and the gates of convents, or they became the lazy attendants of grandees, whose custom it was to maintain an immense and superfluous household. Of the middle

¹ *Voyage d’Espagne.* Voiture, who resided for some time at Madrid, shortly after the accession of Philip IV., and travelled to the south of Spain with letters of recommendation from Olivarez, exhibits an amusing and graphic picture of the indolence prevailing among the lower classes of the inhabitants. “S’il pleut, ceux qui apportent des villages du pain à Madrid, ne viennent point, quoique ils le vendissent mieux. Quand le blé est cher en Andalousie, s’ils en ont en Castille, on ne prend pas la peine d’en envoyer, ni d’en venir querir. Il faut leur en porter de France ou d’ailleurs. Lorsqu’un paysan qui a cent arpens de terre, en a labouré cinquante, il croit en avoir assez ; le reste demeure en friche. On laisse les vignes venir d’elles-mêmes, et sans y rien faire. Un Italien qui tailla la sienne cueillit en trois ans de quoi se dedommager de son achapt. La terre d’Espagne est très fertile : Leur soc de charrue n’entre que quatre doigts dedans, et souvent elle rapporte quatre vingt pour un ; de manière que si les Espagnols sont pauvres, c’est parcequ’ils sont rogues et paresseux.” (*Lettres de Voiture.*) “Indeed,” says Campanella, who wrote about the same period, “the Spaniard is but a heavy dull fellow, not only at agriculture and points of husbandry, but generally at all mechanical arts whatever ; and that is the reason that Spain is so unprovided with all sorts of manufactures and machinery, and that the wool, silk, and whatever other commodities the country affords, are all sent abroad, and whatever raw materials are not exported, are wrought up, not by natives, but by Italians ; and as for their fields and vineyards, they leave their cultivation to the French.”

classes of society, and of the younger branches of noble families, many shut themselves up in those cloisters where superstition had long since prepared retreats for indolence, and where they hoped to enjoy perfect ease, along with some degree of consideration. Among all ranks, celibacy prevailed in an unusual degree. Besides seclusion in convents and nunneries, many obstacles arose to matrimony from family pride, and the disagreements of parents. Marriages were thus contracted from interest, without choice, affection, or desire. From these causes, and from early debauchery, the population was more disproportioned to the means of subsistence than in any other country of Europe; and hence the means for defence and for the acquisition of wealth were diminished. The education of the children, such as they were, of these enforced marriages, was shamefully neglected among the highest classes, and indeed even in the royal family.

The riches of the church were totally disproportioned to those of the rest of the nation, and much wealth was thus locked up in silver images or golden lamps, which, if judiciously brought into commerce, might have rendered many thousands of the population opulent and happy. Equally large were the encroachments which superstition made on the time of the inhabitants, great part of which was withdrawn from useful labour by religious festivals, masses, processions, and purchase of pardons. The effect of this evil is well exemplified, at the present day, in the contrasted prosperity of the Catholic and Protestant cantons of Switzerland.

The luxury that had gradually crept into Spain was more pernicious than it had proved in any other State. As a counterpoise to its baleful effects, it had elsewhere fostered the arts, and even encouraged industry among certain classes of society. But in Spain, it manifested it-

self in loads of useless plate, and hordes of idle retainers, while the useful and elegant arts were abandoned to Italian subjects and foreigners, who came not to settle in the land, but to despoil its natives of their gold.¹

It was thus that Spain, which, of all the countries of Europe, possessed the greatest advantages in climate, fertility, and geographical position, became, in spite of these means of national prosperity, the poorest land in Christendom. The gifts of nature were all in profusion still, but human institutions had corrupted its benefits, or perverted them into sources of weakness and decay.

When the Spanish government perceived the diminution of coin resulting from these causes, it attempted to supply the deficiency, by imposing higher taxes on manufacturers and artificers. But the burden became intolerable to the few remaining workmen. They fled to Italy and Flanders, or, if they staid at home, they relinquished their trades, and no longer manufactured the fine wools of Andalusia, or the silks of Valencia. The ministry having no more manufactures to tax, next oppressed the farmers, and the imposts laid on agriculture were as injudicious as they were numerous and excessive. "When once a nation," says Raynal, "has begun to decline, it seldom stops. The loss of population, of manufactures, of trade, and of agriculture, was attended with the greatest evils. While Europe was daily improving in knowledge, and all nations were animated with a spirit of industry, Spain was falling into inaction and barbarism. The duties on commodities, in their transport from one province to another, were so high, that they amounted almost to a prohibition, so that the communication was totally inter-

¹ F. de Mata, a Spanish author, who wrote in 1655, complains that 120,000 strangers, who wrought better and cheaper than the natives, had spread over the country, entering it poor, but annually carrying away from it more than a million of gold.

rupted. Even the transmission of money from one district to another was forbidden. In a short time not a vestige of a road was to be seen. Travellers were stopped at the crossing of rivers, where there were neither boats nor bridges. There was not a single canal, and scarcely a navigable river."

In this state of adversity and debasement, the Spaniards still unfortunately preserved a superstitious reverence for the age of their discoveries, their conquests, and their glory. They scornfully rejected whatever had not been practised in their brighter days, and disdained to imitate other nations, though they beheld them yearly becoming more powerful and wealthy by their improvements. "We have a constant maxim in the council of state," said the second Don John of Austria to the Countess D'Aulnoy, "ever to consult the spirit of Charles V. in all difficult matters: we inquire what he would have done on such an occasion, and *that* we endeavour to practise in our turn." This sort of feeling which, so long as a nation preserves its power, may lead to beneficial results, is often followed in its decline with disastrous consequences, by prompting overstrained exertions, and arresting its grasp at those favourable occurrences which the revolutions of time and the conjuncture of events may have presented. The Spaniard still retained his immoderate fondness for all that had the semblance of grandeur, and still fed his imagination with chimerical ideas and immense prospects of glory. Forgetting that his country was now but the gigantic skeleton of a once robust and vigorous frame, and confiding in past pre-eminence, he assumed the same tone of national pomp and authority which had been employed in the age of Charles V. and Philip II. He thought he could never err in following the maxims which these princes had adopted, but which in

fact were suited only to the powerful and prosperous State they governed.

However, it was perhaps this tone of grandeur and defiance which contributed still to maintain in Europe a dread of the Spanish name. Lerma had been always more alive to vanity and present appearances, than to real power or advantages; and it had been his invariable policy to conceal the actual weakness of the realm under a shew of external magnificence. The pride of the nation had survived its greatness,—its animosities had outlived its power of oppression; but though much of animating health and vigour was gone, the outward form was still nearly the same. The strength of Spain was estimated by numbering its provinces, and computing the treasures of the Indies; and to the undiscerning eye of the vulgar, Philip IV. may have appeared as great a monarch as his grandsire. It was thus that terror, as Schiller expresses it, still brooded over the Lion's forsaken den,¹ and hence while the provinces of Spain were depopulated and impoverished, many powerful confederations were formed against her, and the humiliation of the House of Austria was the subject of the vows of politicians in all the states of Christendom.²

And in fact with every disadvantage under which she laboured, and spite of the rapid depression she had suffered,

¹ *Thirty Years War.*

² In a memoir on the state of Europe, written soon after the accession of Philip IV., and attributed to the celebrated Duke De Rohan, the author says, “En dix ou douze années de paix, la Maison d'Autriche a fait de plus grands progrès que durant les guerres sanglantes de Charles V. et de François I. On s'est enfin reveillé en France et ailleurs. Les premiers coups d'essai font voir que le mal n'est pas incurable, pourvu qu'on ait autant de constance à maintenir sa liberté que la Maison d'Autriche à poursuivre son projet de la monarchie universelle.”

Spain might still have regained the lofty station she once held in the rank of kingdoms, if, at the succession of Philip IV., a wise and energetic monarch had ascended the throne, or if the reins of government had been entrusted to a prudent and enlightened minister. The excellence of one man may inspire a whole nation with virtues. "Genius in a nation," says Sir William Temple, "ever rises or falls according to that of the prince or ministry. For if men see that the way to rise is by worth and virtuous qualities, the genius of a nation will run that way, and produce great subjects. If they can hope to do it by vicious humours, by little arts, by warm pursuits every man of his own interests, the whole spirit runs into those courses, and perhaps the faster from the propension of our natures rather to ill than to good." ¹ Had Philip IV. equalled Henry the Great, or found such a minister as France had recently lost in Sully, and was so soon to acquire in Richelieu, Spain might have held the preponderance over her rivals, or have at least maintained an equal struggle.

The Spanish empire still comprehended the fairest portion of Europe, and in the New World included

More than her fell Pizarros once enchained.

The supremacy of Spain over Italy, her own western mines, and the oriental treasures supplied by the Indian empire of Portugal,—all these which had hitherto proved but elements of decay, might, under able administration, have afforded immense resources. The extensive frontiers of the monarchy were still guarded by ancient renown and disciplined valour. That celebrated infantry which was originally formed on the Swiss model, and had been for more than a century the admiration and terror of Europe, was still unbroken. It was encouraged by the remembrance of a thousand triumphs,

¹ *Letters*, vol. iii. p. 334.

without one recollection of shame, for no signal defeat had yet withered the laurels of St Quentin and Pavia. The soldiery still retained that intrepid and enterprising though somewhat ferocious and mutinous spirit, by which they were marked in the wars of the Low Countries. Their renowned captain, the noble Spinola, still survived, and many officers must yet have served in the veteran army who had combated against Henry the Great, under the Prince of Parma.

In the civil department, though Philip III. might be unfortunate in his chief advisers at Madrid, the viceroys and ambassadors of Spain, at the close of his reign and at the accession of his son, were men of transcendent talents. Their stratagems in policy, it may perhaps be said, are the usual resources of powerless ambition, and mark declining empire; but at no period were intrigues and negotiations conducted with greater address. At a time when French diplomatists, by their insolence and presumption, had rendered themselves and their country odious in all the capitals of Europe, the Spanish envoys, on the other hand, generally governed the courts at which they were resident. The Count d'Oñate had completely subjected the cabinet of Vienna to that of Madrid. No statesman ever possessed a more penetrating understanding than the Duke d'Ossuna, or was more refined in his politics than the Marques of Bedmar. No ambassador had more knowledge of the human heart than Gondomar, or better understood the art of ingratiating himself with a feeble and pedantic monarch.

The grandees of Spain still retained their zeal for the interests of their country. The spirit of honour and loyalty was not extinct, and the love of glory yet lingered in the breast of the Castilian. A popular and patriotic monarch might still have found among his subjects, the

stern fidelity of Alva, and the bright honour of the Marques de Villena.¹

But Philip IV., though superior to his father in refinement of taste, and in some specious exterior accomplishments, was equally deficient in vigour of mind or solid acquirements, and was far inferior to his predecessor in purity of life.

The minister, on whom for more than twenty years he relied with implicit confidence, and devolved the uncontrolled management of affairs, was a man of irregular genius and of vast designs, which were but ill suited to the present condition of his country ; and to his policy, which was alternately obstinate and capricious, may not unjustly be attributed the overwhelming misfortunes of Spain.

Gaspar Guzman, Count of Olivarez, who assumed the title of Count-Duke on his elevation to the dukedom of San Lucar, represented a branch of the illustrious house of Medina Sidonia, founded by Alonzo Perez de Guzman, surnamed the Good, who was distinguished by the capture of Tariffa, and subsequently by its heroic defence against the Moors in the close of the 13th century. The first Count Olivarez was the younger son of the third Duke of Medina Sidonia, and was raised to that title (derived from a town in New Castile, twenty-three leagues southeast from Madrid,) by the Emperor Charles, on account of his distinguished military services. His son Henry, the second count, and father of the minister, became a courtier at the age of eleven, having at that early period of life accompanied Philip II. to England, on occasion of his nuptials with Queen Mary. He greatly strengthened his influence, some years afterwards, by a matrimonial union with the daughter of the Count de Monterey,² one of the most considerable noblemen in the Spanish court.

¹ See Robertson's *Charles V.* b. iv.

² Lopez de Haro, *Nobiliario Genealogico*, lib. i.

As he advanced in life, his political skill and knowledge obtained for him in Spain the title of the *Gran Papalista*.¹ Philip II., who was an acute observer of the talents of his subjects, employed him much in public affairs. During the pontificate of Sextus V., he was sent as ambassador to Rome, where his son Gaspar was born, in the palace of Nero, in the year 1587,² so that he was thirty-four years of age at the accession of Philip IV. His father having highly distinguished himself at Rome for his diplomatic address and penetration, was sent as viceroy to Sicily, and thence to Naples, where he applied himself diligently to the administration of justice, the reform of abuses, and the preservation of tranquillity throughout the kingdom. The severity of his education and manners, led him to discourage all extravagance in the amusements of the viceregal palace, and in the exterior pomp of government; but he embellished Naples by employing the celebrated architect Fontana on various public works, which, for elegance, utility, and magnificence, are not inferior to those of the first cities in the world.

At the removal of the viceroy from his government, which took place in the year 1599, immediately after the death of Philip II., Gaspar accompanied his father on his return to Spain. As he had an elder brother, Girolamo, who was to inherit the family title and estates, he was originally destined for the church, and was sent, immediately after his arrival in Spain, to prosecute his theological studies at Salamanca.³ On the death, however, of his brother, which happened during his father's lifetime, he abandoned this pursuit, and by the demise of

¹ Giannone, *Stor. Civile di Napoli*, lib. xxxiv. c. 6.

² Yañes, *Memorias para la Historia de Felipe III.*, prolegomena; ed. Madrid, 1723. 4to.

³ Id. p. 98.

the Count shortly afterwards, he was left sole heir to an annual revenue of 60,000 ducats. He hastened to the capital to take up the rich inheritance which had fallen to him, and soon distinguished himself among the courtiers by his liberality and profuse expense. He laid claim to the hand of his cousin german, Inez de Zuniga, one of the queen's maids of honour, and daughter of the Count de Monterey, at that time Viceroy of Mexico, and afterwards of Peru. Before he was accepted by this lady, he spent, it is said, in feasts and entertainments for her recreation, nearly 300,000 ducats;¹ but he hoped to be indemnified by the notice which he thus attracted, and by the royal rewards or honours usually granted to a suitor on whom a Lady of the Palace bestowed her hand. His nuptials at length took place in the year 1607, and tended considerably to increase his influence at court.

At the celebration, in 1616, of the reciprocal marriages in the royal families of France and Spain, Olivarez, along with other knights, accompanied Philip III. to Burgos. On this occasion he appeared with great lustre and distinction, from the number of his domestics, and the splendid liveries in which they were clothed. As a requital for his zeal, and some remuneration for the expense he had incurred, he was appointed, on the formation of young Prince Philip's household, one of the gentlemen of his bedchamber. He long remained little noticed by his master; but he was meanwhile secretly laying the plan of those deep intrigues which ultimately proved so successful. His father had solicited the rank of a Grandee of Spain from the Duke of Lerma, as a reward for his services at Naples and Rome; but his request was refused, and hence first arose the discord and enmity which so long subsisted between the houses of

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i. p. 182.

Olivarez and Sandoval. In prosecution of his schemes of aggrandizement and revenge, he was one of the first who sowed dissension in the family of the Duke of Lerma. That minister's son, the Duke d'Uzeda, prompted by an unnatural and short-sighted ambition, having succeeded in displacing his father and in obtaining his high offices for himself, the next care of Olivarez was to excite a jealousy between Uzeda and his cousin the Count de Lemos, who, it was generally believed, stood high in the personal favour of the prince. Having insinuated himself into the confidence of the Duke d'Uzeda, he persuaded him that this cousin had become so great a favourite with the heir to the crown, that in the following reign he would doubtless occupy that high place at court to which the duke himself aspired. The credulous minister adopted the most violent measures in consequence of this suggestion; he removed Lemos from the person of the prince, and changed his whole household except Olivarez, whom, with misguided policy, he left as a spy on all that passed in the palace. It was then that Olivarez contrived permanently to ingratiate himself with his master, partly by supplying him with money, of which he received but a scanty allowance, and partly by administering in every way to his pleasures.¹ He was too firmly established to be removed when his rivals, at length, attempted to dislodge him, and he was too great a proficient in court policy to allow himself to be tempted by those offers of higher situations in the state, which would have removed him from the immediate presence of the prince. He soon threw off the mask which he had worn, of servile friendship, to the Duke d'Uzeda; and on the death of Philip III., being now strong in the favour of

¹ In vece di spegnere il fuoco nascente nel principe, vi somministrava fomenti. (Leti, *Vita de Don Giovanni d'Austria.*)

the new sovereign, he boldly declared himself the irreconcilable and mortal foe of the whole house of Sandoval.

The Count Duke d'Olivarez commenced his inexorable government, by an implacable and vindictive persecution of the Duke of Lerma and his chief adherents. During his lenient and conciliatory administration, Lerma had been distinguished by the mansuetude of his demeanour, and the suavity of his language;¹ but his ambition was not the less grasping, and the lust of lucre held equal sway in his bosom with the rage of power. He had obtained for himself and his family enormous gifts from the effects of the expelled Morescoes. His annual revenue amounted to 600,000 ducats; and a short while before his disgrace, he had sent off from Madrid to his palace at Lerma 70 waggons loaded with plate, to the value of 800,000 ducats, besides jewels and other precious articles.² Never was a profuse and profligate minister permitted to have a gentler fall. When supplanted in the government during the reign of Philip III., by his son the Duke d'Uzeda, he was allowed, perhaps for family reasons, to retain all his effects, and to enjoy his immense revenue. His indulgent master wrote to him while yet on his way to the place of his retirement, and sent him a present of a stag which had been slain by the royal hand in the chace. It had also been remarked, that, on the day in which he left his apartments in the palace for his paternal estate at Lerma, the prince came to the door of his chamber, and calling him out, conversed with him at considerable length, with an appearance of kindness and complacency.³ On the day before his death, Philip III. had summoned Lerma from Valladolid, where he then was.⁴

¹ Dulcedumbre de palabras.

² Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronologique de l'Histoire d'Espagne*, t. iv.

³ Watson's *Philip III.*, vol. ii- p. 169.

⁴ *Mem. de Bassompierre*. t. i. p. 335.

He set out as soon as the messenger arrived ; but, before he reached the capital, he was stopped by a courier from the new king, who commanded him to return into exile. The duke submissively obeyed this harsh mandate, only observing, that he rejoiced the first royal command of this description had been directed against himself, since, from his example, the king's other subjects would receive a lesson of respect and implicit obedience.¹ He was soon afterwards accused of mal-administration ; and judges were appointed to try his cause who were known to have been his inveterate enemies. In consequence of their sentence, he was deprived of a grant of 15,000 loads of wheat which he had obtained on lands in Sicily. Prompted by the true tenacity of avarice, he resisted the attempts of his oppressors with great constancy and courage ; and, in a spirited memorial, he protested against this spoliation as an encroachment on a vested right. In answer to this document, he was farther deprived of his yearly pension of 72,000 crowns ; and some of his most valuable effects were about the same time confiscated. Pope Urban VIII. now interposed in his behalf, and it was generally believed that the sacred shelter of the cardinal's hat, which he had obtained in the plenitude of his prosperity, alone preserved the head of its owner. Lerma bore his losses and misfortunes with much equanimity, and was now allowed to pass three years without farther molestation. These were spent by him partly at Valladolid, and partly at his palace of Lerma, a vast fabric, with spacious halls and apartments, which was built by himself near the town of the same name in Old Castile, and, of all their buildings, was esteemed by the Spaniards next in magnificence to the Escorial. At the end, however, of these three years, he was suddenly called on to refund the whole amount of the pension which he had drawn for twenty years pre-

¹ Cespedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.* lib. II. c. i.

vious to his disgrace, and which was now equal to the sum of 1,500.000 ducats. He did not long survive this last act of oppression, and died at Valladolid, after a short illness, in 1625.

About the same time that the persecution commenced against Lerma, proceedings were also instituted against his son and political rival the Duke d'Uzeda. Though his talents were below mediocrity, he possessed in an eminent degree the polished manners of a courtier, and by his constant assiduities he had obtained a higher place in the affections of Philip III. than had even been held by Lerma,¹ to all whose offices he had succeeded, with exception of that of governor to the prince, which was conferred on Balthazar de Zuniga. After the demise of Philip III., mutual misfortune reconciled the father to the son; and the Duke d'Uzeda retired from court, in order to reside with his exiled parent at Valladolid. He was soon, however, formally summoned to appear, on an appointed day, in a certain garden of Madrid, which belonged to his family, and was in front of the royal convent of St Jerome. Having obeyed the citation, it was intimated to him, on the part of the king, that he should, in the mean while, retire to his castle of Uzeda, and there await farther commands. The duke immediately complied; but he had no sooner arrived at this residence, than he was seized and hurried off to Torrijon de Velasco, where he was for some time confined with much rigour, and was thence transferred to Arevalo,² a town in Old Castile, at the distance of 80 miles from Madrid. He was then formally accused by the fiscal of the Council of Castile, and sentenced to pay a heavy pecuniary fine, which, however, was subsequently remitted by the king. His employment of Mayordomo mayor was conferred on the Duke d'Infantado, and though relieved from confine-

¹ Watson's *Philip III.*

² Yañez, Prolog. p. 47.

ment, he was condemned to eight years' banishment from court, with orders to reside during that period at Toledo. There he was seized with a profound melancholy: His weak spirits were unable to sustain the misfortunes which had assailed his family, and of which he himself had been the primary cause, as his dissensions with his father had disunited the house of Sandoval, and had given his first advantages to Olivarez. He could neither be consoled by the sympathy of his relatives, nor the letters addressed to him by his father, full of admirable lessons of moral courage and fortitude. He earnestly begged permission to come to court, in order that his health might be restored by a change of air and scene. But he was only allowed to remove to Alcala de Henares, about 20 miles north-east from Madrid, where he died under great depression of mind, on the 1st of May 1624.¹

Pedro Fernandez Castro, Count of Lemos, the nephew and son-in-law of Lerma, was unquestionably in that age the first man of his country. He was distinguished by his high spirit, elevated genius, and discerning patronage of literature. In the reign of Philip III. he had been Viceroy of Naples, from the year 1610 till 1616, and while in that situation he had converted the Vice-regal palace into a temple of the Muses.² On his return to Spain, he was appointed President of the Council of Italy, and was persuaded to unite himself with Lerma to counterbalance the growing influence of Uzeda. But when the son prevailed over the father, he was dismissed from the employments he held near the person of the Prince of Asturias, by whom he was deservedly loved and esteemed, and was compelled to retire to his family seat in Galicia. The popularity of his character, and

¹ Yañez, Prolog. p. 47.

² Pellicer, *Noticias Literarias para la Vida de L. Argensola*; ed. Madrid 1788, 4to.

the former favour he had enjoyed with Philip IV. before his accession to the throne, obtained for him a lot less severe than that which had fallen to his unhappy relatives. He was even permitted to come for a short time to court ; but being distressed by the persecution to which his family were subjected, and being viewed with an eye of suspicion by the ruling party, he again retired to Monforte de Lemos,¹ a town in Galicia, built on a high and steep mountain, where the Counts of Lemos had a noble palace, commanding an extensive and delightful prospect, over a plain diversified with forests of chestnut-trees, vineyards, corn-fields, and orchards.² Here he suddenly and unexpectedly died soon after his retirement, regretted by all his friends, and deplored by the poets of Spain, to whom he had been a zealous and munificent patron.

One of the firmest and ablest adherents of the Duke of Lerma, was the Duke d'Ossuna, so noted for the part he had taken while Viceroy of Naples, in the unsuccessful conspiracy planned by the Marquis of Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador at Venice, against that republic. Towards the close of the last reign, it was suspected he had conceived the design of converting his delegated authority at Naples into sovereign power ; and he attempted, though in vain, to excite an insurrection against the Viceroy who had been sent to supersede him. Notwithstanding the audacious and open nature of his treasonable designs, the Duke ventured to return to Spain, and he presented himself with impunity at court.³ But

¹ Yañez, p. 50 ; Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iii. c. 26.

² Udal Ap Rhys, *Account of Remarkable Places in Spain.*

³ Watson's *Philip III.* t. ii. p. 252. Giannone affirms that the Duke asked to be restored to his viceroyalty, and that his demand would have been granted, had it not been for the remonstrances of the deputies specially despatched to court by the City of Naples. (*Storia Civile di Napoli*, lib. xxxv. c. 4.)

on the accession of Philip IV., when he was no longer supported by the influence of the family of Sandoval, to which he was allied by marriage,¹ the accusation of having aspired to the crown of Naples was revived against him. His fate appears to have been accelerated by his own imprudence.² The French envoy Bassompierre having stationed himself with some others on the bridge of Segomana, in order to see the procession pass with the body of the late king to the Escorial, the Duke d'Ossuna went up to his carriage and inquired when he was to receive his audience; that for himself he had been promised an early admittance; and that he meant to tell the new king at his first presentation, that the world was now governed by three young princes, and that he would choose for his master the sovereign who was the bravest and had the sharpest sword. These imprudent expressions were reported by a person who had been set as a spy on his words and actions, and a letter to Lerma

¹ His eldest son was married to a daughter of the Duke d'Uzeda. (Lopez de Haro, *Nobiliario Geneal.*)

² The mind of Ossuna seems to have been in some degree unhinged towards the close of his life. On his return from Naples he entered Madrid in a triumphal manner, and for fifteen days he exhibited at his palace to the gaze of the multitude the treasures he had brought with him from Italy. He was one of the first grantees who came to visit Bassompierre during his embassy to Madrid at the close of the reign of Philip III. "Le Duc d'Ossuna me vint saluer en apparat extraordinaire : car il étoit porté en chaise. Il avoit une robe à la Hongroise, fourré de martre, et quantité de pierreries sur lui de grand prix ; plus de vingt carrosses le suivant, remplis de seigneurs Espagnols ou Napolitains : à l'entour de sa chaise plus de cinquante Capitaines, Tenientes, ou Alferez Reformados. * * * Il voulut ensuite saluer ceux qui étoient venus avec moi—leur parlant toujours François, et leur disant tant d'extravagances que je ne m'étonnoit point de la disgrâce qui lui arriva peu après. (*Mem. de Bassompierre*, t. i. p. 324.)

was about the same time intercepted, in which he reflected on the late changes, as well as on the character and talents of Olivarez. He was arrested at his own house, in name of the king, by the Marquis de Pobar, accompanied by forty archers of the royal guard,¹ and was confined in the fortress of Alameda, belonging to the Count de Baraxas. His two secretaries, with his treasurer, were also at the same time cast into prison. His Duchess threw herself at the feet of the king, and presented to him a long memorial, recounting the services of her husband, and imploring the royal clemency. But before he was either pardoned or condemned, he died of a dropsy in the place of his imprisonment.²

Father Aliaga, the confessor of the late king, who had owed his promotion to the favour of the Duke of Lerma, and had afterwards basely deserted his patron to follow the fortunes of Uzeda,³ was now deprived of his office of Inquisitor-General, and confined in a convent of the order to which he belonged, distant about fifteen leagues from court. The inferior adherents of Lerma were for the most part banished, or had their effects confiscated. But a darker fate was preparing for Rodrigo de Calderon, his first secretary and confident, and the chief instrument of that profligate rapacity which had marked his administration.

No one can hear, without some degree of interest, the name of Rodrigo de Calderon, associated as it is with our recollection of the most entertaining adventures and the most exquisite delineations of life and manners.

During his long administration, Lerma had been re-

¹ *Mem. de Bassompierre*, t. i. p. 338–341.

² Cespedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.* lib. ii. c. 2.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*.

markable for his boundless liberality to his creatures and dependents. Calderon, the chief of all his favourites, was the son of an officer of subordinate rank in the army of Flanders, and was first introduced into the household of the Duke nearly in a menial capacity. Having acquired an ascendancy over the mind of his master, he rose by his misplaced indulgence to the highest offices of the state, and was allowed to dispose, according to his caprice or interest, of almost every situation of trust or emolument; while in turn his indefatigable activity, his knowledge of life, his cunning and his matchless effrontery, were highly serviceable to a minister whose mediocrity of genius and inaptness for business, were in some degree supplied by his quickness and perseverance. But the overbearing demeanour of this plebeian minion, had always formed a striking and odious contrast to the placid and courteous deportment of his master. It was not therefore to be expected that, on the fall of Lerma, his arrogant and obnoxious favourite should have been permitted to retire into private life without question or accusation. Immediately after the dismissal of his patron in 1618, he was arrested and placed in confinement. Manifold charges were brought against him, and among others, that of having poisoned the queen of Philip III.,—of employing magical arts to gain the affections of the king,—and having occasioned the death of various individuals, particularly of a person called Francisco Xuara. He was acquitted on his trial of all the offences laid to his charge, except instigating the murder of Xuara, and for that crime he was forgiven by the king. But it was again alleged that this pardon had been fraudulently obtained. He was anew thrown into prison, where he was put to the rack, and judgment of death was pronounced, in virtue of the former trial, in which he had been found

guilty of making away with Xuara.¹ The sentence, however, was not carried into execution during the reign of Philip III., but a few months after the accession of Philip IV. it was intimated to him that he must prepare to die. “ He received the messenger of this intelligence with a cheerful countenance, and tenderly embraced him. He now abstained from sleep and food, and spent his time in acts of devotion. About eleven of the clock on the 21st of October he was brought out to the door of the prison, encompassed by the officers of justice. Affliction had softened the natural dignity of his looks and mien; and his grey hairs, his beard, and his dress, suited to the present sad occasion, conspired with the expression of his countenance to impress the spectators with sentiments of veneration and love. He yet possessed sufficient strength to mount on a mule that waited for him at the prison. This he did with great tranquillity, and passed through the streets to the place of execution, embracing and adoring a crucifix which he held in his hand, amidst the tears and lamentations of the surrounding multitude. The executioner held the reins of the mule, and, as he went along, proclaimed aloud the following words:—‘ This is the judgment which, by the orders of our sovereign lord the king, is inflicted on this man, for having been the instigator of an assassination, and accessory to another murder, and divers other crimes which appeared on his trial, for all of which he is to be beheaded as a punishment to him, and a warning to others.’ Having arrived at the scaffold, the resigned sufferer beheld with a serene countenance the instruments of his approaching death—the chair, the sword, and the man whose office it was to use it. He conversed for some time with his

¹ Ortiz, *Compendio Cronologico de la Historia d’España*, t. vi. lib. xix. 6.

confessor and other divines ; and having been received into the bosom of the church, he took leave of his attendants, and sat down on the seat from which he was never to rise. Before his hands and his feet were made fast, he gave a present to the executioner, and twice embraced the man, who was bathed in tears, as a token that he bore him not any ill-will on account of the office which he was about to perform. Then making bare his neck, he yielded his limbs to be bound with the utmost composure. The instant this operation was performed, he reclined himself backwards, and while he was in the act of recommending his soul to God, his head was in a moment severed from his body. As the last impressions are commonly the strongest, men forgave the imperiousness of his former conduct and behaviour, and thought only of that mixture of humility and fortitude—that patience and piety—which he displayed in the last stage of life.”¹

This was a natural but temporary feeling ; and so odious had been the administration of the Duke of Lerma, that those acts of severity which were exercised against his family and adherents, do not seem in any degree to have affected the popularity of Olivarez, especially as they were accompanied by the pardon and recall from banishment of all who had been obnoxious to the former ministry. The new favourite had now completely triumphed over his enemies—the king yielded himself up to his absolute control—the throne was surrounded only by his friends and relatives,—and his administration, which lasted for more than twenty years, commenced with the applause and high expectations of all classes in the kingdom. Olivarez was indeed a minister entirely according to the heart and taste of the Spanish nation, as he flattered them with golden dreams and vast prospects of glo-

¹ Watson's *Philip III.*

ry. Never did the destiny of a country depend more absolutely on the measures of one individual; and it cannot be denied that Olivarez brought with him to the government many of those endowments which tend to benefit and exalt a nation, and which might have redeemed Spain from ruin, had they not been counteracted by other qualities, which ultimately rendered him the most unfortunate minister in the list of Spanish statesmen. Unlike his predecessor Lerma, who deferred business by every possible shift and expedient, he was vigilant and indefatigable in the labours of the cabinet, and could not be withdrawn from them by any pleasures or amusements.¹ He toiled sixteen hours a-day, rising, it is said, an hour before daylight in summer, and in winter giving audience by candle-light to those who wished to see him on business.² He was of a subtle piercing understanding; and, as Voiture, who knew him well, remarks with some misanthropy, he judged most truly of mankind, estimating every individual according to the evil, and not the good, that was said of him. He was zealous for the honour of his king and the interests of his country; he was firm and constant in his resolves,³ and uncontaminated by that ignoble thirst of lucre which had rendered the administration of Lerma so disgraceful. His general information, though not always profound, was extensive, and he was naturally endowed with a ready and per-

¹ Pour ce que j'en ay pû connoître, il est merveilleusement prompt, actif et penetrant, subtil, plein de feu et de lumière. (Voiture, *Eloge d'Olivarez*.)

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

³ La mauvaise fortune a quelquefois renversé ses desseins mais jamais sa constance. Je l'ai vû recevoir d'un même visage la nouvelle de la perte de Mäestricht, et celle de la mort du Roy de Suede. (Voiture, *Eloge d'Olivarez*). Voiture was the agent at Madrid of Gaston, Duke of Orleans, during the period of his rebellion against his brother Louis XIII.

suasive eloquence ; but, in consequence partly of the false taste which at this time began to infect Spain, from the influence of Gongora in verse, and Gracian in prose, and partly from a desire to conceal his real sentiments, his style both in speaking and writing was often ornate, ambiguous, and obscure. Though an unrelenting and vindictive enemy, he was a warm friend and a generous patron, at least of those whom he believed to be entirely devoted to his interests, and wholly subservient to his designs. On the other hand, he was in disposition haughty and irascible, envious of merit in others, and jealous of their most distant approaches to the favour of his sovereign. He was reckless concerning the consequences of his policy to the happiness of individuals, or the interests of provinces, and tributary kingdoms ; while to the allies of Spain he was never conciliatory, and often unjust. He was fond of novelty, and intoxicated with his own views, holding himself superior to ancient usages or maxims, and contemning the “ wisdom of our ancestors.” Such, indeed, was his vanity, and his overweening confidence in himself, that he would hardly ever ask or follow the opinion of others, lest he should thereby betray a distrust of his own understanding. His genius was superior to his judgment, which was frequently the sport of political chimeras ; and such was the mixture of caprice and obstinacy in his disposition, that he often lightly abandoned the best concerted schemes, and fatally persisted in those measures which were utterly impracticable, and involved in their pursuit defeat, rebellion, and revolution.

In private life, Olivarez was moderate in his expenses and household establishment, and was himself strictly temperate. He was affable in conversation, and studiously careful to avoid either causes or expressions of offence. Unlike his rival Richelieu, he remained firm and unshaken amid domestic misfortune :—“ *Le jour que*

Dieu," says Voiture, "en lui ôtant sa fille, lui ravit ses plus chères espérances, il eut la force de donner audience et de vacquer aux affaires. Les sentimens de pere cédèrent au devoir de ministre. Il crut qu'il ne lui étoit pas permis d'abonner aux larmes les yeux qui veilloient au bien de l'état, et qu'un esprit qui avoit à sa charge la moitié du monde, ne devoit pas être troublé du malheur d'une famille." In his personal appearance he seems to have been ungainly and awkward. "Olivarez," says Siri, "was tall and large-boned, with shoulders bending down; he had a long face, a sunk mouth, pointed chin, and hollow eyes; a head of vast circumference, flattened before, but raised high behind; a dark olive complexion; an aspect truculent and fiery."¹ It is from this description that Le Sage drew his caricature: but Voiture, who knew him well, gives a more favourable portrait: "Etant jeune il fut fort bien fait de sa personne—grand, agreable et de belle taille—le meilleur homme de cheval de toute l'Espagne,² vaillant, adroit, liberal et magnifique; et sans doute le plus galant de la cour, jusques à ce qu'il en fut le plus puissant."³

However aspiring and overbearing Olivarez might naturally be in his temper, he so far affected a show of moderation, as nominally to decline the situation of prime minister or *privado*. It was generally believed that the Duke of Lerma had alienated the affections of his master, by grasping at too many dignities, particularly at that of cardinal, which introduced a restraint and ceremony in their intercourse which was irksome to the king. Warned by this example, Olivarez placed Balthazar de Zuniga, his maternal uncle, at the head of the government. This

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

² Espinel in his *Marcos Obregon*, also bears testimony to his skill in horsemanship, p. 168. ed. 1744.

³ *Eloge d'Olivarez*.

statesman, who was the brother of the Count de Monterey, had been ambassador from Spain to the court of France during the reign of Philip III. It was at that time too much the practice of Spanish envoys to foment conspiracies in the states in which they were resident. Zuniga had engaged in a plot for delivering up Marseilles to the Spaniards,¹ and afterwards in supporting the claims of the Marchioness de Verneuil, who maintained the validity of her marriage with Henry IV., which would have rendered his union with Mary of Medici null, and her offspring illegitimate. There is little doubt that the court of Madrid encouraged its ambassadors in these practices; but when they went too far, or were unsuccessful, it invariably disavowed them. Zuniga, however, though his attempts were scarcely recognised, does not appear to have suffered in consequence of them. He was a man of cultivated mind, and of great experience in foreign affairs, which he had acquired during his embassies at Paris and Vienna. He accordingly presided, at least nominally, over the foreign department, while Olivarez reserved to himself the regulation of all the internal affairs of the empire. But though a statesman of sound judgment and moderate views, Zuniga concurred in the daring policy of Olivarez, which, indeed, he could not have resisted. Nor did he long enjoy his titular supremacy: The year after the accession of Philip IV. he was seized with a sudden illness at his apartments in the royal palace of Madrid. The king was then at the Escorial, and on hearing of the sickness of his minister, he immediately addressed a letter to his wife: "I trust to God that he will speedily give your husband the health which I wish him, and which he so well deserves. But if our hope should fail us, so far as depends on me, you will experience no change. His children will ever be mine, and I will so

¹ *Histoire de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne.*

provide for them, that the loss of Balthazar will be felt chiefly by me. May God protect us, and give you the support which is needful.”¹ This letter never was received. Zuniga had breathed his last ere it was written, and his wife Francisca expired in a paroxysm of grief before it reached her. Zuniga died poor, a rare example in a Spanish minister or favourite. Among his papers there was found a long memorial, containing advice and instructions to Olivarez for his political conduct, and for the best means of maintaining his power;—in particular, counselling him to follow the example of the Duke of Lerma, by preserving peace with all the powers of Europe.²

After the death of the nominal prime minister, Olivarez was invested with all the apparent responsibility and dignity, as well as the actual influence of that eminent situation. Olivarez had already consolidated his power, by the complete extinction of the party of Lerma, and by filling the offices of government with those who were attached to his own interests and person. Among them, however, were to be found many individuals of talents and experience, who were appointed to high offices in the state. Balthazar Alamos (the Spanish translator of Tacitus), who had been bred up under Antonio Perez, secretary of Philip II., but who had remained unemployed during the reign of Philip III., was now called, along with some of his experienced political contemporaries, to the public counsels. Palafox, too, afterwards so well known as the Bishop of Osma, was successively a member of the Councils of War and of the Indies, before entering the ecclesiastical state, in which he was so highly venerated.

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iii. c. 19.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

Olivarez assiduously strove to maintain the favour of his master, by all those personal attentions and compliances, by means of which he had so successfully ingratiated himself with Philip, while Prince of Asturias. He regulated all the amusements for which the king, who was much inclined to pleasure, chiefly showed an inclination. His nocturnal excursions, in which Olivarez was supposed to have encouraged and accompanied him in the same manner as before his accession to the throne, excited much public scandal, and gave occasion to severe animadversion and remonstrance from the Archbishop of Grenada, who had formerly been the Prince's governor.¹ Olivarez, it is said, even ordered the royal clothes, adjusted the fashion in which they were to be made, and

¹ The reader may perhaps wish to see how a correspondence was conducted between an Archbishop and Prime Minister of Spain, on the delicate topic of the king's night-walking, soon after his succession. The Archbishop writes :—" I have always been a friend to your Excellency, and as such, and as tutor to our master the King, I shall be bold with truth and plainness to tell that which I hear and observe, hoping that you will not condemn me for it, being for his Majesty's good and for your benefit likewise. I beseech you very earnestly to divert the king from his night-walking, and consider how great a part of the blame lies on you—people publishing it everywhere that you keep him company, and they are grieved to see that the hopes which they had at the beginning of his government succeed so ill ; for the truth is, where much is expected, there is always fear and jealousy ; and indeed this is no fitting delight (call it an entertainment if you will), in respect of the many circumstances which make it hurtful, and the occasion which people take to talk of it, and to observe some indecencies in it which become not a king. And although there were no other harm in it, the example is extremely ill in him who ought to give so good examples, and to remember well how his father, at the time of his death, afflicted himself for faults of omission, which must needs be if we give place to such faults of commission. I beseech you consider it well, and that by how much the greater talent God hath

arranged the wardrobe.¹ He saw the king regularly three times every day, first before he had quitted his couch, when he himself undrew his curtain and explained to him what was to be done in the course of the day; secondly, when he came to the king's chamber, and thirdly, when he came to the king's bedchamber. He gave you, by so much the stricter will your account be; and I do assure you that, to please the king in things unlawful, is the way to lose at least your own honour and authority, and to run the hazard both of your soul and your worldly estate. I pray you believe me, and prevent it in time, not by such means as human wisdom shall teach you, but by endeavouring to please God, and to be thankful unto him for the great favours and benefits which you have received at his hands, duly observing and keeping his holy law, putting the king our master always in remembrance thereof, and guiding him in the way of truth. Remember your virtuous mother, whom Sextus V. had wont always to call the holy Countess, and your noble father, and continue in the steps of their virtues, with works worthy of the place you hold, which shall be both for your own good and the good of his Majesty's kingdom.—*Grenada, 28th August 1621.*"

To this Olivarez replies: "I do very highly esteem the great zeal your Lordship shows in your late letter, and I received it as a great favour, giving you infinite thanks for your good admonitions, being very holy and pious, howsoever they be not seasonable. For, believe that I serve the king in such sort, that I have no need to maintain myself in his Majesty's favour by distracting both his ways and my own; and whensoever I shall determine to give over the care of doing that which is not merely simply but exemplarily good, I should find out sins that would be more profitable to my house. But my ambition is grounded only in the virtues of the king, and in the glory of his actions."

"Your Grace hath believed, and the malcontents have reported, that which might be easily imputed to a king of sixteen years of age, and a servant of thirty-four; and not finding any true foundation whereon to ground their malice, they have taken that for certain which seemed easy and probable. It is most true that, if his Majesty go abroad in the night, I am to wait on him, because he does not conceive that any other will serve him with more love or with more loyalty. And for my part, I never heard that the law

¹ *Siri Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

condly, after dinner, when his conversation was confined to light and agreeable topics ; and lastly, before his Majesty went to bed, when he gave an account of all that of God was broken, in that a young king, who is to govern all, did not live obscured and retired, without the knowledge of any thing ; neither should I make any scruple to have him sometimes abroad, in a decent manner, for informing himself, by his own eyes, of many things, which, if he should not see them at times, would come into his ears wrested and misshapen. His grandfather began to know the world betimes, and so became a great king ; and his father (whose omissions you excuse), though he were so virtuous and good a prince, yet his education being in a kind of retirement, it befell him that he could not live otherwise. But for my part, seeing I do not desire his Majesty only for myself, but for all men also, I would not that he should be ignorant of so great a world as he hath to govern, and therefore shall never move him to keep within, when I see him inclined to go abroad with that temper and moderation which becomes his person ; for without *that* I neither believe that himself would attempt it, nor durst I advise him, because I know that you left him so well instructed, that it were dangerous, ever after, to persuade him to aught that was unlawful. Neither hath he at any time varied from those noble principles imprinted on him at the beginning, nor deceived the great hope which was had of him, for every day he increaseth in merit more than in age ; nor was his father at his age more excellent in all virtues than this young prince. And I do much marvel that you should hold the sins of commission to be greater in a king than those of omission—the first being his vice as he is a man, and only against himself—the second as he is a king, and therefore hurtful to all. You may also do well to observe whether he committeth any error in government ; for I should be sorry if the world did not believe that even in the least occasions I desired to have him not only good, but even the best that ever yet hath reigned. And his Majesty so carrieth himself, that he makes all men admire and commend him, without any need to be helped by the instruction of others ; for his own natural understanding is so excellent, that we who are about him cannot justly take unto ourselves the glory of any of his resolutions. And as it concerned no man so much as your Lordship, to be sorry for any of his faults, and to endeavour the reformation

had been transacted during the day, and asked instructions for the morrow. On these occasions he usually appeared loaded with an immense burden of state papers and memorials, in order to impress the king with an idea of the magnitude of public cares—to lead him to regard all business as a species of martyrdom, and to feel immeasurable gratitude towards the minister who relieved him from its insupportable toils.¹

But Olivarez did not trust entirely to the favour of his sovereign for the permanency of his power. He was

thereof by your wise and reverend advices, so had no man reason to be slower in believing them, having brought him up and discovered in him so many tokens of a glorious prince; and knowing me withal, that I was not born to so short a fortune, as to trust it on that which would not at all times be for mine honour; and although I did not find in my ancestors the cause which you mention, to oblige me to be an honest man, I find in myself obligation enough to be so.

“Admonitions which precede the thing that is feared, and do afterwards govern the event, I reverence from whomsoever they come; but when a representation anticipates the fault, it might happily not be received so kindly as I receive this from your Lordship, because I know your virtue, learning, and understanding: But I beseech you tell me, whether you have known any minister less obnoxious to the commonwealth, or complaints at a lower value than at this time. The care of his Majesty and of us who serve him, is, that his rewards and punishments be just; that his navies and armies be well provided; that his kingdoms be well fortified; that his arms do keep their reputation; and his treasure be managed sincerely and without fraud. That there is somewhat perhaps amiss I do not deny; for it were a vain presumption for any man to hope to do all things as they should be. But I assure you, in acknowledgment of the favour I have received by this your letter, that I am sorry there is nothing which it should cause me to amend; for were there, I should do so, as well because it is reason as to obey your Lordship, whom God many years preserve. *Madrid, 3d September 1621.*—(*MSS. Advocates' Library.*)

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

desirous that the people at large should approve the royal choice of a favourite. Deference for opinion generally throws a transient gleam of sunshine on the first days even of a despotic reign, and the worst ministers at the commencement of their career, usually form some vague wishes for the public good. As the nation now expected from Olivarez the immediate regeneration of Spain, by the revival of commerce and agriculture, and as he had not only denounced the internal administration of Lerma, but severely punished him with all his counsellors, for their gross mismanagement, it became necessary, in order to meet the public expectation, and in order to justify his prosecution of the former ministry, that he should attempt some sweeping reformatations in the interior departments of the state. Accordingly his measures were extensively directed both against the abuses which had crept into private families, and into the public offices ; while vast schemes were at the same time formed for the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of commerce.

Such, at this period, was the pomp of the Spanish grantees, that the Duke d'Ossuna, before his imprisonment, maintained not fewer than three hundred domestics ; and among the lower classes, even the cobblers strutted about with long rapiers and satin mantles. To check this superfluous luxury and expense, to which the political economists of that age attributed the thinness of population and the scarcity of money, the king, by a special ordinance, prohibited all his subjects, without even excepting the Infants his brothers, from employing more than eighteen domestics in their service. He forbade them also to wear silk ornaments, to embroider any article of dress, or to gild any piece of furniture.

Marriage portions were regulated according to the wealth of families. The husband was interdicted from

spending more than the eighth part of the bride's dowry in nuptial dresses or jewels, and all promises or agreements to the contrary were declared ineffectual.

But the rapid diminution of the population was the chief matter of alarm and attention. This topic had attracted notice towards the close of the last reign, and a memorial had been presented to the king by the Council of Castile, containing various proposals, none of which had been acted on. Olivarez, however, now instituted a special *Junta* for the consideration of this subject;¹ and the same ordinance that regulated marriage portions, held out various encouragements to matrimony, which in Spain had hitherto been restrained by numerous impediments. Each bridegroom was now declared to be exempted during four years from every tax or subsidy, and whoever had six male children, was relieved from all imposts during the remainder of his life. Any one who married before he reached the age of eighteen, entered on the full administration of his own estate and that of his wife, the very day of the nuptials. Marriage was permitted at the earliest age without the consent of parents or guardians; and the king annually set apart a certain sum to provide portions for young women whose poverty prevented their settlement.²

These regulations were followed up by other enactments directed to the same object, but of a more arbitrary and exceptionable tendency. Every Spanish subject was forbidden to carry his family or effects beyond the Peninsula, unless he received the express permission of the king; and none were allowed under severe penalties to resort to Madrid, Seville, or Grenada, already the most populous cities of the realm, unless called thither

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii.

² Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*.

by affairs of the most urgent importance ; and the residence at the capital of those who aspired to dignities or employments, was limited to one month. Finally, the king anxiously held out invitations to foreigners to establish themselves in any part of Spain, at the distance of twenty leagues from the sea-coast, under a promise of perpetual exemption from all tribute and impost, provided they were either agricultural labourers or artizans¹.

Olivarez also, though some time afterwards, gave encouragement to the formation of great mercantile companies on the plan of those in Holland. He proposed that one should be established at Lisbon, and another at Seville, for the trade to America and the East Indies, while a third at Barcelona should carry on the commerce of Spain with the Levant. But the indolent character of the nation, and the divided state of the provinces, prevented the formation of these mercantile unions.

At the accession of Philip IV. the country was impoverished by gratuitous pensions to individuals, and the exorbitant emoluments or peculations of those who held official situations. To meet this evil, all persons in public employments were desired to lodge an inventory of their wealth at the time they came into office, and another, to be contrasted with it, of that which they at present possessed,—marking its gradual increase, and stating every article of patronage or emolument which had been enjoyed.² The order extended to all who had entered the public service within the last thirty years, and the inventories were to be furnished in ten days at farthest. This command excited universal complaint and consternation among those who had been bred up in the school of

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*.

² In the close of the preceding century, Sully had instituted a commission for enquiring into the fortunes of the French financiers, and a large restitution had been in consequence obtained.

Rodrigo de Calderon ; and by some it was met with an absolute refusal. They maintained that the inquiry was unprecedented in Spain or any other kingdom,—that a display of wealth created odium and envy, while a confession of poverty excited contempt, so that all who complied with the unreasonable and inquisitorial mandate, would be either hated or despised. The court was obliged to postpone the time which had been fixed for the fulfilment of its ordinance, in consequence of the discontent it created, and the difficulties opposed to its execution, till, like all similar measures in Spain, it was entirely neglected, and then dropped into oblivion.¹

Among other schemes which might have proved conducive to the welfare of the kingdom, a royal Rescript was issued to the different provinces of Spain, requiring the magistracy of each district to collect information concerning the causes of the distresses of the country, and to communicate such advice, accompanied by their reasons, as they should judge most useful.² In this document

¹ Céspedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.*, lib. iii. c. 1.

² In consequence probably of this encouragement, various treatises were written, about this time, with considerable freedom, on the causes of the decline of Spain, and the best means of its revival. In a dissertation by Caxa de Leruela, published soon after this period, and entitled “*Restauracion de la antigua abundancia d’España*,” the depopulation and poverty of the kingdom are attributed entirely to the attention which agriculture received to the prejudice of pasturage. The author complains that in the end of the preceding century a vast extent of old pasture land had been broken up for the purposes of tillage, or the plantation of vines, and that in the commencement of the century in which he wrote, the chief proprietors of sheep-walks had been deprived of the privileges granted to the *Mesta*, and were exposed at the same time to the arbitrary fines exacted by that corporation. He seems to have held in great horror the toils of husbandry, “*hominum boumque labores*,” and ascribes to its exercise the number of beggars who crowded the highways,

his majesty frankly acknowledges the wretched situation of the kingdom,—which was probably a stroke of policy in Olivarez to depreciate the administration of his detested predecessor. He announces that he is fully aware of the depopulation of the country, the decline of its commerce and manufactures, and the difficulties which would be experienced in his attempts to revive them. He, however, expresses his intention, as soon as he should receive the necessary information, to form a junta, consisting of the ministers and presidents of the different councils and tribunals, at whose sittings he should himself attend, to deliberate on the measures most advantageous to the state.² This proposition at least displayed some degree of care and anxiety on the part of the king. But we do not learn that it was attended with any beneficial results; and it was the practice of the Spanish monarchy that the best formed measures were never followed out or accomplished.

and paupers who filled the hospitals of Spain; for as tillage requires strength, the peasant is unable to undergo its toil after the age of fifty, whereas pasturage and herding may be begun in childhood, and continued to extreme old age. His panacea accordingly is to restore the ploughed lands to grass, and to introduce an Agrarian law limiting the extent of landed possession, and abrogating the exclusive right of the eldest son to the sole succession in family estates,—a plan perhaps not altogether irrational in Spain, where, by marriage and inheritance, so much of the property of the kingdom was vested in a few great families, and where those who devoted themselves to pasturage had invariably shewn more intelligence and activity in their avocations than the husbandmen. But whatever may be thought of the soundness of their views, the immense number of treatises, some published, and others in MS., from the time of Philip II., written expressly on questions of political economy, and most of them bearing to be on the requisition of the king or his counsellors, shew that the princes and statesmen of Spain were not negligent in devising means for restoring the prosperity of their country.—(*Ortiz*, t. vii. *prolog.*)

¹ Cespedes, lib. iii. c. 17.

Indeed, different parties quickly arose in Spain, who were divided on the subject of the expediency of the proposed reformatations. In the Cortes, which the king about this time assembled at Madrid, to deliberate on the state of the nation, a majority of the members were of opinion that such violent and sudden alterations would prove injurious,—that the best method would be to prevent future evils,—to husband the treasures and resources of the country, and meanwhile to postpone all severer remedies.

In a great monarchy like that of Spain, a natural and equitable balance of money should gradually have established itself. But the coin had been tampered with during the preceding reigns, and the influx of precious metals from America prevented a steady and permanent adjustment. Such, in consequence, was the perplexing state of the Spanish finances, that Sully or Colbert could scarcely have mastered its complicated difficulties. It was now unanimously agreed in the Cortes that the prevention of the exportation from Spain of the precious metals, and preserving a proper supply of coin at home, were the sure means to restore industry, credit, and manufactures; but the members differed as to the best mode of attaining this great object. Some thought that the quantity of the silver coinage should be increased, and that the value affixed to it should always be kept on a par with species of the same weight in the surrounding nations. Others were of opinion that it was needless to increase the amount of coin, or tamper with its value, but that its transference from the country should be prevented by withdrawing the license which the Genoese and other Italian States possessed, of carrying away the gold and silver of the realm, in fulfilment of their ancient contracts with the kings of Spain.¹

On the whole Olivarez does not seem to have been al-

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.*

together ignorant of the causes of the decay of Spain ; and it cannot be denied that some of his plans were calculated to improve the situation of his country, and to give a beneficial impulse to its productive industry, had they been persevered in by himself, had his subordinate agents carried them into due effect, and had the nation strenuously co-operated in his schemes. But though there had been an universal clamour for retrenchment, and the reform of abuses, yet when any specific measure was proposed, no one would sacrifice for the benefit of the state even the most distant prospect of gain, or relinquish an accustomed indulgence. Those barriers with which Olivarez attempted to oppose the progress of luxury, yielded to its soft but prevailing influence. The few strangers who settled in Spain on the royal invitation, soon became converts to the manners of the inhabitants ; and if the edicts in favour of matrimony produced in fact any increase of population, the race thus forced into existence grew up as sluggish and inactive as their progenitors,—without enterprise in commerce, skill in art, or industry in agriculture.

The minister naturally became discouraged, by the difficulties of setting his plans of improvement in motion. He perhaps thought, that the attempts he had made, and the exposition of his views, now that he was fairly seated in office, were sufficient to redeem his implied pledge, of rectifying the errors and misgovernment of Lerma. He was also prevented from bestowing continued attention on the internal regulation of the monarchy, by his ambitious and complicated schemes of foreign policy. While condemning the misrule of Lerma in the home department, Olivarez had also denounced the pusillanimity which his predecessor had shown abroad. Lerma, having resolved that the nation should enjoy some repose, after its long struggle with the new Republic of Holland, had

hastened a peace with England on the best conditions he could procure, and had concluded a twelve years' truce with the Dutch, whereby their independence was in the meanwhile secured. These treaties had been extremely unpopular in Spain, and it was alleged that, to this system of tranquilizing Europe the minister had sacrificed the national glory. The high-spirited nobility, and the people in general, were mortified by the concessions granted to the Dutch, and were ready to ascribe the humiliation which the country had sustained, not so much to its own inherent weakness, or to any insurmountable difficulty in the contest itself, as to misconduct and want of energy on the part of the government; and though the nation had proved itself inactive and powerless in arms, its *voice* was still for war.

Availing himself of this popular feeling, Olivarez, who was a skilful framer of state papers, sent forth a sort of manifesto, in which he dissected the foreign policy of Lerma, and exposed its errors to the public. The restoration of the Valteline to the Grisons—the neglect of the national alliances with the Italian and German States—the misgovernment of Naples by the Duke d'Ossuna, who had sown in that kingdom the seeds of discontent and rebellion,—the decline of the colonies, and the marine,—all formed separate subjects of accusation, which were well calculated to foment the odium which already attached to the administration of the Duke of Lerma. This document, in fact, made an incredible impression on the minds of the Spanish people. They looked back with detestation on the late government as the sole cause of the national disgrace, and hailed the commencement of the new administration as an epoch of approaching grandeur and felicity.

Had Olivarez duly reflected on the exhaustion of the kingdom—on the deficiency of finances, and of all the re-

sources necessary for military enterprise, he would have assiduously cultivated those pacific relations with foreign states which were at that time best calculated to promote the interests of his master. But Olivarez was unfortunately destitute of that highest wisdom—a skill in proportioning his views to his strength, and his desires to the means of fulfilling them. His own disposition—his wish to act in all things contrary to the policy of his predecessor, and the predominant feelings of the public at this juncture, conspired to recommend the assumption of a hostile attitude: And it must be confessed, that the situation of Europe at this era presented temptations to the adoption of a warlike policy, and a renewal of the scheme of universal domination, which might have misled a far less ardent and ambitious statesman than Olivarez. The truce with the United Provinces, whose chastisement had ever been a favourite object with the Spanish monarchy, had just expired. In Germany war had already commenced; and though Spain had hitherto engaged in it only as an auxiliary of the Emperor, still the rapid success of Spinola in the Palatinate, and the victories in Bohemia purchased by her treasures, promised, if duly followed up, to retrieve that loss of reputation which she had suffered from her unsuccessful and mortifying contest in the Netherlands. Never since the first period of separation, had the two great branches of the House of Austria been so firmly and cordially united. Elizabeth of England, the anxious guardian of the Protestants, and ally of the Dutch, was now no more. Her successor viewed with an indifferent, or at least with a pacific eye, the affairs of Europe, and though possessed of greatly augmented dominions, he was considered as far less formidable than the late queen. He held in high reverence the grandeur and antiquity of the Spanish monarchy, and he never could regard the Dutch but as re-

bels, whom it was unkingly to aid. The death of Henry IV., so long the jealous observer of the designs of the House of Austria, had dissolved the league formed by him for its humiliation. Herself of a plebeian family, Mary of Medici regarded Spain with the admiring worship of an inferior; and she considered it as a sort of treason against the cause of kings to have compassed its downfall. During her feeble regency, France, distracted by religious dissensions, had lost its weight in the political balance of Europe. The Hugonots aimed at forming an independent republic in the heart of the monarchy. The Queen Mother, the princes of the blood, the parliaments, all wished a share in the government, and were all ready to enter into plots and treaties with foreign princes, in order to promote their views of selfish ambition. The genius of Richelieu had not yet unfolded itself, and Louis XIII., having just escaped from a turbulent minority, still continued to be surrounded by weak and corrupt favourites, who had already squandered the treasures amassed by the economic skill of Sully. Advantageous alliances had been formed with the petty States of Italy, which gave Spain a complete ascendancy in the south of Europe; while Gustavus, the future hero of the North, was still occupied with the Danes, the Muscovites, or the Poles, and mankind were not aware of those elements of greatness and glory which as yet slumbered on Sweden's rocky soil.

Seduced by such flattering prospects, which were more favourable even than those which had presented themselves to the Emperor Charles, or his politic successor, but were more than counterbalanced by the sad declension of Spain, Olivarez resumed the chimerical scheme of universal monarchy, and gave a warlike impulse to the Spanish counsels which pervaded them for nearly half a century. Contemplating, in his ardent imagination, the

future achievements of his country, and beholding in prospect the sway of his royal master extended over the half of Europe, he persuaded the feeble Philip, soon after the commencement of his reign, to assume the title of *Great*, which other monarchs have only gained after a long career of wisdom and glory. Never did prince more completely belie the appellation he had usurped, and which, it is believed, his most obsequious courtiers seldom ventured to bestow.¹

¹ The sarcastic enemies of Olivarez were wont to say, that the king had grown great in the same manner as a pit or ditch, which becomes larger the more ground that is taken from it. (Giannone, *Stor. Civile di Napoli*, lib. xxxvi. c. v.)

CHAPTER II.

EXPEDITION OF CHARLES, PRINCE OF WALES, TO SPAIN.

Youth at the Prow, and Pleasure at the Helm,
Regardless of the Whirlwind's sweeping sway.

GRAY'S *Bard*.

TOWARDS the close of the preceding reign, the Bohemians having resolved to defend their civil and religious privileges against the Emperor Ferdinand's encroachments, had thrown off their allegiance to that potentate, and conferred their crown on the Elector Palatine. They were supported for some time in their revolt by the talents of Henry Count Thorn and the celebrated military adventurer Count Mansveldt, an illegitimate son of that Count Mansveldt whom Philip II. had appointed Governor of the Netherlands after the death of the Duke of Parma. In this conjuncture, Philip III. of Spain had determined to support, with his utmost power, the hereditary rights of the German branch of his family. Spinola, the most celebrated general of the age for skill, enterprise, and activity, had been placed at the head of an army of 30,000 Spaniards and Italians, with which he invaded and overran the Lower Palatinate. The influence and authority of Spain had procured for the Emperor extensive alliances in Germany and Italy, while her treasures enabled him to raise the army which gained the decisive battle of Prague. That important victory restored to him the crown of Bohemia, and drove the Palsgrave

a wretched exile into foreign lands. The Palatinate, his hereditary domain, was bestowed on the Duke of Bavaria, who, during this contest, had been a useful ally of the Emperor; and, throughout the whole of Germany, those who professed the reformed religion experienced all the rigours and severities which were to be anticipated from the vindictive arm of a powerful, bigoted, and unrelenting conqueror.

Such, apparently, was the prosperous situation of the affairs of the House of Austria, and such the distressed condition of the German Protestants, when Philip IV. ascended the throne of Spain. The twelve years' truce, which had been concluded with the United Provinces in the year 1609, expired shortly after his accession. The Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, attempted to renew it; but the States insisted on an unrestrained freedom of commerce to America and India, with an absolute and perpetual acknowledgment of their independence. To the terms proposed by Albert, of which the preliminary article was a recognition of his sovereignty or that of Spain, the States returned a spirited and indignant answer, That they would enter into no conference as to details, except on a footing of complete equality,—that they would never renounce a freedom for which their countrymen had shed their blood,—and that it was an insufferable injury even to suppose for a moment that they were capable of relinquishing their independence.¹

Soon after the failure of this negotiation, the Archduke Albert died. To him the Spanish monarchs had transferred the nominal sovereignty of the revolted provinces, which now remained with his relict the Infanta Isabella, daughter of Philip II. By the Spanish deed of abdication, it had been provided, that in the event of the

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. ii. c. 8.

death of the Archduke and the princess without issue, the claim to the United Provinces should revert to the King of Spain. The demise of Albert without children, and the advanced age of the Infanta, now opened up a near prospect of the succession to Philip IV. It thus became an object of the Spanish counsels, by recovering the Seven Provinces, and again joining them with the districts of the Netherlands which still preserved their allegiance, to restore those valuable dominions to their original integrity. In conformity with the instructions he had received from Madrid, Spinola quitted the Palatinate, which he had so recently conquered, and hastening to the Netherlands, placed himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men destined for the subjugation of Holland. His success was scarcely commensurate to what had been expected from so formidable an army, and so renowned a commander. But he was opposed by Prince Maurice, who at this time governed the United Provinces with almost absolute authority, and who, although somewhat too free in his morals for a chief who combated in behalf of religion, and too ambitious for a patriot who drew his sword in the cause of liberty, had been reputed, since the death of Henry IV., the greatest and most glorious of European warriors. If any could contest with him the pre-eminence, it was the noble Italian who now met him on "the classic land of fortified defence." But Spinola, after some unavailing plans for more important undertakings, was obliged to content himself with laying siege to the town of Juliers, which he invested for seven months before the garrison surrendered on favourable conditions. He then marched to the siege of Bergen-op-zoom, which he was forced to relinquish at the approach of the troops commanded by Mansveldt, after having lost two months and 9000 of his best troops in the unsuccessful enterprise.

In order to secure farther protection against their powerful enemy, the Dutch entered into a strict alliance with France, which, though distracted by civil dissensions, was sufficiently alive to the sense of external danger and the disadvantages she must suffer from the predominance of Spain over the United Provinces.

About the same period, a new confederacy of the Protestant princes in Germany was rapidly formed, and as quickly dissolved by the successful arms of the Emperor. James I. of England, the father-in-law of the unfortunate Elector Palatine, was no great friend to that civil and religious liberty for which the Bohemians had been contending; and a support of his relative in the rash attempt which he made on the crown of Bohemia, was incompatible with his notions of the unalienable right of princes. But when the Elector was despoiled of his hereditary states, James found it more difficult to resist the solicitations of a daughter, and the united voice of his kingdoms, which loudly called for his interposition. His natural timidity and indolence deterred him from undertaking any warlike operations of difficulty or importance. He attempted, however, to open a negotiation for the establishment of peace between the Palatine and the Emperor, and the restoration of the former to his hereditary dominions; but he, at the same time, permitted the Spaniards to levy troops in England for the purpose of recruiting their armies in Germany and Flanders. In fact, though closely bound to the Elector by the ties of affinity, an alliance with the crown of Spain had always been the anxious wish of the British monarch, and his farther interposition would have frustrated that project of a matrimonial union between his son and a daughter of Spain, which he had been long earnestly labouring to accomplish.

The prospect of an alliance with a Spanish princess,

had, it is said, been held out to James himself, previous to his marriage with Anne of Denmark, on condition of his embracing the Roman Catholic faith.¹ However this may be, as far back as the year 1604, his Queen, Anne of Denmark, who was warmly attached to the Spanish interests, had entertained the design of uniting her eldest son Henry to an Infanta. After the death of that promising prince, James manifested an eager desire to conclude a marriage between the Princess Maria, sister of Philip IV., and Charles, now Prince of Wales; and a regular negotiation, with a view towards this object, had commenced in the year 1617. The prospect of an alliance with the first royal family in Europe, gratified the hereditary pride of James, and the promise that an immense dowry should accompany the hand of the princess, rendered the temptation irresistible to the vain and necessitous monarch. Gondomar, who admirably understood all the weak points in his character, was at this time the Spanish ambassador at the court of London. This celebrated diplomatist, was endowed with a clear understanding,—a rich vein of festive humour,—a talent of adroit flattery,—and that apparent frankness of manner which serves as the best disguise to artifice. By means of these qualities, he had gradually acquired such an ascendancy over the mind of James, that the weak monarch made this licensed and dexterous spy the constant companion of his social hours, swallowed his adulation with avidity, and listened, with a fond credulity, to his assurances of the anxious desire of the Spanish court to bestow the hand of the Infanta, with an enormous portion, on the Prince of Wales.

All the negotiations of the court of Madrid were dilatory; and, after five years' discussion, the treaty of mar-

¹ *Hispanicæ Dominationis Arcana*, c. vii. sect. 10.

riage was no farther advanced than at its commencement. To have broken it off at the present crisis, would have been peculiarly impolitic in Spain, as its prolongation formed a check on England's interference in the affairs of the Palatinate ; but James had not sufficient penetration to discover whether the difficulties, which from time to time occurred, were real or feigned. Pretences were easily devised by the Spanish ministry for lengthening out the negotiation. The union of a Catholic princess with a Protestant prince, required that due care should be taken to secure the former in the free exercise of her religion. A preliminary article connected with this important topic—that the Pope's dispensation should be obtained previously to the nuptials—afforded the King of Spain an opportunity of deferring the conclusion of the treaty to an indefinite period, or breaking it off entirely, through his influence at the Vatican, as soon as he found its rupture suitable to his interests. But no delays however unnecessary, no demands however unreasonable, could deter the King of England from the prosecution of this darling object.

The advantages of the Spanish match were viewed in a very different light by James's subjects, to whom it had always been extremely unpalatable. It was believed that the king, allured by the prospect of this alliance, had brought the unfortunate Raleigh to the block, being urged to this severity by the clamours of the Spanish minister, against whose countrymen that enterprising genius had carried on such mischievous hostilities. The nation at large was eager to enter on a war for the restoration of the expelled Elector Palatine, and the defence of their Protestant brethren in Germany against the persecutions of the Catholics. Catching the general spirit of the country, the members of the House of Commons, framed a remonstrance, which was chiefly directed against

the proposed alliance with Spain. They represented to their king, that the enormous growth of the Austrian power was dangerous to the liberties of Europe, and they implored him instantly to take arms in defence of the Elector Palatine. They placed before his view the expectations excited among the Catholic recusants on account of the intended match, and they recommended that, in order to frustrate all their future hopes of the re-establishment of Popery, the heir to the monarchy should be timely united to a princess of his own religious persuasion. James, though somewhat disconcerted by this representation, persevered in his pacific, and what he considered his profound scheme of procuring the restoration of the Palatine, through his favour and alliance with the King of Spain; and he anticipated, that if this popular object were accomplished by means of the Spanish match, its attainment would go far to reconcile the nation to the Prince's union with the Infanta. The king, intoxicated with his own deep wisdom and consummate policy, was indignant at the superficial remonstrance of the Commons. In his gracious reply, he admonished the House not to interfere in those measures of government which were beyond the reach of its capacity, and especially, on no account, to touch on the delicate subject of the union between the Prince of Wales and a Daughter of Spain.

So little effect, indeed, had the interposition of the faithful Commons on the proceedings of his Majesty, that he shortly afterwards despatched an emissary to Rome, with instructions to forward the affair of the dispensation; and he at the same time addressed letters, both to the King of Spain, and his minister Balthazar de Zuniga, soliciting the fulfilment of the nuptial treaty.¹ He also commanded Lord Digby, now created Earl of Bris-

¹ Rushworth, p. 57.

tol, and appointed ambassador at Madrid, to adopt in Spain every measure which could facilitate his favourite object; while he himself undertook, in his own kingdom, by relaxing the severity of the laws against Popish recusants, to propitiate Philip and his advisers.

For this negotiation Bristol was peculiarly fitted, both by his long experience of the Court of Madrid (where he had been envoy on two former occasions), and by his personal character. He was diligent, patient, and wary,—reserved in his temper, of a commanding aspect, and a gravity of mien which no Spanish grandee could surpass. He laboured in the difficult task which was intrusted to him with distinguished courage, fidelity, and skill, and on his part at least, nothing was wanting to bring this protracted negotiation to a successful issue.

It appears, however, that at the period of Bristol's appointment, and for some time after his arrival at Madrid, the Court of Spain had no serious intentions of ever conducting this matrimonial treaty to a conclusion. In a letter of instructions from Philip IV. to his prime minister Olivarez, dated 5th November 1622, he writes: "The king, my father, declared at his death, that it never was his intention to marry my sister, the Infanta Donna Maria, to the Prince of Wales, which your uncle Don Balthazar de Zuniga understood; and so ever treated this match with intention to delay it: However, it is now so far advanced, that, considering the aversion felt to it by the Infanta, it is time to devise some means to elude the treaty, which I would have you find out, and I will make it good whatsoever it be. But in all other things, procure the satisfaction of the King of Great Britain, (who hath deserved much), and it shall content me, so that it be not in the match."¹

¹ Rushworth, vol. i. p. 71. Rapin, vol. ix. p. 526. Siri, *Memoirie Recondite*, t. iv.

In a short time, however, after the date of this royal letter, the Spanish court having received assurances unexpectedly favourable on the article of religion, began to take the proposed marriage into serious consideration. Bristol, who was a discerning minister, now became convinced of their sincerity. He assured his master, that he might depend on the Palatinate being ultimately restored from mere motives of friendship and family alliance, without the necessity of having recourse to arms; and he farther acquainted him (which was still more agreeable to the indigent monarch), that a dowry, amounting to about L. 500,000, would accompany the royal bride, whom he represents in all his despatches as amiable and highly accomplished.

Buckingham, who was at this time the unrivalled favourite of James, being unwilling that Bristol, with whom he had been long at enmity, should have the sole merit of effecting an object which he knew to be the ruling wish of his master,¹ suggested to Prince Charles the idea of visiting Spain in person, that he might recommend himself by a journey so conformable to Spanish notions of gallantry, and might at the same time have an opportunity to judge of the merits, and gain the affections, of the future partner of his throne, to whom he would thus be introduced in the agreeable character of a bold adventurer, and devoted lover.² This scheme is said to have been first suggested by a few words which dropped from Olivarez, though that minister probably did not expect that the hint would be acted on:—Towards the close of the year 1622, Endymion Porter having been sent to Madrid as a special envoy, to complain of delays and insincere dealing, the Spanish minister, among other complimentary professions, expressed a wish that the prince

¹ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, book i.

² Ibid.

himself were at Madrid, to see with his own eyes how willing was the King of Spain to embrace his amity and knit with him the closest bonds of alliance. These expressions having been reported to the English favourite, were eagerly seized, it is alleged, as a motive and incentive to the Spanish expedition.¹ However this may be, the romantic suggestion of Buckingham, though far from the line of court or diplomatic precedent, was well adapted to the sentimental and chivalrous disposition of the Prince, who was no doubt feelingly alive to the unhappy domestic lot of kings, so often compelled to receive, as the future partners of their existence, princesses unknown and unbeloved. The arguments of Buckingham, who by this time had gained a great ascendancy over his mind, made a deep impression on the Prince, and he conveyed to his royal father the recent suggestions of their mutual favourite.² James himself, before his accession to the English crown, learning that his destined queen, Anne of Denmark, was detained by adverse winds in Norway, set sail, with an unwonted spirit of gallantry, for the Danish dominions, and brought home his bride in triumph to the coast of Scotland. The remembrance of this successful adventure of his youth, may perhaps have induced him to listen the more readily to the Prince and Buckingham's plan for hastening the conclusion of the matrimonial treaty, by sending his son in person to the court of Spain. He at first complied with little hesitation; but he had scarcely granted his consent, when he began to feel the utmost uneasiness, from reflecting on the hazards to which the heir to his crown would be exposed, and the probable unpopularity of the measure in England. When the Prince and Buckingham, however, again waited on him, to demand their credentials and despatches, he had not suffi-

¹ Aikin's *Court of James I.*

² Clarendon's *Hist.* book i.

cient strength of mind to resist their importunities and upbraidings.¹

Charles, accordingly, and Buckingham, set out secretly, and in disguise, under the false names of John and Thomas Smith,² accompanied only by Sir Richard Graham, who was Buckingham's master of the horse. They were joined, on their journey, by Sir Francis Cottington, who had been at one time British envoy at Madrid, and by Endymion Porter, who had been bred up and spent a great part of his life in Spain. On his way to Madrid, the English Prince passed undiscovered through France, and at Paris ventured to a masque, where he first saw, and as some writers suspect, became fascinated by the lustre of the dark and radiant eyes of his future queen, Henrietta³, who during his whole reign preserved, amid all their quarrels, such a dangerous ascendancy over his affections. It thus seems highly probable, that on his arrival at Madrid, to pay his addresses to the Infanta, his mind was already pre-occupied with the image of another; and it is well known that the Spanish princess had repeatedly declared, she would rather retire to a convent, or even suffer death, than espouse a heretic.⁴

¹ Clarendon, *Hist.* b. i.

² Rapin, vol. ix. p. 534.

³ *Memoires de Brienne*. Waller, too, in his complimentary poems, frequently alludes to this sudden love of Charles, which at least shows the prevalent belief. See his *Epistle to the Queen on sight of her Majesty's picture*, and his poem *On the Danger his Majesty (being Prince) escaped at St Andero*. In France, it was even currently reported, that the Prince had been seen and discovered by Henrietta, who was so struck with his good mien, that she pleasantly said, "qu'il auroit pû trouver une femme en France, sans la chercher si loin." (*Le Véritable Pere Joseph*, t. i. p. 272. ed. 1750.)

⁴ Letter of Olivarez to King of Spain, 8th November 1622. ap. Rushworth, vol. i. p. 71.

After a fortnight's journey, the Prince and Buckingham arrived at Madrid on Friday the 7th of March. They alighted in the evening at the hotel of the Earl of Bristol, to the utter astonishment of that ambassador. Tom Smith (Buckingham) went in first, and began a story concerning a servant of the Earl's, whom he had met on the way, and who, he said, had been robbed. He was speedily, however, recognised by one of the gentlemen of the embassy ; and Charles, who had remained on the street with the postilion, was immediately ushered in,¹ and received with all possible demonstrations of respect. Bristol, however, was deeply mortified by this unexpected visit. He, in all likelihood, penetrated into Buckingham's secret motives for the journey ; and he at once foresaw its evil consequences, both as it testified too great an eagerness for the match, and afforded the Spaniards such an advantage over the Prince as would induce them to rise in their demands.²

On the following morning, Bristol notified this important arrival to Gondomar, who had now been recalled from his embassy at London. Gondomar gave intimation to Olivarez, and he again to the king, who would scarcely credit the intelligence.³ In the afternoon, Buckingham and Olivarez had an interview by appointment, on the Prado, and held a conversation, which lasted nearly an hour and a half, concerning the object of the journey. The Spanish minister then introduced Buckingham by a back way into the private apartments of the king, who expressed the most lively joy at the Prince's arrival, and

¹ Letter, Earl of Bristol to King James, ap. *Memorials and Letters relating to Hist. of Britain in Reign of James I.* edited by Lord Hailes, 2d ed. p. 151-52.

² Brodie's *Hist. of British Empire from Accession of Charles I. to the Restoration*, vol. ii. c. 1.

³ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 4.

comported himself with such apparent alacrity and frankness, that Bristol declares he had never before seen the Spanish gravity so completely laid aside.¹ Olivarez next flew to welcome the illustrious guest in name of his master, and to testify his sense of the honour which was conferred on him. That evening the Prince having signified his wish to see the Infanta, a party was formed for the following day, and it was arranged that the royal pair should meet in their coaches on the Prado. The King accordingly went out in public, accompanied by the Queen, his brothers, and the Infanta, who was then in the first bloom of youth, being a year younger than Philip. "She is," says Howel, "a very comely lady, rather of a Flemish complexion than Spanish, fair-haired, and carrying a most pure mixture of red and white in her face. She is full and big-lipped, which is held a beauty rather than a blemish."² The Spanish royal party thrice met the carriage of the Prince, who was driving with his suite in the Prado,—the Infanta wearing a blue ribbon on her arm to distinguish her.³ Etiquette did not permit the King to take notice of Charles at that time, and he merely raised his cap in passing, as if to salute the English ambassador. After returning from the Prado, a contest of courtesy arose between the King and Prince as to who should pay the first visit of ceremony, and it was in the end resolved that they should meet late at night on the Prado. Having repaired to the spot privately, the Prince went into the King's coach, and conversed with him for half an hour,—Bristol acting as interpreter.⁴ Assurances were given to Charles at this interview, that on the following day all matters should be arranged concerning the manner in

¹ *Memorials and Letters, &c.*

² *Letters.*

³ Howel's *Familiar Letters*.

⁴ *Ibid.* The accounts of the time differ somewhat as to the circumstances attendant on the Prince's reception.

which he was to be publicly received and entertained ; and, in the mean while, he was amused with hunting and hawking parties, as also pleasure excursions to the Casa del Campo, a royal residence in the neighbourhood of Madrid.¹

A few days after the Prince's interview with the King, the time having arrived which had been fixed for Charles's ceremonial entrance into Madrid, he was conducted to the royal convent of St Jerome by four ministers of state, who attended, according to Spanish custom, at a magnificent repast which had been there provided for him. He was also visited by the members of the different tribunals and councils, and by the corregidores of Madrid. The King then arrived in his coach, and the Prince went down to meet him in the court in front of the convent. They mounted two state horses, richly caparisoned, which had been led there for the ceremony, and after profound obeisances and courtesies, the Prince being placed on the right of the King, they commenced their progress. Surrounded by all the grandees of Castile, and greeted by the acclamations of the multitude, they proceeded under a rich canopy, which was borne up by the corregidores of the city walking in procession, till they reached the royal palace.² There the Prince visited the Queen and the Infanta. Four chairs of equal size were placed under a canopy for the King, the Queen, the Infanta, and the Prince. The Queen commenced the conversation, which was carried on for half an hour, in a manner the most spirited and agreeable, Bristol, as usual, being the interpreter.³ Immediately after this interview, Charles was conducted by the two Infants to the apartments which had been allotted him in

¹ *Relation and Journal of Manner of Arrival of Prince of Wales*, in Somers *Tracts*, t. ii.

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 4.

³ Flores, *Reynas d'España*, t. ii. p. 925.

the royal palace.¹ As soon as he had retired to them, the Queen sent him presents of many costly articles,—an ewer of massive gold,—a night-gown curiously embroidered,—a desk, of which each drawer contained the most precious rarities,—and two large chests, secured by bands and nails of gold, and filled with fine linen and rich perfumes.²

Philip and Charles were at this period both in early youth, and there was a remarkable similarity between them in tastes and dispositions. Both were fascinated with a love of the fine arts—both chose to resign themselves to the dominion of favourites, and both were of a reserved and grave demeanour, though in Charles this was the result of natural temperament, and in Philip it was assumed, that he might appear dignified and majestic. From the time of the Prince's first reception in the palace, no demonstration was omitted by the King of Spain which could testify his personal regard for his royal guest, and his gratitude for the confidence which had been reposed in him. The Infanta, indeed, from points of Spanish etiquette, was only seen by her princely suitor in presence of the king, or in public, particularly at the theatre. "There are comedians," says Howel, "who come once a week to the palace, where, under a great canopy, the Queen and the Infanta sit in the middle, our Prince and Don Carlos on the Queen's right hand, the Queen and the little Cardinal on the Infanta's left hand. I have seen the Prince have his eyes immoveably fixed on the Infanta half an hour together, in a thoughtful speculative posture, which sure would needs be tedious, unless affection did sweeten it."³ But though the Prince was thus precluded from private interviews with his intended

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 4.

² Frankland's *Annals of James I. and Charles I.* p. 75.

³ *Letters*, part i. let. 71.

bride, the most studied civilities evinced her brother's respect, and announced the affinity which was expected to exist between them. The King presented Charles with a golden master-key to the private royal apartments, that he might have access to his presence whenever he chose, without the ceremony of introduction. On every occasion Philip placed himself on the Prince's left hand, except when he entered the apartments assigned to Charles, for there he said his guest was at home. All the prisons were thrown open, and their inmates set at liberty, as if an event the most fortunate and honourable for the monarchy had occurred. The nobility of Aragon were ordered to come and give their attendance at court to increase its splendour and lustre.¹ The Council of Castile received orders to obey Charles as the King himself; and the proud Olivarez would not put on his hat in the Prince's presence, though, as a grandee of Spain, he had the privilege of remaining covered before his own sovereign.²

Every sumptuary law, with regard to entertainments and apparel, was also suspended during Charles's abode at Madrid. Philip IV. was the most magnificent and courteous monarch who had ever sat on the Spanish throne, and his royal guest, even when farther advanced in life, and involved in political perplexities, was fond of magnificent spectacles and tasteful banquets. The whole time of his residence in Spain was spent in a ceaseless round of amusements. Bull-fights, feasts, and tournaments, followed in quick succession at Madrid. Charles, on one occasion, ran at the ring, and in the first course bore away the prize, in presence of his mistress. The entertainments of the capital were also at intervals diversi-

¹ *Relation and Journal*, &c. ap. Somers *Tracts*.

² Rushworth, vol. i. p. 77. Hume's *History of England*.

fied by every variety of rural recreation at the royal palace of Aranjuez, and the hunting-seat of the Pardo.¹

¹ Bristol's Journal, transmitted to Secretary Conway, gives us a sufficient idea of the manner in which Prince Charles passed his time at Madrid. "The 27th of March was the first day of a Parliament, held here in the King's Palace, at the which he himself was present, in the morning: and after dinner he ran down to his Highness, and took him up into his own lodgings, where they spent part of that afternoon in conversation, and beholding divers masters of defence, who played at several weapons before them.

"The next day being Friday, in the morning the Prince was troubled with the toothache, but causing the tooth to be drawn, he found present ease, and the rest of the morning he spent at his study. After dinner he exercised himself a while in a garden, adjoining to his lodgings; and about four or five of the clock, he was, by the Count of Olivarez, conducted to a window in the palace, where he saw divers fencers play; and from thence he went to the King's armoury, where, amongst many others which were both rich and curious, he saw the arms of the Emperor Charles V. and Francis I. of France.

"The 29th of this month was the King's birth-day, which caused much bravery and gallantry in the court, and in the morning his Highness sent me to the king, to give him the *En hora buena*, as likewise to the Queen and to the Infanta, to congratulate with them (as is the style of this court) that the King did on this day complete 18 years. This day my Lord Marquis had his first audience of the Infanta, who received him, and those that went with him, with much courtesy. In the evening the King having with him the Queen, the Infanta Don Carlos, and the Infante Cardinal, and attended on by the whole court, went in a solemn manner to visit a monastery of the Descalsas, in which liveth the Infanta Donna Margarita, daughter to the Emperor Maximilian, and great aunt to this king; and his Highness went privately in a coach, in which were with him my Lord Marquis, my Lord of Carlisle, Sir Walter Aston, myself, and the Count of Monterey; by whom he was conducted in such manner at their going thither and returning, they saw them pass by in four several places.

"The next day being Palm Sunday, the King and all the court passed through some parts of the palace in a solemn and public

It was customary in Madrid, on the 1st of May, a day consecrated to St James, the tutelar saint of the kingdom, for all the citizens to resort to a spot, beyond the gate of

procession, the which his Highness likewise beheld from a secret place. In the afternoon the King and the Prince met to see the fencing again, with which they entertained themselves some time. And this day the Prince gave L. 1000, which he commanded to be bestowed, in the Holy Week, in alms upon prisoners, and other poor people of this town, which hath been much esteemed here, and done his Highness much honour with all sorts of people.

“ On Monday the Genoa ambassador, with all the *hombres de negocios* of that state, which were in this town, came and kissed his Highness's hands. The rest of the day he spent in reading of Spanish and in private. Upon the 1st of April, the Prince, having with him my Lord Marquis, my Lord of Carlisle, myself, and the rest of the English noblemen that are here, went abroad towards the Pardo to see my hawks fly, where was present likewise the Marquis of Orane, brother to the Duke of Pastrana, whose place of Halconero mayor he supplieth during his absence, and had with him all the king's hawks, which are made especially for the kite and the swan. But the day proving for the most part windy, and unfit to hawk in, his Highness went to hunt, at which he had much good sport, and killed two wild boars. In the evening, as he returned, he was met upon the way by the Count of Olivarez and the Count of Monterey, who waited on him to the palace, where, as soon as he lighted, he found Peter Killegrew newly come to this town, by whom I received your letters of the 9th of March.

“ The next day being Wednesday in the Holy Week, the public and solemn exercises of devotion began, and the procession and disciplinants, which every year do usually pass through the streets, passed likewise, as their custom is, close by the palace, so that the Prince beheld them out of his own chamber-window. That day his Highness stirred not abroad, but about the evening he was visited by the Count of Olivarez from the King.

“ On Thursday his Highness went privately, and saw the King wash the feet of the poor, and perform other ceremonies usually done on that day; and in the afternoon there passed by his Highness's window a greater procession than had done the day before.

“ Good Friday was spent by this King in hearing sermons and

Toledo, called El Sotillo. There, with their friends, their wives, or their mistresses, they basked themselves in the sun, on the margin of the Mançanares, playing on

in devotion, and towards the evening, when the great procession was to pass by, the Count of Olivarez, the Count of Monterey, and others of the Council of State, came to the Prince's lodgings, and attended him all the time it was passing by, and afterwards his Highness went down to walk in the garden. Saturday the Prince spent all the morning in private at his studies; and in the afternoon his Highness desiring to give unto the King the *buenas Pascuas*, as the use is here, he could not be permitted. But towards the evening, the King, accompanied with Don Carlos and the Infanta Cardinal, came down into the Prince's lodgings, and gave him the *buenas Pascuas*, where they sat and discoursed a good while.

“ The next day being Easter-day, in the morning the Prince sent to desire leave to repay the visit, and the *buenas Pascuas* he had received the day before; and was accordingly appointed, about four o'clock in the afternoon, to be brought up by a private way into the King, with whom, when he had been a short space and performed that compliment, he intimated a desire to do the like to the Queen, and was presently conducted by the King, who accompanied him publicly, attended by all the grandees and great ministers of the court, from his own side to the square, which is on the other side of the palace, and there he found the Queen and the Infanta together, attended by all the ladies of the court. This being the first time that his Highness had personally visited the Infanta, there were four chairs set; in the two middlemost sat the Queen and the Infanta; on the right hand of the Queen sat the Prince, and on the left hand of them all sat the King. When the Prince had given the Queen the *buenas Pascuas*, and passed some other compliments of gratitude for the favours he had received from her since his coming to this court, in which it pleased his Highness to call me to do him service as interpreter, he rose out of his chair and went towards the Infanta, who likewise rose up to entertain him, and after fitting courtesies on both sides performed, the Prince told her that the great friendship which was betwixt his Catholic Majesty and the king his father, had brought him to this court to make a personal acknowledgment thereof, and to assure, for his part, the desire he had to continue and increase the same, and that he was

the guitar or harp, and partaking of some frugal fare. Hither many of the higher classes also frequently repaired, and, in celebration of the festival, joined the national amusements and dances. To this scene the King carried the Prince, on a pleasure party, in his coach, along with the Infants his brothers, Buckingham, Olivarez, and the Duke d'Infantado. They alighted at a grove near the banks of the stream, and viewed, for some time, the happy concourse of people who had assembled at this festival. Charles was much amused and delighted with the sight very glad of this occasion to kiss her Highness's hands, and to offer her his services. To which the Infanta answered, that she did highly esteem what the Prince had said unto her. His Highness then told her that he had been troubled to understand that of late she had not had perfect health, and asked her how she had passed the Lent, and how she now did; whereunto the Infanta answered, *Que Quedava buena, a servicio de su Altezza*. The Prince then retired himself to his chair, and sat down again by the Queen, with whom he passed some short compliments, and so they all rose and with much courtesy took their leaves. And I do assure you that in all things the Prince his comportment was so natural and suitable to his quality and greatness, that he hath given instant cause to the Spaniards to admire him, as I find they generally do. From hence he was conducted by the King in the same equipage that he had come thither, unto the King's side, where, when the King had entertained his Highness a while, with beholding from a window of certain masters and gentlemen that exercised fencing before them, the King had him to another window, which looketh upon a large place before the court-gate, and telling the Prince that he would only go and see the Queen, took his brother Don Carlos with him, and left the Infante Cardinal with the Prince, expecting his return. But before much time had passed, there appeared about threescore of the principal nobility of the kingdom, in the gallery before the window, who were very richly apparelled with embroideries, and being on horseback, came two and two together their several careers. They had all their faces discovered, save only the king and Don Carlos, the Count of Olivarez, and the Marquis of Carpio, who had vizards."—(MSS. Advocates' Library.)

of the immense multitude—the infinite variety of dresses—the graceful active youths—the confused but beautiful assemblage of handsome dark-eyed *Donnas*. In the afternoon a comedy was represented. The Prince and Buckingham eat in public, clothed in rich silk vestments, embroidered with the sign of the cross. The evening then concluded with bull-fights, and other national sports and pastimes.¹

These details may perhaps appear idle and uninteresting: but brief was Charles's holiday of life; and we have been so accustomed to contemplate that unfortunate monarch in difficulties, affliction, and martyrdom, that we feel as it were a certain sympathy and satisfaction, while thus viewing him in the gaiety and frivolity of youth.

Amid the diversified exhibitions, however, with which the English prince was successively entertained, the King of Spain and his ministers had deeper views than the temporary amusement of their guest. They saw the bent of his inclinations, and it was their object gradually to affect him by the showy and imposing ceremonies of the Catholic faith. The day of *Corpus Christi*, which fell this year on the 15th of June, is the only one in which the consecrated host is exposed about the streets to the gaze of the adoring multitude. The festival, which was ever held with much pomp in Spain, was this season celebrated with all the lustre which the church and monarchy could command. On this solemn occasion, the exterior of almost every house in Madrid was hung with tapestry, and splendid altars were erected on the streets, with canopies suspended over them. The King having heard mass in his private chapel, advanced with his grantees and courtiers in solemn procession. The long array was preceded by drums and trumpets, the tapers of the church, and banners of the kingdom. Then came the

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 6.

orphans and charity children, with green boughs in their hands, and garlands on their brows. Next followed the monks of various religious institutions, and the members of the National Hospital, bearing golden reliquaries. Behind them appeared the knights of the three military orders of St Jago, Calatrava, and Alcantara, with white caps on their heads; and at a short distance, the Eucharist was borne in a golden casket. It was surrounded by the chief inquisitors of the holy office, by twenty-five priests carrying pans of incense, and by the royal chaplains with caps of silk and gold. Close to these walked the King in royal attire, holding in one hand a white flambeau, and near him the infant Carlos. The long train was closed by the resident ambassadors from foreign states and the royal guards. This procession set out from the convent of Santa Maria at eight in the morning, and did not return till two in the afternoon. Charles stood at a balcony with the Queen and Infanta, and the King saluted them as he passed in the course of his progress.¹ During his long residence in Spain, Charles saw not the pale repining nun, or the cells of the Inquisition: he beheld only the magnificent architecture, the appropriate paintings, and the splendid pageantry of "a gay religion full of pomp and gold." And it is not impossible that the display of these gorgeous and imposing celebrations may have prepared the mind of the future King of England for the influence of a Roman Catholic Queen and a stately hierarchy. "I am confident," says the Earl of Carlisle, in a letter to King James, who had sent him at this time to Madrid, "I am confident, that when it shall please God to restore his Highness again into England, he will declare to have made so great good use of the experience of this journey, that shall give no less cause of rejoicing to them that were most tenderly affected, than

¹ Cespedes, lib. iv. c. 10.

they shewed to have before of apprehension. In the mean time, I dare boldly assure your Majesty, that his well grounded piety, and knowledge of the religion wherein he was bred, is infinitely confirmed and corroborated by the spectacles which he hath seen of their devotions here."¹

While Charles and the Court of Madrid were apparently engrossed with these exhibitions or amusements, the intrigues and discussions concerning the matrimonial alliance still continued. It seems probable, that, by this time, the Spanish ministry perceiving the extreme anxiety of the king of England for the match between his son and the Infanta, and observing that he was ready to accede to whatever terms might be insisted on as preliminaries to its accomplishment, at length seriously began to contemplate the fulfilment of a project which had long been a mere delusion. The whole Spanish nation was fully convinced that the motive of the prince's journey to Madrid, was to abjure the Protestant and embrace the Catholic religion, previous to his marriage with the Infanta;² and they entertained a belief, in which they were in some degree sanctioned by English history, that the faith of the monarch would soon become that of his people. The King of Spain, in a letter addressed to the Cardinal Infant, Archbishop of Toledo, enjoined the prelates of the realm to offer up prayers to heaven for success to the object of the Prince's journey.³ The Spanish ecclesiastics, uniting with the Popish refugees of

¹ *Memorials and Letters*, &c. p. 158.

² Letter from Spain concerning the Prince's arrival; ap. *Cabala*, p. 14, ed. 1654. It would appear from this collection, that Bristol would not have been disinclined to the conversion of the Prince, or even of the King of England himself, (p. 17.)

³ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 4.

England, took every opportunity to engage him in polemical controversy.¹ Padre Rohose, the Infanta's confessor, gave him the most diligent attendance, and, for the space of two or three months, never failed to wait on him while he was at dinner. At length the confessor proposed to the Prince that a disputation should be held in public between the English chaplains of his Royal Highness and the Spanish priests, which he affirmed would be particularly agreeable to the Infanta. Charles replied, that he had not come to Spain to be converted by public argumentation, but he was willing to hear from him at once, and in private, all the objections which could be stated against the religion he professed. But before listening to them, he desired to be allowed to give an account of his own faith, and the tenets by which he held. When he had concluded, Rohose said,—Sir, do you believe all this, and will your Highness give me leave to affirm to others that you so believe? Yes, replied the Prince, do it boldly, for it is the religion in which I was born and bred,—the religion professed in my father's kingdoms, and wherein, by the grace of God, I am resolved to live and die. Then, said Rohose, for ought I see, you may be saved as well as I. The disputation here dropped, and the Prince wondering, some time after, that he saw no more of the confessor, it was whispered in his ear that he had been forbidden his presence, lest, instead of persuading the Prince, the Prince should convince him.²

At the same time that these endeavours were used in Spain to convert Charles to the Roman Catholic religion, the Duke of Pastrana was sent ambassador from Spain to Rome, and by him the Pope was inspired with hopes

¹ Rapin, vol. ix. p. 535.

² This was told by Charles himself to Henry Carey, Earl of Monmouth, who relates it in a note to his translation of Capriata's *Guerre d'Italia*, book vii. p. 246.

of restoring the Catholic faith in England, or, at least, of obtaining advantages for those who still adhered to it. His Holiness had already written to the Inquisitor-General of Spain, intimating "his desire that the Prince of Wales should not stay *in vain* in the courts of those kings to whom the defence of the Pope's authority and care of advancing religion, hath procured the renowned name of Catholic;"¹ but he now addressed to the Prince himself a long epistle, exhorting him to embrace the religion of his ancestors,² and expressing his expectation, that as he "intended to match with a Catholic damsel, the ancient seed of Christian piety, which had so happily flourished in the mind of British kings, would reverberate in his breast." Poor Charles, who appears to have been an early proficient in hypocrisy, returned an answer, dated 20th June, which, though of studied ambiguity, was, it must be confessed, but little calculated to repress the hopes entertained in the south of Europe of his conversion to the Catholic faith. He deeply deplores the unhappy divisions which existed in the Christian world, and expresses his anxious wish to restore peace and union; and, with regard to the match with the Infanta, he declares that he could never so vehemently desire to be united in a strict and indissoluble bond with any mortal whose religion he would persecute. This letter was addressed to Gregory XV., who died before it reached Italy; and, however the epistle may have been intended, it appears from the reply of Urban VIII. (Gregory's successor), that it was considered at Rome as equivalent to a recantation of the Prince's religious errors. "The first letters," he writes, "which were delivered to us after we were preferred to the throne of the Apostleship, were those which you sent out of Spain to Gregory

¹ *Scrinia Sacra*, p. 210.² Rushworth, vol. i.

XV., of famous memory. We lifted up our hands to heaven, and gave thanks to the Father of Mercies, when, in the very entry of our reign, a British prince began to perform this kind of obeisance to the Pope of Rome.”¹

Both the Supreme Pontiff and the Spanish court seem to have been resolved (while Charles was treated with all apparent courtesy) to seize, as Bristol had foreseen, every advantage which his arrival at Madrid afforded them. When the late Pope Gregory's dispensation, which, at least on the Spanish side, was an essential preliminary to the marriage, at length arrived, it was arranged, between the Spanish ministry and the Pope's nuncio at Madrid, that it should not be delivered by him till an acquiescence was obtained from the King of England in terms still more favourable to the Infanta's exercise of the Catholic religion and the education of her future children, than those which had been formerly provided. The original conditions of the matrimonial treaty were, that the marriage should be celebrated in Spain and ratified in England, and that the Infanta and all the attendants brought with her from her own country, should enjoy the free and public exercise of their religion. The articles, however, were now modelled anew, and extended to the number of twenty-three, wherein it was provided, that the Infanta should have an oratory or chapel in her palace, in which mass might be celebrated,—that the nurses of the offspring of the marriage should be chosen by the Infanta, and that the children should be brought up by her till they were at least ten years of age; and though they prove to be Catholics, should not lose the right of succession to the throne of Britain,—and, finally, that the King of England should give security for the fulfilment of these stipulations. These new articles having been transmitted to England, were all ratified by James; and the only point concerning

¹ Rushworth, vol. i. p. 98. and 99.

which he stickled, was conferring on the Pope (while taking an oath to observe the articles) the appellation of Holiness or Holy Father, as he himself had written a learned treatise against that title.¹ In addition to the public treaty, some private concessions were also granted by the King of England. He undertook to suspend the penal laws enacted against Roman Catholics, till he should ultimately procure a repeal of them in Parliament; he farther promised to grant a toleration for the exercise of the Catholic religion in private families, and he engaged that no attempts, public or private, should be made to persuade the Infanta to abjure her creed.

James, conceiving that he had now made sufficient sacrifices to Popish prejudices, despatched a vessel to Spain, loaded with presents for the Infanta, and destined to convey the royal pair to the shores of England. At London the treaty was generally considered as concluded,²

¹ Rapin, vol. ix. p. 547.—When the wise Sully was sent as ambassador extraordinary to England by Henry the Great, the first question put to him by James, at his audience of introduction, was, whether he had ever yet addressed the Pope by the appellation of Holy Father.

² In order to recommend the Spanish match in England, various publications were circulated, particularly that compiled by Michel du Val, entitled the *Spanish English Rose, or the English Spanish Pomegranate*, which was embellished by a frontispiece, containing portraits of Charles and the Infanta. Several pamphlets were also written on the other side, in dissuasion of the match, as Scot's *Vox populi*,—Allured's *Letter*,—many zealous sermons, and, some time after, the *Vox Cæli, or News from Heaven, of a Consultation held by Henry VIII., Edward and Mary, Elizabeth, &c. wherein Spain's ambition and treacheries are unmasked, particularly towards England, and now more especially under the pretended match of the Prince with the Infanta*. (Written by S. R. N. I.) It is said in this tract, that the King of Spain had advised Charles to make war on the Protestants as soon as he succeeded to the crown, and had offered him an army to aid in exterminating them. The author of the *Vox Cæli* does

and festivals in honour of the approaching union were held at Madrid on the 21st of August. The King and Prince went in parade along the streets, attended by guards in the royal livery, which was pearl-coloured satin striped with silver, black fringes, and silver-plated caps with red and black feathers. The stud of royal horses appeared in the procession, followed by thirty-two palfreys of the Admiral of Castile,—his livery black and gold; forty-two belonging to the Marques of Castel-Rodrigo, with grooms in green and silver; and twenty-four of the town of Madrid. This pageant having passed through the great square, which was covered with cloths of the most costly fabric, the king proceeded to the palace of the Countess of Miranda, where it had been arranged that he should equip himself, before running a course at the ring, and engaging in the cane plays called *Juego de Cannas*. To honour his reception, the saloons of this residence were beautifully fitted up with white damask, and the halls were cooled, and at the same time perfumed, by odoriferous streams poured from crystal vases. On his entrance the king was received at the principal staircase, by the hostess and the Marchioness of Flores d'Avila. He partook of a collation which had been provided for him, consisting of all manner of conserves, dried suckets, and rose-sugar confections of eight different sorts.¹ His Majesty then prepared himself for the course, and having proceeded to the appointed place, he ran at the ring with his favourite Olivarez, and was not call in question the *sincerity* of the Court of Madrid in the proposed match. On the contrary, it is maintained that they were most zealous to accomplish it, in order to extirpate the Protestant Heretics, and reduce England to the condition of a province of Spain.

¹ *Relation of the Juego de Cannas made by the King of Spain.* Ap. Somers's *Tracts*, t. ii.

followed in this amusement by the bands of grandees and courtiers.¹

This public display was considered by the citizens of Madrid as an announcement of the approaching nuptials, and as a prelude to the ceremonies which would take place at their celebration. But at this critical moment the Pope's nuncio refused to deliver up the dispensation which had been transmitted to him by the late Pope Gregory, till it should receive the ratification of his successor Urban VIII. And though a day for the performance of the marriage-ceremony had been actually fixed, that crafty pontiff delayed any renewal of the dispensation, in the hope that, during the prince's protracted residence in Spain, some expedient might be devised for his complete conversion. The intricate negotiations concerning the restitution of the Palatinate, also tended to impede the conclusion of the alliance, as the demands of the Spanish Court alternately rose or fell according to the aspect of intelligence from the seat of war in Germany, and at the same time, the secret intrigues of Richelieu threw every obstacle in the way of the treaty both at Madrid and at Rome.

Prince Charles had now been about six months at Madrid. The circumstances of his romantic and chivalrous expedition had from the beginning prepossessed the Spanish nation in his favour; and though the match was by no means universally popular, his conduct and demeanour during his long stay had merited general approbation. His sedate majesty, his gravity and decorum, which were congenial to their own disposition, had procured for him the respect of the Spanish people,² while his fine taste, and various accomplishments, had endeared him to the court, and to a sovereign whose mind had

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 12.

² Rushworth, p. 103.

been cast in the same graceful mould. "The king's love to the prince my master," says Cottington, in a letter to James, "seems every day to increase; he is continually with him, and says often that he will one day follow him to London. The little Cardinal, Don Ferdinando, is strangely enamoured of the prince, so as they have much ado to keep the Cardinal from him any time of the day."¹

In this esteem and popularity, however, Charles, and perhaps Bristol, stood alone among their countrymen. On his first arrival in Spain, Charles had been accompanied only by Cottington, Sir R. Graham, and Endymion Porter. But during the residence of their prince abroad, the English nobility flocked to the Spanish capital, and Charles became at length encircled by a splendid retinue, who vied with the native grandees in magnificence, and contended with them in the national sports and exercises, though they at the same time ridiculed the entertainments provided for them, and the pastimes of the people.² Among these English gallants, the Earl of Carlisle and Sir Kenelm Digby were supposed to be imbued with the Catholic doctrines; but among the greater number, the antipathies in religion and manners were perpetually clashing, and the English in the suite of Charles both acted and talked too freely. Some of them were rash upstart favourites of Buckingham; others were Puritans, whose chief delight was to insult the Roman Catholics, and ridicule their religious ceremonies, and who frequently committed irreverent and scandalous acts even in the king's own chapel.³

When the priests tampered with the English on speculative points of faith, the sturdy Protestant often closed a tough point of theology on the broken head of the

¹ *Memorials and Letters*, p. 160.

² Ortiz, *Compend. Chron.* t. vi. lib. xx. c. i.

³ *Cabala*, p. 14.

weaker Papist.¹ Sir Edward Verney struck a Doctor of the Sorbonne a blow under the ear, for visiting and labouring to convert one of the prince's pages, who was sick of a deadly fever,²—and this in a land where the haughtiest grandee trembled to touch irreverently the meanest friar. It is said that, among other unseemly characters, Archie Armstrong, king James's fool, who was a Scotsman by birth, and partook of the national antipathy to Popery and Prelacy, found his way to Madrid, and contributed his full share of folly and impertinence.³

But of all the English, Buckingham was the most detested. In proportion as the prince was loved and esteemed, his favourite was hated and despised. His affectation of French manners, his levity, sallies of passion, and open profligacy, were peculiarly obnoxious to a dignified and formal people.⁴ He admitted improper company into the royal palace, and accustomed as he had been to the most familiar correspondence and intercourse with his “dear dad and gossip,” he continued to use revolting familiarities with the prince, and gave him ridiculous nicknames, to the horror and amazement of a respectfully loyal people. In a letter to the king from one of his confidants at Madrid, the writer requests that his majesty should inquire, “Whether Buckingham was not wont to be sitting while the prince stood, and also having his feet resting on another seat, after an indecent manner? Whether, when the prince was uncovered, he uncovered his head or no? Whether, sitting at table with the prince, he did not behave himself irreverently? Whether he were not wont to come into the prince's chamber

¹ D'Israeli's *Commentaries on the Life and Reign of Charles I.* vol. i. p. 70.

Rushworth, vol. i. p. 101.

³ Howel's *Familiar Letters*, Part I. let. 71. *Life of James I. in Constable's Miscellany*, vol. lvi. c. 11.

⁴ Hume's *History of England*, c. 49.

with his clothes half on, so that the doors could not be opened to them that came to visit the prince from the King of Spain? Whether he did not call the prince by ridiculous names? Whether he did not divers obscene things, and used not immodest gestures and wanton tricks with players in the prince's presence?"¹

The arrogance and intemperance of Buckingham were exhibited on various occasions, even in the royal presence. One morning the King of Spain requested Prince Charles to take the air with him and visit the pleasure house of the Pardo, which was about four miles distant from Madrid, and stood in a forest where his majesty used frequently to hunt. Buckingham not being ready to set out, the King, the Prince of Wales, and the Infant Don Carlos, went into a coach which was in waiting, and the king likewise invited into it the Earl of Bristol, to assist in their conversation, as the Prince had not yet acquired an adequate knowledge of the Spanish language. Bristol accordingly occupied the fourth seat, and Olivarez was left to follow in a second coach with Buckingham. From not being in the way at the time, the English favourite was not aware of the arrangement which had been made, but as soon as he was ready went into the coach, cheerfully enough, with Olivarez and some other noblemen of both nations; and the party went on very pleasantly to overtake the King. But on the way, hearing accidentally that the Earl of Bristol was in the coach with his majesty, the Duke broke out into an ungovernable transport of passion; he reproached the Count Olivarez as the contriver of the affront,—he reviled the presumption of the Earl of Bristol in taking the place which, in all respects, belonged to himself as Ambassador Extraordinary, and he indignantly insisted on quitting the coach, that he might straightway return to Madrid. Olivarez readily discovered, by his agitation and the tone of his voice,

¹ *Cabala*, p. 221.

that the Duke was highly exasperated ; but as he did not understand the English language, he could not comprehend the cause of such sudden and vehement resentment. At length hearing the name of Bristol frequently repeated with the most violent gesticulation, he began to surmise the cause of offence. He then desired an attendant, who was on horseback, to overtake the royal coach with all speed, and request that it might proceed no farther, as his Grace of Buckingham was in some displeasure, the ground whereof was not properly understood. The king's coach immediately stopped ; and when the other approached it, Olivarez alighted and acquainted the king with what he had observed. Charles appears to have taken no part in the matter ; but the king condescended to step from his coach and pay great compliments to the Duke, while Bristol humbly excused himself, on account of the king's command that he should ride along with him to serve as interpreter. In the end, Don Carlos went into the coach with Olivarez, while the Duke and Bristol accompanied the king and prince. Harmony being restored by this arrangement, the royal party proceeded on their excursion to the Pardo, where they dined, and, after their repast, returned in the same manner to Madrid.¹ " This, with all the circumstances of it," continues Lord Clarendon, who relates the anecdote, " administered wonderful occasion of discourse in the court and country,—there never having been such a comet seen in that hemisphere, their submissive reverence to their princes being a vital part of their religion."

That personal animosity which had arisen between Buckingham and Olivarez (the latter of whom had been always rather disinclined to the match),² was also extreme-

¹ Clarendon's *Hist. of Rebellion*, part i. book i.

² Letter of Olivarez to Philip IV. ap. Rushworth, vol. i. p. 71 ; and Ortiz, *Compendio de la Historia d'España*, t. vi. lib. xx. c. ii, p. 364.

ly unpropitious for the favourable issue of the negociation. According to common report, their enmity had originated in the marked attentions paid by the English Duke to the Duchess d'Olivarez. This rumour, however, is contradicted by Clarendon;¹ and, indeed, from the moment of the Prince's arrival at Madrid, Olivarez, who was a regular diplomatist and politician, treated the inconsiderate Buckingham with supercilious contempt. The Spanish minister had been particularly shocked by the Duke's familiarity and want of respect, in his behaviour towards the Prince. He was often heard to censure it severely; and he had declared that if the Infanta, as soon as she was united to the Prince, did not repress such unsuitable license, she would herself experience its mischievous consequences.² This observation being reported to the Duke, gave him the first alarm, and led him to fear that a loss of favour and influence might be the consequence of the projected union. From that time he was but little courteous in his behaviour towards Olivarez, and rather seemed to seek than to avoid causes of dispute. It is said that, on one occasion, when Olivarez reminded Buckingham of a promise he had made with regard to the conversion of Charles to the Roman Catholic religion, the English favourite grossly insulted him by giving him the lie.³ At another time, when Olivarez entered into some ex-

¹ "By these means, this great affair, on which the eyes of Christendom had been so long fixed, came to be dissolved without the least mixture or contribution from those amours which were afterwards so confidently discoursed of. For though the Duke was naturally carried violently to those passions, when there was any grace or beauty in the object, yet the Duchess of Olivarez, of whom was the talk, was then a woman so old, past children, of so abject a presence—in a word, so crooked and deformed, that she could neither tempt his appetite, nor magnify his revenge."—(*Hist. of Rebellion*, book i.)

² Clarendon's *Hist.* book i.

³ Rapin, vol. ix.

planation with him, and made the strongest protestations of his regard, and his desire to maintain that friendship which he conceived might be useful to both their masters, Buckingham received his professions with the most marked contempt, and declared, with superfluous sincerity, that he would have no friendship with him, and that he must ever expect from him, personally, all possible opposition and enmity.¹ The quarrel between Olivarez and Buckingham being well known, every Spaniard who was desirous of paying court to the former, made it a duty to exhibit his dislike to the latter; and all concurred in pitying the lot of the Infanta, who would henceforth be exposed to the approach of a man of such dissolute morals and ungovernable temper.

The strong indications which Buckingham observed of this universal feeling among the Spaniards, and his apprehension of the influence which they might acquire in England, after the arrival of the Infanta, prompted him, if possible, to break off the match; and the intelligence which he now daily received from London, induced him speedily to adopt measures for that purpose, as also to accelerate his return to Britain. James, while he still continued the outward show of favour, had never forgiven Buckingham for his contrivance of the Spanish expedition, which had caused him so much uneasiness. Though he dissembled his resentment, this change in his affections did not escape the watchful eyes of those courtiers, whose business it was to search the thoughts and comply with the present humours of the monarch. Although most of them had been indebted to the Duke for their promotion, the discovery of the King's altered disposition occasioned many intrigues to supplant him. He learned that, at the instigation of Olivarez, the Spanish ambassador at London having leagued with these domestic ene-

¹ Clarendon, book i.; Hume's *Hist. of England*.

mies, was plotting his downfall, and had already obtained some private interviews with James, for the purpose of undermining his influence. Buckingham received frequent and perhaps exaggerated accounts of the machinations which were carried on against him in the court at home. The intelligence could not fail to alarm a minister whose jealousy, as manifested even in the expedition to Spain, showed how much he was alive to the many fatal accidents which daily threatened the downfall of his towering and unmerited greatness. He was well aware of the popular odium which the former errors of his administration had excited, and he knew that the royal favour alone could stem that torrent of public hostility which the Spanish alliance would inevitably direct against him. On the other hand, popularity in England would follow a breach of the treaty ; and his present unlimited sway over the Prince would never be counteracted by the influence of the Infanta and her Spanish counsellors.¹ These motives seem sufficiently strong to have incited Buckingham to produce an immediate rupture, independent of the report, which, however, was generally believed in Spain, and was not inconsistent with the Duke's character, that he had been persuaded to use his influence in breaking off the match by an emissary of the Palatine, who had, about this time, secretly arrived at Madrid, and promised him the elector's daughter in marriage for his eldest son, as a reward for his efforts in dissolving the Spanish alliance.²

Influenced by such a complication of motives, Buckingham resolved to employ that ascendancy which he had so strangely acquired over the mind of Charles, for the purpose of inducing him to break off the marriage, and return forthwith to Britain. It is not precisely known

¹ Brodie's *Hist. of British Empire*, vol. ii. c. i.

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. xvi.

what arguments he employed for the attainment of these objects, on which he was now more intent than he had ever been on the ill-advised journey to Spain. But the Prince's recollection of the beautiful Henrietta—the Infanta's known aversion to an union with him—the delay in the delivery of the Papal dispensation, which gave room for throwing on the Spaniards the imputation of insincerity—the eagerness with which, contrary to their pledge, they still laboured for his conversion, and an ill-timed proposal made, just previous to his departure, that he should remain a year in Spain after the marriage, in order to give time for rescinding, in a British Parliament, the penal laws against Catholics,¹ all admirably concurred to forward the schemes of Buckingham.

And all these things considered, Charles might perhaps, at this moment, have been justifiable in at once breaking off the matrimonial treaty, and in returning to England, had he openly and decidedly avowed that he considered it at an end. But while, before leaving Madrid, he had determined to dissolve the contract, he professed to the King of Spain, that he still retained the same anxiety as ever for its completion, and that, on his arrival in England, he would remove every obstacle to its fulfilment. It is even asserted by the Spanish historians, that, previous to his departure, he swore, along with Philip, in presence of the Patriarch of the Indies, and on the Holy Scriptures, to accomplish the marriage.² The consent of James to his return having been obtained, by working on that monarch's fears for his son's safety, it was intimated to his Catholic Majesty, that orders had been received for the Prince's departure from Spain, as his presence in England had now become necessary to

¹ Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, t. v.

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 16.

remove the nation's alarm and jealousy at his protracted stay. But it was added, that his absence should make no change in the contract, as he meant to leave a proxy in the hands of any person whom his Majesty might appoint, to espouse the Infanta in his name, as soon as the dispensation formerly granted should be renewed by the present pontiff.

On the day preceding that which had been fixed for the Prince's departure, the King, dressed in mourning, as expressive of his grief,¹ waited on him, and carried him to bid adieu to the Queen and the Infanta. Some studied compliments passed among them, and Charles still kept up the character of the faithful lover and the future husband. The Infanta gave him a letter, written in her own hand, for the Nun of Carrion, who was renowned in that age by her character for sanctity, and she requested that, as he must pass near her habitation on his way to the coast, he should personally deliver the epistle to that celebrated *Beata*.² Before Charles quitted Madrid, the King presented him with 18 Spanish and 6 Barbary horses, 6 breeding mares, 20 colts richly caparisoned, a diamond hilted sword and dagger, 160 muskets and cross-bows richly ornamented, and an admirable painting of the Virgin by Correggio.³ Rubens had been in attendance on Prince Charles during part of his visit to Spain, and, by orders of the Catholic King, he had copied the Europa, the Baths of Diana, a Venus, and several other pictures, which Titian had painted in Spain during the preceding century. It was supposed that Philip intended to present these copies to the Prince of Wales; but

¹ Mendoza, *Relazione di quanto è successo nella real Corte del Catholico Rè nostro Signore nella partenza del Principe de Gales*. Tradotta dalla Lingua Spagnuola nel' Italiana: ed Milano, 1623.

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 16.

³ Mendoza, *Relaz.* Ortiz, *Compend.* t. vi. lib. xx. c. 1.

he reserved them to himself, and bestowed on his royal guest the originals, which, however, were afterwards returned to Spain, when Charles dissolved his matrimonial engagements with the Infanta.¹ Of all these presents the paintings were the most valuable, and probably most adapted to the taste of Charles: and I have no doubt that his half-year's residence at Madrid, with his frequent excursions to Aranjuez and the Pardo, promoted and confirmed his natural taste for the fine arts. From the Queen, Charles received a great many bags of amber, with some dressed kid skins and linen. Olivarez presented him with a few Italian pictures, and several valuable pieces of furniture, particularly three sedan chairs of curious workmanship.² The chief Spanish grandees also sent considerable gifts, chiefly of horses; and in this general courtesy, Olivarez, dropping former animosity, gave his enemy Buckingham a piece of tapestry. In return, the Prince bestowed on the King an enamelled hilt for a sword, and a dagger studded with precious stones. To the Queen he presented a pair of curious ear-rings, and to the Infanta a string of 150 crown pearls, and a diamond anchor, as the emblem of constancy.³

Buckingham set out first, on pretence of preparing for the Prince's reception on board the English fleet, which was lying at St Andero to receive him.⁴ At his depar-

¹ Cumberland's *Anecdotes of Painters in Spain*, vol. i.

² Mendoza, *Relazione*. Two of these were afterwards presented by Charles to Buckingham; and his use of them in London gave rise to great clamour against him, as having reduced men to the condition of beasts of burden (*Notes to Memoirs of Embassy of Bassompierre to Court of England*, p. 82.)

³ Mendoza, *Relazione*. Ortiz calls them contemptuously (I think without reason) the gifts of merchants.

⁴ Rushworth, vol. i. p. 103. Rapin, vol. ix. p. 559. From the Spanish historians, however, it would appear that he remained, and



ture for that port, all imaginable honours were paid to the Prince. Gondomar, the Count of Monterey, and the other Spanish gentlemen who had been appointed to wait on him during his stay at Madrid, were ordered to attend him to the coast. The King himself resolved to accompany him during a part of his journey, and escorted him, in the first place, to the palace of the Escorial, on the way to St Andero. At this royal residence they passed some days. The first was spent in admiring the various curiosities and works of art which this wonder of the world contained, and the others, in surveying its external scenery of woods and forests.¹ On leaving this palace, a stag was roused in their way, and the chase led the royal hunters to a wood, where a scene as if raised by magic opened. A magnificent repast was spread before them, on a table canopied with green boughs. Cool shades, delicious viands, and refreshing streams, dissipated the fatigue and hunger of the sport they had enjoyed.² Philip then went on with the Prince as far as Campillo (a station between the Escorial and Guadarrama), where, on the spot at which they separated, he ordered a marble column to be reared, with an appropriate inscription, as a memorial of his regard, and his pleasing recollection of the Prince's visit.³


After parting from the King of Spain, Charles, on his way to the coast, stopped first at Segovia, where he was regaled at supper with trout patées, and other delicacies,⁴ in the Alcazar, by the governor, who seems to have been a worthy successor of Don Andrea Tordesillas. From accompanied the Prince at his departure from Madrid. Cespedes, *Hist.* iv. 16. Mendoza, *Relaz.*

¹ Mendoza, *Relaz.*

² D'Israeli's *Commentaries.*

³ Clarendon, Book i. Ortiz, *Compend.*

⁴ Mendoza, *Relazione.*



Segovia his route lay by Valladolid, where the Duke of Lerma at that time resided : and Olivarez concluded his acts of paltry malevolence against that fallen minister, by issuing a special mandate to absent himself from the city till the Prince had quitted it. The old Duke was much affected by this order, and declared, that, though Olivarez had done him from time to time many ill offices, this last act bore with it more malice than any of the preceding, in regard of the earnest desire he felt to see the Prince, and to speak with him, having been the first who set on foot the treaty of alliance.¹ Perhaps, however, Olivarez feared that he knew too much of the original design of the match, and might communicate more than it was expedient the Prince should learn.

In the absence of Lerma, Charles was entertained by the University of Valladolid, and on his farther progress by the Bishop of Palencia. This brought him near the residence of the Nun of Carrion, to whom he bore a letter from the Infanta. He tarried with her an hour and a half ; but though he gave her three hundred crowns in alms,² he left her, it is said, very little satisfied either with his visit to herself, or his errand into the kingdom.³ As he proceeded, he lodged at the castles of the lords of the different cantons through which he passed, till he arrived at St Andero, where the Royal Navy, under command of the Earl of Rutland, had arrived, in order to receive him on board. Being prevented from sailing for two days, by adverse winds, he gave the Cardinal Zapata, Gondomar, the Marquis d'Aytona, and other Grantees, who had accompanied him, an entertainment on shipboard, which, if we may believe Waller, amazed his

¹ Howel's *Continuation* of Lennard's Translation of Mazzella's *History of Naples*, ed. 1654.

² Mendoza, *Relazione*. ³ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 16.

guests by its magnificence.¹ The Admiral's vessel, where the Prince regaled them, lay out in the Roads, at some distance from the harbour. In the evening, as the Prince accompanied his guests back to shore in a barge, they were surprised by a swelling tide and sudden tempest, which overtook them with so much fury, that they could neither reach the land, nor regain the ship they had left. The rowers became faint with toil, and, night coming on, they resigned themselves to the mercy of the waves. At length one of the fleet which lay towards the harbour, fortunately exposed a light. By great exertions they reached this vessel, and though they encountered much hazard of being upset or dashed to pieces in their approach, they were at length all safely received on board.² When the storm abated, the Prince returned to the Admiral's ship, and it is said, that, when he re-embarked, the first words he uttered, were, "that it was weakness and folly in the Spaniards, after they had used him so ill, to

¹ Now had his Highness bid farewell to Spain,
And reached the sphere of his own power, the main,
With British bounty, in his ship he feasts
Th' Hesperian Princes, his amazed guests,
To find that wat'ry wilderness exceed
The entertainment of their great Madrid.

The poem "on the danger his Majesty escaped in the Road at St Andero," was the earliest production of Waller, and written when he had not exceeded his eighteenth year. "This piece," says Dr Johnson, "justifies the observation made by one of his editors, that he obtained by a felicity like instinct, a style which perhaps will never be obsolete; and that were we to judge only by the wording, we could not know what was written at twenty, and what at fourscore. His versification was in his first essay such as it appears in his last performance."—(*Lives of the Poets*.)

² In a report, however, given by some of the Prince's attendants, and published in Somers' Tracts, it is said that the Prince had dined in the town of St Andero, and that the storm occurred on his way to visit the British Fleet, along with his Spanish escort.

grant him a safe conduct and departure.”¹ The fleet set sail that night, or the following morning, for the shores of England, where the Prince’s return was hailed with universal joy and congratulation.

So long as Charles had continued in Spain, the matrimonial treaty was conducted chiefly by Buckingham, though Bristol sometimes ventured to oppose his own sagacious counsels to the impetuous measures suggested by the Duke. On the Prince’s departure, however, as appearances were still intended to be kept up, the management of a fictitious negotiation was again entrusted to Bristol, who was still allowed to believe that the English Court were sincere in their intentions, and was thus placed at Madrid, in a situation the most embarrassing to a man of his distinguished probity and honour.

On leaving Spain, Charles had declared that the King or Infant Carlos, was to act as his proxy in espousing the Infanta, and he left a document for this purpose in the hands of Bristol. But its validity was artfully declared to reach only to Christmas, after which it was rendered null.² It thus became the object of Charles and Buckingham to devise every possible stratagem, in order to protract the negotiation till that period had elapsed, lest, if the Papal dispensation arrived before Christmas, no farther pretence should remain for delaying the celebration of the nuptials. Bristol was therefore instructed not to deliver the proxy which had been left in his hands, till full security was obtained for the restitution of the Palatinate. This condition was now for the first time introduced as an essential article in the negotiation; and when formerly proposed, Olivarez had declared, that, if formally inserted as a stipulation, it would necessarily involve his master in a war with the Emperor and the whole Catholic league in Germany. Philip was at no loss to un-

¹ Frankland’s *Annals*, p. 85.

² Rapin, vol. ix. p. 562.

derstand the hypocritical language and deceitful conduct held by the Court of England. He was aware of Buckingham's disgust with the Spanish Government, as well as his unbounded influence with his master, and he foresaw that he would employ every machination to prevent the espousals. Being determined, however, to prove to all Europe the sincerity of his intentions, and to throw the blame where it deserved to fall, he immediately agreed to the stipulated condition, and Olivarez pledged his word that the proxy should not be demanded till a written promise was delivered for the re-establishment of the Elector Palatine.

A few days after this pledge had been given, and while the proxy still remained valid, the long expected renewal of the dispensation, by Urban VIII., at length arrived from Rome. Philip was by this time sufficiently aware that the marriage could never be completed, and that the English court was resolved to break it off at all hazards; but it was now his turn to dissemble, and to throw as much odium as possible on England, by exhibiting, in the strongest light, to the Spanish nation and to the rest of Europe, its faithless breach of contract. Accordingly, on receiving the Papal dispensation, Philip fixed the 19th of December for the marriage ceremony, and ordered all the necessary preparations for the espousals. The household establishment of the Infanta, who already bore the title of Princess of Wales, was arranged; presents were provided for the royal family of England; bonfires were kindled throughout the kingdom in anticipation of the joyous event, and messengers were despatched to the allies of Spain to apprise them of the approaching nuptials.¹ The King then demanded from Bristol delivery of the proxy as alone wanting for the solemnization of the matrimonial union. But it now appeared that the ambassador had received private in-

¹ Rushworth, vol. i. p. 112.

structions from England, that if all the resources of procrastination failed, and the dispensation unfortunately arrived while the proxy remained in force, he should peremptorily refuse to give it up till after Christmas, the period at which it ceased to be effectual. On receiving the demand for its delivery, Bristol, without much circumlocution, immediately notified to the Spanish King these contemptible instructions of his court.¹ Philip, who knew that the proxy expired at Christmas, now dropped the mask. On the very day on which he received this intimation, he commanded the arrangements for the nuptials to be suspended, he desired the Infanta to relinquish the title of Princess of Wales² and the study of the English language, and ordered immediate preparations for war throughout all his extensive dominions.

Bristol was forbidden to appear at court in his public and diplomatic character ; but the King of Spain, during the course of his embassy, had formed the highest opinion of his qualifications and integrity. Learning with regret, that Buckingham had contrived to excite a prejudice against him in England, he entreated him, through

¹ Rapin, vol. ix. p. 563.

² The Infanta Maria, who had been the destined bride of Charles, was married, some years afterwards, to the King of Hungary, who became Emperor by the title of Ferdinand III. "She was equally remarkable," says Coxe, "for beauty of person and purity of morals ; and, with less flattery than the compliment is usually applied, is said to have resembled the angelic nature both in body and mind."—(*Hist. of House of Austria*, c.. 60.) Having died in childhood in 1646, she did not survive the martyrdom of Charles ; but if she lent her ear to the story of the commotions in England (and could she fail of interest in them !), she must have known of the events at Naseby and at Newark, as also of the flight of Henrietta : and seated at Vienna on the security of an Austrian throne, she must have remembered, with heavenly gratitude, the day of the string of pearls and the diamond anchor.

Olivarez, to fix his residence in Spain, where he should enjoy all the honours of rank and advantages of fortune, safe from the malice of his powerful enemies and the resentment of the English populace. But the noble minded ambassador, while he expressed the utmost gratitude for the princely offer, respectfully declined it. Nothing, he said, could more tend to confirm the calumnies of his foes than a prolonged residence at Madrid, and the highest dignity in the Spanish monarchy would be to him but a poor compensation for the loss of that honour which he would endanger by such exaltation. Charmed with this answer, Philip begged him, at least, to accept a sum of 20,000 crowns, which might be requisite for his support until he could refute the aspersions of his enemies, remarking, at the same time, that his acceptance of this offer might be for ever concealed from the knowledge both of the public and his master. There is one person, replied the ambassador, who cannot fail to know it,—he is the Earl of Bristol, who will consider it as his duty to reveal it to the King of England.¹ Conscious of his own innocence, Bristol held himself in readiness to leave Madrid on the first order to that effect; and, on receiving it, he immediately departed. On his arrival in England he was, at Buckingham's instigation, forbidden to appear at court, by order of a king who was undeserving of so faithful and disinterested a servant.

Thus terminated the celebrated Spanish match, which has always been accounted one of the most mysterious and inexplicable passages in history, and has been regarded in Spain as an impenetrable state secret;² like the exile

¹ Rushworth, vol. i. p. 113.

² Cespedes, a contemporary writer, alludes to this enigma in the following mysterious manner, but I cannot even guess at the scope of his dark insinuation.—“Mas nuestro vulgo mal afecto por la contrariedad de religiones, quiza livianamente hablo en mas illicitos

of Ovid from Rome,—the imprisonment of Tasso in Italy,—the iron mask in France,—and the murder of Darnly in Scotland. It should not at first view seem very difficult to account for the rupture of an alliance to which those chiefly interested were so little inclined. James, and a few English Catholics, were the only persons by whom it was earnestly desired. The Infanta was decidedly averse to the union. Charles himself, from the period of his arrival at Madrid, was at most but indifferent; and the Queen of Spain, it has been reported, expressed a wish to him that he should marry her sister Henrietta in preference to the Infanta.¹ Notwithstanding Charles's popularity in Spain, and the hopes entertained of his conversion, the majority of the Spanish nation were hostile to the match, being, in some measure, influenced by the remembrance of the inauspicious marriage between Henry VIII. and their princess Catherine.² The English Protestants not only disliked it, but held it in horror; and many of them believed, that, as soon as the Infanta bore a child, it was the intention of the Spanish Jesuits to get rid of the King and Prince of Wales by poison, that she might reign over the realm in name of a minor, who was to be strictly bred up in the Roman Catholic faith. In these circumstances, the rupture of the contract was not wonderful; but the efforts of the two courts to throw on each other the disgrace of this breach of faith, has created much diversity of opinion, and involved the subject in perplexity. Some historians have

motivos; pero hemos los de sepultar; impugna el siglo en que vivimos la libertad con que escribió Cornelio Tacito, en su historia, la infame isla de Caprea, su torpe e vil amenidad, y los estupros de Tiberio. Justo es que usemos con los principes de mas decoro y reverencia." (*Histor.*, lib. iv. c. 16.)

¹ *Mem. de Mad. Motteville*, t. i. p. 286.

² Siri, *Mem. Recon.* Ortiz, *Compend.*

believed that the Spanish court was perfectly sincere from the beginning of the treaty,—that, with the spirit of proselytism which marks the faith it professed, it hoped to behold, by means of this marriage, the ancient worship restored in England, or at least to see the Catholic church relieved from persecution : but that, while exerting every effort to promote this union, the levity and insolence of Buckingham had disgusted the Spanish government ; and the favourite, perceiving how much he was detested by the Spaniards, and dreading the influence they might acquire in England, if the marriage were accomplished, resolved to poison the mind of the Prince, and at length prevailed on him to break off the nuptials.¹ This was the view of the subject which Bristol strenuously maintained, both during the course of the negotiations and after they had been abandoned.

Another class of writers, and these the most numerous, have believed that the Court of Spain was insincere in the whole treaty,—that the match was merely a bait, with which they wished to attract the English King, in order to prevent his interposition in favour of the Elector Palatine, and that the Prince perceiving, while at Madrid, that the negotiations made no progress, became sensible, at length, of the deception which had been practised, and left Spain in disgust at the artifice by which he had been lured thither, and at the empty professions by which he had been so long detained.²

¹ Clarendon and most writers of the period. D'Israeli's *Commentaries on Life of Charles I.*

² This is the view taken by the majority of modern English and French historians. A writer of the latter nation says : “ Il est certain que le Roy d'Espagne n'eut *jamais* intention d'exécuter ce mariage—luy même l'ayant depuis déclaré ; et que son dessein a toujours été de suivre la destination de son père, qui luy avoit recommandé en mourant de faire de sa sœur une Imperatrice.” (*Observations sur le Test. Polit. de Richelieu.*)

On the whole, it appears most probable, that Philip III. had been insincere in the commencement of the treaty,—that his successor had at first continued it, chiefly with the view of diverting James from the affairs of the Palatinate, but secretly reserving to himself the power of concluding or breaking it off, according to the circumstances that might occur, of which the most important was Charles's conversion to the Catholic faith. The expectations which his journey to Spain excited, and the favourable terms obtained for the future exercise of that religion in England, disposed Philip's mind in favour of the nuptials. But the parties chiefly interested, being indifferent, or perhaps averse to their union, the obstacles which from time to time intervened, and which a mutual attachment might have conquered, became insurmountable, till at length the quarrel between Buckingham and Olivarez, who were the chief actors in this political drama, closed the shifting and delusive scene. The Lord Keeper Williams, when asked by King James, if he thought the expedition of his son to Madrid would gain the Spanish Princess, replied with much truth, and, at the same time, with due political caution, “that if my Lord Marquis (Buckingham) will give honour to the Count Duke Olivarez, and remember he is the favourite of Spain, or if Olivarez will shew honourable civility to my Lord Marquis, remembering he is the favourite of England, the wooing may be prosperous; but if my Lord Marquis should forget where he is, and not stoop to Olivarez, or if Olivarez, forgetting what guest he hath received with the Prince, bear himself like a Castilian grandee to my Lord Marquis, the provocation may cross your Majesty's good intention.”¹

But whatever may be the true light in which this mat-

¹ Hacket's *Life of Lord Keeper Williams*, p. 115, ap. d'Israeli's *Curiosities of Literature*, vol. iii. p. 446.

ter ought to be viewed, the Prince and Buckingham, who had now become the most popular man in the kingdom, ran little hazard of contradiction, in consequence of the absence of Bristol, and the general feeling on the subject which prevailed in England. They had thus full scope for representing to the King and Parliament all the occurrences in Spain, in that point of view which best suited their own plans and interests. By the suppression of some facts, and the false colouring laid on others, both Parliament and people were misled. Prince Charles, either influenced or deceived by Buckingham, concurred with him in throwing on the Court of Madrid the reproach of artifice and insincerity, throughout the whole transaction. During his residence in Spain, the external demeanour of Charles had been unexceptionable. But the line of policy he adopted at his departure, and after his return to England, reflects little honour on his spirit or sincerity. If he was smitten at Paris with the charms of Henrietta, he should have returned to England, and not proceeded to Madrid with pre-occupied affections. If, on his arrival there, he found the Infanta averse to an union with him, he ought at once to have rejected the hand which the heart could not accompany. He should have done any thing, in short, rather than have stolen out of Spain, making hollow professions, on which he did not mean to act. And after his return, if he was persuaded by Buckingham's representations that the Court of Madrid had been insincere, he ought instantly to have broken off the treaty, instead of enjoining farther dissimulation to Bristol, and rendering the whole nation contemptible in the eyes of Europe, by the miserable artifice of the proxy.

But the Prince, the favourite, the Parliament and the people, were all of one mind. Never, in the most just and righteous cause was a nation so unanimous ; and it was not

to be expected that King James, always weak in mind, and now infirm in body, should have resisted such a combination. Though irritated against Buckingham on account of the journey to Spain, and his son's alienation from the match, he loaded him with encomiums and favours, as if he had performed a meritorious and acceptable service. The Marquis of Innoiosa, indeed, who had succeeded Gondomar as Spanish ambassador to the Court of London, made one desperate effort to release the King from bondage, and, by ruining the favourite, both to avenge the injuries offered to his master, and avert from his country the misfortune of a war with England. Watching an opportunity when there were few persons near the King, he slipped into his hand a paper, which contained thirteen heads or articles, some of them sufficiently startling to a Prince jealous of his prerogative, and vain of his political wisdom. He was informed, among other unpalatable statements,—that he had fallen into utter contempt throughout the whole kingdom ;—that being besieged and encompassed by the duke's creatures and dependents, so that none could be admitted to his presence without their consent, he was in fact to be regarded as much a prisoner in his own palace as John of France had been in England, or Francis I. in Spain, after the battle of Pavia :—that it had been resolved by the Prince and Buckingham, to restrain his Majesty in the exercise of the government ; and that, to effect this purpose, an army was levying, and commissioners had been already appointed, to superintend the national affairs, and guard the public weal. This representation of his kingly state must have formed a mortifying contrast to the delightful flatteries of Gondomar, who made such account of his deep policy, his king craft, and his learning. The statements of the present ambassador were palpably exaggerated ; but James is said to have been deeply affected by them. Bucking-

ham, however, either found means to remove his suspicions, or the king had not sufficient energy to discard his favourite. Innoiosa, in consequence of this abortive attempt, felt his situation so unpleasant at London, that he left that capital for Madrid, without being recalled, or without audience of leave.¹ After his departure, King James implicitly followed the policy which had been dictated to him, and entered into a confederacy with the French and Dutch, for recovering the Palatinate, and repressing the ambition of the House of Austria. This alliance was naturally followed by a war with Spain, which reflected as little honour on the military skill and prowess of the English, as the preceding negotiations on their sincerity or national faith.

Such was the result of the celebrated project of the Spanish match, which for many years had been the darling object of James, and which, it appears, he had at one time nearly conducted to the desired conclusion. Its history is not uninteresting as a record of the fruitless efforts of human policy, and of the duplicity practised in that age, both by statesmen and by princes.

¹ Siri, *Mem. Recon.* Ortiz. t. vi. lib. xx. c. ii.

CHAPTER III.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

Long years of havoc urge their destined course.

GRAY'S *Bard*.

A new era may be considered as having arisen in Europe soon after the accession of Philip IV, and the commencement of the administration of Olivarez. The force of those great events which had received their impulse in the beginning or middle of the preceding century, was now nearly spent; and these being exhausted, new incidents necessarily arose—new schemes of policy or ambition again disquieted mankind, and other actors appeared on the stage, with different views and passions.

In the early history of the European kingdoms, their affairs were little interwoven, unless when national antipathy fomented hostilities, or the approximation of territory gave rise to unavoidable discord. It was during the reign of the Emperor Charles, that the monarchies of Europe were first accustomed to act in opposition or confederacy. But at the period on which we now enter, they had been combined into one vast system. States which formerly had no existence for each other, became connected by new relations or sympathies, and acquired new points of contact.

It was in the course of the 'Thirty Years' War, that Europe first recognised its constitution as a community of powers, and acknowledged that mutual dependence of its

states, which has ever since existed. Religious feelings had created unions and animosities which political considerations never would have formed, and furnished common principles of action to those between whom scarcely any other relation existed. Inconsiderable or isolated nations were thus impelled to seek among foreigners the co-operation necessary to their protection, and Denmark and Sweden were introduced into the policy of the south of Europe.

The interests of the Catholics and Protestants in Germany, had neither been settled with wisdom, nor fixed with precision, at the treaty of Passau; and the two religious parties had still continued to observe each other with a jealous eye. Their disputes and animosities were ready to burst into open violence, and formed excellent materials, of which the European princes might avail themselves for political aggrandizement, when suitable opportunities should present themselves. It was easy to foresee that, when these did occur, the hostilities would be obstinate and bloody; for fanaticism was sure to mingle in the conflict, and excite its votaries to a struggle, in which the destruction of their opponents would be as much the motive, as their own independence of opinion.

What is called the Thirty Years' War had begun in 1619; and indeed its commencement must be dated at that period, in order to complete the number from which that celebrated and long protracted contest has derived its appellation. At first, however, it was only a combat for the crown of Bohemia and the sovereignty of the Palatinate, to which were soon added the remains of the war of Cleves, and the renewal of that in the Low Countries. It was not till five years after its commencement, that it became the most extensive and desolating warfare that as yet had agitated Europe. From the contest in Bohemia, and the chastisement of its inhabitants, who had at-

tempted to vindicate their civil and religious privileges against the might and bigotry of the Emperor, the war had spread first over all Germany, and afterwards through the whole European commonwealth. On one side were ranged the Emperor, the Duke of Bavaria, some of the Italian States, and the King of Spain, who were thus united in a confederacy for oppressing the Lutherans and Calvinists of Germany, and aggrandizing the House of Austria. On the other hand, France and England, the Protestant States of Germany, the United Provinces, Denmark, and at length Sweden, were combined, for the purpose of protecting liberty of conscience, and setting bounds to the ambition of the Emperor. Among the northern nations, the former motive, joined to the Restoration of the Elector-Palatine, might be the prevailing spring of action ; while France, it seems certain, was chiefly influenced by the desire of humbling her ancient rival : and in furtherance of this paramount object, she scrupled not to support abroad, a faith which she persecuted at home—to ally herself with heretic nations, and to foment in other Catholic countries those religious dissensions by which her own vitals were torn. The war was carried on from the banks of the Danube to the shores of the Baltic, in fields of everlasting renown. The campaigns of the Austrian generals against Gustavus Adolphus, and after the death of that monarch, against those skilful commanders who had been bred up under his standard, have afforded to the historian subjects for the most animated and interesting recital ; while the bold adventures, predatory lives, and wild manners of the German soldiery, with the singular character of their leader Wallenstein—his fervid imagination, his boundless ambition, his vehement passions, his unconquerable pride, his impenetrable reserve, and the astrological visions in which he ever beheld the

most bright and glorious prospects, have supplied the poet with delineations more picturesque than fiction ever portrayed.

A frequent change in the precise object of its prosecution, and the constant accession of new parties, contributed to render the Thirty Years' War the most protracted contest which had yet desolated Europe. It may, in fact, be divided into three periods of warfare—the first while Tilli and Wallenstein triumphed without check over the Protestant States of Germany, and expelled the leader of their union, Christian of Denmark, from the empire;—the second, from the landing of Gustavus in Pomerania, till his fall at Lutzen;—and the third, from his death till the peace of Westphalia, during which the rival powers alternately passed from the extremity of defeat to the summit of success.

But though, in this long conflict, the Emperor was in a great measure influenced by Spanish counsels, and was considered by the Protestants as the political slave of Spain, that monarchy was not principally or directly engaged in these exciting and romantic scenes of warfare. She advanced subsidies, indeed, and sent occasional supplies of troops to Germany, but the Netherlands and Italy were the chief theatres of her exertions in the cause in which she had engaged; yet the part she performed, though not the most important, proved far above her powers of action.

We have seen that Spinola, after his conquest of the Palatinate, had entered the Netherlands, but had been obliged to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.¹ Circumstances at this time rather tended to favour his invasion of the United Provinces. In the early periods of their history, Holland, Zealand, and Friesland, had been the prey of the most violent political factions. The despot-

¹ See above, p. 61.

ism of Spain, and the necessity of close union to resist it, had checked this spirit of dissension; but it had revived with their independence, and differences in points of faith presented never-failing topics of animosity. The States were agitated and divided by the religious disputes of the Gomarists with the Arminians, on grace, free-will, and predestination; and those who had jointly resisted the persecutions of Spain, now persecuted each other for unimportant distinctions in faith. These sects, as usual, associated themselves with parties in the state—the Gomarists being supported by the House of Orange, and the Arminians by the republican faction. The Dutch had also been disappointed in the extent of the aid which they expected from the Protestant powers of Europe, particularly England; and they now chiefly relied on the precarious assistance of France, and the diversion to the Spanish forces which they anticipated from the league of Italian princes.

To efface the remembrance of his failure before Bergen-op-Zoom, Spinola now resolved on the siege of Breda. About twenty-five years had elapsed since the siege of Ostend had drawn the attention of Europe, and had attracted to its walls many illustrious foreigners from France, England, and Denmark, who were led by military curiosity to view so interesting a scene. The operations before Breda were hardly less important, and the eyes of all Christendom were directed to the achievements of the contending parties.

Breda was a town of a triangular form, in Dutch Brabant, about three miles in circumference, and situated on a plain which was covered with thick woods, and intersected by the Rivers Mercke and Aa. These streams united near its walls, and after their junction, flowed through the town, under the name of Merckendaal. Breda had been surprised by a stratagem of Prince Mau-

rice, in the year 1590, during the government of the Duke of Parma, and had ever since remained in the hands of the Dutch. Its fortifications had been rendered strong by art, and it was also protected by the streams, woods, and morasses with which it was environed. There was a tower in the middle of the town, about 400 feet in height, whence all the adjacent country could be descried.¹ The garrison, composed of French, Flemings, English and Dutch, to the number of 7000, was commanded by Justin of Nassau, a prince of the House of Orange, distinguished for intrepidity and skill.

Spinola was well aware of the difficulties of the enterprise. He knew that Breda had been well garrisoned and provided with all necessary supplies, and he foresaw that every effort would be made for the relief of a town which contained the principal treasures of the States. He had also been perplexed by the immense variety of opinions, adverse to his own, which were held in the army he commanded. He stated his hesitation and difficulties to the Court of Madrid, and promptly received the laconic reply, “ Marques sumais Breda—YO EL REY.”

After this decisive answer, Spinola prepared in earnest for the siege. Having called in some troops in the vicinity, he encamped about the middle of July, at the distance of two leagues from Breda, with an army composed of Spaniards, Italians, Irish, and Walloons, the whole amounting to 24,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. As the town, however, is surrounded at no great distance by a number of other fortified places, which he successively threatened, and as he carefully spread contradictory intelligence, Breda was not believed to be the object of his intended attack, and Prince Maurice was more apprehensive of an assault on Bommel, Grave, or Heusden. So

¹ Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana*. This author gives a full description of the fortifications with various plans.

well was this deception practised, that the governor of Grave sent his wife and family for protection and security to Breda, and ordered all the crops in the neighbourhood to be immediately reaped and brought into Grave. It was rather to show his zeal and alacrity, than from entertaining any real alarm, that the governor, Justin of Nassau, repaired the bridges, mills, and some parts of the fortifications of Breda. Spinola remained a month in his encampments, without pursuing any decisive operations, and thus occasioned great perplexity to the enemy. At the end of this period, suddenly, and at midnight, he despatched a body of troops to occupy the most favourable positions they could secure under the walls of Breda. This design was executed without opposition, though Prince Maurice was encamped with a considerable force at the distance of a league north from the town. Spinola soon afterwards followed, with the remainder of his army, the party which he had detached. The inhabitants and garrison were confounded; but Justin, with great promptitude, made all necessary arrangements for defence, and the magistracy placed their citizens on a limited allowance of provisions. The Spanish commander now judged that, from the strength of the fortifications, he could not, without great risk and immense loss, attempt to storm them. He therefore resolved to draw lines round the city, and secure them in such a manner as to prevent the entrance of all supplies, and thus at length reduce it by famine. Accordingly, he in a short while completely protected his entrenchments by a chain of forts, and separated his infantry into four divisions, stationed at equal distances in these lines of circumvallation. One of his positions, which was considered as the most important, was on the banks of the Mercke, at the spot where it issues from the town which it intersects. A bridge of boats was there placed across the

stream, and the Spanish cavalry was quartered behind the lines. When Breda was thus first invested, Prince Maurice ridiculed the plan as chimerical. But perceiving his town in the very centre of the Spanish arms, and observing the vigilance as well as the admirable military dispositions of Spinola, he opened his eyes to the risk of its capture; and in the beginning of October, he marched with 18,000 men, accompanied by a great supply of artillery, ammunition, and provisions, in the hope of surprising one of the four Spanish positions, and forcing his way into the town through the vacant space. But Spinola being apprised of his design, and prepared for the attack, advanced with the chief part of his army to the spot against which Maurice directed his assault, and speedily compelled him to retreat.¹

The hostile armies being now in each other's vicinity, daily skirmishes occurred between them; but nothing effectual was attempted for the relief of Breda, till Maurice at length resolved to make a diversion in its favour by a formidable attack on Antwerp, from which at that time a number of Spanish troops had been drawn to escort a convoy of provisions to the besieging camp before Breda. At midnight, Maurice despatched 4000 men from his army, giving out that he was marching them to Bergen-op-Zoom, to be there shipped for Friesland. This movement excited little notice either in his own or the Spanish camp. But the detachment, after having proceeded a short way on the route to Bergen-op-Zoom, made a sudden wheel, and arrived before day-break at Antwerp, where scaling-ladders, and every thing necessary for the meditated attack, had been secretly forwarded, from a distant quarter, during night, by orders of Maurice. The cavalry stationed themselves as silently as possible at the principal approaches to the city. A dark tempestuous

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. v. c. 8.

night, and the wind rustling among the trees by which the town was surrounded, aided an enterprise, the success of which depended on secrecy and silence. Four planks were already pulled out from a palisade, when the noise occasioned by the accidental fall of one of the scaling-ladders alarmed the sentinels. Every thing was immediately placed in a posture of defence;¹ and as the hope of the besiegers rested entirely on the chance of a surprise, their attempt was totally frustrated. In their rapid flight they left behind them scaling-ladders, augers, levers, and other instruments, which unequivocally manifested their intentions.²

After this failure, Maurice separated his army into two divisions: he gave the command of one to his brother Prince Henry, with orders to intercept the communication of the Spaniards towards Bois-le-Duc, and he himself, though at this time grievously indisposed, proceeded with the other (in what view is not very apparent) towards Rosendaal. Being now seriously alarmed for the safety of Breda, he invoked more effectual assistance from France, Venice, and Savoy; while Count Mansfeldt, who was already in London, urgently solicited, from King James, reinforcements of troops, to be employed for its relief.

Nothing could exceed the diligence of Spinola during this siege, in personally inspecting all the works and operations of his own army, as well as in discovering and frustrating the designs of the enemy. He often remained, it is said, two days without food, and generally slept for short intervals on a cart, or in some soldier's hut near the out-works. He never appeared to be disconcerted by disasters or untoward occurrences; and by the equanimity of

¹ Salio el Castellano, (says Cespedes), aunque purgado de aquel dia!

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. v. c. 9.

temper which he always maintained, he kept alive the hopes and confidence of his soldiery.¹ The unremitting exertions and vigilance of Spinola, which continued unabated during the severity of winter, gradually reduced Breda to the utmost distress; but the spirit and firmness of its governor Justin, inspired both the citizens and garrison with hope. There were a great number of horses in the town, which they regarded as a last resource if pressed by the extremity of famine, and they looked forward to the promised assistance from France and England, of which Maurice was careful from time to time to send them intelligence. Spinola's army had been reduced during winter by disease and desertion, but it was speedily recruited by his efforts, and restored to its original complement.

About this time the Marques discovered that the enemy were attempting to inundate the Spanish quarters, by constructing an artificial dyke in the course of the Mercke below his lines. But when the waters already surrounded the tents of the soldiers, the dike burst, and the stream flowed away by its natural channel, or by the canals which Spinola had cut for its escape. Tilli, the Imperial general, now sent the Spaniards a reinforcement of 5000 men; while, on the other part, Mansfeldt, whom James had appointed general of some troops levied in England, lost many of them by shipwreck on the coast of Holland, or by desertion after they had landed. With the remainder of his forces he encamped near Gertruydenburgh, where he was soon after joined by Prince Henry, who had now succeeded to the command of the Dutch army by the death of his brother Maurice. In consequence of this junction, and by drawing some troops from garrisons, their forces were augmented to 43,000 men, all destined for the relief of Breda.² Spinola, however,

¹ Hugo, *Obsid. Bredana*.

² Cespedes, *Histor. lib. vi. c. 3*.

formed new and stronger lines, in order to prevent the entrance of any succour into the town, which was now farther afflicted by the progress of contagious diseases, occasioned by unwholesome diet, and a deficiency in the supply of medicines. In this situation the whole aims of Justin were, to make the provisions last as long as possible—to keep the citizens contented with their scanty fare, and to spread beyond the walls a report of their abundant supplies. With this latter view he sent forth three citizens properly instructed, bearing the character of spies, in the hope that they would be taken by the sentinels on the Spanish lines, and that being interrogated, they would give a large account of the stores of provisions, and all necessary articles. But neither the governor, nor these pretended spies, had calculated on the vigour of the Spanish counsels. The emissaries of Justin were promptly subjected to the experiment of the Wheel, and these respectable burgesses being unaccustomed to its process, divulged the whole stratagem at the first twinge.

The lines of the besiegers were so close to the town, that they were harassed by continual discharges of artillery; and the fire being particularly directed towards the quarters of Spinola, the curtains of his tent were frequently pierced by bullets. With the view of keeping his garrison in some employment, Justin made an attack with 2000 men on a Spanish position, defended only by twenty-five soldiers, who kept their ground, till the enemy, fearing that Spinola might come to their relief, with a superior force, retreated with some loss and in great disorder. The result of this assault imparted spirits to the Spaniards, and spread discouragement among the besieged. Another attack made by Prince Henry with 6000 men, on the external part of the Spanish lines having proved equally unsuccessful, the hopes of the inhabi-

tants of Breda, and even the resolution of Justin, began to decline. Finding that he could no longer depend on the fidelity of the garrison, or submission of the citizens, he asked leave from Prince Henry to surrender the town, which he obtained, along with high commendations for the skill and valour he had displayed. The Prince imprudently added in his dispatch, that if the Spanish commander knew the extreme necessity to which the garrison of Breda was reduced, he would not grant the terms of capitulation which were suitable to such brave soldiers. He took the precaution, indeed, to send his answer by two confidential persons, disguised as peasants. But before reaching the town, it fell into the hands of Spinola, and confirmed what he already suspected concerning the desperate state of the garrison. Prince Henry, however, had underrated the generosity of the Spanish general, who granted the same honourable conditions to the besieged as he had previously intended. The garrison was permitted to march out with banners displayed, and with all the honours of war: the moveables and effects in Breda, which had belonged to Prince Maurice, were delivered up to his successor: indemnity was granted to the burghesses, and they were allowed two years to remove their treasures, if they chose, beyond the power of the Spaniards. The siege of Breda had always been an unpopular enterprise with Spinola's officers and soldiers; and during its progress, many of them had left the lines and gone to serve in Italy. Those who remained had looked forward to an immense booty at the termination of the siege; and as they knew the straits to which the town was reduced, and the wealth it contained, the conditions of its surrender were peculiarly obnoxious. The terms of capitulation, however, were scrupulously observed. According to agreement, Justin marched out with his garrison, which was now reduced to 3000 men. Spinola waited with his

principal officers at the quarter through which the governor was to march, and greeted him as he passed with much courtesy and approbation.¹ The garrison, however, left behind them to the victors, forty-three pieces of artillery, a great number of muskets, with an immense quantity of ammunition and implements of war.² After its surrender, the Infanta Isabella visited Breda, and shewed herself to the army, accompanied by Cardinal Cueva, who was formerly so well known while ambassador from Spain to Venice, by the name of the Marques of Bedmar, and who now, in his capacity of Spanish envoy, acted as chief minister to the Arch-Dutchess.

Subsequently to the capture of Breda, the military operations languished in the Netherlands. Olivarez, who was ever sanguine in his expectations, anticipated, that when the Emperor should have reduced both Germany and the northern nations under his sway, of which at this time he had a fair prospect, Holland would then of itself naturally fall under the dominion of its ancient masters. He therefore considered it better that Spain should employ her treasures in contributing to the decisive victories

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. vi. c. 5.—Calderon, the celebrated Spanish dramatic poet, who was born in the year 1600, served during his youth in the wars of Flanders, and was probably present at the siege of Breda. One of his plays, *El Sitio de Breda*, turns on that subject. It is a sort of historic drama, alternately representing the movements in the Spanish army, and those within the walls of the city. It comprehends the whole course of the siege, beginning with Spinola's feint against Grave, and concluding with a tedious and most prosaic discussion concerning the terms of capitulation, and the entrance of the Spaniards into the town. A Prince of Poland, who arrives during the siege to witness the military exploits, is the herald of admiration and praise concerning the valour and glory of the Spaniards, as also the power of their King,

El mayor Rey del Mundo es el de España.

² Hugo, *Obsid. Bredana*.

of the Emperor, than lavish them in besieging a chain of fortresses, the reduction of which would cost more than the support of several armies. The intricate details of Italian politics now also arrested the attention of the Spanish minister, and expensive leagues began to be formed with the petty states of Lombardy.

In order to support the arduous and widely extending contest in which the country was engaged, the States of Castile had granted their King a gratuity of 72 millions of ducats, payable by instalments in a certain number of years. Olivarez had sufficient address to communicate such a spirit of domination to the higher orders, that the grandees and ecclesiastics voluntarily assessed themselves to meet the present exigencies of the realm. The Inquisitor General exhorted all his Majesty's subjects to contribute to the necessities of the state, and followed up his recommendation by an offer of 200 ducats for his share. Like sums were subscribed by the Count de Monterey, the Marques of Castel-Rodrigo, and the Marques del Carpio ; while the Constable of Castile contributed 200 and the Count-Duke Olivarez 300 ducats.¹ But a country which can only carry on war by the precarious donations of individuals, had best remain at peace. In fact, nothing could be more deplorable than the present state of the Spanish finances. The royal domains were alienated or mortgaged,—the produce of the mines of Mexico and Peru was frequently seized by the Dutch gallies on the voyage homeward to the mother country, and the revenues derived from Naples and Portugal were assigned to the merchants of Genoa or Venice in payment of the interest of loans : Sicily, Sardinia, and the Dutchy of Milan, produced little more than was sufficient to support their viceroys, with the garrisons and gallies necessary for their protection : Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia,

¹ *Cabala*, p. 168.

Navarre, and Roussillon, in consequence of ancient and highly valued privileges, contributed nothing to the exigencies of the state except a voluntary donation, the amount of which being fixed by the deputies of these provinces, was always extremely moderate. After all deductions, the ordinary revenue did not exceed fifteen or twenty millions of ducats, which were chiefly drawn from the tithes of the clergy, and were scarcely sufficient for the maintenance of the King, the support of the royal establishment, and payment of the civil appointments. Yet with resources thus limited, it was proposed by Olivarez to subsidise the Emperor, to maintain armies in Italy and the Netherlands, and to fit out fleets to be employed in the Mediterranean, the East Indies, and the coast of South America. In order to accomplish such stupendous plans in a country so ill provided with specie, and destitute of commerce, industry, or useful arts, it was necessary to resort to extraordinary means. A new coinage, with a fictitious and exorbitant value, threw the finances into still greater disorder; and the continued exaction of gratuities, by producing discontent, and at length rebellion, completed the ruin of the country.¹

It had been a part of the policy of the Spanish monarchs to make a progress through their dominions shortly after their accession, with the ostensible object of inquiring into their situation, but, in reality, chiefly with a view of levying contributions from the provinces and wealthy cities which they visited. From various circumstances, and, among others, in consequence of the long protracted stay of the Prince of Wales at Madrid, Philip had as yet scarcely moved farther from his capital than the Escorial or Aranjuez. In the spring, however, of the year 1624, it had been resolved that he should make a progress through the south of Spain. He proceeded, along with the In-

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*, t. iv.

fant Don Carlos and Olivarez, from Aranjuez to Anduxar and Cordova. But on his way through Andalusia, he experienced very unfavourable and tempestuous weather, which occasioned many inconveniences and impediments. So memorable, indeed, was the storm, that Gongora described it in a sonnet,¹ and Quevedo, who was at that time in attendance on the court, wrote a letter concerning it. The King amused himself, as he passed along, with exhibitions of bull-fights and cane-plays, which were got up at the different towns for his entertainment. He resided for ten or twelve days in the Alcazar of Seville, admiring its architectural beauty, the ornaments of its halls, its terraces and garden, and apparently much delighted with the magnificence of the inhabitants of that famed city, their masquerades, illuminations, and fireworks. The Duke of Medina-Sidonia² had reared a temporary palace in the solitudes of his chase and forest called Donna Anna, to which the King was conducted from Seville by the Duke's vassals and pages in splendid array. Thence, after partaking of a magnificent repast, he proceeded towards the coast, and arrived at the harbour of San Lucar de Barrameda on the estuary of the Guadalquiver, where the Dukes of Medina-Sidonia almost reigned over Andalusia. He was received at the ducal residence with much state and ceremony, and, after a short stay, having embarked at the quay of San Lucar,

¹ *Opere*, p. 31.

² He was Don Juan Manuel the eighth Duke, who married a daughter of the Duke of Lerma, and soon after distinguished himself as Captain General of Andalusia at the attack on Cadiz by the English. He was father of the celebrated Duchess of Braganza, who became Queen of Portugal, and of her brother Gaspar Perez the ninth Duke, who entered into a conspiracy against his native country about the time of the revolution of Portugal.—(Lopez de Haro, *Nobiliario Genealogico*.) The chase was called Donna Anna after the Duke's mother, Donna Anna de Silva y Mendoza.

he sailed down the noble stream of the Guadalquiver in a species of triumph. He touched at his great commercial city of Cadiz, where he inspected the armaments and arsenal, and thence travelled by land to the Rock of Gibraltar. Pursuing his journey along the shores of the Mediterranean, he reached Malaga, where he gave directions with regard to the repairs of the harbour, and was entertained by a display of fireworks and a mock sea-fight. Thence, by the route of Antequera, he arrived at Grenada, and reposed for six days in the ancient Moorish palace of Alhambra.¹

But this had proved merely an excursion of pleasure. The king had indeed received *bouquets* of diamonds from the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and from his Dutchess the gift of a silver casket, containing a hundred pair of gloves perfumed with amber; but he had touched nothing real, except a sum of 30,000 ducats which he had deigned to accept from the citizens of Seville, and about 20,000 from those of Grenada.

The exigencies of the state required more effectual and ample supplies. And, accordingly, soon after his return to the capital, from his expedition to the south of Spain, it was determined that he should proceed into Catalonia, in order to persuade the inhabitants of that province, by the influence of his presence, to double their annual gratuity. To this expedition, which proved so unfortunate in its ultimate consequences, he was urged by the complaints of the Cortes of Castile, who were at present obliged to provide for the whole expenses of the war; and the visit was combined with a plan of Olivarez, to join in a closer political, as well as commercial union, the different kingdoms and principalities of which the Spanish monarchy was formed.²

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.*, lib. v. c. 1. and 2.

² Id. lib. vii. c. 1.

On his way to Barcelona, Philip held the Cortes of Aragon at Saragossa, and rendered himself popular in that city, by withdrawing the military guard, which had been placed there in 1592 by Philip II., when exasperated by the protection afforded to his secretary Perez. After much discussion, the Cortes granted 2000 men for fifteen years, to be clothed, armed and paid at the expense of the province.¹ From Saragossa the King proceeded by Monçon, Balaguières, Cervera, and Martorel to Barcelona. He arrived in his coach, about four in the afternoon, within a mile of that city, and was there met by a vast concourse of people, who had rushed forth to receive him, amongst whom were the professors of the university, the deputies of the states, the bishop, and the viceroy. These dignitaries were on horseback, and rode with the king, who had now descended from his coach, and had mounted a palfrey. On entering the city, he alighted at the monastery of Valdonzellas, where he dismissed the light body guards of Perpignan, by whom he had been escorted, and went in his coach, to repose himself in the palace of the Dukes of Cardona, which, on that evening, was splendidly illuminated. On the following day he made a royal progress through the town, in his best equipment of feathers and diamonds, and wearing the pearl called the Orphan, which was supposed to be unmatched in the world. While proceeding round the walls, he was saluted by artillery, and all sorts of instrumental music, and when he reached the principal gate, a suspended figure, representing an angel from the sky, delivered into his hands the keys of the city. The ceremonies were continued during the next day, when the king received the homage of the grandees and oaths of fidelity from the citizens. Meanwhile, he adopted measures for speedily summoning the Cortes. But it was not

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. vii. c. 1.

to be expected that even a royal visit, which had so unpopular an object in view, could bend the resolution of a fierce intractable people ; and with the assembling of the Cortes ended all the good humour and rejoicings. As at Saragossa, the king required the states of the province to furnish him with troops (according to some accounts, to the number of 6000) for a term of fifteen years, and he also proposed, that they should agree to his minister's plan, of associating themselves with a great national company, to be formed for the improvement of commerce. But the Cortes would only consent to these proposals, on conditions which were inadmissible, or which could not be performed, and of which the most unpalatable was a stipulation for repayment of the sums which his Majesty's predecessors had borrowed from the states of Catalonia. Philip had not the sagacity, nor his minister the temper, to appeal privately or individually to the different members of the assembly to whom he had applied as a body,—a device which generally succeeds in the hands of men in power, who are anxious to overcome popular resistance. Olivarez could not conceal his indignation at this refusal (for such it was considered), of the Catalans. The court was so much the more dissatisfied, that the states of Valencia, which had also been applied to for pecuniary assistance, had replied that they meant to follow whatever example was given them from Catalonia. At length, during one of the meetings of the Cortes, a Catalan gentleman drew his sword on the Duke of Cardona, for supporting, with imprudent warmth, the interests of the King, for whom he acted. The tumult which ensued was appeased by the Duke of Maqueda, who, with some other Castilian grandees of his Majesty's retinue, boldly entered the hall of assembly.¹ But Philip, immediately after this

¹ Cespedes, lib. vii. c. 2.

outrage, quitted Barcelona in great irritation. Its inhabitants blamed Olivarez for this precipitate departure, and accused him of attempting to render them suspected by their Sovereign. This was the commencement of the long-enduring hatred between that intractable people and the vindictive minister. The Catalans, on obtaining from the Crown some commercial advantages in a mercantile treaty, which was shortly afterwards concluded with France, sent deputies to Madrid, with instructions to resume consideration of the royal demands; but the events which had occurred still rankled in their bosoms; and to the ill-timed visitation at Barcelona, may be traced the origin of that general revolt, which, fourteen years afterwards, desolated Catalonia, and shook the monarchy to its foundations.

Though Olivarez, being thus disappointed of the supplies on which he had calculated, could not maintain so formidable an army as he wished in Italy, he had already contrived to form a powerful league in that country for the destruction of French influence, and the support of the Austrian power. After their states had been long the theatre of war between the hostile armies of France and Spain, the Italian princes found themselves in a great measure delivered from the presence of foreign nations, by the peace of Chateau Cambresis, concluded in 1559. For this advantage they had been less indebted to their own strength than to the mutual jealousy of the two great powers of Europe. They had now, for more than half a century, enjoyed a period of unwonted repose; but though little molested, during this interval, by hostile incursions, the eyes both of the French and Spanish potentates had continued still to be greedily fixed on their rich possessions.

If, during the reigns of Philip II. and Philip III, the Spaniards did not form a plan for universal monarchy in

Europe, they at least designed, if possible, to extend their dominion over the whole of Italy ; and the conspiracy of the Marques Bedmar at Venice formed a part of their scheme. At the commencement of the present reign, the Spanish Viceroys in Italy still followed that vision of Cæsarean supremacy, which ever eluded their grasp. The vain and ambitious character of the Duke of Feria, at this time governor of Milan, led him, in the eager pursuit of this phantom, to involve his country in the most ruinous wars, expensive leagues, and intricate negotiations.¹ Though the Italian princes held splendid and luxurious courts, they were deficient in military strength, and it required much address and management to preserve their independence.² Hence they pursued an

¹ “ Le Duc de Feria,” says Bassompierre, “ homme ambitieux et vain ; qui vouloit, à quelque prix que ce fût, brouiller les cartes, et faire parler de lui.”—(*Memoires.*)

² Quevedo, in one of his satires, entitled, *Fortuna con Seso*, written some years afterwards, has thus represented the situation of Italy during this period :—“ Italy, for want of ground to walk on, exercised herself on the tight rope, of which she fixed one end at Rome, and the other at Savoy. France and Spain were the spectators. The two kings of these countries kept a watchful eye on her, observing to which side she inclined as she danced, each being ready to catch her if she fell. Italy, perceiving what they aimed at, laid hold of the Republic of Venice, and grasping it with both hands, as a pole to poise her, leaped and skipped wonderfully, sometimes making as if she would fall to one side, and sometimes to the other, diverting herself with the eagerness of both parties, who stretched out their arms to catch her, and surprising others with her skill, in recovering herself and deceiving them both.

“ The Savoyard complained, That his Duke was the perpetual motion, and consumed his subjects with continual wars, to bear up his dominions, which are ever ready to sink between France and Spain : That this safety consisted in embroiling the two kings at the expense of his subjects, to the end that, being employed against

equivocal and wavering policy. They had no fixed plan or united principle of action. Each took counsel by his own immediate danger—broke treaties when it suited, and accommodated his versatile measures to his hopes and fears, or even to his momentary inquietudes. If at any time a mutual danger led the different states to combine, in order to set limits to the encroachments of Spain, and assert the independence of Italy, soon the dread of its vengeance induced them to conciliate the alliance of this formidable monarchy.

Spain, on the whole, was, at this period, more dangerous than France to the maintenance of Italian independence. Almost all the States were in contact with the Spanish possessions of Naples or Milan, which extended over one-half of the Peninsula; and the Pope, who was nearly hemmed in between these two viceroyalties, while he found in the Spanish princes the most stedfast supporters of the Papal See, beheld in them dangerous neighbours to his temporal sovereignty. The recent occupation by Spain of the small but important district of the Valteline, which was considered as a step towards opening a direct communication, especially for the passage of troops, between the Austrian territories and the Spanish dominions in Italy, had, for some years past, excited more than usual alarm. The Valteline was a Catholic country, and it had been occupied by the Spaniards towards the

each other, neither of them might swallow him, since both these princes alternately conquer and defend him, all which the subjects pay for, being never allowed any respite to breathe. When France attacks him, Spain supports him; and when Spain invades his territories, France defends them. But whereas neither protects him for his sake, but to prevent the other from enlarging his dominion, by that accession, and becoming a nearer and more formidable neighbour, the defence is often more fatal to the subjects than the invasion."

close of the reign of Philip III, under pretence of protecting the inhabitants from the oppressions of their Protestant neighbours, the Grisons, from whose confederacy they had revolted. The Spaniards still held possession of this district at the accession of Philip IV. But by a treaty negotiated at Madrid, the year he succeeded, between Mareschal Bassompierre, on the part of France, and the Spanish minister Balthazar de Zuniga, it had been stipulated that the Valteline should be restored to the Grisons, and that the Spanish troops should be wholly withdrawn from the territory. On some frivolous pretences, the Spaniards refused to fulfil this obligation. A league had been in consequence formed in 1623, by the King of France, the Duke of Savoy, and Republic of Venice, for the purpose of compelling Spain to restore the Valteline; and to this confederacy the Swiss Cantons were, soon afterwards, persuaded to accede. The King of Spain nominally placed the Valteline in a species of deposit with Pope Gregory XV, but as that Pontiff was known to be entirely devoted to the interests of the House of Austria, and as Spain still continued to insist on the free passage of her troops through the Valteline,¹ the new allies were not to be satisfied with this evasive arrangement. During the minority, indeed, of Louis XIII, the Queen Regent had departed from the policy of Henry the Great, by uniting herself to the House of Austria. But it was again followed out as soon as Richelieu was reinstated in the council; and before the close of the year 1624, the Marquis de Cœuvres, at the head of a French army, entered the Valteline as an auxiliary of the Grisons, and took possession of all the towns occupied by Spanish or papal garrisons. Alarmed at this success, as also at the French alliance with Savoy and Venice, the Court of Spain formed a league with the Dukes

¹ Aubery, *Histoire du Ministère de Richelieu*, t. i.

of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and the Republic of Genoa, by which these powers engaged to raise an army of 30,000 men, and to equip a fleet of 200 gallies, in case the King of France should cross the Alps for the invasion of Italy.

The expulsion of the Spaniards from the Valteline had been the chief object of the French, but their confederates of Savoy and Venice urged them to turn their arms towards Italy; and even after that step had been determined on by Richelieu, the allies differed in opinion as to the point of attack that should be chosen. The Venetians proposed an invasion of the Milanese. This, however, was objected to by Richelieu, as it would have amounted to a direct declaration of war against the Catholic king, for which he was not yet prepared. As the French minister would only consent to wound Spain through the medium of her confederates, an attack on the Genoese was suggested by the Duke of Savoy, who had a dispute with them concerning the Marquisate of Zuccarello, a small district lying between their confines and those of Piedmont. The Republic of Genoa had long been accounted the most useful and most faithful ally of the Spaniards in Italy. Ever since the French influence had been destroyed by the great Andrew Doria, the Genoese had maintained the closest and most uninterrupted connection with Spain. Their harbours were open to its fleets, and their merchants supported its treasury. But though the interests of this commonwealth and of the crown of Spain were thus linked together, the Venetians refused to employ their forces in the enterprise, considering it unjust to avenge themselves of the Spaniards by destroying an unoffending State. The proposition, however, was favourably received in France,¹ where it was thought that the ruin of Genoa would lead

¹ Vassor, *Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII*, livre xxi.

to the subjugation of Milan¹ with the other Austrian possessions in Italy, and would, at all events, hinder the Duke of Fera, at that time governor of the Milanese, from carrying his arms into the Valteline. Accordingly, though there was no ground or pretext for war on the part of France, and though no previous complaint of injury was made to the Republic, the formidable Lesdiguières, who had often warred in Italy, and who, in extreme old age, still retained all his vigour and his vices, was sent across the barrier of the Alps, at the head of a body of French troops, accompanied by his son-in-law, the celebrated Mareschal Crequi. The French generals had an interview with the Duke of Savoy at Susa, where they arranged the plan of their attack and partition of Genoa. Their united armies amounted to 30,000 men, with which force they marched through Montferrat,—jealous of each other, but reconciled, for a time, by their mutual enmity to Spain, and their hopes of sharing the spoils of an opulent commonwealth. The utmost consternation prevailed at Genoa when intelligence reached that city of the approach of the enemy. In the preceding century, Genoa had enjoyed an enviable state of prosperity. Its nobles were less ambitious and luxurious than those of Venice,—its sober and parsimonious citizens were less addicted to pleasure,—and its government was more capable of availing itself of circumstances, as well as more pliant in its relations with other states. But in the present age, though the streets of Genoa exhibited every mark of wealth and splendour, it was internally a weak and enervated State. Spinola had been the herald of its military fame abroad; but at home its nobility were unwarlike, and without experience in arms,—its senators were old and enfeebled by ease or luxury,—its youth dissolute,—its populace thoughtless, factious, and without

¹ Capriata, *Storia delle Guerre d'Italia*, lib. viii.

confidence in their leaders, some of whom they believed, and not without reason, had intentions of delivering up the town to the enemy. But the Republic was saved by the dissensions of its foes. The Duke of Savoy wished to march forward directly to Genoa, in which event the city might have been carried by assault, as it was little prepared at that time for defence, and the Duke of Ferra, the Spanish governor of Milan, was not yet in a condition to afford assistance. The French general, however, insisted on reducing all the fortresses in their progress,¹ and wasted much time in the capture of Gavi, and similar places on the frontiers; and each castle that was taken, gave rise to a dispute whether it should be held by a French or Savoyard garrison.² It was believed by the Duke of Savoy, and it was currently reported both in France and Italy,³ that Lesdiguieres, who was extremely avaricious, had been bribed by the Genoese; but it is more probable that he acted in conformity with instructions from Richelieu, who was convinced that no lasting impression could be made on Italy so long as France was internally distracted by her religious wars, and who, therefore, only wished to amuse the Duke, in order to preserve his friendship and alliance for a more favourable opportunity. But, however this may be, the delay afforded time to the Genoese to muster some forces, of which those destined for the defence of the city were placed under command of the Duke of Tursis. By orders of the Spanish court, the Marques of Santa Croce hastened to their relief from Sicily, and the Duke of Ferra assembled a considerable force at Alexandria. On these demonstrations, the French, who had advanced within sight of Genoa, retired on pretence of laying siege to Savona. The Duke

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*, t. iv.

² Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, t. v.

³ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal. de Savoie*, t. ii. p. 407.

of Feria, though ignorant himself of the first principles of war, was assisted by Gonçalo de Cordova, who had been summoned from Flanders.¹ These commanders, as soon as they saw Genoa relieved from the dread of an immediate surprise, and even in a situation to commence offensive operations, fell on the territory of Piedmont, and laid siege, though unsuccessfully, to Verrua on the Po.² The Duke of Savoy, on receiving intelligence of this unexpected diversion, quitted his new conquests to fly to the protection of his hereditary states, which he had left almost destitute of defence. On his retreat from the Genoese territories, he lost nearly one half of his army by sickness and the hostility of the natives of Montferrat, through which he passed.³ But the Duke of Feria evacuated Piedmont at the approach of Lesdiguieres, who soon followed to his assistance, and who thus in turn saved that principality as the Spaniards had preserved the Republic of Genoa. After this exploit, Lesdiguieres would undertake no new enterprise. He set out himself for Grenoble, and placed his army in winter quarters in Piedmont.⁴

Such was the result of the ill concerted, and worse conducted, expedition against Genoa, which had been prompted by unjust ambition or motives of revenge, and which terminated in the disunion and discomfiture of the aggressors.

During the course of this war in Italy, a formal declaration of hostilities between France and Spain had appeared so inevitable, that Olivarez confiscated all the effects of Frenchmen residing in the Peninsula, and seized the French vessels lying in its harbours. Yet, to the surprise of all Europe, the King of France, immediately after the

¹ Siri, *Mem. Recon.* t. v. ² Cespedes, *Hist.* lib. vi. c. 7. and 8.

³ Capriata, *Guerre d'Italia*, lib. ix.

⁴ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal. de Savoie*.

retreat from Genoa, entered into an accommodation with Spain. The disputes between his generals and his chief ally the Duke of Savoy, left him little hope at present of success in Italy ; and he was also desirous to compose the internal disturbances of his kingdom, without impediment from foreign warfare. On the other hand, Olivarez was not indisposed to a temporary agreement, as the tide of fortune had not been altogether so favourable as his presuming ambition promised. This treaty, though adjusted at Madrid between the Spanish minister, and De Fargis, the French ambassador, bore the date of Monçon, in Aragon. The Court of France alleged that it had been concluded by its envoy without sufficient powers or authority. In fact, De Fargis had been six years ambassador in Spain, previous to the treaty of Monçon, and having received his directions before Richelieu became minister, had acted conformably to his orders. Richelieu alleged that he had sent him different instructions ; but De Fargis persisted in denying that these had ever reached him.¹ However this may be, the French Court resolved, with some slight variations, to ratify all the conditions. By the articles of this treaty, which the two great powers concluded without the knowledge of their Italian allies, it was stipulated that Spain should not again interfere with the Grisons in their possession of the Valteline, and should relinquish all right of marching troops through that territory. In return for this surrender, Spain obtained from France some commercial advantages ; and it was agreed that the two monarchs should employ their good offices to adjust the differences which existed among their Italian allies.²

Soon after the conclusion, however, of the treaty of Monçon, an incident occurred which rendered the newly

¹ *Observations sur le Test. Polit. de Richelieu.*

² Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. vii. c. 2. Vassor, livre xxiii.

established amity between France and Spain of short duration, and speedily rekindled the flames of war in Italy. Among the Italian princes, the Gonzagas had hitherto been the most subservient vassals of Spain ; but on the death of Vincenzo, Duke of Mantua and Montferrat, without issue, the succession to these duchies devolved on a French subject, Charles, Duke of Nevers, who was descended from a collateral branch of the family of Gonzaga, and had been acknowledged by the deceased Duke as his heir. Of these territories he had at first taken undisputed possession. But Ferdinand, Duke of Guastalla, the representative of a more distant collateral line, speedily asserted a claim to the succession. Olivarez, it is said, on the first news of the death of the Duke of Mantua, was disposed, at once, to acknowledge the Duke of Nevers. But he early received despatches from Gonçalo de Cordova, who, having succeeded the Duke of Feria as governor of Milan, enlarged on the danger which Spain would incur if a territory contiguous to her Italian possessions should remain under the power of a vassal and dependent of France.¹ The King of Spain, accordingly, resolved to support the pretensions of the Duke of Guastalla, while the Duke of Savoy, who had been highly exasperated at Richelieu for having concluded the treaty of Monçon without his knowledge, and had also some old claims on Montferrat, entered into a treaty with Spain for the purpose of partitioning that principality between them, and establishing the Duke of Guastalla on the throne of Mantua. In pursuance of this agreement, the troops of the Duke of Savoy overran that part of Montferrat which had been assigned to him in its division ; while the Spaniards under Gonçalo de Cordova, laid siege to its capital Casal, which was accounted one of the strongest places in Europe, and had fallen to their

¹ Denina, *Revoluzioni d'Italia*, lib. xxiii. c. 1.

share in the proposed partition.¹ But Gonçalo (though he had earned some reputation in the Netherlands), being in fact an unskilful general, all his operations were so ill conducted, that he made no progress in the siege; and the Duke of Savoy having got possession of Trino and Alba, with the other places allotted to him, showed little zeal for the success of his allies, and even allowed the besieged to draw supplies of provisions from his territories.² Meanwhile, the Emperor ordered Mantua to be put under sequestration, and published his ban against the Duke of Nevers for holding possession of this inheritance, without having paid homage to the Emperor, as liege lord of the Dutchy.³ The States of Italy, who were anxious for the due preservation of the balance of power, were justly alarmed at this judicial decision of a prince who was now in the zenith of his strength, and had 150,000 men under his banners, inured to victory, and commanded by the most celebrated generals of Europe.

The new subjects of the Duke of Nevers, or, as he may now be styled, of Mantua, were zealous in his cause; but he received only a feeble and tardy support from the Pope, or from the Venetians who were cautious in all their movements, and were afraid of the formidable power and dangerous neighbourhood of the Spaniards. He would, in consequence, have been utterly unable to make any effectual resistance to the arms of the House of Austria, had he not found a powerful protector in the King of France. At this momentous period, the capture of Rochelle, the stronghold of the Hugonots, left that monarch at leisure to turn his attention to the affairs of Italy. Olivarez has been much censured by politicians for not having made some vigorous effort to succour a town,

¹ Coxe's *History of House of Austria*, c. 51.

² Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. i.

³ Schiller's *Thirty Years' War*, book ii.

which had long rendered the utmost services to Spain, by employing in its reduction the troops of the French king. But it must be recollected, that the two nations, as yet, were not actually at war. They were inflicting mutual wounds in remote quarters, through the medium of distant allies; but an attempt to relieve Rochelle might have brought in return a French army across the Pyrenees, and hastened those disastrous events which Spain on her French frontier was soon destined to endure.

Richelieu had found it impossible to accomplish at once the two great objects he had proposed on first assuming the reins of government—the extirpation of the Hugonots, and the ruin of the House of Austria. But the King of France, as was anticipated, had no sooner got possession of the last place of refuge for his rebellious subjects, than he declared himself the Protector of the Duke of Mantua, and the liberties of Italy, against Austrian usurpation. Placing himself in person at the head of 25,000 men, comprehending almost all the nobility and chivalry of France, he marched, accompanied by Richelieu, in the month of February, amidst frost and snow, towards the Pennine Alps and Valley of Suza. In the late treaty with Spain, the Duke of Savoy had undertaken to prevent the entrance into Italy of any French army which might attempt to cross the Alps, with the view of espousing the cause of the Duke of Mantua. Richelieu, however, had an interview near Suza with the Prince of Piedmont, who appeared there on the part of his father, and every effort was tried by the French minister to induce him to allow the free passage of the army. This, however, was not to be obtained on any condition, short of yielding to Savoy as much of Montferrat as it was entitled to by the agreement with Spain. As this demand could not be conceded with any regard to the interests of the Duke of Mantua, the Prince wore out the

time in negotiations, in order to allow Gonçalo de Cordova to send forward reinforcements.¹ At length, however, these delays proving ineffectual, Louis XIII, aided by Mareschals Crequi and Bassompierre, forced, amid almost insurmountable difficulties, the Pass of Suza,² which was considered as the key to Italy. This success was followed by a separate peace between Louis and the Duke of Savoy, by the terms of which the latter agreed to admit a French garrison into Suza—to accept of Trino in lieu of all farther pretensions on Montferrat—to allow the French troops free access into any part of that principality—to do all in his power to throw supplies of provisions and ammunition into Casal—no longer to molest the Duke of Mantua in the quiet possession of his States; and, in the event of any resistance being offered by Spain to the full execution of this treaty, to join the league which had been formed by the King of France and Republic of Venice, for maintaining the tranquillity and independence of Italy. Being thus deserted by their chief ally, the Spaniards were obliged to abandon the siege of Casal, and to concentrate their forces in the Milanese.

The result of this campaign was extremely injurious to the reputation of the King of Spain in Italy. He had shown an unjust and grasping spirit in attempting to deprive the Duke of Mantua of his lawful inheritance. His general Gonçalo de Cordova, who first urged on the

¹ Siri, *Memor. Recon.*

² So low at this time was the military reputation of Britain all over the Continent, on account of the unsuccessful expeditions to Cadiz and the Isle of Rhé, that, before the battle of Suza, the Sieur de Comminges having advanced to the Italian Lines to demand free passage, was answered by the Count de Verrua, the Savoyard officer on guard, that the French would now find that they had not to deal with English. (Aubery, *Hist. du Ministere de Richelieu*, t. ii.)

war, had failed ingloriously in the enterprise against Casal, and had been unable to preserve the fidelity of the Duke of Savoy. Louis, on the other hand, appeared in the light of a conqueror, and a useful protector of his allies. Accordingly, while the most ancient confederates of Spain, even the Genoese, began to waver in their attachment, the league of the King of France with Venice and the Duke of Mantua was cemented. Almost all the Princes of Italy sent ambassadors to congratulate Louis, and to thank him for having delivered them from the imminent slavery they apprehended, had Casal been taken by the Spaniards. Some of the States, particularly the Venetians, who hitherto, with their usual prudence, had taken little share in the military operations, invited him to advance farther into Italy against the common enemy; and it seems probable that, with such support, Louis might at this time have easily overwhelmed the Spaniards. But whatever were his motives,—whether he was prompted merely by fickleness of temper, or by the alarm of new disturbances in Languedoc,—he suddenly returned to France with Richelieu, before the conditions of the treaty of Suza were fulfilled, leaving in Italy only a small force of 6000 men under Mareschal Crequi, which soon afterwards dispersed from want of provisions.

The tardy and unskilful operations of Gonçalo de Cordova before Casal, had highly dissatisfied Olivarez, who never forgave a failure in the execution of those measures he had himself planned and adopted. In the present critical juncture of affairs in Italy, he resolved to entrust the government of Milan, with the conduct of the war in Lombardy, to the able hands of Spinola. That commander had recently come to Madrid from the Netherlands on some military and political affairs, and was desirous either to return to his government in the Low

Countries, or to pass the remainder of his days in Spain. He yielded, at length, to the urgent entreaties of the King, that he should forthwith embark for Italy ; but his absence from the Netherlands was fatal to the interests of his master in that quarter, and his presence did not re-establish his affairs in the region where he went to assume the command. On his first arrival, indeed, the celebrity of his name confirmed his countrymen, the Genoese, in their alliance with the Spaniards, and again brought over to their cause the wavering Duke of Savoy. But whether it was, as an old writer expresses it, “ that his felicity followed him not, but was fixed to the Belgic soil, or that the several ends and emulations of the chieftains, who managed that war, did turmoil his genius, or that his death, which shortly happened, cut off the thread of his excellent fortune, he was forced to succumb in this.”¹ Spinola had undertaken the expedition with reluctance, and the aspect of affairs, on his arrival at Milan, did not tend to encourage him. It was not long before he was satisfied that, in the contest concerning the Mantuan succession, he had a cause to support which was unjust in itself, suspicious to the Italian princes, and hateful in the eyes of the world. He found the Dutchy of Milan, which was the chief support of the Spanish power in the north of Italy, exhausted even beyond his expectation, and totally unable to sustain the burden of a new army. He was aware that no dependence could be placed on the Duke of Savoy : he learned that the French were again preparing to cross the Alps with a formidable force, and he perceived that the fortifications of Casal were so strong, that its siege must prove a tedious and doubtful enterprise.² It was also evident that, in a contest with France in Italy, Spain hazarded an unequal game, since, in that country, France had little to lose

¹ Monmouth's *Translation of Capriata*, book xi.

² Ibid.

whereas Spain exposed to peril her valuable possessions of Naples and Milan.¹ Accordingly Spinola, who had received ample powers to treat of an accommodation, as well as to carry on the war, used every effort to adjust the existing differences. He even agreed that the Duke of Mantua should obtain the investiture of that Dutchy from the Emperor, if he would receive, for the sake of appearances, a small German or Spanish force on any part of his territory; and he consented to disband the remainder of his army, provided the French recalled all their scattered troops from Italy—restored the towns they still held in Piedmont, and placed Casal as a deposit in the hands of the Imperialists.²

All his endeavours, however, for a general pacification in Italy, having proved ineffectual, Spinola began to make preparations for the siege of Casal. This fortress was considered by the Spaniards of the utmost importance, as, by its possession, they could hold in check the Duke of Savoy, and could best succour their allies among the Italian princes. The former failure, too, before it, still rankled in the breast of the Spanish minister, and in the instructions which Spinola received from the Court of Madrid, the capture of Casal was pointed out as the leading object to which his efforts should be directed.

This city stood in a plain, on the left bank of the Po. Its form was irregular, but it was everywhere surrounded with walls, except on the north side, where the river,

¹ “ Il Marchese Spinola era solito di dire, che sarebbe stato Poltrone co’ Francesi in Italia, e non havrebbe combattuto con essi, mentre non havessero avuto à perdere uno stato eguale à quello del Ducato di Milano.” (Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, t. vii. p. 272.)

² The French writers, however, allege, that Spinola only negotiated in order to gain time to prepare for war. (Aubery, *Hist. du Ministère de Richelieu*, t. 1.)

flowing up to the houses, served the purpose of a ditch. On the south, where the plain extended itself, stood the citadel, which was of large compass, flanked by six bulwarks, and strengthened by all the arts of fortification which were at that time practised.¹ The neighbouring hills approached within half a mile of the citadel; and the great error committed by Gonçalo de Cordova, in the recent siege, was neglecting to occupy these heights, which commanded the city, and guarded the chief access by which provisions or other supplies could reach it.

Spinola sat down before this place, which, in those days, was accounted almost impregnable, with an army of 18,000 infantry, consisting of Germans and Italians, and a body of 2500 Spaniards under the young Duke of Lerma.² Spinola also commanded about 6000 cavalry; but at this time his son Don Philip had conducted almost the whole of that force to the succour of the Duke of Savoy in Piedmont. Soon after Spinola had encamped before Casal, many of the Spanish grandees hastened to his tents—eager to serve under so renowned a leader, in an enterprise which was exciting the attention of all Europe. The garrison in Casal, consisting of soldiers of France and Montferrat, was nominally commanded by a son of the Duke of Mantua; but the French Mareschal Toiras directed all the military operations. While forming the lines of circumvallation, frequent skirmishes occurred between the Spaniards and the besieged; and Spinola, it is said, expressed the highest admiration at the vigilance and valour of the French garrison: “Had I,” he exclaimed, “50,000 as brave and as well disciplined troops, I could conquer Europe.”³

¹ Capriata, lib. x.

² Siri, *Mem. Recondite*, t. vii.

³ Vassor, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* livre xxviii.

The negotiations for peace having failed, and the war having been renewed, by the blockade of Casal, the Emperor, who had, at this time, triumphed over all his enemies in Germany, and concluded a treaty with the King of Denmark, now resolved to interpose effectually in the affairs of Italy, on pretence of his obligation to preserve the general tranquillity of that country, and his rights as Paramount of Mantua. After some fruitless, and perhaps fictitious, negotiations with France, he despatched, at the urgent representations of Spain, an army amounting to 40,000 men, under the Count of Collalto, who forced their way through the country of the Grisons, and the Valteline, and descending on the plains of Italy, perpetrated in those favoured regions which are watered by the Po, the same horrors that had attended the prosecution of the war in Germany. The Milanese, though belonging to the King of Spain, did not escape their ravages, and they soon obtained for their master the curse of Italy, in addition to the execrations of the Empire. Having desolated the open country, the Imperialists next laid siege to Mantua. Its Duke had a high character in France, and was distinguished in the time of Henry IV. as a loyal subject, and a brave commander. But he showed himself a feeble and irresolute sovereign, and his defence of Mantua, which possessed great advantages in its natural position, and its bulwarks, did not correspond to his former military reputation. The Marquis de Coeuvre, now known by the name of the Mareschal d'Estrées, who was sent by the French King to his assistance, conducted himself with indiscretion and negligence; the Duke of Savoy, who again inclined to the part of Spain, refused to fulfil the obligations he had undertaken at Susa; the Venetian troops, who attempted to effect a diversion in favour of the be-

sieged, were shamefully discomfited,¹ and the Duke of Guastalla, the competitor for Mantua, entertained correspondencies within the town, by which every local information was communicated to the Imperialists.² It was by stratagem, however, that the Austrians at last succeeded in obtaining possession of Mantua. Having intercepted a courier, with a letter from its Duke to the Venetians, in which he implored them to send him a reinforcement of 4000 troops by a certain day, the Austrian commander conceived the design of surprising the place, by substituting a body of his own soldiers instead of the expected Venetians. On the evening of the appointed day, this band, feigning that they had forced one of the quarters of the Imperialists, but that they were pursued by them, made their way fighting, and retreating, as it were, towards the town. Having arrived at the gate, it was opened to them, under this feint; and having thus obtained an entrance, they instantly seized on the principal places of the city. The Duke being informed of this surprise, precipitately fled with his family into the citadel. But it was found to be incapable of holding out, and he was allowed, on its surrender, to retire into the Ecclesiastical States.³ After his departure, the city was given up to plunder. The devastations and cruelty of the soldiery exceeded all that they had yet perpetrated in Italy. The palaces and churches were sacked, and many of the inhabitants were massacred, perhaps by the very hands which were so soon to be stained by the memorable carnage at Magdeburg.

Meanwhile Spinola had been advancing but slowly with the siege of Casal, as, during all the operations, his

¹ Vassor, livre, xxviii.

² Aubery, *Hist. du Minist. de Richelieu*.

³ Heiss, *Hist. de l'Empire*, livre iii. c. 9.

schemes were counteracted by false friends and treacherous allies. Collalto, the Austrian general, being jealous of his reputation, would not afford him any assistance or co-operation, even after he had succeeded in the reduction of Mantua. The Duke of Savoy, assuming the character of a secret friend of France, wrote one day to hasten the march of the French army into Italy, and on the next demanded reinforcements from Spinola to oppose its progress. On pretence of compliance with the terms of the treaty concluded at Suza, he was ever sending supplies of all sorts into Casal, and was only prevented from openly espousing the side of the French, by constant remittances of Spanish gold.¹ The King of France was as much perplexed as Spinola by the doubtful policy of the Duke, and entered Italy at the head of an army, uncertain whether to attack his states, or to aid him against the Spaniards. At length, however, Pignerol having been seized by the French, and the Duke having, in consequence of this step, declared against them, Louis took Chambery, and overran almost the whole of Savoy. In this emergency, the Duke, Spinola, and Collalto, met at Carmagnuola, in Piedmont, to consult on the best measures to be adopted in the present posture of affairs. At this interview, the Duke of Savoy proposed that the enterprise against Casal should be abandoned, and that all the allied forces in Italy should be united to retake Pignerol and Suza, and again drive the French beyond the barrier of the Alps. This opinion was supported by Collalto, and even by some officers in Spinola's army, particularly the Duke of Lerma.² But the Spanish commander had received peremptory orders from the Court of Madrid to take Casal, and he conceived that all he had performed since he entered Italy, would be lost if its siege were now relinquished.

¹ Capriata, lib. xi. Vassor, livre xxviii.

² Brusoni, lib. i.

This opposition to his views, and a previous refusal of Spinola to supply him with farther reinforcements or money, unless he should place in his hands some cautionary towns in Piedmont, as security for his good faith towards the King of Spain, produced a bitter enmity against the Spanish commander, in the breast of the faithless and vindictive Charles Emmanuel.¹ Determined, if possible, to effect his ruin, he employed the Abbot Scaglia, one of his emissaries at Madrid, to complain of the rigorous usage he had received from Spinola, and to insinuate that he was engaged in a secret correspondence with Cardinal Richelieu. The Duke himself died² shortly after this proceeding, but he was succeeded by his son Victor Amadeus, who was a Prince nearly of the same character as his father. The suggestions of the Abbot Scaglia had but too much effect at Madrid. During his short stay in that capital, before embarking for Italy, Spinola had shewn that he was a profound politician, as well as a consummate warrior. He had ventured to criticise some parts of the policy of Olivarez, particularly the assistance he afforded to the King of France in the siege of Rochelle; and it was as much with a view of removing a person of his probity and talents from the presence of the King, as of re-establishing affairs in Italy, that the jealous minister procured his appointment to the government of Milan. Olivarez was thus prepared to listen eagerly to the complaints against him; and it is an example of the wretched system of policy he adopted, that he should have given an ear to the suggestions of a perfidious ally, to the disadvantage of a servant of long tried fidelity, and the only commander of the age on whose experience or military talents Spain could place reliance. The powers

¹ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal. de Savoie*.

² It is somewhat remarkable that the Duke of Savoy, Spinola, and the Austrian General Collalto, all died in the same year.

of Spinola, which before had been sufficiently ample, because he would not leave Spain if they were limited, were now by the influence of Olivarez greatly restricted. In addition to other mortifications, he daily received complaints and reprimands from the Court of Madrid, and the most harsh unmerited reproaches for his delay in the capture of Casal. His whole soul was now bent on the success of that enterprise; and however desirous of peace on his first landing in Italy, he now earnestly protested against the suspension of arms which was negotiated among the belligerent powers by means of Mazarine, the Pope's Legate.¹ This treaty, which was concluded when he justly believed himself on the eve of entering Casal, and which deprived him of the anticipated glory, completed his chagrin. By the terms of the truce, the Spaniards, indeed, were to have possession of the city, but the citadel was to be retained by the French garrison; and if succour arrived within a prescribed time, the town was to be relinquished also. To Spinola, however, the occupation of the place was of little interest, compared with the hope of its surrender to his arms, which he conceived could alone wipe away the stain on his military fame, and the censures of the Court of Spain. He retired from the camp to the Castle of Scrivia in the vicinity, and the Marques of Santa Croce assumed the command of the army. Spinola was of a dry meagre habit of body, and of an anxious, atrabilious temperament. He could never sleep when he had ought of the smallest importance on his mind, which was the more remarked, because such was the tranquillity possessed by his great rival Prince Maurice, that, like his illustrious father, he sunk to repose amid the most trying circumstances, as soon as he had laid his head on the pillow, and could with difficulty be awakened for the execution of the most im-

¹ Capriata, lib. xii.

portant enterprises.¹ The siege of Casal, and the crooked politics of the Duke of Savoy, it may thus be believed, had occasioned Spinola many sleepless nights. His health had been already broken, and his constitution worn out by the campaigns of thirty years. But the distrust which had been latterly exhibited of his counsels, the controul exercised over his military operations, the reproaches of a Court to whose service his life had been devoted, and above all, the loss of his fame and honour, of which the Spanish ministry, as he thought, had deprived him, and which ever preyed on his spirits, hastened the death of this noble-minded Italian. He was attended in his last moments by the young Duke of Lerma, whose ancestor, the minister of Philip III, had so long supported him in his military career. Mareschal Toiras, the brave defender of Casal, also paid him a visit of consolation, and was moved even to tears by the situation in which he found his late enemy. He carried on long discourses with the King and Olivarez, justifying his conduct, and representing to them the fidelity with which, for more than thirty years, he had served the crown of Spain. “*Me han quitado la honra! Me han quitado la honra!*” was his ceaseless exclamation, till he at length expired, like his great countryman Columbus—a victim to the base ingratitude of Spain.²

That country had never owed to one of her own subjects such obligations as to Spinola. He was a native of Genoa, and the noblest of her sons since the days of An-

¹ Aubery, *Mem. pour l’Hist. de Hollande*, p. 281, ed. Paris 1697.

² Vassor, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* Siri, *Mem. Recon*, t. vii. It is said that the King neither paid him the pension he had promised, nor relieved him of the debts he had contracted for the Spanish service, and that he in consequence died so poor, that his son hesitated to declare himself his heir, *haereditatem dubitavit adire*.—(*Hispanicæ Dominations Arcana*, c. xix. § 15.)

drew Doria. His exalted rank and princely possessions had not prevented him from engaging in trade in early life, and he continued his mercantile occupations till the age of thirty, without entering on warlike service, or even participating in public affairs. The thirst, however, of military reputation, was the predominant passion of his soul. But he had, in fact, no native land which could afford scope for the exercise of his genius, and whose defence or aggrandizement could hallow his thirst of fame. At that time the campaigns in the Netherlands, carried on, as was asserted, for the maintenance of religion and regal authority, opened the noblest career of arms in Europe. His warlike emulation was kindled by the achievements of his younger brother Frederick, who, with a small squadron of gallies, had successfully cruised against the commerce of the Dutch. He had proposed to embark on board his brother's ship, but the death of Frederic determined him to turn his attention from the sea to the land-service. At his own risk and expense he led a band of 8000 Italians to the assistance of the King of Spain in the Netherlands. As his country had been in the closest alliance with Spain for a century, he could hardly be stigmatized as a military adventurer, and he served the land which had adopted him as a soldier, with the implicit fidelity and obedience of a citizen. He so distinguished himself by his enterprises at the head of his auxiliary force, and by the judicious plans which he proposed for the prosecution of the war, that he was soon raised to the command of the whole army, consisting of a heterogeneous mass of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, and Walloons, whom he managed with a discipline and organization of which there had been no example since the days of Hannibal. For ten years of his life he had been opposed to the most consummate generals, and the wisest people then on earth ; and during the whole of that

period, he so signalized himself by his prudence and enterprise, that, after the death of Henry IV. in 1610, he deservedly held the reputation of the first commander in Europe.¹ Though placed in a situation unfavourable to humanity and virtue—the servant of a despotic master—the leader of an unjust war in a country where the inhabitants were regarded as heretics and rebels, and where the most atrocious examples of bad faith and cruelty had been set by his predecessors, his career was distinguished by moderation and a scrupulous regard to the observance of treaties. Yet such was his devotion to the cause of the monarch whom he served, that, believing the disappointments in his military operations were chiefly attributable to the frequent desertions and want of discipline, arising from the irregularity with which the soldiers received their pay, he mortgaged his Italian possessions, to raise such sums as might afford immediate satisfaction to the troops. After having exhibited in the Dutch war all the resources of the highest military capacity, he wisely recommended peace to the Court of Spain, and exerted all his influence to persuade the Archduke Albert and the Spanish ministers, of their folly in longer prosecuting hostilities. The favour which he enjoyed with Philip III. and the Archduke, was proportioned to his ability and the zeal he had manifested for their interests. Philip IV. seems to have been disposed to continue towards him the same royal countenance. When, on his departure for Italy, he stipulated that it should be his last campaign, and that, after the succession of Mantua was adjusted by war or negotiation, he should be permitted to return to Spain, where he might pass his life in retirement and

¹ Gallucci, in his *Life of Spinola*, prefers him as a commander to the celebrated Prince of Parma. But Siri, who heard Condé and Turenne talk on this subject, informs us that both of them assigned the superiority to the Prince. (*Memorie Recondite*, t. vi. p. 718.)

preparations for eternity, Philip replied that he would impatiently await his arrival, in order to profit by his wisdom and counsels. But the spirit of jealousy and suspicion, with which the mind of Olivarez was imbued, and which often counteracted his best laid schemes for the welfare of his country, interposed its malignant influence, and prematurely deprived Spain of all those hopes that could be founded on the services of a skilful, faithful, and enterprising leader of its armies.

It seems singular that the ministers of despotic crowns should, in general, have been so unfavourably disposed to those great commanders who supported their administration, by carrying their measures successfully into execution ; but so it was, at least in this age. Richelieu oppressed Montmorenci, Toiras, and the Duke de Rohan—Mazarine drove Condé and Luxembourg from the kingdom—and Louvois persecuted Turenne.

Spinola had no successor bred up under his standard ; and as the glory of Spain declined, the Italians coveted her service less. In fact, the Spaniards, though excellent soldiers, had always been deficient in military genius. They wanted that quick perception and acuteness which, from the days of Romulus to those of Napoleon, have rendered the Italians such consummate commanders,—though, in modern times, from the unhappy division of their country into different nations, these qualities have always been exerted for the aggrandizement of other states, and not of their own delightful land. Since the days of that monster surnamed the Great Captain, Spain had produced no general, except Alva, of distinguished military attainments. All its great campaigns in the sixteenth century, were conducted by foreigners—Lannoy was a Fleming,—the Marques of Pescara, and Constable of Bourbon, commanded at Pavia,—and Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, gained the battle of St Quintin.

It was the Prince of Parma who retrieved affairs in the Netherlands, and vied with Henry the Great; and with Spinola now expired the military reputation of Spain.

After his death, the affairs of that monarchy evidently declined in Italy. The Emperor, now pressed by the King of Sweden, recalled his troops, or at least sent no reinforcements to supply the loss of those who perished by the pestilence, which at this time desolated Lombardy. The French army, which had been greatly augmented, and, as we have seen, had overrun Savoy, advanced, when the suspension of arms had terminated, to the relief of Casal. Santa Croce, the Spanish general, showed as much ignorance as his predecessor Spinola had displayed skill and enterprise. Mazarine, meanwhile, was indefatigable in his exertions to negotiate a treaty between the contending parties,¹ some preliminaries of which had been already adjusted at Ratisbon; and he had often encountered imminent dangers in passing between the hostile lines. The chief difficulties he found in adjusting the peace of Italy, were the investiture by the Emperor of the Duchy of Mantua,—the share which the Duke of Savoy claimed of Montferrat,—and some contraventions of the treaty of Monçon with regard to the occupation of the Valtelline. These obstacles appearing almost insuperable, the French Mareschal Schomberg was at length about to bring the Spaniards to a general engagement in the neighbourhood of Casal, when Mazarine rode between the lines, displaying his ensigns of peace; and as soon as he could make himself heard by the leaders of the opposing armies, he persuaded them to a cessation of hostilities. This truce was soon afterwards followed by a treaty between the contending parties, so far as Italy was concerned, which was concluded at Cherasco, in Piedmont,—the Count de Rocca being the commissioner for the Spaniards,

¹ Siri, *Mem. Recon.* t. vii. p. 272.

Galas for the Austrians, and Mareschal Toiras for France.¹ By the terms of this treaty, all foreign troops, whether French or Spanish, were to evacuate Italy ; the Emperor agreed to grant the investiture of Mantua to its Duke, on condition of his paying an annual pension to his competitor the Duke of Guastalla ; the Spaniards were to raise the siege of Casal, and give up the towns which they had occupied in Montferrat to the Duke of Savoy. To this last article the Spaniards did not object, as they considered that Prince as their ally, and the French acceded to it as they had already entered with him into a private arrangement. All the terms, however, of the treaty of Cherasco were not literally fulfilled. The Duke of Mantua, reduced to extreme distress, and unable to deny anything to the King of France, allowed a French garrison to remain in Casal. Instead, too, of evacuating Pignerol, the French troops only made a feint of marching out, and privately remained at a granary within its walls.² The Duke of Savoy, who was privy to the deception, received indemnification by some additional territory in Montferrat, and henceforth entered cordially into the interests of France, and the schemes of Richelieu.³

The removal of Spinola from the Netherlands had been attended in that quarter even with more disastrous consequences than had followed his death in Italy. His successor, the Count de Bergues, a Flemish nobleman, had distinguished himself in high military employments under Spinola, particularly at the siege of Breda,⁴ by his valour and conduct. But he proved incapable of the supreme command ; and even had his talents been higher, the jealousy entertained by the Spanish army of his authority, would have opposed insurmountable obstacles to his

¹ Aubery, *Hist. du Minist. de Richelieu*.

² Gaillard, *Hist. de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, t. vi.

³ Siri, *Mem. Recon.* t. vii. p. 415, &c. ⁴ Hugo, *Obsid. Bredana*.

success. He allowed Bois-le-Duc, Visel, and other important places, to be taken by the Prince of Orange, almost without attempting to relieve them; and he lost an admirable opportunity of ruining Holland by the capture of Amsterdam, while the best troops of the States were employed in the siege of Bois-le-Duc.¹ At length, in consequence of his mismanagement, Prince Frederic Henry of Orange succeeded in completely expelling the Spaniards from the Seven United Provinces. The Spanish and Flemish counsellors in the Netherlands reciprocally threw on each other the blame of that bad success which attended all military operations. These misunderstandings rose at length to such a height, that the Flemings requested the King of Spain to send them neither troops nor money—engaging that they would themselves defend their country. The Archdutchess Isabella, who was distinguished by her moderation, and, though a Spanish princess, was adored by her Flemish subjects, attempted to check or suspend these mutual animosities. But the step which she now adopted of renouncing the sovereignty of the Netherlands in favour of her nephew Philip IV., rather tended to inflame them. The alarm occasioned by the prospect of again falling under the dominion of Spain, united many of the Flemish nobles in a conspiracy, of which the object was to erect the Spanish Netherlands into a republic, on the model of the Seven Provinces. At length the Count of Bergues being completely disgusted with the pride of the Spaniards, entered into this conspiracy, and acquired high popularity among the Flemings, by giving out that he was persecuted by the Spaniards, because he would not suffer them to oppress his country. He addressed a long letter to the Archdutchess, wherein he set forth that he had served Spain for forty years, during which period he had lost six brothers, slain in battle,

¹ Vassor, livre xxvi.

but that, so far from having received any return or reward, he had been oppressed by the arts and envy of the Spaniards, particularly of the Marques de Leganez.¹ Renouncing, at the same time, the command of the army, he retired as a private citizen to Liege, whence he intimated to the Prince of Orange, that, in the event of his invasion of Gueldres (which was the Count's peculiar government), no resistance should be offered to his arms; and he farther issued a proclamation, calling on all true Flemings to rendezvous around him at Liege.² But the prudence of the Archdutchess disconcerted this dangerous plot, of which the particulars were revealed to her by the Duke of Arschot, who had been solicited to engage in it. The Count of Bergues was forced to fly with a small escort to Aix-la Chapelle, a number of his accomplices were arrested, and he was himself soon afterwards attainted of high treason.

The Prince of Orange, however, had in the mean while availed himself of the suggestion of this traitor, and of the disunion in the Spanish counsels, by the successful invasion of Gueldres, where he quickly made himself master of the towns of Venlo and Ruremonde. When he advanced into Limburgh, the city of Maestricht, which was defended by the famous Austrian commander Pappenheim, offered some resistance; but it at length submitted to his arms, and opened up the way for the capture of all the other towns in the Province.

In the midst of these disasters, Olivarez still flattered himself with the hope of giving a turn to the tide of affairs, by exciting such internal commotions in France as might prevent that nation, at least for a time, from interfering in foreign politics. Since the reign of Henry II., the French monarchy had, with little intermission, been agitated by internal dissensions. It was peculiarly

¹ *Hispan. Domin. Arcana*, c. xix. sect. 16.

² Vassor, livre 32.

the land of civil war, conspiracies, and commotions ; and it is singular, that, amid such disturbances, it should have reached an unexampled pitch of prosperity and greatness, while Spain gradually declined, though in a state of profound domestic tranquillity. At the present moment, though there was no actual insurrection in France, the disorganized state of its internal police,—the disaffection of the principal nobility,—the discontents of the Queen mother,—of the Queen herself,—and the first Prince of the blood, held out a prospect of distractions quite irresistible to Olivarez. Accordingly, the failure of his attempt, about two years ago, to support the Duke of Rohan in his design of establishing a Republic of French Protestants in Languedoc, did not prevent him from still forming new schemes for a revolt in France ; and he justified his encouragement of a rebellion in that kingdom, by the correspondence which the French monarch still maintained with the disaffected subjects of Spain in the Netherlands. The disloyalty of Gaston Duke of Orleans, brother of Louis XIII., afforded the best opportunity, which had occurred since the fall of Rochelle, for the prosecution of such designs as Olivarez meditated. That Prince had long been opposed to the administration of Richelieu, and, in conjunction with his mother Mary of Medicis, had raised powerful cabals against him. But the genius or good fortune of the French minister had hitherto triumphed over these powerful enemies. Ever on the brink of rebellion, and the resort of all the discontented, Gaston had, at different times, retired from court with the apparent design of kindling a civil war in Burgundy and Franche Comté. He at length quitted the kingdom altogether, and removed to Lorraine, where he found in Charles, the sovereign of that country, a prince sufficiently prejudiced against Richelieu, and ready to engage in whatever intrigues might contribute to his fall. A

threatened invasion, however, of his territories by the King of Sweden, and his apprehension that Austria, in its present situation, could afford them little protection, compelled him to enter into a nominal treaty with France, of which one condition was, that he should drive the Duke of Orleans from his court and capital. That Prince in consequence quitted Nancy, and betook himself to Brussels,—whither his mother, Mary of Medici, had already repaired, and where he now placed himself under the protection of the Archdutchess Isabella. From the Netherlands he continued his private correspondence with Olivarez, who remitted to him a large sum of money, which that minister had obtained in loan in order to enable Orleans to kindle a civil war in France. But there was now a great difficulty found in obtaining for the Duke a footing in that kingdom. He was already well known as a politician who engaged in the most dangerous and intricate schemes, which he ruined by his unsteadiness and caprice. He had no army with which he could attempt a successful invasion, and his small court of factious and disunited adherents possessed but little influence in France. The discontent, however, of the Duke de Montmorenci, the first peer of the realm, afforded the opportunity which was wanted. That nobleman was governor of the extensive province of Languedoc, where the Duke de Rohan had recently headed the revolt of the Protestants. The insurgents, when reduced to obedience, having been deprived of their cautionary towns, and of the most valuable privileges of French subjects, had ever since nourished secret feelings of hostility to the existing administration. Their governor Montmorenci, who, though deficient in prudence, was a man of generosity and courage, was almost adored amongst them. He had highly distinguished himself in the recent wars in Italy; but conceiving that his services had been ill re-

quited by Richelieu, and being also offended at a refusal of the dignity of Constable, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Duke of Orleans. While engaging in this culpable conspiracy, he appears to have concealed from himself the treason of his designs, by a consideration of the services he should render to the brother and mother of his king, and by the reflection that his plans were directed rather against the administration of Richelieu than the royal prerogative.

The weak and rash Duke of Orleans, prompted by injudicious advisers, resolved to set out for Languedoc, long before the time on which Montmorenci had fixed as the period when he should be prepared to commence the enterprise. He proceeded first to Treves, where he had an interview with the Spanish general, Gonçalo de Cordova, who was now employed in that quarter, and had received instructions to place at his disposal the troops which the King of Spain had promised. This boasted reinforcement consisted only of a few squadrons of German and Neapolitan cavalry,—the refuse of the Spanish army. With this miserable force, which, when united to some Companies under his own command, did not exceed 2000 men, the Duke passed through Burgundy and Lyonnois without being joined by a single inhabitant.¹ On his arrival in Languedoc, he assumed the title of the King's Lieutenant-General for the reformation of abuses in the State. The King of Spain now signed with him a treaty, by which he agreed to supply him with troops and money, and to receive as his ambassador the Count de Fargis, who had formerly been for nine years the envoy from the French court to Madrid, but had now joined the Orleans faction. He was treated by the King of Spain and his ministers with the same distinction as the ambassadors of crowned heads. But the office with which he had

¹ Vassor, livre xxxii.

been charged, appeared so odious to the people, that soon after his arrival he was nearly massacred by the inhabitants of Madrid.¹

De Fargis did not continue long in Spain after this ebullition of popular feeling, which evinced that the Spanish nation still retained their ancient principles of inviolable fidelity to their sovereign. He was succeeded, as agent of the Duke of Orleans at Madrid, by the celebrated *bel-esprit* Voiture, who prospered greatly in insinuating himself into the good graces of the Count-Duke Olivarez. That minister, who admired and imitated the *Estilo culto*, which had been recently introduced into the literature of Spain, delighted in conversing with him, and on his departure for France, asked him to keep up a mutual correspondence, saying, that if they had nothing to communicate, they could at least write fine things to each other. But though Voiture obtained the favour of Olivarez, and wrote some Spanish verses, which were ascribed to Lope de Vega, he had little success in the important points of his embassy.² In fact, however desirous Olivarez might be to abet the designs of the Duke of Orleans, it was impossible, in the present crisis, to render him any effectual assistance. Some troops, originally destined for his service, required to be sent to Flanders, in consequence of the disastrous intelligence from the Netherlands.³ An assembly of the States of Castile, which had been summoned by the King, on the pretext of requiring them to swear fidelity to the Prince Balthazar, as heir to the monarchy, refused the extraordinary subsidy demanded from them; and a new journey to Barcelona, undertaken about this time with a view to supplies, only served farther to exasperate the Catalans against Olivarez and his government.

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

² Vassor, livre xxxii.

³ Ibid.

The Duke of Orleans was thus left to such scanty resources, as his precipitate arrival in Languedoc permitted the Duke of Montmorenci to supply. He unsuccessfully attempted to occupy Narbonne, and several other important places. Mareschal Schomberg, who had failed in intercepting him on his route to Languedoc, now entered that province at the head of the royal army, amounting to 8000 men. He attacked the Dukes of Orleans and Montmorenci at Castelnaudari, where they had posted themselves at the head of a more numerous, but ill-provided and ill-disciplined force. The combat, or rather skirmish, was of short duration, and ended in the total defeat of the insurgents. After this battle, the Duke of Orleans abandoned his enterprise and his friends, with a meanness unworthy of a prince of France, and a son of Henry the Great. It was a chief object of Richelieu to bring him back to his duty and obedience, without allowing him to stipulate for the pardon of Montmorenci, and he was easily persuaded, by the private emissaries of the Cardinal, that the best thing he could do for his unfortunate associate, was to leave him, without conditions, to the King's generosity and mercy. He was himself forgiven by his brother, on certain degrading terms; but Montmorenci, who had been wounded and taken prisoner at Castelnaudari, was soon afterwards condemned by the Parliament of Toulouse, at the instigation of Richelieu, and led to the scaffold, in spite of all the intercessions of his illustrious family, and of the people of Languedoc in behalf of their beloved governor.¹

Those few Spanish troops, which were in the service of the Duke of Orleans, were allowed to retire into Roussillon, and that Prince agreed to terminate all correspondence with the King of Spain. Olivarez, on hearing of the execution of Montmorenci, expressed his astonishment

¹ Vassor, livre xxxii. & xxxiii.

that Richelieu should have ventured to carry into effect his sentence of condemnation. Kings, he observed, are not immortal, and their favour is of short duration, but the hatred which such examples procure is everlasting.¹

How mankind deceive themselves ! This fine sentiment was uttered by one whose hands were already stained with the blood of Rodrigo de Calderon, and were soon to be imbrued in that of the Marques d'Ayamonte.

However unfortunate the Spaniards had been in their prosecution of that subordinate part of the great plan for the aggrandizement of the House of Austria which had been intrusted to them, and which they carried on by fomenting dissensions in France, and by campaigns in the Netherlands or Italy, still Olivarez had long consoled himself with the glorious successes of the Austrians in Germany. He flattered himself, that, when the Emperor had completely vanquished his enemies, the United Provinces would soon fall under the dominion of their ancient masters, and that the balance of power in Italy would of itself incline to the side of the Spaniards. To ensure the triumph of the Imperialists, he had cramped the exertions of his country both in Italy and the Netherlands ; and this policy, for a time, seemed to be rewarded and justified by the splendid successes of the Austrian arms. From the period of the battle of Prague, till the invasion of Germany by Gustavus Adolphus, the Emperor had enjoyed an uninterrupted career of prosperity. His generals, Wallenstein and Tilli, had marched from victory to victory, till they rendered Ferdinand nearly as powerful in Germany as Charles V. after the battle of Mulberg.

But even on this splendid scene the jealous disposition of Olivarez had already shed its malignant influence. At the very moment when, by the appearance of Gustavus

¹ Voiture, *Œuvres*.

Adolphus on the theatre of war, an able general was required to oppose him, the intrigues of the Spanish minister chiefly contributed to the disgrace of Wallenstein, the greatest of the Imperial leaders; and shortly afterwards, the decisive battle of Leipsic deprived the Emperor, in one day, of the fruits of ten years conquest and glory. Wallenstein, indeed, whom he had sacrificed to the enmity of the Spaniards and of the Duke of Bavaria, again resumed the command at the entreaty of his master. But he now held it with the view of aggrandizing himself, and not of discomfiting the enemies of the House of Austria.

The death, however, of the king of Sweden, who fell at the battle of Lutzen towards the close of the year 1632, again revived the hopes of the Spanish minister. The intelligence of his fate, like that of the assassination of Henry IV, was received at Madrid with indecent demonstrations of joy, utterly inconsistent with the character of a brave and magnanimous people. Public festivals were held in all the principal towns in the kingdom, and Philip himself, it is said, attended the representation in his capital of a tragic farce, entitled, the Death of the King of Sweden, which lasted during twelve days.

Those sanguine prospects opened up by the fate of the chief enemy of the house of Austria, now induced Olivarez to make the only important attempt which he had yet hazarded, to support the Imperialists with a Spanish force in Germany. The Duke of Feria, who had been reappointed to the government of Milan, marched from Italy, through the Tirol into Suabia, at the head of 15,000 troops. He was joined at Ravensburg by an equal number of imperialists under Aldringher, a devoted friend and retainer of Wallenstein. The professed objects of the Spanish expedition were to raise the siege of Philipsburg, to expel the Swedes from Alsace, to open a

free passage for the march of the Cardinal Infant from Italy to the Netherlands, and to succour the Duke of Lorraine, who, having broken his recent treaty with France, was again on the brink of being expelled from his dominions. The imperial force under Aldringher, was destined to co-operate in these objects. But Wallenstein had now formed the design of rendering himself independent of the Emperor, and seizing the crown of Bohemia ; and he regarded the destruction of the Spanish army, which to his great indignation had not been placed under his orders, as one of the steps towards the accomplishment of his ambitious plans. He had, therefore, directed his creature Aldringher, that, while he spared as much as possible the German troops under his command, he should employ every possible device and stratagem to harass the Spaniards, till they were worn out or destroyed by fatigue and famine. Accordingly, by artful representations, this Austrian officer led them into inextricable difficulties ; he contrived to render every plan which their general formed, abortive, and, at length, abandoned him with his whole army, on pretext of defending Bavaria from the incursions of the Swedes.¹ The Spanish troops were harassed, on their various marches and counter-marches, by Mareschal Horn, at the head of the united Swedes and German protestants, and were daily reduced by death and desertion. At last, without having fought a single battle, or accomplished one of the objects for which he had entered Germany, the luckless Duke of Feria sought shelter for the wretched remains of his army within the walls of Munich, where he soon afterwards died of vexation and chagrin.

The death of the King of Sweden was not followed by those results which the Spanish minister had so confidently anticipated. The protestant confederacy was

¹ Vassor, livre xxxiv.

soon knit in bonds as close as ever, and the generals who had so often conquered under the banners of Gustavus, followed up his victories with undiminished spirit and success.

While thus unfortunate in Europe, on land, the state of the Spanish marine and of the foreign colonies did not present a more cheering prospect. During the whole period that he had swayed the sceptre, the navy of Philip IV. had been uniformly unsuccessful, except in some engagements with corsairs, and in repelling the ill concerted English expedition against Cadiz. The superiority of the Dutch marine was apparent in every contest which occurred. In the year 1625, the Spanish fleet had been defeated by a Dutch squadron on the coast of Peru: Lima was captured, and an immense booty carried off. About the same time St Salvador was taken in Brazil, and its conquest was followed three years afterwards by that of Pernambuco.

The Dutch, indeed, did not always retain their acquisitions; but being enriched by pillage, they were supplied with the means of defending themselves in Europe, and of equipping new squadrons abroad. The Spanish fleets, loaded with the treasures of Mexico and Peru, fell annually into their hands. At length in 1631, Olivarez resolved on a great effort for the protection of these treasures, as also the recovery of the colonies in America and the East Indies, which had been taken, and were still occupied by the Dutch. On this occasion, both the Grandees and ecclesiastics of the realm signalized themselves by their zeal and exertions in behalf of their country. Cardinal Borgia placed in the hands of the King 500,000 crowns, the produce of pensions and benefices which he enjoyed. Many of the Grandees built ships, or raised and maintained bodies of marines at their own expense. By these means Olivarez was enabled to equip three fleets,

one of which was destined to overwhelm the Dutch in Brazil, and another in the East Indies, while the third was intended to annoy them on their own shores. The soldiers and sailors who embarked in the first squadron, died of the plague: The second had various successes in sea fights, but retook none of the East Indian possessions; and the last fleet, which had been fitted out in the Netherlands, was defeated and totally destroyed on the coast of Holland.

Amid their public misfortunes, the royal family of Spain sustained a severe domestic calamity, by the death of the Infant Don Carlos, youngest brother of the King, which happened in the year 1632. He died in the twenty-sixth year of his age, of a malignant fever, during an expedition in which he had accompanied the King to Barcelona, on his renewed attempt to extort supplies from the states of Catalonia. He was deeply regretted by the nation, being universally considered as a prince of extraordinary merit and endowments; and it is said his dark colour rendered him more popular among the Spaniards. His brothers, the King and Cardinal Infant, were of the fair German complexion; but the Spaniards longed for a monarch of their own hue, and were wont wistfully to ask each other, if they were ever to have a king with black whiskers.¹ Soon after his brother's accession, Carlos had been elevated to the dignities of Admiral of Spain, and Grand Prior of Castile. But being of an active ambitious spirit, the jealous Olivarez removed him from all employments of political occupation or influence. The chagrin he felt in consequence, added to the weariness of an useless and inactive life, drove him to the pursuit of pleasure, which he followed with an eagerness that is said to have accelerated his end.

¹ Howel's *Letters*.

CHAPTER IV.

WAR WITH FRANCE.

Erunt etiam altera Bella.

VIRGIL, *Bucol.*

IN one point of view, Spain and France may be considered as having been chief parties in the Thirty Years' War, though they had not yet openly declared hostilities, or engaged in direct conflict on their own territories. Spain supplied Austria with the sinews of war—formed leagues against France among the Italian States, and protected whatever internal factions were at variance with the French government. On the other hand, Richelieu, amid the cares of a stormy domestic administration, pursued, with undiminished perseverance, his plan for lowering the ascendancy of the Spanish branch of the House of Austria. Mary of Medici, indeed, during her regency, and the Duke de Luines, had abandoned the well known policy of Henry IV, who always opposed himself to the aggrandizement of the Austrian family. But Richelieu recurred to the system of that great monarch: he thoroughly understood the vast, though hitherto unemployed, resources, which his own country possessed; he distinctly perceived the real weakness which lurked under the apparent strength of the Spanish monarchy, and had accurately applied his measure to the capacity of his rival Olivarez. He therefore conceived that this was the proper opportunity to elevate France to the rank which she was entitled to hold among the nations of Eu-

rope. That state of warfare which he considered as conducive to the interests of his country, he foresaw would also prove his best policy, in reference to his own plans of ambition. He knew that no statesman in France but himself was capable of conducting the contest, and he trusted that its prosecution would divert a factious nobility from their cabals against his government. But though the French minister was in every way eager for war, existing circumstances opposed no inconsiderable obstacles to an actual declaration of hostilities against Spain. Even the most powerful minds cannot venture with impunity to set at defiance the feelings or prejudices of the age. The minister of a Catholic king, and a Cardinal of the Romish Church, the station which Richelieu held, and the purple which he wore, did not permit him, in conjunction with the enemies of the faith he professed, to attack openly a State which had always the address to sanctify, in the eyes of the multitude, its ambitious projects, under pretence of a zeal for religion. The external respect which he was thus obliged to show for the views of his contemporaries, had hitherto limited his political exertions to secret intrigues and negotiations, in order that he might accomplish, by other hands, the projects which his own comprehensive mind suggested.¹

It was evident, however, that this state of things could not long subsist; and it seems, indeed, wonderful, that those powers which were in fact principals, should so long have acted a secondary part in the contest, without coming themselves to collision. The ministers of both nations were therefore now strenuously preparing for the inevitable conflict. In virtue of treaties already concluded with the Swedes, and the princes of the Protestant League, France had both numerous and powerful allies in Germany. At the special solicitation of the Ger-

¹ Schiller's *Thirty Years' War*, book ii.

man Protestants, Richelieu took Alsace under the protection of France. He occupied Treves and Lorraine, and thus, in fact, rendered the Rhine the French boundary on the side of Germany.

Richelieu had been always much alarmed by any report of a treaty between Spain and Holland, as its conclusion would have left the former at leisure to aid the Emperor with such forces as might have utterly crushed the Protestant party in Germany. Accordingly, his attention was chiefly directed to prevent any chance of agreement between these powers. After a good deal of negotiation, a league offensive and defensive was concluded between France and the States-General of the United Provinces, of which the chief object was to wrest the Spanish Netherlands from the grasp of their present rulers. Those states which voluntarily withdrew from the yoke, were to be permitted to erect themselves into an independent republic, on the model of Holland. But a partition was to be made of those which remained faithful in their allegiance. A scheme of division was actually drawn up, by which the greater part of the Dutchy of Luxemburgh, the counties of Namur, Hainault, Artois, and Flanders, were assigned to France (which had the lion's share), while Brabant, Guelderland, the lordship of Mechlin, and some other territories, were to be annexed to the Republic of Holland. In prosecution of this league, the contracting parties obliged themselves to invade the Spanish Netherlands, each with an army of 30,000 men, and in no event to lay down their arms except in conjunction. One article, however, which was inserted in this treaty, was in itself sufficient, if acted on, to retard the success of all their military operations. It was stipulated that, in order to prevent jealousies between the contracting powers, their united arms should first attack two towns within the territories assigned to France; that

they should then besiege two places within the limits of the share which was to fall to the United Provinces, and so on alternately.¹

The King of France, aware how much the Italian princes were irritated against the Spaniards, and what jealousy they entertained of their dominion; and being also apprized of the satisfaction which they felt at the assistance he had afforded to maintain the independence of Mantua and Montferrat, conceived that this was a suitable opportunity to form with them a new confederacy, of which the professed object should be to drive the Spaniards wholly out of Italy. With this view, Mareschal Crequi, who was now ambassador at the Vatican, and the son of President Bellievre, who was sent as ambassador extraordinary to the Italian States, were directed to unite as many of them as possible in a league with France. These envoys completely succeeded in counteracting the influence of the Cardinal Infant, the King of Spain's brother, who had passed the preceding year at Milan.—Crequi represented to the Italian princes, that the sole view of his master was to maintain their common liberties, threatened by Spanish despotism. He promised, that theirs should be all the territories recovered by the expulsion of the enemy, while the King of France should retain for himself only the title of Preserver of Italy. By means of these protestations, Richelieu gained his old ally the Duke of Savoy, who entered into a treaty in which he did not fail to stipulate for the appropriation of the Milanese. The Duke of Mantua, who was by birth a Frenchman, and was indebted for his duchy to the interposition of the French arms, willingly engaged in the league. The Duke of Parma, whose family had been the most ancient and firmest adherents of Spain, and whose grandsire, Alexander Farnese, had been its ablest

¹ Vassor, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* Aubery, *Hist. de Richelieu.*

general, now readily entered into the confederacy with the French, who had corrupted his confidential minister Schotti with gold, and fed himself with vain and chimerical hopes of aggrandizement. The present duke was a young prince of a daring spirit, and was somewhat jealous of the long dependence of his house on the crown of Spain. Olivarez, aware of this feeling, thought, by curbing, to make him walk quietly in the paths of his ancestors, and accordingly threatened, in case of his contumacy, to proclaim as duke an elder brother, who had been excluded from the succession on the score of natural incapacity. Attaching more weight to these menaces than was meant by them, he fancied that all the preparations of the Cardinal Infant, while at Milan, were made to despoil him of his dominions. The threats of the Spanish minister thus only served to incense the Italian prince, and to throw him wholly into the arms of France, in whose cause he long persevered, amid the severest calamities, with unshaken constancy and resolution. Having acceded to the alliance against Spain, he issued a manifesto, in which he disparaged that power, but wrote in grandiose terms of himself, and his own dominions. The duke of Tuscany having read this pompous document, called it a Declaration of War by the King of Parma against the Duke of Spain.¹

The republic of Genoa, as well as the Dukes of Parma, had for centuries been firmly allied to the Kings of Spain, and two of its sons, Columbus and Spinola, had been their most valuable servants. Its harbour being always open to their fleets, had been useful as a communication between their possessions in the north and south of Italy. But Richelieu thought he might at this time rely on the accession of Genoa to the league, on account of the displeasure which its citizens had recently conceived against

¹ Vassor, livre xxxix.

the Spanish government. Olivarez, who possessed great talents for exciting towards his country the enmity of foreign nations, impolitically disturbed that good correspondence which had subsisted for so many centuries to the mutual advantage of both lands. Presuming on the services which Spain had rendered to the Republic during its recent contest with the Duke of Savoy,¹ he now made exorbitant and unjust demands on those Genoese merchants who had so often filled the Spanish coffers with gold, when there was a delay or failure in the remittance of the American treasures. The repayment of these loans, which in a great measure identified the interests of the two countries, had been formerly assigned to the lenders, in the bullion brought by the Plate ships, but to their great disappointment they were now obliged to trust for reimbursement to the exhausted revenues of the King of Spain in Italy. This injured the credit of the Genoese in foreign climes, and rendered them both incapable and unwilling to supply farther loans. Even a part of the Italian revenues, which had been appropriated to the satisfaction of their claims, was fraudulently diverted by the Spaniards from that purpose ; and the ambassadors whom they despatched to Madrid, in order to complain of these injuries, obtained no redress or attention. The Genoese also highly resented the decision, which, in his brother's name, the Cardinal Infant had pronounced in the dispute between them and the Duke of Savoy, with regard to the small territory of Zuccarello. While thus exasperated by serious grievances, they were also daily irritated by the Spanish envoys at Genoa intermeddling in the domestic affairs of the Republic. About the same period, the Marques of Santa Croce, who was entirely dependent on the authority of the Count-Duke, and was of all men the most solicitous in seconding his

¹ See above, p. 136-7.

wishes, eagerly embraced all occasions which presented themselves, of manifesting resentment against the Genoese. Being stationed at Messina with the Spanish gallies, he refused to the flag of their admiral Giustignano, that precedence and honour hitherto allowed to it, by the Spaniards, in the Italian seas. Ten Dutch vessels, laden with grain, which belonged partly to Genoese merchants, were seized by the Spanish admiral in the harbour of Genoa, and carried off as lawful prizes.¹ These offensive measures, which at the present time were peculiarly impolitic, deprived Spain of an useful auxiliary; and though the Genoese, notwithstanding the wrongs and injuries they had sustained, would not absolutely declare against their ancient ally, in favour of France, they restricted the Spaniards in the privilege of landing in their ports, or marching troops through their territories.

Terrified by the fate of Clement VII, the Roman Pontiffs had adhered to the Spanish interests since the sack of Rome in 1527, till the election of the present Pope, Urban VIII, who was supposed to be inclined to the French party, as he had expelled from Rome Cardinal Borgia, and some other promoters of the Austrian faction. The Catholic King, in order to restore the terror of the Spanish name, sent the Archbishop of Cordova to Rome, with instructions that he should prefer the unpleasant demand of a reformation of abuses, that he should threaten the convocation of a general council, and should even hint at an assemblage of Cardinals at Milan, for the election of an Anti-Pope. Urban, though he was deeply offended by these suggestions, and secretly forwarded the views of France, was so overawed by them, that he would not enter into an open and acknowledged confederacy.² In conjunction with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the

¹ Capriata, *Guerre d'Italia*, lib. xiv.

² Denina, *Revoluzioni d'Italia*, lib. xxiii, c. 4.

Republic of Venice, he attempted to establish a sort of independent interest, which might poize the forces of the two great nations, and lessen the Spanish power, without giving a decided preponderance to France. Of all the states of Italy, Modena alone adhered to the cause of the Spaniards. Its Duke, and the Emperor, were now the only remaining allies of Spain, and, with these exceptions, Richelieu had secured the aid or the neutrality of all the other powers of Europe.

Fortified by so many external alliances, and triumphant at home over the rage of faction, and the discontents of the peers of France, Richelieu was now eager, by falling on Roussillon or Flanders, to strike a direct and vital blow against the Spanish monarchy; and he eagerly awaited some overt act on the part of that kingdom, which might justify a declaration of hostilities.

Nor were the Spaniards long in affording the French minister the plausible pretext which he courted. Olivarez was now tired of this insecure and dubious state of peace. He judged rightly that France, by her alliances with Holland and the Duke of Savoy, could injure Spain through the side of Flanders and Milan as much as in a professed war, while Spain had not the same means of inflicting wounds on France; and he now clearly saw that his country could avenge herself only by open fight for those aggressions which France committed against her by indirect hostilities. Olivarez was in consequence little anxious to avoid such causes of offence as might prompt an immediate appeal to arms.

At the time when Gaston Duke of Orleans repaired, with treasonable designs, to Languedoc, it had been intimated by Richelieu to the court of Madrid, that any steps taken in his favour, or any encouragement afforded to him in his rebellious attempts, should be considered as

equivalent to a declaration of war. Gaston, who was restless without activity, having again fled from France to Brussels after the execution of the Duke de Montmorenci, the King of Spain, still in pursuit of his great political object of fomenting such troubles in France as might incapacitate Richelieu from interfering in the affairs of Germany, entered into a treaty with the French Prince.¹ In this agreement, signed at Brussels by the Marques d'Aytona, governor of the Netherlands, the Duke became bound, for two years and a half, to listen to no terms of accommodation with his brother, whatever offers might be made to him, except with consent of his Catholic Majesty ; and in case of an open rupture between the crowns of France and Spain, he engaged to promote, with his utmost influence, the interests of the House of Austria, and not to make peace till the conclusion of a general treaty. He farther agreed, that if he succeeded in obtaining possession of any towns in France, some of them should be given up to Spain as an indemnification for the expenses incurred by her exertions in his behalf. On the other hand, the Catholic king consented to maintain for his service a force of 15,000 men, and to march them towards the southern frontiers of France at a seasonable opportunity.² The object and import of this treaty, the terms of which were soon well known throughout Europe, seemed to authorize the adoption of the most decisive measures on the part of Richelieu. But the immediate cause of the warlike declaration, was the seizure and imprisonment, by the Spaniards, of the Elector of Treves. That ecclesiastical prince, influenced by the successes of

¹ A particular account of the reception of the Duke of Orleans, by the Archdutchess Isabella at Brussels, and of all the occurrences during his stay in that capital, may be found in the *Mémoires de Montresor*, t. i.

² Vassor, livre xxxv. Aubery, t. i. p. 426.

Gustavus, having detached himself, three years before, from the Catholic league, and placed his territories under the protection of France, was deprived of his states by the Imperialists and Spaniards. He had been restored, however, and at the same time pillaged, by the French ; but in the beginning of the present year, the Spaniards again made an inroad, from the Netherlands, on the city of Treves, cut the French garrison in the town to pieces, and, contrary to the rights of nations, carried the Elector prisoner to Antwerp, whence he was soon afterwards transferred to Vienna. When the governor of the Spanish Netherlands refused the King of France that satisfaction he demanded, and declined to restore the captive prince to liberty,¹ Richelieu found that his time was now arrived, and that, in avenging the injuries of a Catholic and ecclesiastical prince, he had discovered a better pretext for war than in supporting Protestant princes or rebellious subjects. He accordingly hastened to promulgate a national manifesto, in which he set forth the lawless seizure of the Elector of Treves, and the ceaseless plots of the Spaniards against the quiet and safety of France. He showed that they had fomented the rebellion of the Hugonots,—that, employing the Duke of Lorraine as their instrument, they had sown discord in the royal family of France,—that they had supplied the Duke of Orleans with troops to pass armed through the kingdom, for the purpose of exciting commotions in Languedoc,—and finally, that they had meditated an attack on the coast of Provence, which had been frustrated only by the inclemency of the season. The court of Spain, in its reply, recurred to matters as far back as the peace of Vervins, concluded in 1601 between the two powers. By that treaty it had been stipulated, that neither should

¹ Schiller, *Thirty Years' War*, book v.

protect the enemies of the other ; yet the King of France had never ceased openly or secretly to support the rebels in Holland,—that, more recently, he had maintained the claim of the Duke of Nevers to the sovereignty of Mantua, a fief of the empire, against the Spanish force employed in defending the Emperor's authority,—that he had wrested Pignerol, the key of the Alps, from the Duke of Savoy, contrary to the articles of the treaty of Cherasco ; and it was answered with regard to the Elector of Treves, that, being a prince of the empire, the protection extended to him by the King of France against his liege lord, was contrary to the law of nations and a violation of the Germanic constitution. The whole document was interspersed with cutting railleries and severe invectives against Cardinal Richelieu.

Both countries had certainly found plausible pretexts for arms—

—— *Quis justius induat arma*

Scire nefas.

In most wars, however, of rival nations, it is seldom so much any particular breach of treaty or unjust aggression that provokes hostilities, as the desire of each to surpass the other, or gratify long cherished resentments. But the origin and prolonged prosecution of the present contest are, perhaps, not to be so much attributed to the conflicting interests of the two countries, or the ambition of their respective sovereigns, as to the rivalry and intrigues of their ministers, particularly Richelieu, who was eager to signalize his administration by memorable events, and whose policy led him to occupy in foreign warfare the restless spirit of the people whom he governed.

Nearly about the same period in which Louis issued his manifesto, he made a formal declaration of war. A pursuivant proceeded to Brussels, where he publicly read

his defiance, but as no herald or magistrate would receive it, he threw it down in the market-place of that capital.¹

In entering, however, on this important contest, though Richelieu had been most provident on the score of foreign alliances, his military preparations at home were scarcely adequate to his gigantic schemes. His levies of troops, his pecuniary supplies, his commissariat, and his measures for the defence and fortification of frontier towns, were hardly on the scale that might have been expected. In fact, Spain had exhibited such small proofs of military skill or activity in those secondary contests in which she had recently been engaged, that Richelieu had rather undervalued her power; and some early events of the war, when Spain was roused to exertion for the defence of her own frontiers, showed that he had too lightly estimated the strength of a monarchy, worn out indeed and exhausted, but still possessed of a spirit which could keenly struggle for existence.

Military operations quickly followed the promulgation of the French manifesto, and the declaration of war at Brussels. The chief objects which Richelieu proposed to himself for the ensuing campaign, were the occupation of the Spanish Netherlands—the recovery of Roussillon,—and the expulsion of the Spaniards from the north of Italy, or at least the establishment of a preponderating

¹ It is in the following terms :—“ Le Héraut de France au titre d’Alençon sous-signé, certifie à tous ceux à qui il appartiendra, être venu aux Pais-Bas, pour trouver le Cardinal Infant d’Espagne, de la part du Roi son maître, son unique et souverain seigneur, pour lui dire, que puisqu’il n’a pas voulu rendre la liberté à Monsieur L’Archeveque de Trèves, Electeur de l’Empire, qui s’étoit mis sous sa protection lorsqu’il ne la pouvoit recevoir de l’Empereur, ni d’aucun autre prince; et que, contre la dignité de l’Empire et le droit des gens, vous retenez prisonnier un prince souverain qui n’avoit point de guerre contre vous, sa Majesté vous déclare qu’elle est résolue de tirer raison par les armes de cette offense, qui intéresse tous les princes de la Chrétienté.” (Vassor, xxxviii.)

French influence in that country. Armies were accordingly formed, and warlike operations commenced, nearly at the same period, in the Low Countries—the Frontiers of Spain—and the plains of Lombardy.

After the detection and suppression of the conspiracy of the Count de Bergues, the Marques d'Aytona had directed the counsels of the Netherlands, under the Archduchess Isabella. That princess had dissipated the formidable plot with her usual judgment and moderation. But, about this time, Spain and the Netherlands sustained an irreparable loss by her death. The daughter of a cruel and gloomy tyrant, she was distinguished by humanity, and by suavity of manners,—the sister of a weak and imbecile prince, she was eminent for her capacity; and her high qualities were only stained by the bigotry common to her country and her race. She possessed all the feminine virtues of her ancestress Isabella of Castile, and she wanted only a wider field to have been as great a sovereign as that renowned Queen of England with whom she was for many years contemporary. Little was to be hoped for in the Netherlands after Spain had been deprived of Spinola, and of this popular princess. Subsequently to her death, severer measures were adopted against those noblemen who were supposed to have been implicated in the Count de Bergues' conspiracy. The Duke of Arschot, to whom it had been revealed, but who had refused to participate in it, having proceeded to Madrid, to lay before the king the complaints and grievances of the Catholic provinces, was thrown into confinement, and was compelled to disclose more than he had hitherto imparted with regard to the plot, and those who were concerned in it. Arschot died from chagrin, and the bad treatment he received; and in consequence of the additional information he had communicated to the court of Madrid, many

Flemish noblemen were arrested, or forced to fly their country.¹ The Spanish government having become unpopular on account of these arbitrary proceedings, and having no longer that security, for the maintenance of its power, which depended on the wisdom and popularity of the Archduchess Isabella, it was thought expedient that a member of the royal family should be intrusted with the administration of the Netherlands. This appointment was accordingly conferred on the Cardinal Infant, who was at that time in Italy, where he had collected a considerable army. With this force, amounting to about 12,000 men, he had passed in the preceding year through Germany, on his route to the Netherlands, and having formed a junction with the Imperialists, under the King of Hungary, he greatly contributed to the victory gained over the Swedes and German Protestants, at Nordlingen. Mareschal Horn, who commanded the enemy, along with Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, and was taken prisoner in the battle, declared, that in all the combats in which he had fought during a long military life, he had never witnessed such valour as was displayed by the Spanish troops at this engagement;² and Bassompierre, who was present, says, “Ces soldats temoignèrent un courage plus qu’humain; ils demeurèrent inébranlables comme des rochers.”³ All writers of the time extol the intrepidity of the Cardinal Infant. A Piedmontese colonel was killed on one side of him, and Don Pedro Giron was wounded on the other. His humanity and generosity after the battle delighted both armies. He relinquished his own quarters to the wounded soldiers, and retired to a miserable hut, where there was scarce room for a table and a bed.⁴

The Cardinal Infant sent fifty standards, taken from

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.* t. iv.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. viii. p. 160. ³ Vassor, livre xxvii. ⁴ Ibid.

the enemy, to his royal brother at Madrid, as trophies of this signal victory. He did not, however, regard it as consistent with his duty, to follow up the advantages he had acquired. His appointed destination was the Spanish Netherlands, and he was, besides, offended at the treatment which his troops had experienced from their allies. Though they had chiefly contributed to this triumph, and though the Imperial troops, after the battle was gained, shouted aloud that the Spaniards had obtained for them the victory,¹ they nevertheless refused to share with them the provisions found in the town of Nordlingen, and they were in consequence obliged to subsist on the flesh of the dead horses which had been killed in the combat.²

It seems to have been a fatal error in the Austrian policy, that this success was not decisively followed up by the united arms of the King of Hungary and the Cardinal Infant. The court of Spain, indeed, after they had learned the particulars of this victory, sent orders to him that he should remain in Germany. But that prince, after affording some assistance to the Imperialists in the dutchy of Wirtemberg, had set out on his destination to the Netherlands, and was far advanced on his march before the arrival of the Spanish messenger at the Austrian head-quarters in Germany. Having proceeded through the Palatinate and Franconia, he successively arrived at Cologne and Juliers, where he was met by Prince Thomas of Savoy, the Duke of Lerma, and a large concourse of Flemish noblemen. He entered Brussels in great pomp, accompanied by the Marques of Leganez and of Balbases, and a number of other general officers, at that time esteemed the first in the Spanish service. The battle of Nordlingen had been a brilliant commence-

¹ Aedo, *Viage del Infante Cardenal*, ed. 1635, 4to.

² Coxe, *History of House of Austria*, c. 56.

ment of the Infant's career, and he arrived at the capital of the Netherlands in all the splendour with which it had surrounded him. That victory had excited a great sensation in the Austrian provinces, and had already been celebrated at Brussels, by festivals and other demonstrations of joy, in which a huge *fleur-de-lis* was represented as broken down and trampled by the figure of an eagle.¹ On his first arrival, he waited on Mary of Medici, who was at that time residing in Brussels, and by whom he was highly complimented on his conduct at Nordlingen.² Her son Gaston, Duke of Orleans, had previously contrived to make his escape from the Netherlands into France. While concluding his treaty with the Spanish government, that prince had been all the time engaged in a private negotiation for a return to his own country, and a reconciliation with his brother. It was not, however, so secretly conducted, as to be altogether concealed from the Spaniards, and the Marques d'Aytona one day told the duke, that he knew the accommodation was concluded, and that he might depart when he thought proper. But it was the interest of Gaston to make it be believed, that the Spaniards wished to detain him, and that he had escaped from them with difficulty.³ Having one morning left Brussels, on pretence of fox-hunting in a neighbouring forest, he set off at full speed, accompanied by his favourite Puylaurens, and arrived in the evening at La Capelle, the first frontier town in Picardy.⁴

The Cardinal Infant entered on the civil and military government of the Spanish Netherlands, nearly at the time when the seizure of the Elector of Treves had called

¹ *Mémoires de Campion*, ed. Paris, 1807, 8vo.

² Vassor, livre xxxvii.

³ Griffet, *Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII.* t. ii. p. 437. &c.

⁴ *Mém. de Campion*.

forth from France an open declaration of war. By uniting the newly raised troops which he had brought with him from Italy to the veteran legions of the provinces, he found himself at the head of a considerable military force. At the same time, an army of 20,000 French was assembled under the inspection of their king at Amiens, and was intrusted to Chatillon, and Mareschal Brezé the brother-in-law of Richelieu. These officers possessed an equal, or what was worse, an alternate command, and, as was to be expected, constant differences existed between them during the whole progress of the campaign. It was intended, however, that this army should form a junction with the Dutch at Maestricht, after which the troops of both nations should be placed under the orders of Frederic Henry, Prince of Orange, who had inherited all the military talents of his ancestors. In order to counteract this movement, the Cardinal Infant separated his army into two divisions. One was ordered to confront the Dutch, and the other, under Prince Thomas of Savoy, marched to oppose the progress of the French. This latter division of the Spaniards encountered the enemy at Avein, in the territory of Liege; but though it had taken up a favourable position,¹ it was totally defeated, and forced to retreat to Namur. The French army then continued its march with little farther interruption, and effected its intended union with the Dutch in the neighbourhood of Maestricht.² After this junction, the Prince of Orange assumed the command of the allied army, which now stormed and sacked Tillemont, where great cruelties were committed.³ Some small towns in its vicinity short-

¹ *Mémoires du Sieur de Pontis*, livre iii.

² Gualdo, *Storia delle Guerre d'Europa dall 1630 sino 1640*, lib. x.

³ Chatillon, in his despatches, admits that great cruelties were practised at Tillemont; but he lays the blame on the Dutch troops,

ly afterwards surrendered, or were deserted by the Spaniards. The union of the two armies spread terror throughout the Spanish Netherlands, and the outrages practised at Tillemont gave the Catholics a horror at the French name and alliance. Richelieu had expected that the inhabitants of the Spanish Netherlands would unite with the French against their present masters. But the Flemings, forgetting their late discontents with the Spanish government, now made the utmost efforts against their invaders. Those Catholic towns which, according to the partition treaty, were to be delivered up to the Dutch, feared for the security of their religion,—those which were to fall to the share of the French were alarmed for the loss of the privileges they at present enjoyed,¹—and the inhabitants of the smaller towns, who fled for protection to the larger, trembled for their lives and property.

Richelieu was in the habit of despatching long and detailed instructions to the officers commanding the French armies. He had ordered Chatillon and Brezé, as soon as they could effect their junction with the Prince of Orange, to bring the Cardinal Infant, if possible, to a general engagement, which he seems confidently to have anticipated would end in his defeat, and his loss of the Netherlands: but if he divided his force, they were instructed to follow wherever he marched, as the possession of his person would probably terminate the war.² The Spanish prince, however, contrived to elude a general engagement—trusting to wear out the enemy by famine. It was a

who, he says, forced their way into the town, while terms of capitulation were in progress.—“ Et en moins de deux heures cette misérable ville fut entièrement saccagée ; et ensuite tous les excès qui se peuvent commettre dans un désordre, y furent pratiqués.” (Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 489.)

¹ Griffet, *Hist. de Louis XIII.*

² Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 456.

subject of astonishment to all Europe, that a body of 40,000 men, such as that commanded by the Prince of Orange and the French Mareschals, should not have been able to bring to action the army of the Cardinal Infant, which was not half so numerous, and was, besides, disconcerted by its partial defeat at Avein. As his opponents could not force the Spanish commander to a battle, they were obliged to employ their arms in besieging towns. It was believed for some time that they intended to invest Brussels, but the storm fell on Louvain.¹ This place prepared for a vigorous resistance, and was for some time bravely defended by the inhabitants, particularly by the students of its celebrated university, and by some Irish mercenaries under the command of their officer Preston.² In spite, however, of its gallant defence, it seems probable that the town (of which the fortifications were by no means strong) could not long have held out against the power of the allied forces, if the Dutch had cordially co-operated with the French army. But the mutual jealousies which they entertained, prevented them from acting together with energy and concert. The Emperor, too, having about this time concluded a treaty with the Elector of Saxony and other Protestant princes in Germany, was enabled to send a force of 18,000 men, under the celebrated Piccolomini, to the succour of the Cardinal Infant.³ The slowness of all the operations of the Prince of Orange,⁴ afforded sufficient time for these

¹ Daniel, *Hist. de France*.

² Puteanus, *Histor. Belgicae liber singularis, de Obsidione Lovanensi* 1635. Eric Puteanus, or Henry de Puy, was at Louvain during the time of its siege.

³ Vassor, livre xxxviii.

⁴ "Monsieur Le Prince d'Orange," says Chatillon, "qui n'avoit entrepris ce siège qu'à regret, ne faisait guères hâter ses travaux de son côté." (Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 499.)

auxiliaries to cut off the French supplies of provisions, and advance to the relief of Louvain. On the intelligence of their approach, the half-famished French abandoned the siege, and, after suffering severely in their retreat, retired to recruit at Ruremonde.¹ The Dutch afforded them no assistance, and showed them but little sympathy in their disasters.

Though the Dutch hated Spain, they were jealous of France, and dreaded an increase of its power in the Netherlands. In all the coalitions against Spain into which France and Holland entered, the latter seldom made such great, or, at least, such continued, exertions in the common cause as might have been expected, from the interest which she had at stake, and the oppression she had once suffered from her ancient enemy. She often performed in the north of Europe the same doubtful and temporizing part which Savoy acted in the south. After the first successes of the French, she invariably relaxed her efforts, and paralyzed the vigour of her ally. If Spain was her foe, France was her neighbour, and one, as she afterwards experienced, most powerful and ambitious. She thus probably felt that the best security for her freedom was to preserve the balance between these two powerful monarchies, and that, on the present occasion, the small increase of dominion which the recent treaty of partition had allotted to her, would ill compensate for the dangers to which she might be exposed by the approximation of France to her territories. Hence, though the Republic of Holland had now nearly completed the fabric of her greatness, and though the enthusiastic military excitement had not yet subsided by which the House of Orange had converted a plodding mercantile people into a nation of heroes, it was judged more

¹ Puteanus, *Liber singularis*. Aedo, *Viage, Sucesos y Guerras del Infante Fernando*, c. xix. ed. Madrid 1637.

safe and prudent not to push to an extremity any victories or conquests achieved in conjunction with France.¹

Mareschals Chatillon and Brezé, who were thus in a great measure the victims of the policy of their allies, were under the necessity of leading back beyond the Meuse, to Nimeguen, the wretched remains of their army, now reduced to 9000 men. Though the French commanders had not sustained any severe disaster in the field, their troops had been dreadfully diminished by disease, and by want of provisions, with which the Dutch were but little careful to supply their allies.² Richelieu, apparently, believing that the towns of the Spanish Netherlands would open their gates and furnish the troops with forage and victuals, had established no magazines, or made any regular agreement with the Dutch for the necessary stores. Hence, many of the soldiers being totally unprovided with the necessaries of life, deserted from their banners, and having straggled to the different ports of the Netherlands, there embarked for Calais, whence they begged their way to Paris.³

After the departure of the French, the exertions of the

¹ "La victoire," says the French commander Chatillon, "que nous avons remportée en la bataille d'Avein, étoit tel, que si nous eust été permis de poursuivre nostre pointe avec nos propres forces, nous eussions fait plus d'effet, que peut-être nous ne ferons maintenant que nous sommes joints à l'armée de nos Alliez." (Aubery, *Mém.* i. p. 488.) And again, "J'ay veu Monsieur le Prince d'Orange varier en ses propositions: J'avoue ingénument que je ne connois plus rien en son humeur, et le trouve entièrement changé et irresolu. Cela me fait grand peine. Ses parens et les principaux officiers de son armée sont dans le même étonnement que moi, car ils avouent qu'ils ne l'ont jamais vu si froid comme il a été toute cette campagne." (Id. t. i. p. 508-9.)

² "Il ne nous restera rien," says Chatillon, in a despatch to Richelieu, "de notre voiage à Bruxelles, que le déplaisir d'avoir fait si peu de chose avec la plus belle armée qu'on ait jamais veu dans les Pais-Bas."

³ Condillac, *Cours d'Etude*.

Prince of Orange were limited, during this season, to an attempt for the recovery of the strong fortress of Skink, which had recently been reduced by the Spaniards. The Cardinal Infant, availing himself of the opportunity thus presented to him, quickly regained, by aid of the Austrian reinforcements, his superiority in the field. He took several fortresses from the Dutch, and sent to the frontiers of France detachments which levied contributions over great part of Picardy and Champagne. Towards the close of the year, however, he was deprived by death of two of his most efficient officers, the Marques d'Aytona, who had preceded him in the government of the Netherlands, and was then his chief military counsellor, and the Duke of Lerma,¹ his Camp-Master-General, who died at Harmont, in consequence of wounds received in the course of the campaign.²

On the whole, the events of the war had hitherto been highly creditable to the Cardinal Infant, and had justified the high expectations formed of him in consequence of his behaviour at Nordlingen. Though in the heat of youth, and remarkable for his ardent courage, he had prudently resisted all the attempts of the French to lead him on to a general engagement, and had thus compelled them ultimately to retire to their own country with loss and dishonour. The successes of the campaign, particularly the discomfiture of the French in their attack on Louvain, were the subjects of exultation throughout the Spa-

¹ This Duke of Lerma (grandson of the minister) was married to Donna Felice Henriquez, daughter of the Admiral of Castille; but he left no sons, and was succeeded by his two daughters, the eldest of whom was united to the Duke of Cardona, and inherited the Dutchy of Lerma, with the Marquisate of Denia: the youngest, who had espoused the Duke d'Ossuna, succeeded to the title and estates of Uzeda. (Vayrac, *Etat present de l'Espagne*, t. iii. p. 145. ed. 1718.)

² Aedo, *Viage, &c. del Infante Fernando*, c. xix.

nish Netherlands. Histories were composed with the details of that siege, while panegyrics and laudatory orations were everywhere written or pronounced.¹

Encouraged by these successes, Olivarez redoubled his exertions, and now boldly planned invasions of France from three different quarters. The Cardinal Infant was ordered to enter Picardy with all his forces,—another corps, levied in Germany, was appointed to commence an attack on the side of Burgundy,—while a third army, under the Admiral of Castile, was destined to penetrate through Guienne as far as Bordeaux.

Of all these expeditions, the most successful, at least for a time, was the invasion of Picardy, which, indeed, had nearly proved fatal to the French monarchy. By orders of the Cardinal Infant,² his generals, Prince Thomas of Savoy, Piccolomini, and John de Vert, or Wert, an eminent soldier of fortune, and at that time esteemed a thunderbolt of war,³ began their march at the head of an army which exceeded 30,000 men, and was particularly strong in cavalry. Having fixed on Cambray as a *place d'armes*, the Cardinal Infant issued a proclamation, in which he imputed the invasion of France to his desire of avenging the injuries of the Queen-Mother, Mary of Medici, and restoring her to the rights of which she had been deprived. Richelieu solicited his Dutch allies to make a diversion in favour of France, and retard, if possible, the march of the Cardinal Infant, by an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. The Prince of Orange was sufficiently disposed to this measure, but the States-General would not consent to it.⁴ No inter-

¹ Puteanus, *Liber singularis*. Vernulæus, *Triumphus Lovanensium*, &c.

² It seems doubtful whether the Cardinal Infant himself was in France during any part of this expedition.

³ *Mém. de Campion*.

⁴ Vassor, livre xxxix.

ruption being thus offered by the Dutch, the Spanish generals entered Picardy, and seized almost without resistance on La Capelle and Catelet, which the French ministry expected would have occupied their arms for some months. The Count de Soissons, who was already thinking more of his plots against Richelieu, than the defence of his country, did nothing to arrest the progress of the Spaniards, till they arrived at the Somme, which they intended to pass near Bray. Here some ineffectual attempts were made at resistance; but the banks of the river being highest on the side towards Artois, the Spaniards cannonaded with such effect the French troops who defended the passage, that they were obliged to retire to a distance, and leave the invaders time to form their bridge. The whole Spanish army then crossed at leisure, and the German regiments, under Piccolomini, pursued the enemy, who suffered some loss, to a considerable distance. After this passage the Spaniards occupied Roye, to the south of the Somme, on the river Oise; and having thus obtained an entrance into France, spread themselves over the whole country, lying between these rivers.¹ The smoke of the villages, to which they set fire, was seen from the heights in the vicinity of Paris; and such in that capital was the consternation consequent on these events, that it seems probable, had the Spanish generals marched straight on Paris, the city would have fallen into their hands, unprotected as it was by a regular army, and abandoned by many of its inhabitants, who, in the apprehension of the moment, had fled towards the Loire. Even the haughty unbending Richelieu, disconcerted by these sudden and unexpected reverses, advised the king to retire to Orleans, and was himself on the verge of relinquishing the reins of government. But the same fatality which had prevented Philip II. from advancing to Paris, after the decisive

¹ *Viage de l'Infante Fernando*, c. 19. Vassor.

battle of St Quintin, seems anew to have possessed the Spanish commanders. It was in vain that John de Vert represented to them that Paris would fall an easy prey to their victorious arms, if they would but venture to grasp the prize. Prince Thomas was afraid, that though he might have succeeded in pushing on to the French capital, he was not in a condition to have maintained his conquests in a hostile country.¹ He therefore judged it expedient to occupy a line of positions on the Somme, and for this purpose he receded with his army, to form the siege of Corbie. This town presented no great resistance to his arms, but the time occupied by its capture allowed the Parisians to recover from their consternation, and to prepare the means of defence. In a council held at Paris, during this emergency, though Richelieu and the other members still continued to advise a retreat from the capital, Louis XIII, (whose character seems rather to have been underrated by historians), set forth in a speech, which lasted half-an-hour, the dangers and disadvantages which would ensue from this timid procedure; and he concluded, by announcing his determination instantly to march in person to Corbie, with such means as were in preparation.² Richelieu, at length, encouraged and re-assured, as is said, by his intriguing confident the well-known Pere Joseph,³ and the Cardinal La Valette, now adopted the most energetic measures of defence. The Parisians having been allowed leisure to recover from their dismay, raised an army of 60,000 men, chiefly composed of the apprentices, mechanics, and artizans of the capital.⁴ At no period did a warlike spirit more generally pervade France than during this invasion of Picar-

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

² *Mémoires du Duc de Saint Simon*, t. i. c. 7.

³ *Le Vritable Père Joseph*, t. ii. p. 197.

⁴ Ortiz, *Compendio*, t. vi. lib. xx. c. 4.

dy. Louis, throwing off his natural indolence, displayed all that personal courage which stood in the place of other royal virtues. He repaired forthwith to the seat of war; and the Duke of Orleans, who had been reconciled to his brother at the only time when the strenuous co-operation of the Spaniards afforded him any prospect of success in his ambitious projects, was nominally placed at the head of this new levied army, which was destined to guard the passages of the Oise. The enemies of Richelieu anticipated, that these raw troops would fly at the first sight of an enemy. But, on the contrary, Prince Thomas, whose force was not nearly so numerous, was obliged to retreat before these "lads of Paris," and to recross the Somme. The French quickly recovered all those fortified places in Picardy which had been previously lost by the incapacity, or, as Richelieu alleged, by the treachery of their governors. But they could not prevent the Spaniards from plundering and desolating the country as they retired.¹

The Spanish ministry, particularly Olivarez, attributed their disappointment in the result of this campaign, partly to the bad defence made by Corbie, the loss of which was ascribed to the same arts by which it was suspected to have been gained; and partly to the failure in the advance of some additional German levies, of whom 4000 were expected, according to agreement with the Emperor, but only 800 reached the army in Picardy, and at a much later period than had been stipulated.²

The Cardinal Infant having allowed the opportunity of penetrating into the heart of France from the side of

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. Lettres de Voiture*.

² Vezzalmi, *Ganancias y Perdidas de la Monarquía d'España en Reynado de Felipe IV.* Grivilio Vezzalmi, the name assumed by this author, is the anagram of Virgilio Malvezzi, the historiographer and panegyrist of the Count-Duke Olivarez.

Picardy to escape him, resolved to aid the army which had been assembled in Germany under Galas, an imperial general, and the Duke of Lorraine, in order to act against the Dutchy of Burgundy. For this purpose, he detached from Flanders a considerable force, which, after its junction with the troops already collected in Franche Comté, ravaged a great part of Burgundy, and besieged St Jean-de-Lône, a frontier town which lay on the boundaries between that dutchy and Franche Comté, and was the first place that opposed resistance to its arms. The operations, however, of this siege seem to have been unskilfully conducted. The French succeeded in throwing into the town supplies both of troops and provisions. They then attacked, and drove off the Duke of Lorraine, who lost a great part of the Spanish army in his retreat from Burgundy.¹

Weakened by sending detachments from his main army, and disappointed of those pecuniary supplies which had been promised to him from Madrid, the Cardinal Infant was obliged to remain on the defensive for some time after his retreat from Picardy to the Netherlands, which were anew invaded by a French force, under the Cardinal La Vallette, a younger son of the Duke d'Epernon. But even while restricting his operations to defence, the Infant could not prevent the capture by the French of Ivri and Landreci in Hainault. While opposing the enemy in that quarter, he received intelligence of an unexpected attempt on Breda by the Dutch. He immediately hastened to its relief; but the Prince of Orange having rapidly collected 6000 or 7000 peasants, whom he had employed in forming intrenchments, and drawing lines of circumvallation, was so well fortified on the arrival of the Cardinal Infant, who had crossed the Scheldt at Antwerp, and approached with not fewer than 25,000 men, that that Prince, in despair of forcing the enemy's camp, or in any way suc-

¹ Daniel, *Hist. de France*.

couring Breda, marched towards Guelderland. In that province he took Venlo and Ruremonde; but Breda, as he had anticipated, surrendered to the Dutch after a siege of nine weeks. Its reduction had cost the famous Spinola as many months; and, since his time, it had been thought that Breda could be taken only by blockade and famine. It now yielded, however, to the batteries and well directed fire of the besiegers, and, by its capture, greatly relieved the Dutch in Brabant, who now, for many years, had been checked by an enemy in the heart of their territories.¹

During this season, when the Cardinal Infant was left without pay for the support of his troops, and was unable, for want of supplies, either to prosecute advantages or ward off attacks, the most enormous sums were lavished, at Madrid, in celebration of the election of Ferdinand King of Hungary, as King of the Romans. The festivals lasted forty-two days, during which there were incessant exhibitions of dances, comedies, masquerades, bull-fights, cane-plays, and all sorts of follies.²

Early in the year 1638 the Infant resumed offensive operations, and again rendered himself formidable to his enemies. He frustrated the attempts which the Dutch had concerted against Antwerp, and though his army was not so numerous by one half as that opposed to him, he destroyed near Calloo, in Waes, a corps of Hollanders, who had made a descent on that district, with a view of aiding in the siege of Antwerp. In person he beat off the army of the Prince of Orange, who had invested Gueldres; and, about the same time, his active generals, Prince Thomas of Savoy, and Piccolomini, compelled the French to raise the siege of St Omer. Several canals led from that city to the vicinity of Prince Thomas's camp; and the besieged having sent him a number of barks by these channels, some detachments of his army entered the

¹ Vassor.

² Ortiz, t. vi. lib. xx. c. 4.

town silently by night. Simultaneous attacks from the camp and city were then made on the French positions.¹ The troops who occupied some of the most important posts surrendered, and the remainder having decamped, were pursued for a considerable distance towards the frontiers of Picardy.

While these events were passing on the northern and eastern frontiers of France, the third Spanish army, amounting to 12,000 men, and destined for the invasion of that kingdom in its opposite extremity, crossed the Pyrenees under the command of the Duke of Medina del Rio-Seco, Admiral of Castile. He took St Jean-de-Luz without difficulty, and was advancing to the siege of Bayonne, when the old Duke d'Epernon, governor of Guienne, whom age had not yet deprived of his wonted activity, threw himself into it. There was little time for preparations ; but the Spanish commander, on being told he would find Bayonne destitute of defence, replied that could not be said of any place which contained the Duke d'Epernon. He accordingly refrained from laying siege to Bayonne ; and all his other enterprises having failed from the vigilant activity of Epernon,² he abandoned St Jean-de-Luz, with some other posts in its neighbourhood, and the seat of war was speedily transferred from Guienne to Languedoc.

Olivarez, in forming his plans against that province, had expected a revolt among its numerous and often rebellious inhabitants. To foment dissensions in France still continued to be the great aim of his policy ; and with this view, he carried on a constant correspondence with its discontented subjects. One of the bitterest enemies of Richelieu, during this period, was Marie de Rohan, Dutchess of Chevreuse. This lady, so celebrated for her wit, her beauty, and various adventures, had been first

¹ Vassor, livre xliii.

² *Hist. de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, t. vii.

married to the Constable de Luynes, the early favourite of Louis XIII, and afterwards to the Duke de Chevreuse, a son of the Duke of Guise. Her enmity to Richelieu partly arose from her attachment to the Queen, whom that minister treated with little respect or consideration. She was obliged, however, to yield to the power of the Cardinal, and retire to Brussels, whence she corresponded with the Queen; and being gained by the Court of Spain, she conducted various intrigues at its suggestion. During this year she sought refuge in Madrid; and though near the age of forty, she still possessed sufficient charms and accomplishments to fascinate the heart of Philip, who, from his earliest youth, had been a devoted admirer of female beauty. Before her departure for England, she remained two months in the Spanish capital, during which period she conducted an extensive correspondence with the discontented peers of France.¹ In this age, politics and faction divided with gallantry the hearts of the Fair,² who were often the most active agents in the conspiracies of the time. Women like the Dutchess of Chevreuse, or the Dutchess of Longueville in France, and the Baroness d'Albi in Spain, of distinguished rank and talents, and fascinating charms, but of profligate conduct, had too often such influence with the eminent leaders of parties, as to induce them to change their politics on the most frivolous grounds, and often to violate their loyalty to their king, and duty to their country:—

Pour meriter son cœur, pour plaire à ses beaux yeux,
J'ai fait la guerre aux Rois—je l'aurois fait aux dieux.

The hopes, however, entertained by Olivarez on the

¹ Camargo, *Sumario añadido a la Hist. d'España de Mariana*. Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

² “La Duchesse de Chevreuse,” says a French writer, “traite les affaires de l'état comme ses intrigues, et ses intrigues comme des affaires d'état.”

present occasion, of exciting commotions in Languedoc, proved utterly fallacious, as scarcely a single native of the province joined the Spanish standard. But though meeting with no support from the inhabitants, the army, which was placed under the command of Serbellone, a distinguished Milanese officer, and consisted chiefly in militia of Aragon and Catalonia, proceeded to invest Leucate. This fortress, which was the first on entering Languedoc from Roussillon, stood on a peninsula about four leagues in circumference. It was flanked by two bastions, which had been erected in the time of Francis I, but its chief strength consisted in its situation,—being built on a rugged rock, surrounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by a salt water lake.¹ A small garrison, under its governor the Sieur de Barri, whom Serbellone made an infamous and unsuccessful attempt to bribe from his duty,² defended it with great gallantry for more than a month. At the end of that period, when it was reduced to the last extremity, the Duke de Halluin, son of the late Mareschal Schomberg, and governor of the province, having assembled a force chiefly composed of militia and volunteers, unexpectedly attacked the Spaniards, forced their intrenchments during the night in four different quarters, and obliged them to abandon the siege with the loss of 3000 men, as likewise of all their artillery. Serbellone, it is said, had done all in his power to dissuade Olivarez from the attempt on Leucate,³ but after its failure the Spanish minister attributed this discomfiture to a neglect and disobedience of his orders.⁴ The unfortunate general, who had gained considerable reputation during the Italian wars, and the expedition of the Duke of Feria into Germany,

¹ Griffet, *Hist. de Louis XIII.*

² Vassor, livre xlii.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 1.

⁴ Vezzalmi, *Ganancias y Perdidas*, &c.

died of grief and shame, on account of the signal defeat he had experienced.¹

In the following season the French, in their turn, attempted the invasion of Spain, but with as little success as the Spaniards had obtained in Guienne or Languedoc. The notion of the siege of Fontarabia had been suggested to Richelieu, some years before, by the Bishop of Bordeaux; but the Duke d'Epemon, governor of Guienne, and his son the Duke de la Valette, having been sent to reconnoitre the place, reported that the enterprise would be attended with the greatest difficulties. La Valette being afterwards summoned to court, and the siege proposed to him, still remained of the same opinion; but the minister, intoxicated with his success at Rochelle, thought no fortress could be impregnable to his arms.² Accordingly, an army, amounting to not less than 15,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, the father of the great Condé, and a devoted retainer of Richelieu, crossed the frontier, took Irun, and laid siege to Fontarabia, which is situated on a peninsula, jutting into the river Bidassoa. A formidable French fleet was, at the same time, stationed on the coast of Guipuscoa, to co-operate with this army; and, though it failed in an attack on the Spanish ships, under command of Lope de Hozes, which had been ordered to sail to the succour of Fontarabia, it afterwards succeeded in burning them in the harbour of Guetaria, where they had sought refuge.³

¹ Ortiz, *Compendio*, t. vi. lib. xx. c. 4.

² *Observ. sur le Test. Polit. de Richelieu.*

³ The Spanish historian Malvezzi suggests some consolatory reflections for a nation whose navy has been consumed by an enemy. "The French remained without spoil or victory. What the Spaniards had gained by courage, they lost by conflagration—thus showing that the monarchy can only fall with the world, since it

Fontarabia being considered as the key of Spain, on the entrance to the kingdom from Bayonne, its natural strength had been greatly improved by fortifications. Domingo de Eguia, a native of Bilboa, commanded at this time in the absence of the governor; and by means of his garrison of 700 men, and the cordial assistance of the inhabitants, was enabled to hold out, in expectation of those succours which were earnestly implored from the Court of Madrid.¹ A corps of veteran troops was accordingly placed under command of the Admiral of Castile, who, being joined on his march by the militia of the Provinces, and some regiments headed by the Marques de Los Velez, Viceroy of Navarre, advanced with a total force of 13,000 men to the relief of Fontarabia.² He was also accompanied by a number of the principal nobility, who had volunteered in the service, and by the Marquises of Torrecusa and Mortara, both subsequently so well known in the war of Catalonia. The Duke de la Valette, who, by persuasion of his brother the Cardinal, had accepted a command under Condé, recommended that the French should advance to attack the Castilian army, while it was on its march to the relief of Fontarabia. But both Condé and the Archbishop of Bordeaux were jealous of La Valette, and in consequence allowed the Spanish force to approach without interruption.³ After sitting down before the enemies' intrenchments, and occupying several of the adjacent heights, a difference of opinion arose among the Spanish officers, some of them maintaining that the town should be instantly relieved by attacking the French army, and others that it would can be injured but by those means by which the globe itself must perish." (*Ganancias y Perdidas.*)

¹ Palafox, *Sitio y Socorro de Fuenterabia*; ed. Madrid, 1639. 4to.

² Id.

³ *Observ. sur le Test. Polit. de Richelieu.*

be best to allow the enemy to occupy the place, and afterwards retake it. Nearly a month having elapsed, during which the army were daily spectators of skirmishes between the French and the garrison of Fontarabia, without adopting any effectual measures for its succour, the inhabitants and governor at length signified to the Spanish general, that unless an immediate effort was made to relieve them, they could hold out no longer.¹ The Admiral of Castile then made a disposition for a general attack on the enemy's intrenchments, but the night before its appointed execution, a dreadful flood and tempest swept the Spanish camp; a number of horses were drowned, and, by the evening of the following day, not fewer than 7000 soldiers were missing from their quarters.² Some time was occupied in recalling them to their standards, but when they were at length assembled, and the losses sustained by the storm in some degree repaired, the Admiral made a spirited and general attack on the trenches of the enemy. The Marques of Torrecusa led the van, and having forced the French lines, he was quickly followed by the main body, under the Admiral and the Marques Los Velez. In this assault, while the Spaniards lost only 200 men, the French were totally defeated, and precipitately driven forth from their intrenchments. Many of them were killed in the attack, and a still greater number were drowned in attempting to pass the Bidassoa. Those who escaped fled with precipitation to Bayonne, leaving the baggage, ammunition, and artillery, as also the despatches from the Court of France, in the hands of their conquerors. The Prince of Condé himself, and some of his principal officers, with difficulty found safety in a French vessel which had entered the mouth of the Bidassoa.³

¹ Bassompierre, *Mémoires*, t. ii. p. 501.

² Palafox, *Sitio de Fuenterabia*.

³ Id.

Both the French and Spanish nations thus completely failed, when they attempted to pass those gigantic and eternal barriers which the hand of Nature had reared as the unalterable limits and bulwarks of either land.

Intelligence of the success at Fontarabia having reached Madrid, excited incredible joy in that capital. The king, as a testimony of his approbation, rewarded the inhabitants for their brave defence, by conferring on their town the name and privileges of a city, and ordered 100,000 ducats to be assigned them for the repair of their fortifications.¹ The Admiral of Castile was received, on his return to Madrid, with public honours, and the Marques Los Velez, with some other principal officers, obtained thanks for their services. Olivarez, however, as usual, arrogated to himself the chief credit and rewards due for this fortunate expedition.

But Spain was hardly relieved from the alarm of the invasion of Navarre, when she was threatened with a new danger, on the side of Roussillon. The Prince of Condé having persuaded Richelieu, that his late failure at Fontarabia had been occasioned by the faults of the Duke de la Valette, who commanded under him, was again entrusted with a military expedition against the Spanish frontiers. Having assembled a large force in Languedoc, and being aided by the Duke de Halluin (now Mareschal Schomberg) the governor of that province, he entered Roussillon, and menaced the strong castle of Salas. The small county of Roussillon, which had hitherto belonged to Spain as an appendage of Catalonia, lies on the French side of the higher Pyrenees; but a lower range of mountains, called the Courbieres, branching off from them, and extending within a league of the Mediterranean shore, divides Roussillon from Languedoc. At the extremity of these hills, and about a league from the sea,

¹ Palafox, *Sitio de Fuenterabia*.

stood the fortress of Salsas, which was considered as the key of Spain on the dangerous side of Roussillon and Catalonia. Count Santa-Coloma, the Spanish governor of these provinces, had no force under his command which he could oppose to the French army destined to act in that quarter.¹ The governor of Salsas was a brave, but not very skilful officer, who, contenting himself with a fixed resolution not to surrender the fortress, did not employ the proper means for its defence; and, after forty days siege, the enemy entered the place by an opening in the ramparts, which they had accidentally discovered.² The capture of Salsas was followed by the occupation of all the open places in the neighbouring valleys, and of several castles lying on the acclivities of the mountains.

Olivarez was sufficiently alive to the danger of leaving Salsas in possession of the enemy. He accordingly despatched to Roussillon some regular troops, under Spinola, Marques of Balbases, son of the great Spinola, which were destined to unite and co-operate with the Catalan militia, under the Count Santa-Coloma.

The Spanish army, after this junction, being numerous and well equipped, it was resolved to give battle to the enemy, who, on the approach of the Spaniards, retired under the walls of Salsas, and subsequently, with exception of the garrison left in that fortress, quitted the district altogether.³ A report which soon afterwards became current, that this garrison was so much reduced from scarcity of provisions, that it must necessarily capi-

¹ Malvezzi, *Sucesos principales en el anno 1639*. This author was employed by Olivarez to write a favourable account of the events of the year 1639, as Palafox, bishop of Osma, had been of those in the preceding season. Malvezzi states the French force at 25,000 men; Campion, a French officer, who was present during the siege of Salsas, at 16,500.

² Id.

³ Id.

tulate in a short while, induced the Spanish generals to prefer a blockade to an assault ; and when the rumour was discovered to have been ill-founded, the rains which had commenced, the consequent floods of these mountainous regions, and the sickness of the soldiery, interposed almost insurmountable obstacles to a successful attack. It seems probable, indeed, that the enterprise would have been altogether relinquished, had not Olivarez, whose heart was set on its accomplishment, encouraged and exhorted the commanders, and pointed out to them its practicability. He thus earnestly writes to the viceroy of Catalonia on the 3d of October : “ The letters received yesterday have occasioned considerable inquietude. You not only doubt of the success of the siege, but talk of raising it. This, in my estimation, would be the greatest dishonour that could befall the monarchy, and consequently the most sensible affliction I could myself suffer. As I have written at full length on this subject to the Marques of Balbases, I shall only say, in reference to the want of forage and provisions, which begins to be felt in the camp, that if you especially, and all his Majesty’s other officers in the principality, as also the nobility and corporations, do not compel the inhabitants to bear to you, on their shoulders, all the corn and fodder which can be anywhere found, you will fail in the duty you owe to your king, to the blood which flows in your veins, and to your own preservation. If the privileges of the province can be reconciled with the maxims I inculcate, it may be well to respect them ; but if they occasion one hour’s delay, I shall publicly proclaim, that he who founds on them is the enemy of God, his lineage, and his country. You have provisions and forage in the province—some at hand—some at a distance. The first may be brought in on the shoulders of men, and the others by waggons or galleys ; you will not fail.” In a postscript, Olivarez adds,

in his own hand, "The king, your master, did not order you to besiege Salsas—you and the Marques Balbases resolved on it. But it is no longer the honour of Catalonia, or the officers of the army, which is at stake; the reputation of the king is concerned. You have been assisted from hence, and we shall continue to afford you aid at the expense of our own existence. Hazard all, and make yourself be obeyed by the inhabitants of the province, that you may thus save both the province and country—otherwise both are lost. Let every one who is capable march to battle. Let the women carry on their shoulders straw and hay, and whatever is necessary for the cavalry or army. It is no longer time to entreat, but to command and execute. The Catalans are sometimes well-disposed, and sometimes refractory. The safety of the people and the army must be preferred to the laws and privileges of the province. The soldiers must be commodiously quartered, and comfortably laid. Take their beds from gentlemen of the highest rank in the district. Let them sleep on the ground, rather than allow the soldiers to suffer hardship." And, again, on the 14th October: "If the pioneers do not choose to come voluntarily, compel them, though you should lead them tied and bound. Though they should exclaim against your proceedings—though they should threaten to stone you, let not that deter you. Give disgust and offence to all without scruple. I will be responsible for whatever you do. I shall not concern myself, provided Spain preserve her honour, and that we are not scorned by the French."¹ In a subsequent letter, the minister reproaches Santa-Coloma, that he had not punished with death some of the fugitives of the province, which he thinks would have prevented farther desertion.

These rigid injunctions were at length punctually obeyed.

¹ Ap. Aubery, and Vassor, livre xlv.

ed by the Spanish generals, while Olivarez fulfilled his promises, by forwarding to them considerable reinforcements under the Duke de Maqueda, and providing supplies of all sorts from Aragon and Valencia. Being thus supported, some detachments of the Spanish army succeeded in destroying the ammunition and provisions which had been collected in Leucate and other quarters, for the relief of the besieged.¹ The French army under Schomberg and the Prince of Condé, which appeared from time to time, merely showed itself, and then retired. The assault which the Spaniards had so long delayed, was at length attempted. In this attack, the Marques of Torrecusa chiefly distinguished himself, animating the troops by his words and gallant example. The fortress, however, was not carried at the first assault; but so strong an impression was made on it, that the governor, Espenan, who had been appointed to this command on its recent capture by the French, agreed to capitulate, if not relieved by a certain day,—it being understood that by relief was meant supplies of provisions being thrown into the place, or the Spanish lines of circumvallation being forced. From the 23d of December, the day when this compact was concluded till the 6th of January, which had been fixed for the capitulation, it was daily expected on both sides, that some strenuous effort would be made for the relief of Salas. The Spanish generals apprehended that either their lines might be stormed, or an attempt might be made by counter-lines to cut them off from communication with the adjacent provinces of Spain, and consequently from their supply of provisions. These anticipations were strongly expressed to the Spanish ministry, and a long letter to Olivarez is still extant, in which the probable risk of each event is estimated, and the best means pointed out for warding off the danger. At length, no effec-

¹ Malvezzi, *Sucesos*, &c.

tual attempt having been made to relieve the fortress within the prescribed time, the French garrison, with their leader Espenan, marched out, and received a safe conduct as far as Narbonne.

Olivarez, as we have seen, had taken a deep interest in the siege of Salsas, and valued himself highly on the acquisition. Its capture forms the chief incident in the laudatory history of his panegyrist, the Marques de Malvezzi. Salsas was indeed important from its situation; yet the recovery of a small fortress, which had formerly belonged to the Spaniards, and had so recently been taken from them, seems to afford no such grounds for triumph or congratulation. But it has been invariably remarked, that, in the decline of monarchies, trifling successes are inordinately extolled, and magnified into inadequate importance.

The long campaign in the vicinity of Salsas, though it proved ultimately prosperous to the Spanish arms, fostered in the bosom of the kingdom the seeds of rebellion. Those arbitrary measures which Olivarez enjoined to his Generals, may have gained Salsas, but they lost Catalonia. The frequent intercourse which took place between the Catalans and French soldiery, added fuel to those flames nearly ready to burst forth, and, shortly afterwards, excited the fatal insurrection at Barcelona. ✕

Though the operations of the war between France and Spain had been principally conducted, since its commencement, on the frontiers of the two belligerent nations, Italy had also been the theatre of many important events and subtle negotiations. Richelieu (as has been seen) having obtained the alliance of the Dukes of Savoy, Parma, and Mantua, and having secured the neutrality of the Republics of Venice and Genoa, now bent all his efforts to expel the Spaniards from Milan, which was at that time

but weakly defended, being almost completely drained of soldiers, in consequence of the number of troops which the Cardinal Infant had so recently carried with him to Flanders. In 1635, a French army of 15,000 men was accordingly assembled in Dauphiny, and placed under the command of Mareschal Crequi. Having crossed the Alps, it formed a junction with 8000 troops under the Duke of Parma, and 12,000 under the Duke of Savoy, to whom the supreme command of this formidable army of 35,000 men was entrusted. Such a force, if properly employed, ought to have proved sufficient to overwhelm the Dutchy of Milan, in its present unprotected condition. Had it advanced without delay to the gates of the capital, that city would inevitably have fallen into the hands of the allies, and its capture would, in all probability, have been speedily followed by the conquest of the whole Dutchy. But the confederates were long detained by idle disputes among themselves, their licentiousness and love of plunder;¹ and the Duke of Savoy, it is suspected, was not over-zealous in the cause. When they at length resolved to advance into the Dutchy, their army first encamped before the town of Valenza, on the right bank of the Po,—a place which was considered of great importance, as being, with its strong bridge, a point of union between that part of the Milanese situated on the north, and that which lies on the south side of the Po. It was not, however, very strongly fortified; it had no military governor, and its garrison was so feeble, that, on the first demonstrations of attack, they had almost resolved to surrender or quit its walls. The Marquis Celada or Zelada,

¹ “Se i capi Francesi, in vece di trattenersi a vagheggiare le dame del Monferratto e del Piamonte, disputare del sì e del nò, e empir le lore borse d'oro, si fossero a dirittura spinti ad alloggiare sotto alle porte di Milano, sprovisto di gente e di consiglio,” &c. (Gualdo, *Guerre d'Europa*.)

a noble Spaniard, who had recently arrived at Valenza from Flanders, having been sent by the Infanta Isabella to congratulate the Cardinal Infant on his arrival in Italy, assumed the defence of the town, and quickly infused such a spirit into the minds of the inhabitants and the desponding garrison, that there was no longer any talk of surrendering the place, or of abandoning it. Soon afterwards, the Spanish Generals, Don Carlos Coloma, and Spinola brother to the Marquis of Balbases, collected an army, and hastened to Valenza with supplies of artillery, ammunition and victuals. Spinola, with part of the army, entered the town, which he found environed only by an old ruinous wall ; but from some unaccountable delay or negligence on the part of the besiegers, he and his friend Celada, with whom he had served in the Flanders' wars, were allowed leisure to fortify it. They dug round the town a strong trench, which they flanked with eight bulwarks, and formed low redoubts in the ditch, which were called *capponiere*, and which, being commanded by the cannon of the bulwarks, were difficult to take, and when taken, almost impossible to retain. Their confidence grew greater, as the enemy proceeded with little vigour or diligence. The Duke of Parma, who fancied he had inherited the martial talents of his grandsire, was desirous to bring the enterprise to a speedy termination. But, from whatever cause, the French Mareschal, in spite of the Duke's earnest representations, remained wholly inactive, and sometimes absented himself totally from the scene of action,—resorting daily to a neighbouring forest to hunt wild animals. Spinola's colleague, Don Carlos Coloma, who had kept the field with the remainder of the army, in order to aid the town from without, being now strongly reinforced by troops from Naples and other quarters, contributed to frustrate whatever attacks were made by the

besiegers on the trenches and *capponiere*. This succouring army, also took up a strong position, on the banks of the Po, commanding the course of that river and the adjacent country. The town being thus fully supplied with provisions, the allies despaired of making any farther progress, and foreseeing that the approaching winter would totally impede their operations, raised the siege of Valenza, after it had been formed for fifty days. Celada, its brave defender, died soon afterwards, in consequence of the fatigue which he had undergone.

The allied army now separated with mutual disgust on the part of its commanders. The Duke of Parma went to Paris to complain of the misconduct of the French Mareschal. That General, on his part, accused the Duke of Savoy of treachery and intelligence with the Spaniards; and the Duke, at the same time, sent envoys to the Court of France to set forth the negligence of Crequi. The allies, however, still kept the field, ravaging the open and fertile plains of Milan. They likewise took possession of several towns, particularly Bremi, on the Po, which they occupied, with the intention of making it the centre of their future operations, as they trusted that, from its position, it would always secure them a footing in the Dutchy.¹

On hearing of the distress of Milan, the King of Spain took immediate steps for the relief of that bulwark of his Italian power. In 1636 he appointed to its government Diego Guzman, Marques of Leganez, who was a near relative of Olivarez, and son-in-law of the great Spinola, having married his eldest daughter, Donna Polixena.² He had served in the Spanish army during the whole of the present reign, and twenty years during that of Philip III,³

¹ Capriata, *Guerre d'Italia*, lib. xiv.

² Vayrac, *Etat de l'Espagne*, t. iv. p. 56.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. 3.

and was employed in the Netherlands at the time of his appointment to the viceroyalty of Milan. Many Spanish cavaliers repaired to Italy, being eager to serve under this experienced and distinguished governor. His interest at Court also procured for him good equipments and adequate pecuniary supplies; and he had not long entered on the government intrusted to him, when he succeeded in expelling the enemy from every spot in Milan, with exception of Bremi, which they still retained. Milan having been thus delivered, Leganez transferred the theatre of war to the States of the Duke of Parma, and completely desolated those fertile regions. The French Court urged the Duke of Savoy to march to the succour of their mutual ally, and drive the Spaniards from Piacenza. But he remained immoveable, having no great friendship for his neighbour, nor inclination for the task enjoined him. While the Spaniards were thus laying waste his territories, the Duke of Parma was spending his time at Paris in frivolous amusements, or idle disputes with the French nobility on points of form and precedence.¹ When he at length arrived in his States, which he found reduced to extremities, he threw himself with his family into the town of Piacenza, where he was closely besieged by the Spaniards. It would perhaps have been difficult for the Duke of Parma to have preserved a neutrality between the two conflicting powers. But he was quickly destined to experience what little benefit princes of his rank derive from engaging in the quarrels of great monarchs. The Duke of Savoy delayed, and the other powers of Italy refused, to send him assistance; and he was totally disappointed in all those advantages which Richelieu had held out to him as the price of his alliance. Meanwhile, the Spaniards, by taking possession of an island in the Po, having reduced Piacenza to extremity,

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*.

he accepted the mediation of the Duke of Tuscany ; and, on condition of the restitution of his states, he renounced the French alliance, and returned to the compact which had so long subsisted between his ancestors and the kings of Spain. The Duke concluded this peace, in 1637, with the consent of Richelieu and the Court of France, who, being unable to render him any effectual assistance, saw its inevitable necessity. Leganez then took Nizza della Paglia, a town in the Langhe, belonging to the Duke of Savoy ; and he rendered unprofitable a victory which the allies had gained, in that district, over Don Martin of Aragon.

The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, did not long survive these events ; and it was strongly suspected, both in Spain and Italy, though probably on no just grounds, that he had been poisoned at a banquet given to him by Marechal Crequi, a few hours before his death.¹ The demise of the Duke of Mantua occurred nearly about the same period ; and on the decease of these two princes, the Court of Spain used every exertion to detach their successors from the French confederacy. Its efforts succeeded, at least to a certain extent, with the Dutchess-dowager of Mantua, whom, indeed, the French suspected of having entered into an agreement with the Spaniards for delivering Casal into their hands.² But the Dutchess of Savoy, who was regent of the dukedom during the minority of her son, being the sister of Louis XIII, could not easily be drawn off from the French interests. Olivarez, despairing to gain this princess, excited by his intrigues the brothers

¹ “El Duque Vitorio Amadeo pocas horas despues de un banquete que le hizo el Duque de Crequi espirò en hastio, con tan sospechosas circunstancias de muerte procurado que solo en España se ha platicado con modestia en el caso, hablando entretanto la Italia muy libremente.” (Palafox, *Sitio de Fuenterabia y Sucesos del Año 1638*, p. 21.)

² Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 133.

of the late Duke to dispute with her the title to the regency. Both these princes had, in opposition to the deceased Duke, espoused the Spanish party. The eldest, Cardinal Maurice, intrigued at Rome in behalf of the Spaniards: the youngest, Prince Thomas, who was highly popular among his countrymen, having conceived some disgust at his brother's conduct towards him, had offered his services to the Cardinal Infant, when that prince was in Italy; and these being readily accepted, he had privately left the Court of Turin for the Netherlands, where he was at present serving with great zeal and distinction in the Spanish army.

The French, as we have seen, had been expelled from the whole of the Milanese, except the fortress of Bremi, which they still held, and which was considered a highly important position, as it commanded one of the most fertile and extensive districts of the dutchy. Leganez strenuously prepared for its siege, though he concealed his design as much as possible from Mareschal Crequi, and led him to believe that he meditated the invasion of Piedmont. Bremi was but indifferently fortified, and feebly garrisoned; and the governor, Montgaillard, was a sordid wretch, who had been one of Crequi's grooms of the stable, and only availed himself of his situation for the purpose of amassing gold. He had converted the fortress, with the command of which he was intrusted, into a lucrative mart of French commodities, to which all the neighbouring inhabitants of the Milanese resorted. Leganez was thus enabled to obtain accurate information concerning its strength and fortifications. He had no sooner laid siege to it, than Crequi, apprized of his design, hastened with his whole army to save it. That general had suffered greatly in his military reputation, from his supposed mismanagement of affairs in Italy. He had recently requested the king to be relieved from his

irksome command, and it had been proposed that the Duke de Rohan should be called from the Valteline to succeed him.¹ It was, therefore, with much anxiety and haste, that he marched to the succour of a place of which he fully appreciated the importance. But the Spaniards, having already taken up their positions, and even carried some of the outworks, it was only a small division of his force which he could introduce within the walls of Bremi; and he was thwarted in all his attempts to occupy any part of that side of the river on which it is situated. He then bethought himself of placing batteries along the banks opposite to the Spanish trenches, that a way might be opened to send supplies and assistance into the town by water. While standing near a tree, accompanied by a few horsemen, and looking with a perspective glass, to determine where a redoubt might most advantageously be raised, he was aimed at by a Spanish artilleryman, and struck by a ball, which instantaneously killed him.² The governor of Bremi, on hearing of the Mareschal's end, immediately agreed to evacuate the town. He told Leganez that he should not have surrendered it, had not his inferior officers declared, that they would place him under arrest unless he gave it up.³ It appears, however, that he had not justified himself to the satisfaction of his own government, as, on his arrival at Casal, he was publicly beheaded for cowardice and treachery, by the express orders of Richelieu.

By the loss of Bremi, the French were deprived of the last receptacle for their supplies or forces in the Dutchy of Milan; and in consequence of the death of Crequi, they

¹ Gualdo, *Guere d'Europa*, lib. xiv.

² It was reported at the time, that the ball by which he was slain being taken up, a cross was found engraved on it, with letters which formed the billet—*A Crequi*. *L'Espion Turc*. t. i. lib. i. 18.

³ Palafox, *Sitio de Fuenterrabia*, p. 41.

had now no longer any chief of their own nation in Italy. The few French nobility who were still in the army, returned to their own country, and the soldiery dispersed into Montferrat and Piedmont.

Leganez, availing himself of this favourable posture of affairs, marched straightway into Piedmont, at the head of an army of 20,000 men. The Dutchess of Savoy, had she been permitted, would willingly have remained at peace, and observed a strict neutrality between the two nations.¹ But Richelieu was too well aware of the weight of Savoy, either in war, or during negotiations for peace, to allow this inaction. He had no sooner heard of the death of Duke Amadeus, than he began to testify to the Dutchess-dowager the utmost anxiety for her safety, and that of her family, and the most lively apprehensions concerning the designs of the Spaniards, and the princes of the House of Savoy, who, he insinuated, would not scruple to effect their own aggrandizement by the death of herself and children. By his influence, her chief adviser, Father Monod, whom he suspected of being attached to the Spanish interests, was removed from her counsels; and Cardinal Maurice, who had set out from Rome on his way to Turin, was stopped, on entering Piedmont, by a message from the Dutchess, and obliged to return. In short, he wished to render Savoy completely subservient to his plans, and to engross the whole power in that country as well as in France. The Dutchess, however, did not enter cordially into the views of Richelieu, and struggled as much as possible to emancipate herself from his fetters. She had also taken personal offence at the French minister who, at some interview, had ventured to propose saluting her with a kiss—an honour which she had previously refused to the Archbishop of Rheims,² and she at-

¹ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal. de Savoie*, t. iii. p. 49.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. viii. p. 484. It was chiefly, however, to kisses

tempted to convert this audacity on the part of his Eminence, into an affair of state. Her Highness was also especially exasperated at the small account which Richelieu seemed to make of her understanding; and his confidants at Turin earnestly recommended to him more care and attention in that particular.¹ In this frame of mind, the Dutchess, before she would accept of any sort of aid from France, or admit any of its troops into her towns, insisted on an explicit declaration of Richelieu's ultimate intentions. She had next a dispute, whether her league with France was to be offensive and defensive, or merely defensive, to which she wished to restrict it. But Richelieu would afford no assistance on that condition, and she was in consequence compelled to adopt the closer species of confederacy.²

The Dutchess was thus obliged to decline the alliance and protection which Leganez, on first crossing the frontiers of Piedmont, offered to her, and which he assured her would be extended to her family, provided she renounced the friendship of France, and drove beyond the Alps whatever troops of that nation were at present within her territories. As his proposals were unequivocally rejected, of ceremony, from cardinals and archbishops, that her Royal Highness entertained an aversion. She was otherwise not a disdainful princess.—“Madame Royale, digne Fille de Henri IV,” it is said in the *Mémoires de Grammont*, “rendoit sa petite cour la plus agréable du monde. Elle avoit hérité des vertus de son père, à l'égard des sentimens qui conviennent au sexe: et à l'égard de ce qu'on appelle la foiblesse des grands cœurs, son Altesse n'avoit pas dégénéré.”

¹ “Il sembleroit bien à propos,” says the Cardinal la Valette in one of his letters, “que vous escrivissiez une lettre de civilité à Madame, et que vous lui témoignassiez quelque estime de son esprit; car une des choses, dont elle se plaint le plus, est de la mauvaise opinion que vous avez de sa capacité.” (Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 240.)

² Siri, *Mercurio*.

and as he at the same time received intelligence that a new French army, under the Cardinal la Valette, was about to enter Italy, Leganez, in conformity with the instructions of his Court, turned his thoughts to the occupation of all the strong places in Piedmont.¹ He first laid siege to Vercelli, which, from its vicinity to Milan, had always afforded easy access for the invasion of that dutchy, by the French and Savoyards. The Cardinal la Valette, who was ever ambitious of military command, and whose offer to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Crequi had, in the exigency of the moment, been thankfully accepted, hastened to the relief of Vercelli, at the head of a new French army, amounting to 13,000 men.² Though his force was considerably inferior to that of Leganez, and though he did not arrive before Vercelli till the Spanish lines of circumvallation were completed, he succeeded in throwing a succour of 1800 men into the fortress. At the moment, however, when the Court of France expected to receive intelligence of the raising of the siege of Vercelli, which La Valette had announced as certain, they heard of its surrender, to which it had been compelled by want of powder and ammunition. The Cardinal, who had not greatly distinguished himself during his campaigns in the Netherlands, completely lost the confidence of the public by this failure at Vercelli. But he was continued in his command, by the favour of Richelieu, who supported him at the same moment that he unrelentingly persecuted his more deserving father, the old Duke d'Epemon, and his brother the Duke de la Valette.³

After the capture of Vercelli, the light troops of Le-

¹ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. vi.

² Vassor, livre xliii.

³ *Rivalité de France, et de l'Espagne.—Lettres de Voiture.* His haughty father, in allusion to his subserviency to the Minister, called him *Cardinal Valet*.

ganez ravaged the principality of Piedmont as far as the gates of Turin ; but an infectious disorder which spread in his army, and a long and dangerous sickness with which he was himself seized, arrested the progress of his arms, and for a time saved that capital. A manifesto, meanwhile, was circulated by the Spaniards, setting forth that they had no intention to retain Vercelli, and that they merely held it for the young Duke, in order to preserve him from the usurpations of France.

That minor Prince, however, died soon afterwards. He had an only brother, indeed, who succeeded to him ; but he was a sickly infant, and he was now the sole person between his uncle Cardinal Maurice, and the ducal crown. This prospect conferred on the Cardinal an additional claim to assume the regency, and Vercelli afforded him a ready entrance into Piedmont.

Olivarez, in the commencement of the year 1639, availed himself of these favourable circumstances to confirm his treaty with Cardinal Maurice, and his brother Prince Thomas, the former of whom was summoned by the Spaniards from Rome to Piedmont, and the latter from the army in Flanders. The Spanish minister obtained, in favour of Maurice, a rescript from the Emperor, (who was eager for an opportunity to exercise his rights of supremacy in Italy,) by which the settlement of the late Duke of Savoy was declared null, and Maurice was constituted regent in place of the Dutchess, his sister-in-law. Leganez, under colour of placing the native Princes of Savoy in the government of the state, sought not only to expel the French, but, by making himself master of the chief town, to render the Princes and the whole sovereignty dependent on the King of Spain. This policy succeeded admirably for a time. As soon as Cardinal Maurice was invested with such a right as the Emperor could confer on him, he laid claim to the regency. He then plainly

announced his intention of assuming the management of affairs, with the guardianship of the Duke, and of freeing the country from the danger to which it was exposed by the presence of the French forces. The Dutchess, on the other hand, prohibited her subjects from receiving the Cardinal in the capacity of regent, and commanded them, by proclamation, to arm in defence of their young Duke, and of their country, against the meditated aggressions of the Spaniards.

As soon as Prince Thomas arrived from Flanders at Vercelli, to prosecute his own and his brother's claims, a plan of military operations was arranged between him and the Spanish general; and it was stipulated that Prince Thomas should hold possession of whatever towns voluntarily opened their gates to him, but that the Spaniards should, in the mean while, be allowed to occupy and garrison those places which they should acquire by their arms in Piedmont, and should afterwards supply the Princes with troops and money to seize on the dutchy of Savoy. In consequence of this treaty, the contracting parties immediately fell on Piedmont—Leganez in one quarter, and Prince Thomas on the other. The Prince quickly obtained possession of Chivas, Ivrea, and Asti,¹ and most other places of importance, particularly those which lie around Turin, and which had been fortified by the celebrated Duke Emmanuel Philibert,² who gained for the Spaniards the battle of St Quintin. Some of these fortresses were surrendered to Prince Thomas with little resistance, and others at the first summons were voluntarily delivered up by their governors, many of whom entered his service, or that of Spain, after their capitulation. His cause was in general popular in the principality, and its inhabitants, whom the Emperor had absolved from their

¹ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal. de Savoie*.

² Desodoards, *Hist. d'Italie*, t. vi. lib. xvi. c. 28.

allegiance to the Dutchess,¹ flocked in crowds to his standard. The Regent, as a foreigner, was regarded by them with suspicion ; and they somewhat pitied their native Princes, who, by her means, were kept in banishment from their country, deprived of their revenues, and excluded from all share in the administration, in which they had so great an interest.

Richelieu being informed of an alliance which would virtually place all the dominions of the young Duke of Savoy in the hands of the Spaniards, thought it better to snatch some morsels of what remained, than contend for the occupation of those towns which had already fallen into the hands of his enemies. He therefore signified to the Dutchess that it would be requisite to deliver up both her son and capital, with the other places which yet continued in her possession, to France, as the price of any farther protection which that kingdom might afford. But the Regent refused to subscribe to a proposal at once so hazardous and ignominious ; and Louis, ashamed to exact such sacrifices from a sister and ally, who was about to fall from her throne, in consequence of adhering faithfully to her engagements with France, personally interposed in her favour, and granted a promise of aid on less severe conditions.² It was now only required that she should receive French garrisons in the towns of Savigliano, Cherasco, and Carmagnuola ; and in return, the King of France agreed not to make peace with the Spaniards till all the places occupied by them in Piedmont should be restored to the young Duke of Savoy. He also undertook to send across the Alps a sufficient number of troops to resist their farther progress, and to supply the Dutchess with money to keep in the field or in garrison a respectable native force.³

¹ Aubery, t. ii. p. 801.

² Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

³ Aubery, ii. p. 798.

Meanwhile, Prince Thomas continued his popular and victorious career, and having again joined his troops with those of Leganez, took the important fortress of Trino,¹ and arrived at length before the walls of Turin. The French forces under La Valette, had for some time after the first successes of Prince Thomas, kept themselves shut up in that capital: and, indeed, Richelieu, suspicious of the disaffection of the inhabitants, had recommended that a formidable French force should be retained within the walls, in order to be stationed at all the gates or inlets, and that the citizens should be disarmed.² In these precautions, however, the French generals had not persevered; and the greater part of the troops had recently marched on an unfortunate and ill-concerted expedition against Coni, where Cardinal Maurice at that time resided, by whose capture the French hoped at once to terminate the war. But Coni was not taken; and Turin, in consequence of the absence of its chief defenders, was exposed to the utmost hazard. In fact, Prince Thomas, by means of an understanding with some of the principal inhabitants, and the captain on guard at one of the gates, suddenly entered the city; and the Dutchess, accompanied by her family and a few attendants, escaped with the utmost difficulty into the citadel. Prince Thomas was everywhere received with congratulations and applause; and on the following day, the Spanish general Leganez also entered the town with a great additional force. Then commenced a murderous conflict between the Spaniards and the small garrison in the citadel, the fortifications of which had been planned under the direction of Duke Emmanuel Philibert, by Paciotto d'Urbino, the most famous military architect of his age.³ Prince Thomas, in order to prevent the citadel from receiving succour, attempted to block it up by

¹ Guichenon, *Hist. Geneal.* t. iii.

² Aubery, p. 801.

³ Desodoards, *Hist. d'Italie*, t. vi. livre xvi. c. 28.

means of circumvallations, which required lines of only three miles circuit, as it was nearly half begirt by the town. But before these lines could be completed, the French army arrived from Coni, and finding no trenches to keep them off, or any forces in the field to oppose them, entered the citadel. Then commenced bombardments on the town, and frequent assaults from the fortress. But the sallies were successfully repulsed, and the city was tolerably sheltered by parapets against the shot from the citadel. In this dangerous predicament, the Dutchess, accompanied by a small escort, set off for Susa—the young Duke having been previously sent to Chambery.

Soon after the departure of the Dutchess, a truce, for two months, was concluded by the French garrison in the citadel, with Prince Thomas and the Spaniards. This treaty was signed in concurrence with the opinion of the great majority of the officers in the Spanish army, who were called by Leganez to a council of war. They conceived that the soldiers had been exhausted, and the whole army in a great measure disorganized by the late campaign: they apprehended that, confined as they were between two rivers, a retreat, if found necessary, might prove fatal; and that the strength of the enemy would soon be rendered superior by reinforcements, which could arrive from France more speedily than any levies from Spain:¹ On the other hand, the truce would give time to fortify the town against the citadel: meanwhile the army would recruit—the French resources would be consumed—and, as oft had happened, the soldiers, deserting their standards, would return to their homes. The Court of Madrid, however, were much dissatisfied with this treaty; and in Spain, a general feeling was excited against the supposed

¹ Malvezzi, *Sucesos*, p. 84.

misconduct of Leganez, who had thus stopt short, as it were, in the midst of his successful career.¹

In fact, the tide of fortune which the Spanish general thus allowed to pass, could never be regained. Before the expiry of the truce, La Valette died of chagrin, in consequence of the unfortunate issue of his military enterprises, and was succeeded, at the resumption of hostilities, by the Count de Harcourt, whose activity formed a remarkable contrast to the overcautious slowness of his predecessor. He completely foiled Leganez in an attempt which that General made on Casal, contrary to the opinion of all his officers and of Prince Thomas, who wished him to aid in the capture of the citadel of Turin. During the absence of the Spanish army at Casal, Harcourt besieged Prince Thomas in the city of Turin, and effectually prevented Leganez from again entering it, or render-

¹ Some writers (Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol. Universal History*, vol. xxi.) maintain, that Prince Thomas having become jealous of Leganez, and fearing he would place a Spanish garrison in the citadel of Turin, did not press the siege of that fortress so earnestly as he might, and at last prevailed on the Marques to accede to the truce. Leganez, they allege, proved, to the satisfaction of his court, that he had only signed the treaty in consequence of threats from the Princes of Savoy, that they would range themselves under the banners of France, if the Spaniards farther prosecuted a contest which they foresaw would for ever alienate the dominions of their family from the house of Savoy. Malvezzi, however, says nothing of Leganez being influenced by these motives; while Capriata (lib. xvi.) and Brusoni, who, of all Italian authors, write the fullest on the wars of their country during this period, assert that Prince Thomas remonstrated against the truce, and did all in his power to prevent Leganez from concluding it, as being utterly ruinous to their cause. It would appear that Leganez had quickly satisfied his court with regard to his conduct, as he was soon afterwards raised to the envied dignity of a Grandee of Spain, and, when recalled from Italy, was appointed to conduct the more important war in Catalonia.

ing the necessary assistance. After a brave defence, which was continued during four months, Prince Thomas, in consequence of serious commotions in the town, and the dissensions which arose between him and Leganez, was at length compelled not only to desist from any farther attempts on the citadel, but to abandon the town itself to the enemy, who then restored the Dutchess-Dowager to her capital. After these events, the war was but languidly conducted. There were marches and counter-marches—sieges were formed and raised—truces were made and broken, but no decisive combat was gained, or permanent advantage secured. The Italians, however, had yet, for a long series of years, the mortification to behold the iron lances of Spain, and those of her equally hated rival, bristling amid their peaceful olives, and had still to exclaim, in the plaintive language of Petrarch,

Che fan qui tante pellegrine Spade.

On the whole, though events in Picardy and Savoy had ultimately proved less advantageous to the Spanish monarchy than they at one time promised, the various campaigns carried on in the different quarters of Europe, since the commencement of the war with France, had turned out more favourable than was generally expected, or indeed could have been anticipated, from the comparative power and resources of the rival nations. Though unable to make a lasting impression, Spain had inflicted many severe wounds on her enemy, and had in some degree recovered her military reputation; while, on the other hand, the invasion of her territories by the French armies, had proved eminently unsuccessful. The Spanish nation, so long accustomed to disappointments and reverses, was dazzled by those glimmerings of good fortune which appeared on the political horizon; and Olivarez congratulated himself on the success of his policy, which he doubted not would be brought to a happy issue,

provided the country remained in such a state of internal tranquillity, as might permit him to prosecute undisturbed, his schemes of foreign aggrandizement.

Philip was unfortunately persuaded that, whatever successes his arms had obtained, were owing to the measures of Olivarez, and heaped on him all the rewards which his subjects thought were at least partly due to the exertions of others. The arrogant minister claimed to himself the whole credit of these victories, and, by appropriating every recompense, he alienated the affections of all who had been instrumental in his triumph.

To complete the joy of the court of Madrid, a princess, who was named Maria Theresa, was born about this period. The Duke of Modena, who had recently arrived at the Spanish capital, and had been received there with marked distinction, stood sponsor for the child at the baptism. Her only brother Balthazar, who was now ten years of age, and had been recognised as heir to the monarchy, was a sickly boy. There was thus a strong likelihood that she might one day ascend the Spanish throne. This expectation was not fulfilled; but in her posterity the sceptre was transferred from the House of Austria to that of Bourbon. Nearly at the same period was born the prince, to whom she was afterwards affianced, who was long so celebrated by the name of Louis le Grand, and who became, by that alliance, the ancestor of the royal lines of Naples and of Spain.

CHAPTER V.

REVOLUTION OF PORTUGAL.

He claims our country as by right of conquest—

A right to every wrong.—

Gustavus Vasa.

THE detail of tedious wars, attended with consequences but little important, appears somewhat uninteresting in the present age, accustomed as it has been to hear of the most decisive results from a single campaign. Victories, followed by the overthrow of an empire, and the possession of its capital, or a nominal peace implying the total prostration of the fallen enemy, render contests for a petty principality, and long protracted sieges, apparently insignificant. The revolution, however, which separated the crowns of Portugal and Spain, was rapid and decisive in its movements, and was equally important and permanent. A power which had quitted the political scene for more than half a century, suddenly reappeared on the stage, and produced remarkable changes in the commercial and political system, of a considerable part of Europe.

Since the commencement of the war in which Spain and France were now directly engaged, fortune had continued to hover between these rival powers. At the end of five years, it could scarcely be reckoned that either had gained by the conflict, and the tide of war might still have continued to fluctuate, had not civil dissensions come in aid of its operations, and had not a well concerted conspiracy determined more than the campaigns and sieges

of many seasons. France, indeed, was not altogether free from domestic troubles, but her state was now tranquil, when compared with those intrigues and convulsions which agitated Spain, and which terminated in the revolution of Portugal, and the revolt of Catalonia.

From the period of the rapid subjugation of Portugal by the arms of the Duke of Alva, in the reign of Philip II, that kingdom had occasioned but little disquiet to its conquerors. Its acquisition had added to the splendour of the Spanish monarchy, while it contributed, at least for some time, to its security and strength. It increased that naval power in which Spain was chiefly deficient; and the Portuguese colonies in America, with those in the Indies, having experienced the fate of the mother country, had been for many years a source of wealth to the Spaniards. Philip II. chiefly attempted to secure his dominions by the mildness of his government. Aware of the Portuguese hatred towards the Castilians, he felt the necessity of conciliation, and this system, so foreign from his temper and usual policy, was, in a great measure, successful. And though the Portuguese ever felt aversion to the Castilian yoke, it seems doubtful whether any effort would have been made to shake it off, if their conquerors had not ultimately proved such inexorable task-masters. The successors of Philip II, who generally adopted him as their model, did not follow his example in the only point that deserved imitation.¹ Philip III,

¹ It has been alleged, however, that, in a sort of political testament, drawn up by the ministers of Philip II, under his directions, for the guidance of his successors, the tyrant had left, as a leading maxim, the necessity of the total subjection of the Portuguese; but that, to attain this object, instead of loading them with imposts, they ought to be governed by Castilian magistrates and judges, and their nobility drawn to Madrid, or sent to serve in the wars of Flanders, in order that the two nations might thus be gradually amalgamated, and every vestige be effaced of a separate kingdom.—(Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. ii.)

more feeble and less politic than his father, had hurt the feelings and prejudices of the nation by many open acts, which, in the time of his predecessor, would at least have been concealed under a thick veil of policy. But it was reserved for Olivarez to wound them on so many delicate points, that they were at length roused to resistance. It was a maxim of this minister's malignant policy, that the strength of conquered countries should be diminished as much as possible, in order that the usurped authority of the victors might be more easily preserved. He deemed that a nation once proud and patriotic like the Portuguese, would not lose its ancient recollections of power and glory and independence, except in complete prostration and poverty, and that they would never be submissive, unless they were also indigent subjects. Aware too, of the ancient antipathy between the kingdoms, he inferred that the Spanish domination must ever be odious to the Portuguese, who could not see, without indignation, all the employments of government filled by foreigners, or by the most obscure among their own countrymen devoted to the court of Spain. He, therefore, had never treated them as natural subjects of the Spanish crown, but as conquered enemies. The *Grandeos*, left without occupation, and excluded from public affairs, were confined, in a manner, to their country-seats; and even in them they durst not assume the exterior dignity corresponding to their rank, lest they should excite the jealousy of the watchful minister. While the higher orders were thus contemptuously treated, the people were loaded with imposts and reduced to the utmost poverty, and almost all the youth capable of bearing arms, were drawn from the kingdom to serve in foreign wars in Italy or Flanders.

Of these wars the Portuguese also became the victims, by the loss of their rich possessions in the Indies, which

had been acquired, in the reign of their great Emmanuel, by the courage of Albuquerque and the enterprise of Gama. Their subjection to Spain drew on them the hostility of one half of Europe. The powers at war with that kingdom regarded their fleets and colonies as lawful spoil. The Dutch seized on the Molucca Islands, the Brazils, the settlements in Japan and Malacca; and these bold and skilful mariners sought, in such foreign acquisitions, the means of augmenting their limited resources in Europe. It had been stipulated that a fleet should always be left for the protection of Portuguese commerce. But all their ships were employed on objects exclusively Spanish, and in consequence their rich galleons from the Indies, were often captured, by Corsairs, at the very entrance into their harbours.¹

Philip II, in laying claim to the Crown of Portugal, had sworn that all the higher offices, both civil and military, of the realm, should be filled by natives of Portugal—that the commerce of Africa and the Indies should be reserved to them also, and carried on solely by their merchants and vessels—that the third penny, the crusades, and other imposts on ecclesiastical goods, should be remitted—that Portugal should be kept as a distinct and separate crown—that its revenue should be consumed in the interior of the kingdom—and that all matters of justice should be decided within the realm. In the reign of Philip IV. no regard was paid to these stipulations. The council of Portugal, the presidencies of the provinces, and magistracies of the cities, were filled by Castilians, who also obtained grants of royal jurisdictions, and demesnes of the crown, which used to serve as appanages for the princes of the blood. The forms of procedure in the courts were all changed, and instead of final judg-

¹ Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. ii.

ments being given at Lisbon, cases were carried in the last resort, by appeal, to Madrid.¹

Among other conditions which had been settled after the conquest of Portugal, it was agreed that the King of Spain should reside as much as possible at Lisbon; yet Philip IV, though he had now been nearly twenty years on the throne, had never visited that capital. It had farther been provided, that, in the event of the king's necessary absence, the Viceroy should be either a native of Portugal, or near relative of the reigning family. Philip IV. had destined the viceroyalty of Portugal to Casimir Prince of Poland, who was also of the blood-royal of Austria. But he was detained, and thrown into prison by Richelieu, while on his way through France from his own country, in order to take possession of his new government. Philip being thwarted in this design, heightened the indignation of the Portuguese, by appointing to the dignity of Vice-queen the Dutchess-dowager of Mantua, who, though of the Spanish blood-royal, was not within the prescribed degrees of affinity. The new regent indeed was a princess of distinguished merit and prudence, and no one could have been more capable of filling the arduous situation to which she was exalted. But the pride of the Portuguese persuaded them, that there was a studied contempt in sending to rule over them a woman and a foreigner. The Vice-queen was besides accompanied by Vasconcellos, as her secretary, who, though a Portuguese by birth, was wholly devoted to the interests of Spain, and was in fact entrusted with all the

¹ Birago, *Historia delle Rivoluzioni del Regno di Portogallo*, lib. i. ed. 1646. *History of Revolutions of Portugal*, prefixed to *Letters of Sir Robert Southwell*, ed. London 1740. La Clede and Silva (*Historia de Portugal*) have given a long catalogue of the injuries and grievances which the Portuguese suffered from the Spaniards during the oppression of half a century.

real power of the state, which he exercised with intolerable rapacity and tyranny. He was, indeed, sufficiently active, industrious and versatile, but he was remorseless, inflexible, and avaricious. Sprung from the lowest ranks of the people, he had neither friends nor relatives in Portugal, and no one could exercise any influence over his unrelenting mind.

Vasconcellos received his instructions directly from his relative Diego Suarez, who was minister at Madrid for the affairs of Portugal, or from Olivarez, to whom he had rendered himself acceptable by his talents for intrigue, and the dexterity with which he had drawn large pecuniary supplies from Portugal. It was also one of the great objects of Vasconcellos, to excite perpetual animosities among the *Grandeos*, by creating a competition for those illusory honours and distinctions which he instituted. These dissensions, which were carefully fomented among the principal families of the kingdom, were considered by Olivarez as his best security, being fully satisfied, that, so long as the heads of the chief houses were occupied in gratifying personal enmities, they would concert no measures of serious danger to the Spanish government.

Of all the families in Portugal, that of Braganza was most calculated to give inquietude to Spain, as its territorial possessions exceeded one-fourth of the whole kingdom, and its present representative was generally considered as the undoubted heir of the ancient Portuguese monarchy.

The direct line of descendants from the great Emmanuel, having terminated with the unfortunate Sebastian, the succession devolved on his uncle, the Cardinal Henry. Various competitors (as is well known) had appeared at the close of that prince's short reign, for the crown of Portugal. But he died without naming a successor, and having only appointed commissioners to deliberate on the claims

which had been advanced. The pretensions of only four candidates met with much attention or consideration. These claimants were Antonio, Grand Prior of Crato, the Duke of Parma, Philip II. of Spain, and the Dutchess of Braganza. The Prior being the son of Luiz, who was Emmanuel's fourth son, and an elder brother of the Cardinal Henry, his right was unquestionably the best, and, indeed, would have been preferable to that of the Cardinal himself, had he been able to establish his legitimacy, which always remained more than doubtful. The Prince of Parma was the son of Mary, eldest daughter of Prince Edward of Portugal, who was a younger brother of Cardinal Henry. Catherine Dutchess of Braganza, was the younger daughter of the same Prince Edward; and Philip of Spain was the son of the Empress Isabella, sister to Cardinal Henry. As the Prior of Crato was considered illegitimate, the Duke of Parma, according to the usual understanding of the law of succession, had the best right to the crown; and the argument of the Dutchess of Braganza, that she was a degree nearer to Cardinal Henry, as being the younger daughter of his brother, whereas the Duke of Parma was grandson of the elder, appears to have been ill-founded.¹ But the father of the Italian prince, then a minor, was an ally and dependent of the King of Spain, and only urged his son's pretensions in aid of the claims of that potentate. The minds of the Portuguese were, therefore, generally inclined to the Dutchess of Braganza, whose title was indisputably preferable to that of Philip—not only because she was descended from Emmanuel by a male, and Philip by a female, but because an ancient and fundamental law of the realm, which was probably devised to prevent the possibility of an union with Castile, excluded from the suc-

¹ Ibid.

cession the princess who accepted a foreign husband.¹ Those various pretensions, however, which the Cardinal Henry and his convention of states had so long discussed, were quickly settled by the sharp sword of the Duke of Alva. The only resistance made to the Spanish arms, and that most feeble, was by the Grand Prior Antonio. After his expulsion from the kingdom, the claims of the Dutchess of Braganza passed, by her death, to her son Duke Theodosius. This illustrious house was permitted to preserve its ample domains, and all its hereditary honours, except that of sovereignty. The annexation of Portugal to the Spanish crown had been the great political achievement of Granvelle, the minister of Philip II; but Olivarez afterwards attributed its loss to the mistaken lenity of that statesman, who, instead of transporting the family of Braganza from their native kingdom, and assigning them estates or establishments in Spain, allowed them to retain their hereditary rights and station, and thus ultimately to compass the independence of Portugal. Though of a temper sufficiently ambitious and ardent, the Duke Theodosius had never made any preparations to support his claim by force of arms. But he had inculcated on his son the duty of hatred to Spain, and of seizing the crown of Portugal whenever an opportunity should offer. Duke John, who had now succeeded to his father's rights, was not insensible to the splendour and advantages of royalty, but being possessed of the

¹ It has been suspected, however, that the Constitutions of Lamego, as they are called, by which this law was alleged to have been introduced, are spurious. No copy of them, I understand, more ancient than the period of the disputed succession, is extant, and hence it has been supposed that they were forged, to favour the claims of the House of Braganza, and exclude its foreign competitors. It seems, however, as probable, that the originals may have been destroyed by the Spaniards when they conquered Portugal.

finest patrimony in Portugal, he was unwilling to hazard the loss of all the advantages he enjoyed, by aiming at an uncertain prize. His abilities were moderate, his temper soft and indolent, but his character was irreproachable. At his delightful retreat of Villaviciosa, situated in the province of Alentejo, he passed his time in luxurious ease, or the pleasures of the chace, and indulged the natural liberality of his disposition by the exercise of rural hospitality. He thus attracted to himself the affections rather than the admiration of his countrymen. But the calm and blameless tenor of his conduct had disarmed the envy of the Grandees, and almost eluded the suspicion of the Spaniards. Perhaps, had he been all that his father Theodosius wished and prompted, he would less readily have ascended the throne of Portugal. He was so narrowly watched by Olivarez, that had his inactive and voluptuous mode of life been merely assumed, to cover his real feelings and intentions, the disguise would have been easily penetrated, and the Spanish court would never have permitted him, either to possess such affluence, or to remain in his own country. The most refined policy could not have taught him to adopt a wiser line of conduct than that which he followed from inclination. That he might not seem formidable to the Spaniards, it was requisite that he should abstain from all serious employments, and occupy himself with amusements alone. Villaviciosa thus became the scene of continual festivities, and was the resort, not of diplomatists or politicians, but of all whose society was calculated to give a charm to rural existence.¹

Besides, whatever defects existed in the character of the Duke of Braganza, were amply supplied by the firmness and spirit of his illustrious consort, to whom he had

¹ Vertot, *Revolutions de Portugal*.

been united in the year 1633. Luisa de Guzman, the present Dutchess of Braganza, was the sister of Gaspar Perez, the ninth Duke of Medina-Sidonia, the first Grandee of Spain, and at this time governor of Andalusia. In youth her mind had been carefully cultivated, and she had been early inspired with those sentiments of ambition, which, being favoured by situation and events, gradually filled her soul with an immeasurable desire of glory and distinction. She possessed an admirable faculty of duly appreciating characters, and discovering, by minute traces of external demeanour, the secret sentiments of the most circumspect courtier. Her manners at the same time were perfectly unconstrained; and mildness was so blended with dignity, that she inspired both affection and respect in all who approached her. Thus accomplished, she had gained the full confidence and regard of her husband, and, though a native of Spain, had acquired great popularity among the Portuguese, whose manners she adopted with such facility, that she seemed to have been born and educated in Lisbon.

The Duke of Braganza was also peculiarly fortunate in the intendant or comptroller of his household, Pinto de Ribeiro. Though in an humble situation of life, he was a man of remarkable vigilance, activity, and knowledge of affairs, and his whole mind was engrossed by the most eager desire for the elevation of his master. That prince had admitted to his faithful servant, that he would gladly avail himself of a suitable opportunity to ascend the throne, but that he would not make any desperate attempt, like a needy adventurer, who had nothing to lose.

Being thus tacitly authorized, Ribeiro diligently applied himself to foment the existing discontents. He well knew the desire which universally pervaded Portugal, to have a native sovereign at Lisbon, which was sufficiently

manifested by dark and popular predictions of an impending revolution,¹ as also by the eagerness with which faith had, from time to time, been given to those wretched and dissolute impostors who personated the lost Sebastian. Availing himself of this favourable disposition, Ribeiro secretly diffused complaints against the Spanish government, which he adapted to the characters and interests of those with whom he mingled. He reminded the nobility of the lucrative and honourable employments which had been vested in their families, so long as Portugal had remained an independent kingdom, and he aggravated the ignominy and hardship to which they were exposed by serving in the Spanish armies of Italy or Flanders. When with the clergy, he called on them to remember the frequent violations by the Spaniards of the privileges of their order, and the loss of those benefices which were now bestowed on foreigners alone. While among citizens and merchants, he exclaimed against the injustice of the Spaniards, who had ruined Lisbon by transferring the commerce of the East Indies to Cadiz; and he enlarged on the mercantile prosperity of the Dutch, who had freed themselves from the same tyrannical domination under which the Portuguese still groaned. With all classes he expatiated on the good qualities of his master—lamenting, at the same time, that want of energy, which, however, rendered it the more incumbent on his friends to combine and exert themselves for the public good.²

Cardinal Richelieu about the same time had a private

¹ A person, in particular, of the name of Encubert, presaged the deliverance of the Portuguese from a foreign yoke when a king should arrive among them on a wooden horse,—a prediction which was afterwards believed to be verified when the Duke of Braganza, on the day of his coronation, crossed the Tagus to Lisbon in a fisherman's bark. (Murphy's *View of Portugal*, p. 257.)

² Vertot, *Revol. de Portugal*.

agent at Lisbon, with instructions to avail himself of every favourable opportunity. He also addressed letters to the principal persons in the realm, exhorting them to throw off the Castilian yoke, and promising them, if they were so inclined, to send an armament to their assistance, with no farther condition or stipulation, than that they should never again submit to the King of Spain.¹

Though Olivarez had for some time felt considerable disquietude with regard to the popular discontents in Portugal, the first event that directed his suspicions towards the Duke of Braganza, was an insurrection in 1637 at Evora, where, amid the execrations of the mob against the tyranny of the Spaniards, acclamations were everywhere heard in favour of the House of Braganza. The Spanish minister then became aware, though too late, of the imprudence of which he had been guilty in permitting to remain in a newly conquered kingdom a family who were so powerful, and whose hereditary right to the throne was so apparent. He accordingly determined, if possible, to remove the Duke from Portugal. But as he always resided at Villaviciosa, in the midst of his vassals, and was surrounded by a train of attendants almost equal to that of a court, it would have been impossible, without the aid of an army, to seize him by force, and such an extreme measure, he besides feared, might precipitate the revolt which he intended to prevent. He therefore resolved to allure him from Villaviciosa ; and with this view, he offered him the government of Milan, which the Duke declined, on the plea that he had not sufficient knowledge of the affairs of Italy to enable him to fill so difficult and important a situation.

Olivarez appeared to acquiesce in this reason for his refusal ; but he soon devised a new scheme for bringing him to court. The expedition which the king was about to

¹ Aubery, *Mém. pour l'Hist. du Minist. de Richelieu.*

undertake towards the frontiers of Aragon, in order to check a threatened revolt of the Catalans, afforded him a pretext for writing to exhort the Duke that he should place himself at the head of the Portuguese nobility, who had been all summoned to accompany his Majesty. But Braganza did not become the dupe of this new artifice; and he begged the minister to obtain his excuse from the king, on account of the enormous expense which his birth and rank would oblige him to incur, and which, he alleged, he was not in circumstances to support.

This second refusal began seriously to alarm Olivarez; and though he had trusted much to the quiet disposition of Braganza, he now dreaded that others had opened his eyes to the claim which he possessed on the crown, and had placed the temptations of sovereignty in such a light as to overcome his natural love of ease and tranquillity.

The Spanish minister was now convinced that every exertion must be employed to draw the Duke out of Portugal; and, not discouraged by his former want of success, he resolved to attract him to the Court of Madrid by all those semblances of friendship and confidence, which he knew so well to assume.¹

Olivarez, however, does not appear to have formed an accurate estimate of Braganza's character. He seems to have mistaken indolence for pliancy of disposition, and voluptuousness for weakness of judgment. But though it was difficult to persuade the Duke to exert himself for his own benefit, it was not easy to induce him to take measures to his disadvantage. All fair means to effect his object having failed, Olivarez had recourse, at length, to a disgraceful stratagem. A French fleet having appeared off the coast of Portugal, he sent the Duke a commission, directing him to place all the coasts and harbours in a state of defence, and this appointment was accom-

¹ Aubery, *Mém. pour l'Hist. du Minist. de Richelieu.*

panied with every expression of regard which could dazzle his understanding or lull his suspicions. But at the same time that this commission was granted, the crafty minister had sent a private order to Don Lope Osorio, the admiral of the Spanish fleet, to enter any harbour which the Duke of Braganza was inspecting, as if forced in by stress of weather, and having got him aboard on pretence of entertaining him at a banquet, to set sail with him for Cadiz or some other port in Spain. A real tempest, however, having assailed the Spanish fleet, many of the vessels were wrecked, and the others were so shattered and dispersed that they could not make any harbour in Portugal. The good fortune of the Duke of Braganza having delivered him from this danger, he turned the insidious designs of the Spaniard to his own advantage. Availing himself of the commission he had received from the king, he placed his friends in those situations in which they might one day prove useful to him. In visiting the garrisons or fortresses, he generally contrived to gain the good-will of the officers and soldiers; and on these occasions, he was always attended by such a numerous band of adherents, as to render desperate any attempt to get possession of his person.¹

The authority with which the Duke had been invested, created considerable surprise and disapprobation in Spain. As the public did not penetrate the deep motives of the minister, which were only known by the king, his enemies attempted to render him suspected to his master, as being favourably inclined towards the Duke of Braganza,—an accusation which derived some show of plausibility from his relationship with the Dutchess. They urged that there was the utmost imprudence in intrusting the command of Portuguese troops to one who had

¹ *Revolutions of Portugal*, prefixed to *Southwell's Letters*.

such high pretensions to the crown, and that thus to place arms in his hand was tempting him to employ them in the assertion of his rights. But the king, in the hope that some favourable opportunity might still present itself of seizing the person of the Duke, was unwilling to put him on his guard by throwing off the mask of favour or confidence ; and he and his minister “ went on refining,” while Braganza, under cover of his new employment, traversed all Portugal, and laid the foundations of his future grandeur. He everywhere appeared with a splendour which attracted the gaze and observation of the multitude ; he listened to all with mildness and attention ; and wherever he passed, he gained friends by the benefits he bestowed, or by the hope of those favours which he might one day have it in his power to dispense.

Of all his numerous adherents, the chief was the Archbishop of Lisbon. This prelate, who belonged to one of the first families in the kingdom, was sagacious, active, and popular ; and his patriotic zeal, in the present crisis, was heightened by his rivalry with the Archbishop of Braga, who was the confidant of the Vice-Queen, and intrusted in all the affairs of government.

The Archbishop of Lisbon, his friend Antonio de Almada, and the Duke’s intendant Pinto de Ribeiro, at length organized a regular, though secret, association to forward by every means the claim of the Duke of Braganza, and finally to fix him on the throne. A meeting was held of the conspirators ; and at this assembly, the Archbishop, who was a man of powerful eloquence, drew a frightful picture of the state of the kingdom since the time when it had fallen under the domination of the Spaniards. His discourse renewed, in all who heard him, the recollection of those evils they had so long suffered. Each brought forward examples of oppression by Vasconcellos. One had unjustly lost his wealth,—another had

been deprived of his office,—some had been imprisoned on grounds of political jealousy,—and almost all regretted friends or relatives who had been hurried away to serve in the wars of Catalonia or Flanders.¹ When so many private and public considerations combined, it was naturally to be expected that the meeting should unanimously concur in the resolution to shake off so galling a yoke as that which they at present endured; and though, at first, a few were inclined to substitute a republican form of government in room of the Spanish despotism, they were all at length persuaded, chiefly by the influence of the Archbishop of Lisbon,² to unite in the plan of conferring the sovereignty on the family of Braganza.

This preliminary point being settled, the meeting separated, after fixing a day for re-assembling to consider of the most prompt and suitable means of carrying their designs into execution. It seems at this time to have been generally known and understood throughout Portugal, that some scheme was maturing for the deliverance of the country. But the precise object of the conspiracy, and the names of those engaged in it, were closely concealed; and as the Duke of Braganza himself had not personally taken any share in the proceedings, it was not suspected that his immediate elevation was, at present, in view.

Pinto de Ribeiro, however, having now sufficiently sounded the dispositions of the patriots, and finding them all favourably inclined towards his master, wrote to recommend, that he should draw near Lisbon, in order to encourage his adherents, by his presence, and arrange with them the precise measures which might be requisite for the completion of their design.

The Duke, accordingly, set out from Villaviciosa, and

¹ Vertot, *Revolutions de Portugal*.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. i. lib. i.

came to the castle of Almada, which was only separated from Lisbon by the Tagus. He arrived, indeed, with a splendid equipage, and a numerous retinue, but he disguised the real motives of his visit, under the pretence of an official inspection of all the fortresses in the kingdom. Being in the vicinity of Lisbon, he could not, without exciting suspicion, omit to pay his respects to the Vice-Queen. As he advanced to the palace, the streets and avenues leading to it were filled with people, anxious to see him pass. The nobility crowded round, in order to accompany him into the presence of the Vice-Queen; and it appeared on that day, as if the proclamation of a herald or the ceremony of a coronation was alone wanting to invest him instantly with regal authority. After his audience, however, he retired privately to Almada, without again passing through the capital, or alighting at the palace of Braganza, which stood in one of its principal streets. Ribeiro did not fail to make his associates remark the timid precaution of the Duke, and thence he exhorted them, that they should embrace the opportunity of his residence at Almada, to prevail with him, by at once entering into their measures, to secure the safety and freedom of the kingdom. By persuasion of Ribeiro, the Duke agreed to an interview with the conspirators, provided that only three of their number were present at this private conference.

A meeting, arranged with the utmost secrecy, took place in the castle of Almada at midnight. The deputies chosen by the conspirators anew represented to the Duke the unfortunate state of his country—the waning power of Spain, which had so much declined since the era of the conquest of Portugal, and the hope, which he might so justly entertain, of assistance from those powers of Europe which were at enmity with the House of Austria. This discourse was sufficiently agreeable to the

Duke of Braganza ; but veiling himself, in that character of moderation and indifference which he had always borne, he returned them such an answer as, by its terms, was neither calculated to destroy nor to confirm their hopes of his acquiescence. He admitted the deplorable state of the realm, but he expressed his doubts if the time was yet arrived, when such decisive measures as they recommended could be safely adopted. The deputation, however, being convinced that their embassy had not been disagreeable, at length withdrew, by no means dissatisfied, on the whole, with their interview, and pleased with the prospect of obtaining a king of so much benignity.

Soon after the departure of the conspirators, the Duke returned to Villaviciosa, where he communicated to the Dutchess the proposals which had been made to him, the names of the patriots, and the whole plan of their enterprise. The Dutchess, by her arguments and firmness of language, succeeded, in a great measure, in dispelling his apprehensions. But she coincided with him in his view of allowing the number of his adherents to augment before he returned a decisive answer to their proposal, and of not appearing openly in the enterprise till every thing was prepared for its execution.

Olivarez, in the mean while, though generally incredulous as to bad intelligence, was not without uneasiness. Secrecy, no doubt, was the soul of the conspiracy, but from the numbers which were engaged in it, the plot could not be so privately conducted, but that something of its nature transpired, and the Vice-Queen did not fail to communicate her suspicions to Olivarez. The demonstrations, too, of joy at the sight of the Duke of Braganza, on his recent visit to Lisbon, had made a considerable impression on his mind, and exhibited the danger in a stronger point of view than it had ever yet presented itself. He was at length convinced that secret assemblies were held

at Lisbon, and those indefinite rumours which often precede important events, augmented his inquietude.

Though thus aware that the nation was ripe for insurrection, it was no part of the policy of Olivarez to allay the discontents by conciliatory measures. On the contrary, he was daily adding to the burdens of the Portuguese; but he resolved, in order to deprive them of all hope of succeeding in a revolt, to summon the Duke of Braganza immediately to Court. Olivarez accordingly despatched a messenger, to acquaint him that the king was desirous to be informed, from his own mouth, of the state of the troops and fortifications in Portugal,—promising, at the same time, that he should be received at Madrid with all those honours and distinctions which were due to his rank and merit.

The extreme anxiety thus manifested to draw him from Portugal, created in the mind of Braganza the most serious apprehensions for the safety of his person, and he dreaded lest these injunctions should be followed by open force in the event of his disobedience. In order, therefore, to gain time, till the plans of the conspirators were matured, and to avoid the danger of a positive refusal, he despatched a confidential messenger, who was instructed to assure the king of his compliance with the royal command, and subsequently to frame such excuses as he could best devise for the delay in his appearance.

His confident, on his arrival at Madrid, hired a splendid mansion, which he furnished magnificently. He engaged domestics, to whom he gave liveries, and omitted nothing which could induce the belief that his master would immediately enter the capital of Spain, where he was desirous to exhibit himself in all the splendour suitable to his illustrious birth.

After a short time, he pretended to have received intelligence that the Duke was seriously indisposed. Ha-

ving employed this pretext as long as it would suffice, he next presented a memorial to the prime minister, in which, in his master's name, he required that the king should fix the rank which he was to hold at court. He expected that this arrangement would have occupied a considerable time, from the interposition of the Spanish Grandees, who were so jealous in the preservation of their rights of precedence. But the minister, to whom these affected delays appeared highly suspicious, smoothed every difficulty, and obtained from the king a rapid and favourable decision.

As, however, the Duke did not yet appear, to occupy the rank which had been thus assigned him, Olivarez despatched a second courier, with peremptory orders that he should set out immediately for Madrid; and, that he might have no pretext for delaying his journey, on the score of a deficiency of supplies, the messenger placed in his hands a royal assignment, for 10,000 ducats, on the treasury of Lisbon.

The devices of the Duke were at length exhausted, and he feared that a longer delay might bring such orders from Madrid as would utterly disconcert all his projects. He therefore despatched a great part of his household on the road to that capital, and, in the hearing of the Spanish courier, he gave such orders as might have proceeded from a person on the eve of undertaking an important journey. He sent a messenger to the Vice-Queen to announce his departure, and he wrote to Olivarez, that he would reach Madrid in the course of eight days at farthest.

Though all resources seemed now nearly at an end, considerable time had been gained by this system of procrastination, of which the conspirators had diligently availed themselves. Measures had, in the interval, been carefully taken, to secure the concurrence of the artizans

and burgesses whenever it should be found prudent to proceed to action. Two of the wealthiest citizens of Lisbon, who were now associated with the more noble conspirators, had been for some time exerting all their influence with the people, to exasperate them against the Spaniards, and to dispose their minds in favour of the House of Braganza. They had even paid off their artificers and workmen, on the pretext that, as commerce was now ruined, they had no farther employment for them ; but, in fact, with the view, that, being pressed by famine, they might the more readily rise in insurrection, as soon as their assistance was required. The principal conspirators also, without communicating their design, made themselves secure of the presence and support of their friends by a certain day, on the ground of requiring their aid in avenging a private quarrel.

The disunion which at this time prevailed in the councils of the Vice-Queen, was also highly favourable to the success of the enterprise. Her Majesty complained loudly of the pride and insolence of Vasconcellos, and she was particularly offended that all the despatches from Madrid should be addressed to this unworthy secretary, while she, invested with an empty title, had no real authority or influence in the State.

Every thing seemed now in the most desirable posture for the conspirators, and the final and decided acceptance of the Duke of Braganza alone was wanting. In order to fix his resolution, they despatched to him Pedro de Mendoza, who being keeper of the Castle of Mouron in the neighbourhood of Villaviciosa, could repair thither without attracting suspicion or observation. He found the Duke at his hunting seat called Tapada, which was at no great distance from Villaviciosa, and to which he was wont annually to resort during a certain season of the year. Having followed the Duke to the

chace, he led him aside from his attendants to a remote part of the forest, where, in a short conference, he attempted to convince him, that his own apprehensions and irresolution presented the only obstacles to his assuming the crown of Portugal. Before returning a decisive answer, however, he required time to consult the Dutchess, who readily declared that he had no longer room for hesitation—that he must now of necessity go either to Madrid or Lisbon—that in the former place he must perish ingloriously—that in the latter he would fall with honour, or live in felicity. This opinion settled his wavering intentions; he signified his resolution to the conspirators, and expressed, at the same time, his opinion, that the first attempt should be made at Lisbon, the example of which would draw after it the rest of the kingdom.

The conspirators having received this final answer, and being aware that the Duke could not much longer delay his journey to Madrid, at length fixed on Saturday the first of December for the execution of their enterprise.

They privately met, a few days before the time appointed, at the palace of Braganza. They there calculated that they might safely reckon on 150 gentlemen, with their domestics, and about 200 citizens and artizans, who, by their credit and influence in the capital, could easily carry along with them the rest of the populace. The death of Vasconcellos was resolved on, as a sacrifice due to the hatred and the wrongs of Portugal. Some proposed to exercise a similar vengeance on the Archbishop of Braga, as a man who was formidable by his talents, and was sure to unite against the patriots all the scattered adherents of the Spanish government. But this opinion was overruled, lest the death of one invested with so sacred a dignity should stamp their proceedings with cruelty, and draw down on the Duke of Braganza the enmity of the clergy and Inquisition. The plan of attack alone now

remained to be regulated ; and it was determined that the conspirators should divide themselves into four bands, and thus force their way into the palace in four different places at the same moment. It was fixed that one division should attack the German guard, stationed at the entrance : that a second, composed chiefly of citizens, should surprise and disarm the Spanish troops which daily mounted guard at that part of the palace which was called the Fort : Pinto de Ribeiro and some others were appointed to occupy the apartments of Vasconcellos, and despatch him on the spot ; while the last band were destined to seize the person of the Vice-Queen, and all the Spaniards in the palace, to serve as hostages. It was also resolved that, while the four bands were thus employed at the posts assigned them, a body of knights, accompanied by some of the principal citizens, should perambulate the streets, and proclaim John of Braganza, King of Portugal. A communication was likewise made to that prince, who was then at Villaviciosa, that, on the same day in which these resolutions were carried into effect at Lisbon, he should cause himself to be proclaimed in the province of Alentejo, which was almost wholly dependent on the House of Braganza. Before separating, the conspirators agreed to assemble on the morning of the appointed day, in the houses of Miguel Almeida and Pedro de Mendoza, where they should privately arm themselves, and proceed to their respective destinations.

Between the 25th of November, however, when this preliminary meeting was held, and the time fixed for the fulfilment of the enterprise, several circumstances occurred which highly alarmed the patriots, and had nearly disconcerted their whole schemes, by premature disclosure. Some imprudent communications, made to individuals who were supposed by the conspirators to be favourable to their

interests, but who, in fact, were not prepared to engage rashly in any hazardous design, had excited such apprehension, as nearly induced them to postpone the execution of their enterprise. But no bad consequences having ensued, they met early, at the appointed rendezvous, on the day that had been previously fixed.

On the whole, the conspiracy had been conducted with unparalleled secrecy and circumspection; and it is remarkable, that, among so many persons of different conditions and interests, there was not one who shook in his fidelity. Each seemed as steadfast, and as eager for the result, as if he had been at the head of the enterprise, or expected that the crown was to be placed on his own brow, as the reward of the perils he encountered.

Being now fully armed, the conspirators separated, as had been arranged, in four divisions, and proceeded by different streets, to the palace,—most of them in carriages or litters, in order to conceal their numbers, and the weapons which they bore. It seems singular, however, even with all the precautions which they employed, that neither their multitude nor the unusual hour at which they crowded to the palace, attracted observation, or excited the suspicions of the Spaniards. The conspirators were sufficiently alive to a sense of the risk of discovery, and are said to have waited, with the most cruel inquietude and impatience, for the hour of action.

At length, when they were all in the vicinity of the palace, a pistol discharged precisely at eight o'clock, by Pinto de Ribeiro, set them at liberty to act, and they eagerly rushed to obey the signal they had awaited. The German guard, and the Spanish troops at the Fort were easily overpowered by those to whom this duty had been intrusted. Ribeiro, who was at the head of the party appointed to occupy the apartments of Vasconcellos, entered them with little resistance. The noise, however, on

the stairs which led to them, had warned the secretary of his danger, and allowed him time to conceal himself, so that, when the conspirators burst in, he was no longer to be found. Having in vain searched all the presses and coffers, they were much exasperated that the chief object of their vengeance should thus have escaped their fury, when an old female servant, who had some charge of the apartments, being threatened with instant death unless she discovered the place of his retreat, made a sign to them that he lay concealed in a recess formed in the wall.¹ There he was accordingly found, covered up with parchments and papers. The terror he felt at the prospect of instantaneous death, deprived him of all power of action or utterance. Rodrigo de Saa, the Grand Chamberlain, first fired a pistol at his head; the other conspirators then despatched him with their poniards, and threw his dead body over the window, with loud shouts of "The tyrant is slain—long live John, King of Portugal!" The populace, elated with the first sounds of freedom, insulted the corpse of their late oppressor,—dragged it about the streets, and treated it with all manner of indignity.

After this summary act of vengeance, Ribeiro, without losing a moment's time, proceeded to join the other conspirators, whose part it was to make themselves masters of the person of the Vice-Queen. But a like success had everywhere attended the patriots, and this important object was already accomplished. Those who had been destined for its execution, having presented themselves at the gate which led to the apartments of this princess, and the populace having threatened to set fire to it unless it was opened, she came forth to the entrance of her cham-

¹ Vertot, *Revol. de Portugal*. Birago, however, says, that the place of his concealment was discovered by the rustling of the papers among which he lay. (*Hist. delle Rivoluz. di Portog.*)

ber, accompanied by her maids of honour and the Archbishop of Braga. Flattering herself that her presence might appease the nobility, and restrain the populace, she addressed the principal conspirators. She readily admitted that her secretary Vasconcellos was deserving of death : that she was willing to attribute the present insurrection to hatred of an obnoxious minister ; but, if the tumult was longer continued, it would assume the aspect of rebellion, and place it beyond her power to exculpate those engaged in it to the King of Spain. Don Antonio de Menezes replied to her, in the name of his associates, that so many persons of distinction had not taken arms for the miserable object of punishing a wretch like Vasconcellos, but to bestow on the Duke of Braganza that crown which belonged to him by right, and had been usurped from his family.

The Vice-Queen, on thus hearing that the conspirators did not intend to keep any measures with the Spanish government, conceived the design of proceeding into the city, where she thought that her presence might command the respect and obedience of the burgesses. On her attempting, however, to carry this purpose into effect, one of the patriots desired her to return to her apartments, as it was not suitable that so great a princess should be exposed to the fury of an inflamed and exasperated multitude. This was a sufficient intimation to the Vice-Queen that she was to consider herself as a prisoner. The Archbishop of Braga attempted some resistance ; but his ill-timed zeal was easily repressed, and the captivity of the Queen was speedily followed by that of her household, and of all the Spaniards who held official situations in the capital.¹

¹ The Spanish writers complain that these prisoners were ill-treated ; and it is said that one of them, the Marques de Puebla,

One of the chief patriots then proceeded to the royal chamber of audience, followed by an immense concourse. He there enlarged on the happiness of Portugal in having recovered its liberty, with its legitimate king; and several decrees were then, amid acclamations of joy, pronounced in name of John IV, King of Portugal.

At the same moment, all those who had been imprisoned from the severity or suspicions of the Spanish government, were released from confinement, and formed a considerable accession of strength to the patriotic band.

Amidst the joy, however, occasioned by the success of the enterprise, Ribeiro and its chief conductors were not free from inquietude. The Spaniards were still in possession of the citadel of Lisbon, whence they could bombard the town. There, too, a rallying point might be formed for all who were yet attached to the former government, and entrance could be afforded to whatever troops the King of Spain might send for the re-establishment of his lost authority. They therefore instantly compelled the deposed Queen to sign an order, directing the Spanish governor to give up the citadel to those who acted in name of the lawful King of Portugal. That princess flattered herself that the governor, being aware of the situation in which she was placed, knew his duty too well to pay regard to a mandate which he might infer was extorted by force. But the castle had recently been in a great measure stripped of its garrison, of whom 1500 soldiers, along with the chief governor Don Thomas Mexia, had been sent to Catalonia;¹ and the present commander, who was considerably alarmed by seeing at the gates of the citadel all the conspirators, accompanied by a mass of declared, that he would give five hundred crowns to any one who would carry him to Algiers. (Ortiz, *Compend. Chronol.* t. vi. lib. xx. c. 8.)

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Chronol.*

the inhabitants, threatening to tear him and his garrison to pieces, readily availed himself of an order which both secured his safety, and formed so fair an apology for his want of resolution.

On the evening of the same day, couriers were despatched into all the provinces, for the purpose of inviting the people to return thanks to God for the recovery of their freedom, and of commanding the magistrates to proclaim the Duke of Braganza in their respective towns, as also to arrest such Spaniards as might be found within the limits of their jurisdictions. The Archbishop of Lisbon, who was forthwith invested with the supreme authority in absence of the king, signified to the Ex-Queen that she must retire from the palace, which was about to be prepared for the reception of its legitimate monarch. She left the royal residence, accompanied by a few domestics and the Archbishop of Braga, without uttering a word ; and having traversed the streets, with that air of dignity suitable to a dethroned queen, she arrived at a mansion which had been prepared for her near the extremity of the capital.

Thus passed the first of December at Lisbon. On that memorable day, the Duke of Braganza, who was still at Villaviciosa, about eighty miles from the scene of action, endured the most torturing anxiety and suspense. He knew that the moment was decisive of his life, his fortune, and the fate of his family, and that a few hours would bring the certainty of an ignominious death, or of a splendid throne. It had been at one time intended to raise all the towns that depended on him in Alentejo on the same day that had been fixed for the more important proceedings at Lisbon ; but he afterwards thought it preferable to wait for intelligence from the capital, that he might conform his measures to the result of the main operations.

From an early hour on the eventful dawn, he had sent forward courier on courier to Lisbon ; and though in momentary expectation of intelligence, he had passed the whole day, and great part of the night, in total uncertainty, when, at length, Mendoza and Mello, two of his chief adherents, arrived at Villaviciosa. On entering the apartment, which he was pacing with much agitation, they threw themselves at his feet, and thus at once informed him that he was sovereign of Portugal. Before they had time to give him a detail of the success of the enterprise, he hurried them to the apartment of the Dutchess, whom they saluted as a queen already seated on the throne. The palace of Villaviciosa then resounded with shouts of joy ; and at the dawn of day, its master was proclaimed in all his dependent towns of Alentejo.

The Archbishop of Lisbon had also despatched couriers to the new king, to represent the importance of his immediate presence at Lisbon. He set out in his usual hunting-dress, without any escort, and alighted incognito at the royal palace in that city : but the inhabitants having been soon apprized of his arrival, he came forth on a platform erected in front of the building, where he exhibited himself to the assembled multitude, and was proclaimed king, amid shouts of joy and exultation.

A general rising throughout the kingdom followed the successful insurrection at Lisbon. Every town in Portugal expelled the Spaniards, and submitted to its native king. The Spanish governors of the fortresses gave them up without opposition ; or, flying with their garrisons into Spain, abandoned them to the Portuguese. Fernand de la Cueva, who commanded the fortress of St Joam, at the mouth of the Tagus, was the only governor who made any show of resistance. His garrison consisted entirely of Spaniards, commanded by the bravest officers ; and it in consequence became necessary to besiege it according

to military rule. Cannon were transported from Lisbon ; the trenches were opened and advanced to the counterscarp, notwithstanding the continual fire and frequent sallies of the besieged. But at last the governor, who seems only to have resisted in order to make more advantageous terms for himself, gave up the citadel, in spite of his principal officers, who refused to sign the capitulation. The foreign possessions appended to the crown of Portugal, almost immediately followed the example of the mother country.

Thus successfully terminated an enterprise, which, if we consider the number of persons entrusted with the plot, may be regarded as almost miraculous for the secrecy with which it was conducted. But this was a natural consequence of the dislike which the whole nation had long entertained to the Spanish government. This feeling, which had been originally excited by the vicinity of the two countries—by the wars in which contiguity involved them in Europe, and by rivalry of mercantile interests in the Indies, had been daily aggravated during the period of the subjection of the Portuguese to the Spanish dominion : And the Revolution of Portugal affords to all ages a memorable example how easily a kingdom may be lost when a whole people are irritated by misgovernment.

But what were the feelings of Olivarez and the King of Spain, at the disastrous intelligence of this rapid revolution in Portugal, embarrassed, as they already were, by the war against France and Holland, and the yet more dangerous revolt in Catalonia ? The news, of course, soon reached Madrid ; and it was known to all the court, while the king still remained ignorant of it. Olivarez had systematically concealed from his master the dangerous position of affairs in Portugal, lest his knowledge of the im-

pending misfortune might induce him to withdraw his confidence.¹ No one dared to inform his Majesty of the overthrow of his sovereignty at Lisbon, from dread of Olivarez, who, it was believed, would not readily have pardoned the bearer of this intelligence. But, at length, the report was too widely spread to be longer concealed ; and the minister, fearing lest some one of his enemies might disclose it in a manner the most disadvantageous to his interests, resolved, without farther delay, to communicate it to his master. Knowing well the disposition of Philip, he contrived to give such a turn to the announcement as might represent the loss in the least serious point of view. "Sire," said he, accosting the king with a joyful and confident countenance, "I bring you pleasing intelligence ; you have acquired an ample dutchy, and some fair territories." "How, Count?" asked Philip, with surprise : "Because," replied he, "the Duke of Braganza, seduced by the populace of Lisbon, has allowed himself to be proclaimed king : thus, all his estates will be confiscated to your majesty ; you have now only to unite them to the royal domains ; and, by the extinction of the House of Braganza, you will reign hereafter without inquietude in Portugal."

Philip was neither so weak, nor so completely dazzled by these vain hopes, as not to perceive the full extent of the misfortune which had befallen the Spanish monarchy. He gave orders to his minister to employ every effort to crush the rebellion in Portugal, and again bring that kingdom under the Spanish dominion. Olivarez then assured him that the Duke of Braganza would be but *Rey de habas*² (a bean King), alluding to the temporary choice of a nominal monarch among children, by a bean found in a piece of cake divided on Twelfth night.

¹ Leti, *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*.

² Brand's *Popular Antiquities*, vol. i. p. 21.

But Spain was at this time too much exhausted and too much embarrassed by foreign wars, as well as internal dissensions, to enable Olivarez to fulfil his promises to the King, by open force and honourable warfare. The imminent danger in Catalonia, where a formidable insurrection had broken out, required in that quarter all the force at his disposal. It was, therefore, on intrigue and not on arms that he depended for the re-establishment of the dominion of Spain. He privately attempted to excite discontents at Lisbon, and, at length, disgraced both himself and his sovereign, by abetting a conspiracy, which had for its first view the secret assassination of the King of Portugal.

Though that monarch had been called to the throne by the almost unanimous voice of the lower and middle classes, a few among the chief Grandees were somewhat jealous of his elevation, and would not unwillingly have contributed to his downfall.

This was well known to the Archbishop of Braga, Primate of the kingdom, who had been raised from a low origin by the favour of Olivarez, and who, as we have seen, was the favourite and confident of the Vice-Queen during the rule of the Spaniards in Portugal. It had been intended by the conspirators to sacrifice him along with Vasconcellos, and his life had only been spared at the urgent entreaties of his rival the Archbishop of Lisbon.¹ In these circumstances, it would have been wise and prudent in the Primate to have retired, after the revolution, to his own diocese, and to have withdrawn himself from public affairs. But he was of a restless, crafty, intriguing disposition; and so far from entertaining a due sense of gratitude for the preservation which he owed to the Archbishop of Lisbon, he mortally hated that prelate, and

¹ Birago, *Rivol. de Port.* p. 446.

constantly repined at the credit and influence he had gained by the late political events.¹ Instigated by this competition,—by attachment to his former mistress, and by an apprehension that the King of Portugal, though he had hitherto treated him with lenity, might change this conduct when firmly seated on the throne, he entered, soon after the accession of the House of Braganza, into a treasonable correspondence with the Court of Spain, and with the disaffected Grandees of Portugal.

The nobleman to whom the Archbishop of Braga first addressed himself, was the Marques of Villareal, whom, at the period of the revolution, a few of the patriots had proposed to elevate to the Throne of Portugal, in preference to the Duke of Braganza.² To him the Archbishop represented—that their new king, being of a timid and distrustful disposition, would always seek to depress as much as possible the family of Villareal, from the apprehension of finding enemies in too powerful subjects : That the Marques himself, and the Duke of Aveiro, though both of the blood-royal of Portugal, were removed from all public employments, while the offices of the state were filled by persons of inferior rank, who had been the instruments of the Duke of Braganza's elevation ; and, finally, that the King of Spain, from his power and extensive dominions, could alone bestow situations worthy the ambition of men of the Marques's exalted rank and dignity.

Perceiving that this discourse made a considerable impression, and that it corresponded with the previous sentiments of the Marques ; he next stated that he had authority from the Court of Spain, to offer him, in the event of success, the Vice-royalty of Portugal, as the reward of his fidelity. Nothing could be farther from the intentions of the Archbishop, who was entirely devoted to the Dutchess of Mantua, than that Villareal should be eleva-

¹ Southwell, p. 158.

² Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. ii.

ted to that situation. But he was desirous to influence him by the most powerful motives ; and, accordingly, his dupe consented to place himself, along with his son, the Duke of Caminha, at the head of the conspiracy.

Into this plot likewise entered the Count of Armamar, nephew to the Archbishop, and a Fidalgo called Augustin Manuel, who, though of a narrow fortune, was of an enterprizing mind and illustrious birth. The design was also communicated to Francisco de Castro, the Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, who was an intimate friend of the Archbishop, and who, though he would not actively engage in the plot, gave it his tacit concurrence, by concealing it from his sovereign.¹

But though the Archbishop found a considerable number of ecclesiastics and nobility, ready to promote his design, it was still a dangerous attempt to overthrow a government so entirely founded on the affections of the people. It seemed impossible to find, in the whole realm, such a body of men as was necessary to effect a new revolution. But the craft and perseverance of the Archbishop, overcame, in some degree, even this difficulty. For several ages there had been a vast number of Jews dispersed in all the trading towns of Portugal, particularly Lisbon, where they had amassed vast wealth by usury and merchandise. In consequence of an edict of Philip III, and the severities of the Inquisition, they had been forced to make an outward profession of Christianity ; but they inwardly retained their ancient principles and faith. Remarking the necessities of the state, and the deficiency of the revenue at the accession of the new king, they thought this would be a golden opportunity to obtain a toleration for their persecuted religion. They accordingly offered the king an enormous sum of money, to be exempted from the terrors of the Inquisi-

¹ Southwell, p. 159.

tion, and to be allowed the open practice of their rites and ceremonies. But the king, knowing how odious this permission would be to the ecclesiastical estate, and, indeed, to all orders of his subjects, rejected the offer. The Jews, by having thus unseasonably discovered their sentiments, exposed themselves to the vengeance of the Inquisition; and so great was their terror for that tribunal, that they readily concurred in the views of the Archbishop, who promised that, under the new order of things, they should be protected from its fury, and allowed the privilege of a synagogue.

Their party being now formed, the conspirators, after discussing various projects, at length determined on the plan proposed by the Archbishop,—that the Jews should set fire to the city in different places, and to the four corners of the royal residence, and while the people were engaged in quenching the fire in their houses, and while the court was in confusion on account of the conflagration in the palace, the conspirators should burst into it, on pretence of extinguishing the flames, and should seize an opportunity of assassinating the King, amid the hurry and tumult which attend such scenes. It was also arranged that the Duke of Caminha should secure the persons of the Queen and of the royal family, and detain them as hostages till the citadel was surrendered: That the Archbishop, attended by the officials of the Inquisition, and by the ecclesiastics who were attached to him, should walk in procession through the city, in order to quiet the minds of the people, and prevent insurrection, while the Marques of Villareal should assume the reins of government, till farther instructions were received from the court of Madrid.

As they could not, however, depend on any co-operation on the part of the people, with exception of the tribe of Jews, the conspirators all agreed, it would be re-

quisite that Olivarez should send a fleet to lie on the coast, ready to enter the port of Lisbon, and that a Spanish army should also be moved towards the frontiers of Portugal, to quell whatever demonstrations might be made, in the provinces, in favour of the House of Braganza.

The traitors, however, found some difficulty in conducting, with the requisite secrecy, a correspondence on these delicate subjects with the prime minister of Spain, as a *cordon* had been drawn so strictly along the frontiers of Portugal, that no one could leave that kingdom without the royal permission.

At length the necessity of conveying intelligence to Olivarez, without whose co-operation nothing could be undertaken, induced the conspirators to employ a merchant of Lisbon, called Baeza, who, on account of his extensive commercial dealings throughout Europe, had leave from the King of Portugal to write into Castile. He had long been a confident and spy of Olivarez, who shortly before the late revolution, had grievously offended the Portuguese nobility, by conferring on him the dignity of one of their most illustrious orders of knighthood. Though professing Christianity, he was suspected of observing in secret the rites of Judaism; and the exhortations of his Jewish brethren, joined to a large pecuniary bribe, induced him to undertake the conveyance of the treasonable despatches to the hands of the Count Olivarez.

Unfortunately, however, for the cause in which he had engaged, he addressed the packet, with which he was entrusted, to the Marques d'Ayamonte, the governor of the first frontier town in Spain, supposing that the letters it contained were safe as soon as they were beyond the boundaries of Portugal.

But it happened that, while the King of Spain thus encouraged conspiracies in Lisbon, some of his own sub-

jects, though not with the same bloody and atrocious intentions, were in correspondence with the sovereign of Portugal. The Marques d'Ayamonte, a near relation of the Queen of Portugal, was at the head of this political party, whose object was to erect Andalusia into a separate sovereignty, under her brother the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, and who, in furtherance of this project, were at present in close communication with the court of Lisbon. Astonished at receiving from that capital a packet addressed to Olivarez, and sealed with the signet of the Inquisition of Portugal, and also fearing that his own safety might be implicated in the contents, the Marques resolved to open it, instead of forwarding it to its destination. Having perused the letters, he forthwith sent them by express to the King of Portugal, whom they confirmed in the suspicions which he had for some time entertained of the Archbishop of Braga. He immediately summoned a council, where measures were resolved on, which, a few days afterwards, were carried into execution. It was discovered, from the documents which had fallen into the hands of the Marques d'Ayamonte, that it was intended by the conspirators to commence their traitorous operations on the 5th of August, an hour before midnight. Braganza, who had used so little exertion to ascend the throne, showed sufficient vigour and resolution in maintaining his position. On the morning of the day fixed for the execution of the plot, he drew into Lisbon, on pretence of a review, all the troops which were quartered in the neighbourhood. He secretly distributed, with his own hand, several sealed billets to persons about the court, on whom he could rely, with orders not to open them till mid-day, and then to execute punctually what they enjoined. Having next summoned the Archbishop and the Marques of Villareal into his presence, on pre-

trise of Jews, the council agreed, it would be re-

tence of consulting them on some important affairs, they were privately arrested, and a captain of the guard, at the same moment, apprehended the Duke of Caminha on the parade. Those who had received the sealed billets from the king, having opened them at the appointed time, found an order for each to arrest a conspirator, and to convey him to prison, or guard him till farther instructions. All these commands had been issued with so much precision, and were so punctually carried into effect, that, in less than an hour, forty-seven traitors were secured without a possibility of escape. The office of the Inquisition being also searched, was discovered to be full of arms : persons were likewise found stationed in the naval arsenal at Belem, ready to set fire to the vessels,¹ and all was so completely prepared, that nothing seemed wanting but the answer of Olivarez.

Accounts of this dark and murderous plot having rapidly spread, excited a great sensation in the city. The people rushed in crowds to the palace, calling out for vengeance on the guilty ; and the magistracy deputed some of their body, to beseech his Majesty to provide for the security of his throne by their exemplary punishment. The King gladly availed himself of this opportunity to confirm the hatred of his subjects towards the Spaniards, by publicly announcing that it was their intention, had the conspiracy succeeded, to have glutted their revenge, and put an end to all risk of future revolt, by peopling the city with a Castilian colony, and transporting the present inhabitants to the mines of America, to be for ever buried in these abysses of avarice and cruelty.

As the resentment of the populace, however, against the greatest criminals soon passes into sentiments of compassion, it was judged proper that the punishment of the

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. i. lib. 2.

chief conspirators should not be long deferred. Baeza, the Jew, whose inconsiderate transmission to the Marques d'Ayamonte of the despatches, had led to a detection of the plot, having been put to the question, confessed the whole plan and extent of the conspiracy, and others acknowledged their guilt even before being brought to the torture. The Marques of Villareal, his son the Duke of Caminha, the Count of Armamar, and Augustin Manuel, were led out, amid incessant calls of the people for their death, and were executed, according to the Portuguese custom, sitting in a chair, where their heads were struck off by a sabre. A secretary to the Archbishop of Braga, and Correa de Silva, who had been chief clerk to Vasconcellos, with four others, were hanged and quartered. The Grand Inquisitor, and the Archbishop of Braga, being ecclesiastics, and, by the privileges of their order, exempt from the cognizance of the secular power, were condemned to perpetual imprisonment. The former, not having engaged so far in the plot as the other conspirators, and having only been guilty of what is called in this country a misprision of treason, was soon set at liberty. After having languished two years in prison, the Archbishop of Braga, while on his deathbed, made a request to the King that he would pardon his treachery, and grant that his body might be interred in some remote burying-ground, without inscription on his tomb, that no memorial might remain of one who had proved a traitor to his country.¹

The king had procured the conviction of the conspirators, by their own confessions and the deposition of the Jew Baeza, without being obliged to have recourse to the letters which the Marques d'Ayamonte sent him, and which he was unwilling to produce in evidence lest he should endanger the safety of that nobleman in Spain,

¹ Steven's *Hist. of Portugal*, p. 425.

by leading to a discovery of the correspondence which he himself maintained with him. It long continued unknown at the court of Madrid by what means the conspiracy of the Archbishop of Braga had been detected,¹ and the mystery was only revealed in consequence of the farther progress of the intrigues which the King of Portugal carried on with the Marques d'Ayamonte.

From the period of his accession, and, indeed, for some time before it, John of Braganza had entered into the closest relations with all the enemies of Spain. His ports were always open to the fleets of France and Holland, and he had an emissary stationed in the revolted province of Catalonia. While he thus maintained a connection with the declared and public foes of the Spanish monarchy, he did not neglect those discontented subjects whose enmity to the government was the more dangerous from its concealment. Having gained the Marques d'Ayamonte, he next attempted to sow the seeds of disaffection in the breast of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, brother to the Queen of Portugal, by suggesting to him the design of rendering himself independent in his government of Andalusia. The Marques was a man of a bold, daring, enterprising character, and he mortally

¹ Siri, in his *Mercurio* 1644, says, that a confidant of the King of Portugal met, at a small inn, with a Gipsy who was conveying the letters of the conspirators into Spain. His suspicions having been excited by some words which dropped from this messenger, he allured him to a short distance from the inn, and having stabbed him, took possession of his letters. Other writers of the time relate, that it was discovered by the Count of Vimioso, whom the king had deprived of his government of Alentejo. The Archbishop, supposing that his discontent would render him a fit instrument for his traitorous purposes, sounded him on the subject. But the Count revealed the suspicious conversation to the king, and by his majesty's directions, pretended to accede to the Archbishop's proposals till he had discovered the whole plan of the conspiracy.

hated the prime minister Olivarez. His territories, which lay at the mouth of the Guadiana, near the confines of Portugal, were favourably situated for the correspondence which he maintained with the court of Lisbon, and for his communications with the Duke of Medina-Sidonia. That nobleman being of a weak, vain, and ostentatious disposition, listened readily to the persuasion, that he might avail himself of the opportunity presented by the embarrassments of Spain and the elevation of his brother-in-law, to render himself the independent sovereign of Andalusia, instead of governing that province in subseriency to Olivarez, whose haughty spirit led him to degrade the nobility, and who would not probably long permit him to retain the command of so extensive a district in the vicinity of Portugal.

The Marques d'Ayamonte, secure of the favourable inclinations of the Duke, conceived that he had now only to fix the definite objects of his conspiracy, and to arrange the plans for carrying it into effect. This, however, required frequent communications with the King of Portugal, and, in order to facilitate the means of intercourse with that monarch, he employed a Franciscan monk, called Nicholas de Velasco, who had been long attached to the fortunes of his house, and who now passed over to one of the frontier towns in Portugal, on pretence of treating with regard to the ransom of a Castilian gentleman at that time detained in prison at Lisbon. The King of Portugal, as was concerted with the Marques, made this Cordelier be arrested as a spy of the Spanish government, and brought in chains to court, where he had several private interviews with his majesty. His indiscretion, and the air of importance which he assumed, soon rendered him suspected; and one of his fellow prisoners, a Spaniard of the name of Sanchez, by imposing on his vanity, and professing the utmost devotion to the

interests of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, wrung from him the whole secret, and even obtained from him some of the letters of his employer. Sanchez having procured his liberty by the intercession of Velasco, and being about to return into Spain, persuaded that monk to entrust him with his despatches for the Marques and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, which he promised to convey safely into Andalusia. As soon, however, as he had got possession of these documents, he took the straight road to Madrid, and on his arrival at that capital, proceeded immediately to the residence of the minister, to demand an audience as on a matter of the last importance.¹

Olivarez, who was naturally haughty and rather of difficult access, ordered that it should be signified to Sanchez that he might return on one of the ordinary days of audience. On being thus harshly rebuffed, Sanchez exclaimed that the safety of the monarchy was at stake; and he called on heaven to witness his fidelity, and the diligence he had employed to warn the minister of the impending danger. This vehement language being reported to Olivarez, he gave orders that he should be admitted. Sanchez threw himself at his feet, and exclaimed that the state was saved since he had at length reached his presence. He then detailed the whole plan of the conspiracy which he had been thus instrumental in discovering: he developed the intrigues of the Marques and the Duke of Medina with the King of Portugal,—their design to seize on the ships in the harbour of Cadiz,—to deliver the town itself into the hands of the Portuguese, and to turn against the king those troops and arms with which the Duke was entrusted in Andalusia for his Majesty's service. In confirmation of his assertions, he placed in the minister's hands the letters which he had received from the Cordelier at Lisbon, written in cypher, and ad-

¹ Colmenar, *Annales d'Espagne*.

dressed to the Duke or Marques. Olivarez appeared at first to be overwhelmed by such unexpected intelligence, and remained for some time silent, till having recovered himself, he assumed a more gracious manner than he was wont to bear. He commended Sanchez for his fidelity to his king, and added, that he deserved a double recompense for having discovered such treasonable practices, and not having hesitated to reveal them to the nearest relative of the traitor. He then led Sanchez to an apartment, where he was left, with orders that he should not be permitted to speak with any one; and Olivarez proceeded himself to the King, whom he informed of what he had just learned, and presented to his Majesty the letters which Sanchez had obtained from the Cordelier.

Philip was much struck by the disclosure of so black a treason. For some time past the haughtiness of the House of Guzman had been odious and suspicious to his Majesty; and, recollecting the recent loss of Portugal, which he chiefly attributed to the ambition of the Dutchess of Braganza, he could not help reproachfully remarking to the minister, that all the misfortunes of Spain came from his family. The King's natural indolence, however,—his dislike to every species of exertion, and inordinate love of pleasure, prevented him from bestowing any farther attention on this momentous affair. Having soon exhaled his resentment, he gave back the letters to his minister, without perusing them, and ordered them to be examined by three counsellors of state, who should make their report on the subject.

This placed the whole matter in the power of Olivarez, who chose three of his own dependents for the inquiry, and he tutored Sanchez to give such a deposition in their presence, as might tend to exculpate his relative the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, whom, though they had been long at enmity, he was anxious to save, at least from

capital punishment. He then, at a proper season, took his opportunity again to bring the subject before the King. He stated to him that the letters of the Cordelier had been fully decyphered, and that he had apparently been suborned to ruin the Duke of Medina-Sidonia; that Sanchez himself might have been deceived by this intriguing monk; and that the whole accusation hinged on documents which might be forgeries. However, as too much vigilance and caution could not be employed in a matter of so great importance, he judged it best that the Duke should be drawn away, by skilful management, from his government, in which it might not be found easy to arrest him by force—that troops under a new commander should be sent to occupy Cadiz—that the Marques d'Ayamonte should at all events be apprehended, and that if both were found guilty when brought to court, they might then suffer the punishment due to their crimes.

The counsel of the minister was a law still more inviolable to the monarch than his subjects. Philip, who was not revengeful or blood-thirsty, told him he might act as he chose. Olivarez then despatched his nephew Don Luis de Haro into Andalusia, with a mandate to the Duke, that, whether innocent or culpable, he should forthwith repair to court,—assuring him, at the same time, that he might depend on pardon though guilty, but that he was ruined if he hesitated one moment, to comply with the orders of the King. Another messenger arrested the Marques d'Ayamonte in his own palace, and the Duke of Ciudad-Real threw himself at the same time into Cadiz at the head of 5000 troops.

The Duke of Medina was thunderstruck by this intelligence, which left him no alternative but to obey the mandate, or escape into Portugal. The idea, however, of passing his life as a proscribed vagabond in a foreign

land, appeared to him insupportable, and as he knew the absolute power which Olivarez held over the mind of the King, he resolved to rely on his assurances. He accordingly set out, and travelled to Madrid with such expedition, that his prompt obedience disposed the King to believe him innocent, and to forgive him if guilty.

On his arrival, the Duke alighted at the house of the minister, to whom, after having received new promises of pardon, he revealed the plan of the conspiracy,—throwing the whole project, with more truth than generosity, on the Marques d'Ayamonte. Olivarez then privately introduced him into the cabinet of the King. The Duke there threw himself at his sovereign's feet, which he moistened with his tears, and in this humiliating posture confessed his crime, and implored mercy in the most moving terms. Philip, who was melted to compassion by this scene, said that he granted him a pardon in consideration of his penitence, and the entreaties of his relative the Count Olivarez. He then dismissed him from his presence; but as he did not consider it safe to expose him, in the present conjuncture, to the temptation of fresh errors, by allowing him to return into Andalusia, he ordered that he should meanwhile continue in attendance on the court. Part of that immense wealth which had inspired him with such dangerous ideas of independence, was confiscated, and a royal garrison was placed in the town of San-Lucar-de-Barrameda, the ordinary residence of the Dukes of Medina-Sidonia.

But while this mitigated punishment was vouchsafed to the noble relative of Olivarez, and head of the family of Guzman, the full rigour of the law fell on the unfortunate Marques d'Ayamonte. To him, also, a hope of mercy had been extended, provided he admitted his guilt, and manifested a sincere repentance. Allured by this expectation, and by the favour granted to his ac-

complice, the Marques subscribed an acknowledgment of all that was laid to his charge. His confession thus obtained, was employed as evidence on his trial. But if guilty of weakness in this part of his conduct, he redeemed his character for hardihood by the equanimity with which he heard his sentence, and the firmness displayed at his execution. He neither complained of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia nor of the minister. The evening before his death he supped as usual, and passed the night in a sleep so profound, that he required to be awakened when the fatal hour arrived. He proceeded to the scaffold in total silence, and died with a resolution worthy of a better cause.

This series of dark and bloody conspiracies, was terminated by a contemptible farce. In order to reinstate the Duke of Medina-Sidonia in some share of royal favour, Olivarez found it necessary to convince Philip of the sincerity of his repentance. He therefore persuaded him to defy the King of Portugal to single combat. The Duke was, at first, a good deal surprised at this chivalrous proposition. He represented that the *Duello* was forbidden by all laws, divine and human, and that he felt much difficulty in coming to such desperate extremities with a brother-in-law, unless the King of Spain obtained for him a dispensation from the Pope. The minister replied, that it was not a fit time for these scruples, and that he must merit the favour of his sovereign by some act so decisive, as to remove, in future, all suspicion of his connexion with Portugal. But Olivarez added, that if he was absolutely averse to fight, it might be sufficient if he would not disavow the cartel which should be immediately prepared for him, and made public in his name. The Duke now understood that all which was required of him was to consent to act a part in a spectacle intended for the delusion of the King, and amusement of the people. He

therefore agreed to the defiance which Olivarez himself drew up, and in which, after explaining his motives, he summons the Duke of Braganza, with or without seconds, and leaving to him the choice of arms, to “meet him in single combat at Valencia de Alcantara, standing on the limits of the two kingdoms, where he will abide the coming of his antagonist for eighty days, beginning on the 1st of October next, and ending on the 19th of December of this current year.” One should think that a native of Spain, alive to the satire of Don Quixote, would scarcely have written a challenge in terms so similar to those in a romance of chivalry. Many copies, however, of this absurd and extravagant production, were circulated through Spain and Portugal, and in all the courts of Europe. The Duke of Medina followed it up by repairing to the place of combat in full armour, and accompanied by the Camp-Master-General of the Spanish army. They then made the due appeal and proclamations, without the King of Portugal, or any one on his part, appearing to answer to the challenge.¹ That prince had too much sense to take notice of this mummary. He was better employed in consolidating the strength of his kingdom, in confirming his alliances with the enemies of Spain, and in making preparations to resist the attempts of that country to deprive him of his newly acquired territories.

As for the Duke of Medina his compliance availed him little. After he had acted his eighty days’ part in this farcical performance, he was seized and hurried to Victoria, whence he was conveyed to Valladolid, with strict injunctions to pass in that city the remainder of his days.²

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 1.

² Though the Duke of Medina-Sidonia survived for more than twenty years, he was never permitted, either to return to court, or to enter the province of Andalusia. At the termination of that long period, he came to a singular end. “The manner of this

Though Olivarez had been guilty of much hypocrisy in the trial and condemnation of the Marques d'Ayamonte, and though the Duke of Medina did not obtain the free pardon which he was led to expect, both amply merited the punishments which they suffered as traitors to their king and country. But nothing can palliate those complicated and treacherous machinations, by which Olivarez effected the destruction of the Portuguese secretary Lucena, and doomed to perpetual imprisonment the Infant Prince Edward of Portugal.

After the Duke of Braganza had ascended, or rather had been carried to the throne of Portugal, he nominated Francesco Lucena to the office of Secretary of State; a charge which he executed with wonderful capacity, as well as zeal and fidelity to his master. At the time of his appointment he had a son in Madrid, whom he had intrusted with some blank papers, to which he had only affixed his signature, leaving them to be filled up with letters of credit or recommendation, as his son should find occasion. Shortly after the revolution, Olivarez caused the son to be arrested and his papers to be examined, in order to ascer-

Duke's death," says Sir R. Fanshawe in one of his letters, dated from Madrid 1664, "was like his quality, extraordinary. His Excellency was, for his diversion and recreation, being as then in good health to all outward appearance, and not much stricken in years, at a town of his own, not far from Valladolid, where, you know, his constant appointed abode was. In that place of recreation his Excellency had some number of dogs, newly given him, the which, looking out of his windows, he happened to see worrying a poor woman. They neither killed nor maimed her, but the Duke's apprehension was so great that they would do the one or the other, that, violently crying out from the place where he was unto his people to prevent it, he fell into a sudden ecstasy; from that into a deep melancholy, and from that into a fever, which dispatched him before his physicians could come from Valladolid; so thereby verifying in his particular, the surname (motto) of his family—*de puro bueno murio*." *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe*, p. 293-4.

tain if he had been acquainted with the conspiracy. Nothing being discovered which could in any way implicate him in that transaction, he was set at liberty: but the blank papers found in his possession were retained; and Olivarez, daily perceiving the injury which the Secretary Lucena occasioned to the Spanish affairs, by his diligence and able counsels, resolved to employ them for his ruin. Having filled them up in cypher, with what purported to be a treasonable correspondence with the Spanish government, he despatched them to a spy whom he retained in Lisbon, and who adopted measures for their being intercepted and laid before the King of Portugal. As soon as the Secretary was in consequence arrested, Olivarez wrote epistles addressed as from himself, to Lucena, corresponding to the blank letters; and these feigned documents, he also took care should be intercepted. Lucena was surprised at seeing his name appended to productions which he had neither written nor dictated. From the hurry of affairs, he had forgotten the blanks which had been intrusted to his son, and he supposed that his name had been counterfeited. The charge, however, admitted of no vindication, except a bare denial. His judges found the defence to be frivolous and nugatory; he was condemned to death, and too hastily executed. The truth was discovered after the King of Portugal had for ever lost the wisest, the most industrious, and the most attached of his ministers.¹

The death of the Secretary Lucena was accomplished by the blackest arts of treachery, but the seizure and perpetual imprisonment of Prince Edward, brother to the King of Portugal, seemed a more flagrant violation of the laws of nations, and excited a stronger sensation among the Powers of Europe.

At the time of the revolution of Portugal, this prince

¹ *Hist. of Revolutions of Portugal*, prefixed to *Southwell's Letters*.

was serving in Germany, in the Imperial army, as a subject and soldier of Spain. He had displayed considerable military talents in the wars in which he had been engaged, and Olivarez dreaded, that if allowed to return to Lisbon, he might be placed at the head of the Portuguese army destined to act against Spain, which would at once terminate those dissensions and competitions of its present commanders, on which the Spaniards in a great measure relied for their safety.¹ During this period, Francisco de Melo was the Spanish ambassador at the court of Vienna. He was a Portuguese by birth, and had been in youth a confidant of Duke Theodosius, father to Prince Edward and to the present King of Portugal. He had been seduced, however, from his allegiance to the House of Braganza by Olivarez, who had summoned him to the court of Madrid, where, by caresses and promises, he engaged him wholly in the interests of the Catholic King. From that time he showed himself more zealous than any Spaniard for the destruction of the Family of Braganza; and while, in his situation of Spanish minister at the court of Vienna, he first suggested to Olivarez the expediency of seizing on the person of Prince Edward, and detaining him as an hostage. Melo having obtained an approval from the Count-Duke of this nefarious scheme, began his intrigues with the Austrian ministers. His proposals were received by them with horror, and were also rejected, at first, by the Emperor, to whom Melo personally applied. But having succeeded in gaining Father Quiroga, the Imperial confessor, his Majesty allowed himself to be shaken in his former resolutions by his persuasions. He summoned Prince Edward from Ulm to Ratisbon, where a diet was at that time held, and where, on his arrival, a guard was immediately placed on his person. This in-

¹ Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. iii.

telligence was immediately communicated by Melo to Olivarez, who, amid all the disasters of the monarchy, showed such immoderate joy at the news, that his attendants and secretaries were astonished at the unwonted satisfaction he displayed.

Meanwhile, the Infant complained loudly of the treatment he had received, and demanded a personal audience of the Emperor, which was refused, and several princes of Germany also interceded in his behalf in vain. So far from obtaining any redress of his wrongs, he was deprived of all his Portuguese attendants, and sent from Ratisbon under a still stronger and stricter guard to Passau. On pretence, however, that he could not there be detained with sufficient security, the Spaniards obtained his transference to Gratz, which was nearer Italy, where they wished him to be ultimately conducted. At Gratz, the severities which the Prince had hitherto endured were redoubled, and to such distress was he reduced, that he was obliged to write to the Emperor, soliciting his permission to dispose of a small quantity of silver-plate, which belonged to himself, in order that he might procure the means of subsistence. Still his Imperial Majesty continued faithfully to promise, that he never would deliver him into the hands of the Spaniards, which was the chief subject of his apprehensions. An offer, however, of 40,000 crowns from the Spanish government, induced the Emperor, who at this period was reduced to the utmost extremities for want of money, to violate all the claims of hospitality, the laws of nations, and the pledges given to the Infant. That unfortunate prince was delivered up by the Governor of Gratz, to Novarro, an agent of Spain. "Tell your master," said he to the imperial commissioner, "that he is a tyrant, and that it pains me more to have once served him, than to be thus given up to my enemies."¹ From Gratz he was

¹ Silva, *Hist. de Port.* t. iii.

conducted with all possible secrecy and despatch to the castle of Milan, which was one of the strongest places possessed by the Catholic King in Italy.¹ Here he was treated with much indignity, and being shut up in a tower where criminals were usually imprisoned, his health suffered severely. In this confinement he was detained, in spite of all protests and remonstrances, during the remainder of his miserable existence. In the year 1648, Mazarin suggested that he should be exchanged for the Duke of Tursis, an Italian noble in the Spanish service, who was captured by the Duke of Guise during the insurrection at Naples.² This last attempt for his release failed also, and the unfortunate prince died soon afterwards in his solitary imprisonment.

¹ Birago, *Hist. delle Rivoluzione di Portogallo*.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xi. parte ii. p. 500.

CHAPTER VI.

REVOLT OF CATALONIA.

Furor impius intus.

VIRGIL. *Æneid.*

WHILE the Revolution of Portugal had been so ably planned and carried into execution, Spain was beset by a more imminent danger in one of her most ancient and important principalities. The loss of Portugal, whether considered as a dependent kingdom, or merely as a province of Spain, detracted more perhaps from the splendour of the monarchy, than from its real strength and power. The Portuguese fought with reluctance under the banners of Castile; their foreign possessions, with their commerce, had already become the spoil of the Dutch, and even the pecuniary supplies which had been extorted from them, must soon have failed under that system of policy which Olivarez adopted, and by which the nation was systematically impoverished. But the revolt of Catalonia preyed on the vitals of the monarchy. Its hardy sons—its opulent cities—composed the blood and the sinews of Spain; and its insurrection opened to foreign enemies a direct course to the heart of the kingdom.

After Catalonia had been relieved from the domination of the Arabs in the 9th century, it was ruled by its own Counts of Barcelona. These governors were at first dependent on the French monarchs, who had aided them

in the expulsion of the Infidels. But they early threw off their vassalage, and erected themselves into independent sovereigns. It was during their sway, and before the end of the 11th century, that the ancient Gothic laws, by which the province had hitherto been governed, were abolished, and what are called the Usages of Catalonia substituted in their room. This provincial code, besides fixing the maxims of civil and criminal jurisprudence, was the basis of the constitutional rights of the people, who derived from it many important privileges and immunities. About a century after the establishment of this charter, the sovereignty of Catalonia was annexed to that of Aragon, in consequence of the marriage of Raymond Berenger, Count of Barcelona, with Petronilla, daughter and heiress of King Ramiro of Aragon. From that period, the name of Catalonia was, in some degree, sunk in that of the more important monarchy to which it was united. But the Kings of Aragon still resided much at Barcelona, as is proved by the fact, that, of the fifteen princes who reigned from the time of the junction of Catalonia with Aragon, till the accession of Ferdinand the Catholic, not fewer than six died at Barcelona.¹ During the reigns of these monarchs, an immense number of concessions and privileges were granted by them to their Catalonian subjects, who, notwithstanding the annexation to Aragon, still retained their own separate government, laws, and Cortes: And it was an invariable custom that their King, before his coronation at Saragossa, should pass into Catalonia, in order to confirm the privileges of the three states—the Prelates, Barons, and Corporations.

At the period of the fortunate union of the Spanish crowns under Ferdinand and Isabella, the royal prerogative in Catalonia was extremely limited; and though the pea-

¹ Capmany, *Memorias Historicas sobre la Marina, &c. de Barcelona*, t. ii. Appendice, No. 2.

santry were in as abject a state of servitude as in any feudal country of Europe, the aristocracy and the municipal communities were in the enjoyment of extensive privileges. The chief exercise of power was in the Cortes or Parliament, which was composed of the nobility, the dignitaries of the church, and the deputies or representatives of the principal towns. They determined on the amount of the donations to be supplied, for the service of the king, and without the permission of this assembly no tax could be imposed or money coined. They appointed judges for the investigation and redress of all grievances, particularly those founded on claims or complaints against the crown. The citizens had at all times the right of addressing their representatives, and they exercised it, not in the tone of supplicants, but of freemen demanding their birthright. Their oath of allegiance also implied, that if these privileges were violated by the king, it should be lawful to disclaim him as a sovereign, and place another on the throne.

The concessions and immunities granted to the towns, and their frequent commercial intercourse with the Republics of Italy, cherished among the corporations a spirit of liberty and an attachment to popular institutions. This freedom and independence, led to wealth and an increase of inhabitants. In the 15th century, the number of towns in Spain was considerable, and their population and riches beyond that of the cities in other countries of Europe except the Netherlands. Of these none exceeded Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, in splendour and commercial importance. Geronimo Paulo, an author who wrote a minute description of it in the year 1491, compares it to Naples in dimensions, and to Florence in elegance and beauty.¹ Its magistrates aspired to the highest honour which Spanish subjects could enjoy, that of re-

¹ Ap. Schott. *Script. Hisp.*; and Capmany, *Mem. Appen.* No. 13.

maining covered in the presence of their sovereign, and being treated as *Grandeos* of the kingdom.¹

Though the power of the crown was thus closely circumscribed, and the privileges of the citizen extensive, their enthusiastic passion for freedom had often led the natives of Catalonia to manifest a mutinous spirit towards their princes. But the union of all the Spanish monarchies under one master, tended materially to abridge the rights of the people and extend the prerogatives of the crown. Castile now became the seat of government, and as Aragon and Catalonia formed but inconsiderable portions of an enormous empire, it could not be expected that the Cortes of these provinces should preserve that control over the sovereign which they had hitherto exercised. Catalonia, as a principality by itself, or even as a part of Aragon, might have defied all the power of its princes, and successfully resisted an invasion of its privileges. But the case was much altered in the reign of Charles V, when the Catalans became the subjects of the King of all Spain,—a king too of consummate abilities, and supported by immense foreign influence. A partial insurrection against such a monarch must have proved altogether ineffectual, while the jealousies and divisions which, in spite of their nominal union, still existed among the ancient kingdoms of Spain, prevented a general or combined insurrection.

These mutual antipathies withheld the Aragonese and Catalans from joining in the rebellion of the *Comune-ros* of Castile at the commencement of the reign of Charles V. Hence that monarch had not a justifiable pretext, of which he would most readily have availed himself, to abolish the power of the Cortes and reduce the inhabitants of Aragon or Catalonia to the same subser-

¹ Robertson's *State of Society in Europe*, note 34, prefixed to *Hist. of Charles V.*

viency to which he had brought the Castilians. His successor, Philip II, watched every opportunity to strip these provinces of their laws and liberties, and so far as concerned the Aragonese, he found it in their affording an asylum to his secretary Antonio Perez, and facilitating his escape into France. The Catalans, however, still retained their most important immunities and privileges, which they continued to be jealous in preserving and bold in asserting. If their representatives no longer held in their hands the balance of war and of peace, they were still exempted from all military service except in their own principality, and their pecuniary contributions to the exigencies of the state were entirely voluntary. In other provinces, indeed, such supplies were nominally so, being termed gratuities or donations. But in Catalonia they were frequently withheld when craved by the sovereign with the most earnest intercessions and under the most urgent circumstances. Charles V, on various emergencies, undertook journeys into Catalonia for the purpose of procuring supplies. But he generally found the cortes intractable on the subject of benevolence. So many difficulties were encountered,—so much time wasted,—and so little money gained, by these expeditions, that during the latter part of his reign, and that of his successor Philip II, the Catalans were left in the unmolested enjoyment of their privileges, and the King contented himself with such limited military service and such meagre donatives as they voluntarily tendered.

At length, however, (as we have seen¹) Philip IV, urged by the increasing difficulties of an expensive war, undertook an unsuccessful, and indeed, as it afterwards proved, a fatal expedition to Catalonia. Fifteen years had now elapsed since the king, by advice of Olivarez, had proceeded to Barcelona with the unpopular ob-

¹ See above, p. 128, &c.

ject of compelling the Catalans to double their annual gratuity. The measure, it is true, was abandoned ; but the arrogance of Olivarez,—the tumult which arose in the Assembly of the States, in consequence of one of the Catalan representatives having drawn his sword on the Duke of Cardona,—and the abrupt departure of the monarch from Barcelona, had excited those embittered feelings between the court and the people, which were ready to burst forth into open hostilities on any renewed provocation. Olivarez long smothered his resentment, and, from the apprehension of popular tumults, he refrained, during many years, from any farther invasion of the Catalonian privileges. But a long protracted war, the expenses of which always increased as the resources of the monarchy declined, again turned his thoughts to this fatal object. The southern provinces of Spain had been so impoverished by the expulsion of the Morescoes, and consequent decline of arts and agriculture, that they could contribute little to the exigencies of the State. Biscay and Navarre refused their assistance on the score of national privileges ; so that the whole burden of the war fell on those provinces which had composed the ancient kingdom of Castile, but which now did not form one half of the Spanish realm. The Castilians, though they had supported this grievous load with unexampled generosity and patience, began at length to murmur ; and their complaints prompted Olivarez to consider of a more equal distribution, throughout the kingdom, of the burdens of war. The prosperous and unexhausted state of Catalonia, which had continued to flourish amid the misery and depopulation of the rest of Spain, presented peculiar temptations to a financier. At this time the province contained more than a million of inhabitants,¹ and its capital Barcelona

¹ Carta del Rey Catolico al Conde Santa-Coloma 31 Marzo, 1640 : ap. Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 1.

was accounted the wealthiest city in Spain. Olivarez accordingly delivered his decided opinion, in the supreme Council of State, that it was absolutely necessary to abrogate, or, at all events, in the present emergency, to suspend, those invidious privileges which rendered so many citizens totally useless to their country. These sentiments were sufficiently popular on the spot where they were uttered. The council unanimously approved of such sage resolutions, and the King in consequence imposed a tax on Catalonia, proportioned to its population and wealth. He at the same time issued an order that 6000 Catalans should reinforce the army in Italy, and he commissioned the Marshals of the household to mark out cantonments in the province for a royal army which was about to act on the side of the Pyrenees.

No nation ever could endure illegal or unjust taxation. It is safer to trample on the laws and religion of a state, than extend a sacrilegious hand to the purse of individuals. It was tonnage and poundage that, in the reign of Charles I, weighed so heavily on the hearts of the patriots of England. A refusal of the Parliament of Paris to register the royal edicts for an impost on provisions brought into the capital, gave rise to the civil wars of the Fronde. The exaction of some duty on tea, impelled the Americans to throw off their allegiance to Britain ; and had it not been for the tenth and twentieth pennies, the Dutch would have endured from the Spaniards the persecution of the Protestant faith, the introduction of the Inquisition, and the execution of Egmont.

The intelligence of the new impost excited a great sensation in Catalonia, and a determined spirit of resistance. This ferment was increased when the Viceroy, instigated by Olivarez, seized on a fund which was at the disposal of the city of Barcelona, without consulting the municipal corporation, and when one of its members, having re-

monstrated against this spoliation, was violently thrown into prison.¹

The lax discipline, however, of the royal troops stationed in Catalonia, and the outrages committed by them, were the proximate causes of the insurrection. The vicissitudes of the war between France and Spain, and the reciprocal invasions of their frontiers, occasioned frequent marches and counter-marches of troops through Catalonia. Indeed, of all the provinces of Spain, it was the most exposed to this annoyance. The excesses of a licentious and ferocious soldiery had long created discontents; and, in order to be relieved of this burden, the Catalans had offered to defend their own towns,—hinting, that if any strangers (in which denomination they classed the Castilians as well as the French) entered their province with arms, they should be accounted and treated as enemies.²

We have seen that, in the preceding year, the French had occupied Salsas in Roussillon, which was considered as one of the keys of Catalonia; but that a joint command for its reduction had been conferred on Spinola Marques of Balbases, and the Count of Santa-Coloma, Viceroy of Catalonia, who was a native of the province, and highly popular in his government as an approved patriot, and a true friend to the liberties of his country. The siege of Salsas by the Spaniards, lasted seven months, and the fortress at last surrendered in January 1640. Many of the Catalonian nobility had followed the standard of their popular Viceroy, and had greatly exerted

¹ Giannone, *Storia Civile de Napoli*, lib. xxxvi. c. 55.

² Libertino, *Historia de los Movimientos de Cataluña*, lib. i. The real name of the author of this historical work was Francisco de Melo, (Antonio, *Bib. Hispan*). It is written with considerable freedom, and with a bias towards the cause of the Catalonians. Assarino's *Rivolucion de Cataluña* is the best work on the side of the Spanish Government.

themselves during the continuance of the siege. At its conclusion, they felt deeply mortified and disappointed that they received no rewards or distinctions, nor even acknowledgments for their services, from the Court of Madrid.¹ During the progress of the siege, the harshest measures, as we have seen,² were adopted, to compel the natives of Catalonia and Roussillon to provide victuals and accommodation for the army. As soon as the enterprise against Salsas was successfully terminated, the soldiers who had been employed in its reduction were quartered in the frontier towns, and soon spread themselves over the country. In the course of spring 1640, the King and the Count-Duke addressed the most earnest letters to the Viceroy, Santa-Coloma,³ enforcing the necessity of supplying the troops with quarters, in order that the army, which was essential for the defence of the province, might not disperse. It was urged in these despatches, that the privileges which the Catalonians pleaded, had been granted to them before their union with the other provinces of Spain, and could not now be insisted on, when they formed an integral part of the monarchy; and, finally, that as they were unable to protect themselves, being placed near the frontiers of France, they ought both to lodge and feed the soldiers who were sent to their assistance. The Viceroy, in his letters to court, attempted to obtain some mitigation of the royal orders. He represented that they could not be so cheerfully submitted to, in a district where the inhabitants had been altogether unaccustomed to the burden, as in Milan and other places, where they had been long habituated to support the grievance. He informed the king of the extreme poverty of the villagers, who were not only unwilling but unable to subsist the soldiery, and he at the same time took the opportunity of setting forth the grow-

¹ Libertino. ² See above, p. 206-7. ³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 1.

ing discontents and the bad disposition of the different bodies and corporations in Catalonia.¹ The deputies of the towns at the same time reminded the king of the great exertions which the states had made, in the former year, to repel the inroads of the French into Roussillon, and which merited indulgence instead of new exactions.²

So far, however, were these remonstrances from obtaining any alleviation of the hardships to which the province was subjected, that Olivarez reproached Santa-Coloma, because he had not made an example of some of the refractory citizens, by sending them manacled to the King; and in a despatch from his Majesty, dated 24th March 1640, the deputy Tamarit, one of the ablest of the popular leaders, was ordered to be arrested, and conveyed, by sea, to the castle of Perpignan.³

The peasants contended, that they were only obliged to give the troops lodging, water, salt, and culinary utensils, during their passage through the province;⁴ and they strenuously objected to supplying rations of provisions. From the exhausted state, however, of its finances, the Spanish government was unable to pay its soldiery, who, in consequence, could subsist only by plundering the natives; and by their rapacity and insolent bearing, they quickly reduced the peasantry to a condition of the deepest misery, and excited them to a state of the highest exasperation. Constant quarrels arose between the soldiers and the villagers, and at length skirmishes took place, when the peasantry of the districts united for mutual protection. The Viceroy Santa-Coloma, divided between what he conceived to be his duty to his King and compassion to his countrymen, was uncertain how to act, and took no decisive measures for repressing the disorders,

¹ Aubery, *Mem. de Richelieu*, t. ii.

² Id. ii. p. 481.

³ Id. ii. p. 505.

⁴ Siri, *Mercurio*. Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.*

while his colleague, the Marques of Balbases, inexorably exacted the requisite supplies for the troops. After a short while, Balbases retired, and Santa-Coloma succeeded to the sole command of the army. This appointment, it was supposed by the court of Madrid, would be popular in Catalonia, and might allay the ferment which prevailed. But the disposition of Santa-Coloma seems to have changed with his situation, and the viceroy was soon forgotten in the military commander. He became exclusively the soldier's friend, and the natives quickly perceived that he was more solicitous to provide for the wants of the army, than to preserve the rights of the province.¹ It was then the people began to talk of liberty, and the redress of grievances, and the deeds performed by their ancestors in maintaining their privileges. Memorials poured into the palace of the Viceroy, and complaints from the citizens of populous towns were now daily brought before the legal tribunals of Barcelona. These became so numerous, that Santa-Coloma resorted to the injudicious measure, of forbidding the advocates in that capital to maintain the causes of the citizens and peasantry against the soldiers. After this prohibition, few of the complaints of the injured villagers reached the Viceroy, who, from a mistaken sense of loyalty, and a listless inactive disposition, allowed the evil to increase, till it was beyond his power to apply the means of remedy.

The troops, in consequence, lived in Catalonia as if it had been a conquered country. They set fire to the villages which refused to pay contributions; they pillaged and burned the churches, and at the town of Arenas the chapel was reduced to ashes before the priests had time to remove the consecrated host, which was in consequence consumed. This sacrilege excited the utmost indignation amongst a people remarkably attached to the Roman

¹ Libertino, *Movimientos*, &c. lib. i.

Catholic religion, and the Bishop of Girona complained to the Pope, who pronounced a sentence of excommunication against the profane soldiery.¹

But of all the excesses committed at this period, the outrage which raised the chief clamour, was the conflagration of a castle and village belonging to Antonio Fluvia or Fluvia, a pious and accomplished Catalonian gentleman, by a troop of Neapolitan cavalry. His house was attacked, because it was supposed that the peasantry had concealed provisions in it. When his residence was set on fire, he fled with his family to an adjacent church, where, while in the act of grasping a crucifix, he was slain, with his wife and three domestics.² The Viceroy despatched commissioners to inquire into this flagrant transaction, and to punish those who were found guilty. But this feeble attempt at reparation gave little satisfaction, as it was quickly followed by similar atrocities. An officer of an Italian regiment, called Leonardo Molas, had rendered himself particularly obnoxious by his severity. Accounts were received in the village of Farnes, that he was shortly to arrive in that cantonment with a strong detachment of troops. The peasantry caught the alarm, and a civil messenger, named Monredon, whom he had sent before, as a sort of billet-master, to provide quarters, seeing the inhabitants removing their effects to churches and other places of sanctuary or concealment, threatened to burn their houses. He discharged a pistol at one of their number, but being attacked on account of this outrage, he sought shelter in an unoccupied dwelling, whence he fired on the people, and slew several. The multitude then set fire to the house, and he was consumed in the flames. Intelligence of this disturbance having arrived at head-quarters, a party of soldiers was marched

¹ Griffet, *Hist. de Louis XIII.*

² Siri, *Mercurio.*

to the spot, who desolated the place, and exterminated the inhabitants.¹

Santa-Coloma had from time to time informed the king of the disturbed state of the province which he governed ; and at length suggested a choice of two different measures for allaying the commotions. One was to withdraw the military altogether from Catalonia ; the other to augment the troops to such a number, that the inhabitants, sensible of their inferiority, would return to implicit submission and obedience. The style of the proposition was novel, and excited wonder among the Spanish ministry. Balbases, who had now been for some time at Madrid, had insidiously persuaded Olivarez that, before quitting Catalonia, his exertions had removed every difficulty in the administration of that province ; and that, if the dissensions which he succeeded in quieting had revived, this change must have been the evil consequence of Santa-Coloma extending too much indulgence to the inhabitants. Olivarez, always slow in believing disastrous intelligence, adopted neither of the measures proposed by Santa-Coloma ; and by his ambiguous answer, left that unhappy Viceroy in greater perplexity than before. While in this uncertainty, he was waited on by three of the magistrates of Barcelona, as deputies of the citizens, who represented their grievances, pointed out the remedies, and hinted at the formation of a political Society among the people. The Viceroy received the first mission ungraciously ; and on their seeking his presence a second time, he threw the deputies into confinement.

The Catalans had always held their native magistrates in high respect and esteem. Their imprisonment excited a great sensation, and animated all classes with hatred against the Viceroy. At length an insurrection broke out on the 12th of May, when the citizens of Barcelona, aid-

¹ Siri, *Mercur.* t. ii. lib. i.

ed by some bands of peasantry who had entered the town, broke open the prison, released the deputies, and threatened an attack on the Viceregal palace.

This tumult, however, subsided, and the inhabitants of Barcelona might perhaps have remained satisfied with the release of their magistrates. But a greater danger was to be apprehended from the mountaineers of Catalonia, a hardy and temperate, but a lawless and vindictive race. They were divided into bands, and there was a chief for each guerilla. One of the present leaders of these freebooters, called Pedro de Santa-Cecilia-y-Paz, was reputed to have slain, with his own hand, 325 persons. They used musketoons, called *pedernates*, which were slung round their waists with a leather belt: they despised swords, which they deemed cumbrous, but they always carried girdle knives. They wore long woollen caps or bonnets, which hung over behind the head, and were stripped, like Highland tartan, with various colours, to distinguish the respective troops to which they belonged. Large wide cloaks, of a coarse sort of frieze called *xerga*, covered the upper parts of their bodies. Sashes, frequently of silk, were twisted round their loins, and on their feet they had mountain sandals, made of hemp or cow's hide, laced up to their ankles. In this garb they often left their hills and fastnesses to prey on the inhabitants of the plain.

Even among these daring mountaineers, the *Segadores* or reapers were noted as a dissolute and audacious race. They passed the greater part of the season without home or fixed habitation; and their coming, wherever they roamed, was always dreaded by the more peaceful inhabitants. It was the annual custom, that these lawless bands should enter Barcelona on the eve of Corpus Christi day, which happened in June, when the reaping season commenced. On the present occasion, immense troops

descended from the mountains, and approached the walls of Barcelona. The unusual multitude which flocked this season towards the capital of the province, excited the utmost apprehension in the mind of the Viceroy. He informed the magistrates of his fears, and proposed that the gates should be shut to prevent the entrance of an excessive number, lest (as he alleged) the celebration of the ensuing religious festival should be in any way disturbed or interrupted. The magistracy excused themselves from compliance, on the grounds—that the reapers were mild and affable people, from whom no danger whatever was to be apprehended; that their admittance was indispensable for gathering the harvest round Barcelona, and that to shut the gates against them would create more tumult than any that could be reasonably anticipated in consequence of their reception. From the dawn of a day appropriated to the commemoration of the most sacred of all religious institutions, wild groups of peasantry, to the number of 4000, with flashing eyes, indignant hearts and wrathful intonations of voice, poured into the city, most of them armed, and many of their number of the most desperate characters. One of the boldest attacked, on the street, a person known as a follower of Monredon, the obnoxious officer who had been guilty of the recent outrages at Farnes. The reaper was wounded in the scuffle, but was quickly succoured by his own people. The soldiers who guarded the viceregal palace hastened to the scene of tumult. But they could not restrain the violence of the inhabitants, who joined the lawless strangers, and raised the usual seditious cry of Spain, a sure harbinger of disorder, *Viva el Rey y muera el mal Gobierno*. This watchword struck terror into the hearts of all the supporters of the government, and it was everywhere followed by doubt, confusion, and uproar. The armed militia, on pretence of appeasing the tumult, rush-

ed through the streets, and increased by their numbers and presence the universal commotion.

The friends and adherents of the Viceroy were of opinion that he should immediately quit the city; and two Genoese vessels, lying at the time in the harbour, afforded the hope of escape. He considered such a flight, however, as ignominious, and resolved to abide his fate, or at least to remain till he should see if the ecclesiastics, who were exerting themselves for that purpose, should succeed in appeasing the tumult. They had, in fact, partially prevailed in allaying it, when a crowd passing the palace of the Marques of Villafranca, it was supposed by his household that they meant to burn it; and some of the domestics having fired on the multitude, though without ball, the rage of the mob was anew excited; and it was reported through all the city that one of their leaders had been slain by a discharge of musketry from the palace of Villafranca.¹ In this extremity, the Viceroy's agitation was so great, that he was unable to adopt any proper measures, and such orders as he issued were not obeyed. Perceiving, at length, that his presence could be of no avail in restoring order, he resolved, when it was now too late, to save himself by flight. The insurgents had by this time occupied the arsenal and fortifications in the harbour; and, before he could reach the Genoese ships, he required to pass under a range of cannon directed by his adversaries. The confused din of voices, the firing of soldiers and clash of arms resounded through the city. Some houses were on fire,—the prisons were all open,—and men of fierce aspect and atrocious crime were at large. He attempted, however, to reach the shore, and sent forward his son, a boy of twelve years of age, with some attendants. The skiff belonging to the Genoese gallies, which, with imminent hazard, was waiting for them, took the youth on board,

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.* t. vi. xx. 5.

but was obliged to put off from shore ere the Viceroy's arrival, as it was perceived by the mariners that the populace pursued. The son was conveyed safe to one of the gallies in the roads; but the bark could not return for the unfortunate father, as a fire was directed against it from all quarters. Everywhere around he heard outcries for his life; and, now hopeless of escape by sea, he retreated with infirm and wandering steps to the rocks of St Bertrand, on the way to the fort of Monjuich. Meanwhile, his palace had been entered, and his flight having become public, he was furiously sought for in every quarter of the city. His unwieldy bulk hindered him from moving with any degree of activity or quickness, especially on the rugged path he had to tread. He was farther disabled by the fatigue he had endured the whole day,—the want of nourishment, of which he had scarcely partaken,—and a hurt he had accidentally received in his rapid escape from the palace.¹ These causes, by retarding his flight, prevented the only chance of escape which remained. Exhausted with fatigue, and tottering with dismay, he had dropped down among the rocks of St Bertrand, where he was soon discovered by one of the parties in search of him.² A single domestic, who had been an African slave,³ and had accompanied him in his flight, was attempting to revive him by washing his face with sea water,⁴ when his pursuers came up with him. This faithful attendant, interposing between the ill-fated Viceroy and the band of assassins, endeavoured to shield his master with his own body, and received many wounds in the generous attempt. But his efforts proved unavailing, and the unfortunate Santa-Coloma was despatched on the spot, with five mortal wounds on his breast.⁵

¹ Ortiz, *Compend.*

² Libertino, *Movim. de Catal.*

³ *L'Espion Turc*, t. i. lib. iii. letter 22.

⁴ Ortiz, vi. xx. 5.

⁵ Bossi, *Storia di Spagna*. Ortiz says he must have died before

After this catastrophe, the houses of all the royal ministers and judges were sacked. Of these the richest was the palace of the Marques de Villafranca, commander of the galleys, who had quitted Barcelona a few days before. He was a nobleman of various accomplishments, and was distinguished by information beyond his age and country. But his estimable qualities had procured for him the aversion, and not the esteem, of the multitude. His domestics were first sacrificed to the fury of the mob, who, in proceeding to rifle the house, found, among other curiosities, the bronze figure of an ape or monkey, which, by means of machinery, appeared to imitate the gestures of a living animal, by rolling its eyes, bending its limbs, and pressing its paws together. The multitude, blinded with ignorance and rage, believed this ingenious piece of mechanism to be some diabolical invention. Fixing it on the top of a pike, they carried it along the streets, exhibiting it to the people, and at length lodged it in the Inquisition, as the familiar demon of its master, whom they denounced as a sorcerer and magician.¹

Nor did the insurgents spare the persons of the obnoxious functionaries of government. Their inflamed passions, and long-smothered revenge, led them to seek out every individual who had been connected with the administration of the province; and many civil officers were put to death under circumstances of peculiar atrocity and horror. Some Castilians, too, of rank and consideration, who held no official employments, and had sought refuge in the once respected and inviolable convent of St Francis, were barbarously murdered, without being allowed that time for confession which they earnestly implored. The armed peasantry were only at length persuaded to quit the town, by the magistrates spreading a report, that the assassins came up with him, for that the wounds he received did not bleed.

¹ Libertino, *Movimientos*. Siri, *Mercurio*.

inhabitants of Roussillon, being grievously oppressed by the Castilians, required their assistance. Instead, however, of hastening to that province, they continued for some days to plunder the surrounding country, and then loaded with booty, returned to their mountain homes.

Their absence, however, gave time for the local magistracy, who now exercised all the powers of the Viceroy, to restore some order in the city, and deliberate on their future proceedings. They straightway sent intelligence to his Majesty of the transactions on Corpus Christi day, exculpating the people, and throwing the whole blame on the deceased Viceroy, whose inconsiderate measures, as they alleged, had alienated the minds of the Catalans. His death, according to their report, was entirely accidental;¹ and with hypocritical submission, they begged instructions for their future conduct, and deprecated the misconstruction to which the fate of Santa Coloma might subject them. The intelligence, however, was viewed at Madrid in its true light, and was considered as of most serious aspect. The King showed some desire of accommodation with his Catalonian subjects; and had it not been for the obstinacy of Olivarez, who insisted on implicit submission, the late insurrection might have been attended with no farther evil consequences than the tragical end of the Viceroy, and the other calamities which occurred during the popular tumult. It might have been wise, under the circumstances, to have believed the state-

¹ In a manifesto which the magistrates made public, and which has been preserved in Siri's *Mercurio*, they assert that, at the commencement of the tumult, the Viceroy fled from his palace to the arsenal, where the whole councillors and heads of the city waited on him, to advise his escape, and to aid in his embarkation;—that in his haste and terror, he had wandered from his way, till, exhausted with fatigue, he sank down among the rocks of St Bertrand, where he perished, and some vindictive passenger subsequently inflicted two stabs on his dead body.

ments of the magistracy of Barcelona, and accepted their sulky apologies. But Olivarez would not hear of entering into terms with rebels, which, he maintained, would weaken and undermine the royal authority. Their proffers having been rejected, the citizens of Barcelona prepared for strenuous and systematic resistance. The example of revolt set by the capital, was followed throughout the principality. Tortosa rose, and expelled the Castilian garrison, and detachments of the royal troops were cut off in every direction.

It may at first sight appear strange, that a single and isolated province should thus have ventured to brave the whole strength and power of the Spanish monarchy. But the situation and circumstances of Catalonia presented peculiar facilities for resistance. Except where bounded by the sea, it was begirt on every side by nearly inaccessible mountains. Most of the towns and villages were seated on heights, and being surrounded by old walls or towers, were easily convertible into strong military positions. The Catalan was always well armed, and in no other country could so great a number of warlike peasantry have been so suddenly collected, or so quickly applied to martial purposes. Their contiguity to France encouraged the inhabitants to expect support from that kingdom, should they be driven to demand its protection. In fact, the French government was already vigilantly attentive to the state of Catalonia; and its secret agents had, at private meetings with the peasantry and citizens, instigated their revolt, and promised them supplies of money, arms, and ammunition. After the death of Santa-Coloma, a communication was opened by the magistracy of Barcelona with Espenan, the governor of Leucate, who, having forwarded their propositions to Richelieu, that minister despatched an envoy to Catalonia, to treat of the terms of succour, and, in consequence, Espenan

advanced through one of the passes of the Pyrenees, towards Barcelona, at the head of 300 infantry and 1000 cavalry.¹ In fact, the Catalans, conscious of the murder of their Viceroy, believed that they had offended beyond the hope of pardon, and were fully convinced, that they could trust for safety only to their own exertions, and to the aid of the numerous foreign enemies of Spain.

In the approaching crisis, the first consideration for the Spanish government was the choice of a proper successor to Santa-Coloma. The Duke of Cardona, whose family was, without competition, the greatest in Catalonia, was selected for the arduous situation. His loyalty had recommended him to the Court, and his amiable and patriotic qualities to the inhabitants of the province. He had formerly held the government of Catalonia, but was residing tranquilly in private life, when he received the mandate of the king, accompanied by the most flattering expressions of esteem and regard.

Though, at the period of his appointment, the discontents and insurrectionary movements were widely diffused through Catalonia, the new Viceroy conceived that the tranquillity of the whole province depended on that of Barcelona. He there re-established the legal right of accusation against the soldiery, of which the citizens and peasantry had been deprived by his predecessor; and he used every effort to soothe the irritated feelings of the populace. Barcelona thus became in a great measure tranquillized; and the Viceroy hoped that, in time, the smaller towns would follow the example of the capital.

While matters were thus tending towards a pacification, some disorderly regiments stationed in Catalonia, having marched to Perpignan, had assaulted and sacked that town, and almost totally expelled the inhabitants. Intelligence of these outrages having reached Bar-

¹ Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, t. viii.

celona, the Duke of Cardona considered that the situation of affairs in Roussillon required his presence. On his arrival at Perpignan, his first act was to arrest the commanders of these ill-disciplined regiments, and place them under confinement. His conduct, however, in this transaction, did not meet with the approbation of the ill-advised ministry of Spain. Olivarez sent instructions to the Duke of Cardona, that he should proceed no farther against the prisoners, and that their case should be referred to a *Junta* which had been established in Aragon for the cognizance of such affairs. The Duke understood this mandate as an expression of the royal displeasure at the steps he had adopted. The mortification thus inflicted on a heart of devoted loyalty, had such a prejudicial effect on his health, which had been but feeble at the date of his appointment,¹ that he was attacked by the fever called a Calenture, which carried him off in a few days; and with him ended, for a time, all chance of the pacification of Catalonia. His authority had been a restraint on some, and the popularity of his character retained others in hope; but after his death, all ranks and classes in the principality became animated with the same mind, and united for the same object.

Soon after the loss of the Duke of Cardona, three deputies, representing the three orders in Catalonia,—the ecclesiastics, the nobility, and the citizens, were despatched to the Court of Madrid. They were not, however, allowed to approach the capital, being stopped at Alcala de Henares, a town six leagues distant. Olivarez resorted to this measure, because he was anxious to conceal from his Majesty the true state of affairs in Catalonia, and was in consequence unwilling that its deputies should obtain a personal audience of the king. Copies of a memorial, however, were forwarded by them to the Queen and the

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Chron.*

Prince of Asturias, and a statement was addressed by them to the public, called a Proclamation, in which they justified the recent proceedings of the Catalans,—detailed the services of the province in behalf of the King,—and accused Olivarez as the cause of the ruin of their country. These steps, at length, gained the deputation an audience of the King; but it could obtain no specific promise of redress, and was obliged to return to Barcelona, without having procured any satisfactory adjustment.

In fact, the remorseless Olivarez was desirous formally to declare war against the Catalans. To a statesman whose chief object is arbitrary power, those of his countrymen who are most free are naturally the most odious; and the Catalonians had always been distinguished by the peculiar hatred of Olivarez. They entertained suspicions, indeed, that, in order to have a pretext for depriving them of their privileges, and lowering them to a level of equality with the rest of the kingdom, he had formed a premeditated plan of driving them into rebellion. Olivarez, however, did not wish that the proposition for the immediate commencement of open hostilities, should appear to flow from himself. He called a council, to which he presented a document termed the Royal Justification, which contained a defence of the army in Catalonia, and an exposition of the late rebellious acts of the Catalans. Wrapped up in reserve and mystery, he then calmly awaited the result of the deliberations of the council he had summoned. All delivered sentiments precisely such as he wished to hear expressed, till it came to the turn of Velez de Guevara, Count d'Oñate, to state his opinion. When he rose, Olivarez eyed him with attention, mingled with fear. The Count proceeded to recommend gentle measures: he enlarged on the horrors as well as dangers of a civil war, and concluded by recommending that the King should immediately set out for Catalonia,—that he should

there present himself before his vassals, and having ascertained the real state of affairs, should forthwith apply such relief to their complaints as in his wisdom he might think expedient. Oñate was followed by the Cardinal Borgia, President of the Council of Aragon, who maintained, that the conduct of the Catalans had been such as merited chastisement,—that war was the only remedy which now remained,—and that, if the King quitted his capital, it should be at the head of an army, and surrounded by the most experienced officers of Spain. The speech, however, of the Count d'Oñate, who was much revered for his advanced age and virtues, had made so strong an impression on the assembly, that Olivarez found the question might perhaps be ultimately decided contrary to his wishes, unless he hazarded an explicit declaration of his sentiments. Soon as these were openly announced, all difficulty vanished, and it was resolved by an almost unanimous vote, that war should be publicly proclaimed against the Catalans,—that an army should be collected from every quarter whence it could be most expeditiously assembled,—that the militia of the provinces should be embodied,—that the King should be advised to set out for Aragon, on pretence of holding the Cortes of that province, and should fix his head-quarters at Saragossa.

The chief difficulty regarded the choice of a military commander for the army. The Duke of Cardona had been succeeded as Viceroy of Catalonia by Garcia Manrique, Bishop of Barcelona, who was a man of learning and moderation, but by no means endued with those qualifications which the exigencies of the time required. Indeed he scarcely at all acted in the government, and as a prelate it was not to be expected that he should lead an army into the field. Spinola, Marques of Balbases, the Count of Monterey, and the Admiral of Castile, who had so highly distinguished himself at Fontarabia, were alternately proposed as Generals, and their respective me-

rits discussed. But the fatal choice at length fell on the Marques de Los Velez, who had been successively Viceroy of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon, and held the government of Navarre at the time of the siege of Fontarabia.¹ His family name was Faxardo, and his ancestors, who had highly distinguished themselves in the wars with the Moors, had enjoyed the title of Marques and the situation of Captain-general of Murcia since the time of Ferdinand the Catholic.² The present Marques accepted the command in Catalonia with readiness, being himself deceived as well as the Spanish ministry, and thinking that, with all their ebullitions, the Catalans never would resist the exercise of the royal authority and the advance of a regular army. But the tumult which had raged at Barcelona was not, as supposed at Madrid, a momentary effervescence of public feeling. It was the first burst of long smothered resentment, the summons for the uprising of all who were excited by the desire of vengeance or animated by the hope of liberty: and though in its commencement it had been entirely a popular commotion, the nobility and clergy of Catalonia, finding that the disaffected maintained their ground and received succour from France, declared in favour of the insurrection, and now directed the chief operations.

Los Velez had hitherto been chiefly known for his piety and devotion to the church.³ But he was possessed of no military capacity, and had little experience in war. He was a man, however, according to the minister's own heart,—sanguinary and unrelenting, and, it is said, he had received a private order from Olivarez to proceed with the utmost rigour as well as the greatest expedition.⁴ He was a Catalonian indeed by birth, and possessed extensive estates in that principality; but he bore no good will

¹ Palafox, *Sitio de Fuenterabia*, p. 200.

² Lope de Haro, *Nobil. Geneal.*

³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 1.

⁴ *Universal History*, t. xxxi. book 19.

to his native province, his palace having been burned and his effects confiscated during the late insurrections. The Marques of Torrecusa, a Neapolitan nobleman, was appointed camp-master-general, and the Duke of St George, his son, commanded the cavalry.

Having arrived at Saragossa with such troops as he could collect, Los Velez endeavoured to conciliate the Aragonese that he might detach them from all correspondence with their rebellious neighbours; and he also opened a communication with such places in Catalonia as were believed still to remain faithful to their allegiance. Tortosa, one of its most important towns, and which had recently expelled a Castilian garrison, was almost immediately delivered up to him by means of the Justiciary of Catalonia, Luis de Monsuar, who was at that time resident in Tortosa, and had easily persuaded the magistracy to this surrender. After its capitulation, the fortress was immediately occupied by a military party, which Los Velez had despatched from Saragossa. Having acquired this advantageous position, which commanded the chief passage of the Ebro, and afforded an entrance into the heart of the province, the Spanish general began to form his plan for the ensuing campaign. He determined to separate his army into three divisions. One was destined to enter Catalonia by the plains of Urgel in the north, and, marching through the heart of the province, to descend by Montserrat on the capital. The second division was to cross the Ebro at Tortosa, and, keeping the sea on the right hand, was also to advance on Barcelona, after taking possession of such places of importance as might lie on its line of march. The third and remaining section of the army, destined to be commanded by the King in person when he should arrive, was ordered to remain for some time at Saragossa, in readiness to move towards

any part of Catalonia where its services might be most required. Juan de Garay, a celebrated military adventurer, and at that time governor of Roussillon, was also directed to co-operate, by entering Catalonia, and uniting the troops under his command with those of Los Velez as soon as that general should appear before Barcelona, of which the siege was then to be attempted.

This complex plan had been formed on the calculation that the army which was now assembling would amount to 50,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry,—a number which did not appear over estimated, considering the preparations and exertions which had been made. Garay, however, was of opinion that the whole forces should unite before entering Catalonia—should invade it at one point—and having traversed the province, without waiting to besiege any of the fortified places on the way, should fall directly on Barcelona. He also suggested that the army of reserve, proposed to be left in Aragon, where nothing was to be apprehended, might be much more advantageously stationed on the frontiers, between Catalonia and France, in order to intercept or watch whatever military aid might be sent from that country. The counsel given by Garay appears to have been sound and judicious, but his opinion was overruled.

Los Velez was daily embarrassed by receiving ambiguous and contradictory orders from the Court of Madrid. The season for active operations was passing away, and he had not yet obtained the reinforcements or supplies, which he judged necessary to enable him to enter Catalonia. The Aragonese, who favoured the insurrection of their neighbours, assisted the troops to desert from this unpopular warfare, and so many left their standards, that, though recruits were constantly arriving, the army was never augmented. On the other hand, the Castilians, who were obliged to supply soldiers, and also to

equip them, complained that those who had been provided, returned home in a few days, so that they despaired of ever being able to make up their complement. But the General was chiefly detained by the delay in the arrival of the train of artillery. The ancient art and practice of war had been lost in Spain, and the nation were ignorant, or did not avail themselves of new inventions. They had no proper carriages for the transport of military stores ;—some required to be made, and others to be mended. The mules were obliged to be collected and driven in from the most remote provinces. They had no pioneers or miners. There was a total deficiency in the *materiel* of warfare, and in all things required, or at that time used, for a siege. Cranes, engines, hand-grenades, bombs, mortars, anvils, scaling-ladders, were all wanting. Some essential articles were shortly expected from England, some from Holland, and others had to be sought in remote corners of Spain. In the mean time, winter was approaching ; and at the commencement of that unfavourable season, the Spanish General, ill provided with stores, and supported by an army far inferior to his expectations, marched out from Saragossa. He first advanced to Alcaniz in Aragon, and thence entered, at Uldicon, the province of Catalonia, of which he had now been appointed Viceroy and Captain-General.

Meanwhile the Cortes of Catalonia, and a Deputation of three members, representing the church, the nobility, and the communities, to whom the executive government was intrusted, assembled in Barcelona. At the meetings of the Cortes, many declamations were uttered against the cruelty of the soldiers, and oppression of the ministry, and, while acknowledging the natural clemency of their king, it was observed that the virtues of a monarch, when not exercised, are like wealth buried in the depths of the

ocean. A great majority of the members of the Cortes declared in favour of an immediate appeal to arms. The Bishop of Urgel attempted to inspire more moderate counsels into the assembly, and particularly to create a distrust of French assistance, on which the Catalans now began to place strong reliance. But the inflammatory harangues of the Deputy Claris, bore down all opposition. Preparations for resistance were vigorously commenced, and an envoy was forthwith despatched to implore immediate succour from the King of France, whose ministry in consequence agreed to send a reinforcement of 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry.

Los Velez having written to the deputation, to inform them of his appointment as Viceroy of Catalonia, received for answer, that he might find it hazardous to enter their province, either armed or unarmed; that the king had nominated the Bishop of Barcelona to be their Viceroy, —that they had not sought for another, and that, in such dangerous times, frequent changes of governors were injurious to the interests of the principality.

Having received this reply, which he interpreted as a defiance, Los Velez proceeded to Tortosa, where he established his head-quarters, and where all those in the province, who still maintained their professions of loyalty, repaired as to a rendezvous. Here he mustered his army, which he found amounted to 23,000 infantry, and 3500 cavalry, and was also attended by a train of 24 pieces of artillery.

According to the concerted plan of the campaign, Los Velez ought now to have advanced, through the province, to Barcelona, but as he considered the circuitous route by Valencia more level than that by which he was himself to march, he sent the artillery round in that direction. The ground, however, having been already saturated by the rains of the season, the whole train, in

consequence, stuck fast in a road which led through the marshes of Valencia, and only a few pieces could be extricated after great delay and enormous expense.

In the depth of winter, Los Velez marched out from Tortosa, with his whole army, in the direction of Barcelona. He advanced for some distance along the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied all the important positions on the way to Tarragona, a city which he had to pass before reaching the capital of the province. The inhabitants of Barcelona, greatly alarmed, and conscious that their preparations were as yet altogether inadequate to resist such a force as that brought against them by Los Velez, sent an express to Espenan, the Governor of Leucate, who still hovered near the frontiers with the French force destined for their assistance. He immediately advanced with his troops, and was joyfully received within the walls of Barcelona. Having restored some degree of confidence in that city, and hastened on the levies, he proceeded with his chief force to Tarragona, whither it was now fully understood that the army of Los Velez was marching.

It was at the assault on Cambrils and other places on the route to Tarragona, that the Spanish soldiers committed those excesses, which some historians, particularly the French, have painted in such strong colours. There seems, however, to be much injustice in attributing all the atrocities they perpetrated to their commander Los Velez. Cambrils was long besieged, and the troops had suffered severely from fatigue and famine during its investment. Their spirits had been sustained by the hopes of its plunder, which they would have earned had it been carried by assault. It surrendered, however, at discretion, and it was arranged that those citizens who had borne arms, and who in fact were nearly the whole male inhabitants, should march out on the day after the treaty of capitulation was

concluded. Los Velez seems to have employed every precaution for their safety, and to have used every endeavour to allay the disappointment felt by the soldiery at being deprived of the plunder of the town. But it was found impossible to prevent some of the disorderly troops from crowding round the inhabitants at their egress. A dragoon, more daring or rapacious than his companions, attempted to pull from one of the citizens of Cambrils, the cloak which he wore. Its owner resisted, and in the struggle, drew a cutlass, with which he severely wounded his antagonist. A comrade of the trooper, in chastisement of the citizen's audacity, having inflicted on him several wounds with a knife, the alarmed inhabitants attempted to escape in every direction. Some dragoons, who had not been present at the commencement of the affray, drew their swords, in order to arrest their flight. A cry of treason and treachery spread among the soldiery, who were ready to seize any pretext for violence and pillage. A general massacre of the inhabitants forthwith ensued. The officers repaired to the scene of tumult, but were too late to restrain the violence of their troops. Seven hundred of the unfortunate citizens had already been butchered, with circumstances of peculiar atrocity. Los Velez, when he heard of this bloody occurrence, came forth from his quarters on horseback ; but, seeing the immense number of the slain, returned in affliction and despondency to his tent, and expressed his regret in the strongest terms—declaring that he would not have suffered so much had he seen his own sons slaughtered before his eyes.¹ In the vain hope of concealing the disgraceful transaction, the dead bodies were speedily interred, and

¹ Palabras (says Libertino) que yo escrivo con entera fê, aviendolas oydo de su boca ; y mi hallo obligado a escrivillas por la gran diferencia con que algunos papeles (de los que se han hecho publicos) hablan d'este caso. (*Movim. lib. iv.*)

the blood was covered up. But the memory of the massacre at Cambrils long remained in Catalonia.

It may be more difficult to exculpate Los Velez in the military executions which followed this sanguinary scene. He was attended, in his campaign, by some blood-thirsty judges, appointed by Olivarez, who carried to the camp the spirit of severity which actuated the administration, and showed the Catalans that the rigours of law might equal, if not exceed, the ravages of military despotism. Anxious to display their loyalty, and ingratiate themselves with the Court from which they had received their commissions, they followed the progress of the army, and consigned to the cord or the axe those whom the sword had spared. At Cambrils, the magistrates of the town, which, as we have seen, had surrendered at discretion, were put to death, without even the form of a trial—without notice of the charges against them, or hearing them in defence. They were privately strangled in the evening of that day during which so many of their fellow-citizens had been massacred by the soldiery. On the following morning their dead bodies were seen suspended from the ramparts, with their former badges of magisterial office. The Castilian soldiers, who, the day before, had slain in a fray 700 of the citizens, beheld with horror, and detestation, this cold-blooded judicial murder.

If Los Velez did not prompt or demand these sentences, he at least did not attempt to restrain or mitigate the cruelty of those by whom they were pronounced. Almost every village beheld the execution of some of its wretched inhabitants, and wherever the army marched, the province was strewn with the mangled limbs of its patriots. The execution of the Baron of Roccaforte was accounted one of the cruelest and most unjustifiable acts of Los Velez, during this stage of his career. The brother of that nobleman afterwards defied him to mortal

combat, and on his not appearing, published a manifesto, in which he declared, that he would beat out his brains though in presence of the King.¹ Even when their lives were spared, the inhabitants of the captured towns were branded with red-hot iron,² or sent without discrimination to the gallies, for the remainder of their days. The loyal were frequently involved in punishment with the disaffected, and never had contest so frightfully assumed the character of a war which was only to end by extermination.

From the bloody scenes of Cambrils, Los Velez marched on, through a rich and fertile valley, to the fortified town of Tarragona, which was at that time the second in the province. He was but ill provided with means for its attack: But Espenan, the French commander, who had recently entered its walls, was still worse prepared to defend it. Many of the inhabitants had little disposition for resistance, and being divided into factions, some were for returning to their allegiance, while others were bent on maintaining their faith to the Republic. There was a total want of ammunition, forage, and all warlike stores. Though the town was of great extent, the garrison was small, and of the troops promised by the deputies of Barcelona, only one regiment of 800 men had as yet arrived. Espenan conceived, that, as an officer, he was not bound to defend a town in such a hopeless predicament, since no one was called on to do more for others than they did for themselves. However, he sent a messenger to Barcelona, who was commissioned to express his readiness to stand a siege, provided that adequate means for defence were supplied to him. The republican government, in consequence of its limited resources, or its belief that these might be employed more advantageously than in the pro-

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. p. 3.

² Le Clerc, *Vie de Richelieu*, t. ii.

tection of Tarragona, returned such an answer to Espenan, that he perceived the deputies had made up their minds to the loss of the city, though they could not bring themselves to consent in words to its surrender. He, accordingly, sent out one of his officers to treat with the Spanish General, who had the art to draw up his troops, on the acclivity of a hill sloping towards the city, ranged in such a manner, that the army appeared well equipped and formidable. It was agreed between the French officer and the Duke of St George, in name of their respective commanders, that Espenan, and whatever troops he had brought with him from France, should dislodge from the city; that whatever French soldiers might be stationed between Tarragona and Barcelona, should retire northward to the frontiers of their own country, and that he himself should thenceforth neither defend in person, nor by his troops, any place entrusted to him by the republican deputation. Deprived of the assistance of their French allies, the magistracy sent in their submission to the Spanish General, who entered the town with his army the same evening on which Espenan commenced his route to France.

Soon after the occupation of Tarragona, the strength of Los Velez was augmented by some artillery, which arrived from Majorca; and he was also joined by Juan de Garay, the governor of Roussillon. But he brought none of his troops along with him, as the aspect of affairs in his province appeared, as he alleged, so threatening, that he could not withdraw any part of his force without endangering the safety of his government.

Hitherto the career of Los Velez, though everywhere marked with blood, had been rapidly successful, and after his entrance into Tarragona, had been the subject of great rejoicings. The intelligence, however, which there reached him, of the revolution of Portugal, first threw a distant

cloud over his future prospects. It diminished his chance of reinforcements—it taught Catalonia, what a nation, not much more powerful than itself, could achieve, in the cause of freedom, against a strong oppressor, and it seemed to portend the signal ruin and overthrow which awaited himself in his attempt for the establishment of despotism.

It will be remembered, that it formed part of the plan of the campaign, that a force should enter Catalonia on the north, by Urgel, and that an army of reserve should remain in Aragon. But, from the deficiency in the expected levies, almost the whole troops that could be assembled had marched with Los Velez to Tortosa. The Duke of Noxera had advanced with some men, subsequently collected, to Fraga, a town between Balbastros and Monçon; but a quarrel having arisen between him and his Camp-master-general, the Prior of Navarre, he proceeded no farther, and, on pretence of the want of adequate supplies, remained inactive during the whole campaign. Though thus disappointed, on every hand, of that co-operation which he trusted he should obtain on his arrival before Barcelona, Los Velez still resolved to prosecute his design on that city. Leaving a small garrison in Tarragona, he accordingly marched forward to Martorell, and on his route was abundantly supplied with all sorts of provisions in the valley of Villafranca, the most fertile district of all Catalonia.

The intelligence of the speedy surrender of Tarragona, though not altogether unlooked for, was received at Barcelona with dismay. In this dilemma, the revolutionary government first attempted to induce Espenan to delay his retreat. But, either from fidelity to his capitulation, or dislike of the cause in which he was engaged, he hurried on to France. As a last resource, it was resolved to employ every effort in order to arrest the progress of the enemy at Martorell, which was considered in the light of an

outwork of Barcelona, and the only tenable hold by which they could ward off the royal army from the gates of the city. The place was surrounded by a river, and was guarded by some strong passes among the mountains, so it was hoped it might be maintained against the advancing foe.

The chief command at Barcelona was at this time held by Tamarit, the deputy or representative of the class of nobility, who, in consequence of the increasing danger, had been summoned to Barcelona from the station he held in Roussillon; and he had now both to teach his countrymen the art of war, and to learn it amongst them in this crisis of their fate.

As the sole hope of the Catalans rested on the successful defence of Martorell, the deputy Tamarit resolved that all the armed inhabitants who could leave Barcelona, should proceed under his own command to this important position, and that Josef Margarit, who is said to have been at one time a leader or chief of a band of assassins, but acted in the sequel such a conspicuous part in the insurrection, should harass the Spaniards in the rear, and, if possible, retake those towns which they had now left behind them. The part of the plan assigned to Margarit was successfully performed, and though he could not venture on laying siege to Tarragona, he recovered some smaller towns. But his colleague Tamarit was not so fortunate, though, at his mandate, even the clergy and friars of Barcelona had sallied forth along with the citizens, and advanced to the defence of Martorell. That place was now attacked in one quarter by the troops under the command of the Marquis of Torrecusa, while Los Velez in person harassed the garrison, by drawing it out, and engaging with it in skirmishes in different directions. The commander of some French troops within Martorell early proposed a capitulation, and Tamarit was not slow in acceding to his opinion. He had

discovered, on trial, that Martorell ought not to be the theatre of a last despairing effort, and that the final stand must be made at Barcelona. But the Spanish troops had already advanced within gunshot of the fortifications, and there was no longer time even to propose a surrender. Los Velez took advantage of the impression which had been made by Torrecusa. The town was assaulted and carried—the soldiers rushed in along with the retreating Catalans, and spared neither sex nor age. Los Velez was proprietor of the town, and derived from it one of his titles, and having in consequence expected greater compliance, he felt proportionally exasperated at the resistance which he had encountered. He remained a day at Martorell, to recruit his army, exhausted with fight and pillage; and, before marching on Barcelona, the road to which was now open, he called a council of war, chiefly that he might have the advice of the Justiciary Monsuar, to whom he had been indebted for the surrender of Tortosa, and of Antonio de Alarcon, a member of the royal council of Castile, who, by order of Olivarez, attended the army as a spy on Los Velez, and watched all the military movements. At this meeting the Spanish General received considerable aid from the intelligence communicated by the governor of Monjuich, who, on the preceding evening, had abandoned that citadel of Barcelona, and deserted to the royal army. Los Velez produced to the general officers whom he had summoned letters from the king and his minister, urging a vigorous prosecution of the war, and the speedy investment of Barcelona. These documents were no sooner read, than the members of this military council, though they knew the strength of Barcelona and its garrison, as also the broken and diminished state of their own army—though they were fully aware of the difficulty of retreat through such a province in the event of disaster, and what little pro-

spect they had of reinforcements, were unanimously of opinion that they should advance that night to Sans, about half a league from Barcelona.

Los Velez now sent his last cartel to that city, summoning the inhabitants to surrender, and return to their obedience. At this time the perturbation was great at Barcelona. But though the citizens were much discouraged by their recent misfortunes, they resolved to endure every extremity rather than submit to a conqueror, who had exercised such cruelties on their countrymen at Cambrils and Martorell. They accordingly rejected the proposals of the Spanish commander with scorn and indignation, and absolutely refused to treat with him, unless he first withdrew his army from the province. So far, indeed, were they from acceding to them, that they now, for the first time, deliberately renounced their allegiance to Philip; but, distrusting their power to defend themselves, and having hitherto found only hollow and ineffectual support as the allies of France, they chose Louis XIII. for their sovereign, under the title of Count of Barcelona, the appellation under which their rulers in the Gothic ages had been appointed by the Carlovingian dynasty of France.

His plan of attack was now formed by Los Velez.—The town of Barcelona is commanded by the fortress of Monjuich, which was at that time a tower on the summit of a hill of the same name, about 1000 paces distant from the city. Its occupation was, of course, an object of primary importance. Accordingly a large division of the army was destined for the service. This body again was separated into two bands. One was ordered to ascend the hill of Monjuich, on the side which slopes towards the plain; while the other, consisting chiefly of an Irish brigade under Lord Tyrone, was directed to commence the attack on the opposite side, which inclines towards the

city of Barcelona. The execution of the enterprise was entrusted to the Marques of Torrecusa ; and his son the Duke of St George supported him with a considerable force stationed near the foot of the mountain. The remainder of the army, under Juan Garay, was drawn up facing the city, in such form as the ground admitted. Los Velez, to encourage his soldiers, made a harangue to as many as could hear him, offering high rewards to the soldiers who should first plant the banners of Castile on the heights of Monjuich. The troops then proceeded to occupy the positions allotted to them, in excellent order, and with much of the pomp and circumstance of war.

Nor were the citizens of Barcelona remiss on their part in providing for defence. Their care was chiefly directed to the succour and reinforcement of Monjuich, the command of which was confided to a French officer named D'Aubigné. Josef Margarit occupied Montserrat and other passes in the rear of the royal army, in order to prevent farther supplies from reaching it ; and the deputy Tamarit, who had escaped from the disasters at Martorell, commanded in the city. As soon as the hated Castilians were descried from its walls, he harangued the citizens, extolling their strength, and depreciating the power of the enemy.

As had been arranged, the Spanish troops began to ascend Monjuich, and some skirmishing commenced on the slope and skirts of the hill, in the course of which Lord Tyrone was killed. The Duke of St George, who was one of the most brave and popular young noblemen in the Spanish service, and who now, from the plain below, gallantly supported the ascending party, was mortally wounded at the head of his troops, in a skirmish with some French cavalry which came out from the town to reconnoitre. Nevertheless, the Spaniards, though many of them were slain by discharges of artillery directed from

the summit of Monjuich, gradually ascended the hill, and some had nearly reached the eminence. The fort was now closely surrounded by the Castilian banners, and the garrison, alarmed for the event, made signals, as previously concerted, to the city for succour. Every inhabitant of Barcelona showed himself eager to be the first who should march to the relief of the fortress, and a chosen band of 2000 musketeers was promptly despatched by a subterranean passage which communicated between the city and Monjuich. Torrecusa encouraged his men as much as possible; but though they were now immediately below the walls of the fort, they could not attack or scale it for want of ladders and other necessary implements, with which they were altogether unprovided. Torrecusa despatched repeated messages to the Marques Xeli, General of Artillery, to supply him with those essential articles; but the troops meanwhile, in waiting for them, remained exposed to the batteries of the fortress. While in this dilemma, and while the Castilian soldiers yet stood firm, though very ready for flight, a Catalonian serjeant called out from the ramparts that *they ran*. At this cry, a small party rushed impetuously from the fort, and carried all before them. Believing that the whole garrison was falling on them, the Spaniards at the top, throwing away their arms, hurried down the declivity of the mountain, and in their rapid flight overwhelmed, or bore along with them, their comrades who were stationed farther down the hill. The officers, losing all authority, could no longer restrain them, and the confusion became inextricable. The whole garrison of Monjuich then rushed out, and slew the Castilian soldiers in their flight, almost without resistance. The Marques of Torrecusa, seeing the total discomfiture of his men, and hearing, at the same time, that his son, the Duke of St George, was mortally wounded, cast away, in a transport of despair, the ensign of

command ; and, indeed, no orders which he issued would have been now obeyed.

Los Velez, who was with that portion of the army which had been drawn up before the city, hearing that Torrecusa had thus relinquished the command, called Garay before him, and, in this extremity, entrusted him with the sole direction. That military adventurer had differed from Los Velez in opinion as to the original plan of the campaign, and hitherto had rather contributed to retard and frustrate, than to aid, the plans of the General, and he had only a few hours since refused assistance to the Duke of St George. But now the remains of the Spanish army were indebted to his exertions and presence of mind for salvation. He marched off the infantry stationed before Barcelona with all despatch, in an opposite direction from Monjuich,—he interposed the whole mass of cavalry between them and the disordered troops who were rushing towards them from the hill, calling “Fly, fly,”—and he issued instructions to sabre them if they attempted to advance. He then gave orders that each of the fugitives should repair by a circuitous route to the standard of his regiment, which was displayed at some distance from the present scene of tumult and disorder. Garay thus succeeded, by incredible exertions, in bringing round to their banners many of those fugitives who would otherwise not only have perished themselves, but would have involved in ruin the rest of the army ; and having formed them into a band, he united them to the main body of infantry which had marched off from before Barcelona, and was now in retreat towards Sans.

Had the citizens of Barcelona availed themselves instantly of the favourable opportunity presented to them, the destruction of the Spanish army might probably have been completed ; but, content with the triumph obtained

by the deliverance of Monjuich, they did not farther prosecute their advantages.

Some order being now restored in the Spanish army, its chiefs, with exception of Torrecusa, assembled in their quarters at Sans, to which they had retreated; and, taking into consideration their deplorable situation, with forces diminished by more than 3000 men, with the loss of 4000 stand of arms, a deficiency of provisions and all supplies, they were unanimously of opinion that they ought to retire as speedily as possible to Tarragona, and there await the farther orders of their king. This retreat was accordingly commenced, and was carried into effect without much farther molestation from the Catalonians.¹ Los Velez addressed a letter to the King from Tarragona, relating his disaster, imploring clemency, and resigning his command. He was almost immediately afterwards appointed ambassador to Rome, where he was chiefly engaged in that singular scene of intrigue and violence, to which the Court of Spain resorted in order to prevent the reception of a Portuguese envoy at the Vatican. From Rome he was sent as Viceroy to Sicily, where his cruelty, which seems to have been aggravated by age and misfortune, drove the inhabitants to insurrection a short while before his death, which happened in 1648.² The Marques of Torrecusa, who had violated, on Monjuich, every duty of an officer and a soldier, was still permitted to serve successively both in Portugal³ and Catalonia. He in some measure, however, redeemed his character at the close of life; for, having been sent to command the Nea-

¹ Camargo, the Spanish continuator of Mariana's History, says, that Los Velez after he had come in sight of Barcelona retired to Tarragona.

² Camargo, *Sumario Anadido a la Hist. de Mariana*.

³ Colmenar, *Annales d'Espagne et Portugal*, t. i. p. 242.

politan troops destined for the relief of Orbitello when invested by the French, he compelled them to raise the siege, and expired, at the age of seventy, in the moment of success.¹

In Catalonia the Prince of Botero, at that time Viceroy of Valencia, was appointed successor to Los Velez. He established his government at Tarragona, which was besieged soon after his nomination. The French General La Mothe-Houdancourt and the Catalans advanced against it by land, and the Archbishop of Bordeaux, who commanded the gallies in the Mediterranean, blockaded it with his fleet. It could not, however, be so completely enclosed, but that the inhabitants and garrison received occasional supplies of provisions; and, on one occasion, the Duke of Maqueda availed himself of an opportunity of throwing into it abundant stores. The Archbishop of Bordeaux, who had all along despaired of success, now dreading an assault from a superior Spanish fleet which had appeared off the harbour, put out to sea, and sailed for the coast of Provence.² On the secession of the naval armament, La Mothe-Houdancourt retired from before the city to the positions which he had previously occupied.³ Botero had died during the siege, in consequence of his wounds and the fatigue he had sustained,⁴ and was shortly afterwards succeeded in the viceroyalty by the Marques of Leganez, who had been recalled from Italy in order to fill that situation.

By this time the Syndics of all the different towns in Catalonia had assembled, and though their original design, when first resisting the aggressions of the King of Spain, had been to erect their principality into an independent republic, they unanimously followed the example of Barcelona, and, with the exception of Balaguers,

¹ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. 14.

² Aubery, *Mem. de Richelieu*.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. i. lib. 2.

⁴ Ibid.

which was in consequence declared rebellious by the deputies, they took an oath of fidelity and allegiance to Louis. From this time Margarit directed the chief proceedings of the revolutionary government, supported by a French army under La Mothe-Houdancourt.

The intelligence which the King of Spain received of the cruelties that had been perpetrated in Catalonia, and the unprosperous result of these sanguinary measures, visibly affected his health and spirits. Grief and shame produced a malady which had nearly brought him to the tomb. But his youth, the excellence of his constitution, and the hopes of better success from a change of measures and the appointment of a new viceroy, relumed the lamp of life.

In the commencement of the year 1642, the Spanish Court published a general amnesty in favour of the Catalans, and proclaimed the restoration of their national privileges on their laying down arms and returning to obedience. This document was in some degree apologetic. His majesty alleges, that his commands had been misunderstood by those who were commissioned to execute them, and that as soon as he had learned the real causes of complaint, he had done every thing in his power to apply a remedy. He engages to remove the grievance of soldiers being quartered on the inhabitants, and he promises that the Magistracy of Barcelona should, in future, cover themselves in the royal presence, in the same manner as the Grandees of Spain.¹ This tardy show of moderation, which was now attributed to weakness and not to clemency, only served to fortify the resolution of the rebels, and to augment their desire of vengeance.

The insurrection of Catalonia was considered of so much importance by the enemies of Spain, that Louis

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. i.

XIII. advanced in person to support it, at the head of a powerful army. On his march towards the Pyrenees, he entered Roussillon, and his Generals laid siege to Colioura, which was at that time defended by the Marques of Mortara, now Governor of Roussillon.¹ Olivarez immediately conceived the design of succouring it, and appointed the Marques of Pobar to command the expedition destined for its relief. The minister was assured by those who were versed in military affairs, that this was impracticable, and the Marques remonstrated against it, as he would have to march all the way from Tarragona through a difficult and hostile country. But the eagerness usually felt to fulfil the wishes of a powerful favourite, induced many officers, and some persons of distinction, to tender their services, though they were aware that the expedition was extremely hazardous. They were attacked and defeated in the neighbourhood of Villafranca by some French troops under La Mothe-Houdancourt. The remainder of their force being beset by the Miquelets under Margarit, who had occupied all the positions on their route, and being entangled in an impassable country, from which the peasantry had conveyed away every thing that could serve for sustenance, those who escaped destruction from the musket and cutlass of their foes, were obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The King, in a proclamation which he issued to the provinces of Spain, on occasion of this disaster, says, “that the Marques of Pobar had engaged the enemy contrary to express orders;” but as he was precluded from retreat, he had probably no other means of avoiding famine than the chance of a successful combat.

Colioura having thus obtained no relief, speedily surrendered; and this entrance having been made into Roussillon, the King of France advanced in person from Nar-

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. i.

bonne, where he had established his head quarters, to the siege of Perpignan. But he shortly afterwards retired for his health to the baths of Bezieres, leaving the command of the troops before Perpignan to Mareschals Meilleraye and Schomberg. About the same period, La Mothe-Houdancourt was appointed the French Viceroy and captain-general of Catalonia, and Margarit was nominated to act in that capacity at Barcelona during his absence. This deputy had ingratiated himself with the French court during a recent embassy to Paris from the citizens of Barcelona. He received many marks of esteem and distinction, and, among other favours, his brother was raised to the bishopric of Lerida.¹

The intelligence of the disasters in Catalonia occasioned the greatest alarm at Madrid. There was no Spanish army to oppose the farther progress of the enemy, or to prevent his advance to the capital. It was in vain that the King recalled his native troops from Germany and the Netherlands, or attempted to bring foreign levies from these regions. So great was the dislike to the service, on account of the Catalonians granting no quarter, that the soldiers chose to suffer any punishment rather than join an army which was intended to act against such ferocious enemies. Accordingly, the troops destined for this duty, were bound hand and foot, and dragged on board vessels, in order to be transported to the fatal scene of action. Those who were thus reluctantly driven to the war, deserted if an opportunity offered, while those who were compelled to remain, being depressed by apprehension, sunk under the diseases of the climate, or perished by the sword of the unrelenting foe.

¹ Aubery, *Mem. de Richelieu*, t. ii.

CHAPTER VII.

DISGRACE OF OLIVAREZ.

And power too great to keep or to resign.

JOHNSON.

IN consequence of the unfortunate result of events in Catalonia, the kingdom was now left almost without resource. Had it not been that the Castilians hated the Catalans, and were desirous that their privileges should be abridged, in order that the national burdens might fall less heavily on themselves, the disgrace of Olivarez would, in all likelihood, have immediately followed the disasters of Los Velez. But the sad intelligence which was now almost daily received at the capital, exasperated as well as alarmed both the Grandees of Castile and the citizens of Madrid. The latter inveighed bitterly against the minister as the prime cause of all these misfortunes ; and in their rage, they did not even spare the King. One day, while his Majesty was setting out on a wolf-hunt, they called aloud in his hearing, that he should rather give chace to the French, who were the wolves most likely to devour them. There was some spirit in this exhortation, in so far as it manifested a disposition for resistance rather than submission, and the King took the hint, though thus unceremoniously given. Ashamed and confounded that his people should have thus required to remind him of his duty, Philip, who was at least an ad-

mirable letter-writer, addressed an epistle¹ to Olivarez on the state of Spain. He then immediately summoned a general council, at which he ordered the attendance of the Marquis de Grana, the Austrian envoy, who at present possessed that sort of influence at the court of Madrid which the French ambassador maintained after the accession of the Bourbon line. The King's inclinations led him to proceed to Aragon or Catalonia, in order to show himself to the troops; and the opinion of the Marquis supported this design. But Olivarez,² who was followed by all the other members of the council, attempted to dissuade him from a scheme which they represented as wild and hazardous. The selfish and suspicious minister, fearing lest some Grandee of Aragon, or surviving officer of the royal army in Catalonia, might open the King's eyes on the errors of his administration, strongly represented to him the danger to which he should expose his person, by entering a province infested with rebels, and overrun with enemies. For the first time since his accession, Philip formed a resolution contrary to the advice of his favourite; and shortly afterwards, while his Majesty was engaged with his private secretary, the Count-Duke was refused that admittance to the royal presence which had

¹ "Una lettera," says Siri, "per eccellenza di stile e di concetti stimata la più bella che possa uscire da ingenio humano."—*Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. i.

² This debate seems to be portrayed by Quevedo, in his *Fortuna con Seso*, under guise of the King of England discussing in Parliament, whether he should place himself at the head of his troops. The person who advises him against it is evidently meant for Olivarez, "An old decrepid senator, whose grisly clotted beard covered all his breast, his head hanging down, and the hunch of his back, through age, rising above it, lifting himself up by help of a staff, said," &c. Quevedo had been alternately patronised and persecuted by Olivarez. Latterly, he had been imprisoned for lampooning that minister, and was only set at liberty on his disgrace.

never before been denied him. Olivarez was in consequence sensibly mortified and alarmed. But instead of facilitating, as would now have been his wisest course, the preparations for the royal journey, he farther displeased his master, by purposely withholding the funds which were necessary for his departure. When these were at length procured, Philip set out, with no great splendour or retinue, accompanied by Olivarez, the Marques of Carpio, and a few attendants. The minister was observed to look gloomy and thoughtful, and, on entering the coach, which took them from Madrid, the King was overheard to say to him, that he might come or stay behind as he chose.¹

Finding that his arguments had failed, and that all efforts to detain his master at Madrid had proved ineffectual, Olivarez resolved to protract the journey as much as possible, and during its progress to shut out from the royal ear the voice of truth. Nearly a month was spent in travelling to Aranjuez, and lingering in that delightful abode. The minister next found means to detain his Majesty during the whole month of June at Cuenca, where he procured for him the pleasures of the chase, and all manner of amusements; and he contrived a yet farther delay at Molina in Aragon. A troop of comedians provided by the Count-Duke attended him in his tardy progress, which resembled rather a party of pleasure or rural excursion than the march of a sovereign to his army. At one of the places where he stopped in his way a courier arrived, on his route to Madrid with a packet for Olivarez, which contained also a letter to the King from the General commanding in Catalonia. His Majesty opened all the despatches: in the letter intended for his own eye everything was represented as in the most prosperous condition, while in that to Olivarez, there were loud complaints

¹ Ó venis ó quedaos, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. ii.

that he had been left without troops, money, or provisions, and, in consequence, had been obliged to remain an idle spectator of the progress of the French arms.¹

When the King at length arrived at Saragossa, Olivarez arrested his progress by alarming him with the risk of captivity by the French, should he venture to proceed farther. From the windows of the ancient palace of the kings of Aragon, he beheld his towns destroyed with fire and sword by the French and Catalans, who, having no longer enemies to contend with in Catalonia, had burst into the plains of Aragon under their General La Mothe Houdancourt, and, shortly before Philip's arrival, had possessed themselves of the important town of Monçon. During the whole expedition, however, Philip was so beset by Olivarez and his creatures, that no one could venture to carry an accusation against the minister, nor could any of the *Grandeos*, who had accompanied the King, obtain a private audience.

Like other nations in their decline, the Spaniards had long trusted more to the weakness and dissensions of their enemies, than to their own strength or conduct; and Olivarez, whose crooked policy always led him to deal in conspiracies and intricate machinations,² consoled his sovereign amid the lamentable sights which he witnessed from Saragossa, by the hope that Cinqmars, the favourite of Louis XIII, would, with his associates De Thou and the Duke de Bouillon, speedily raise a considerable portion of France in insurrection against the inordinate power of Richelieu. A treaty for this purpose had been concluded between Olivarez and Cinqmars, by the terms of which it was stipulated that if the insurrection proved

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. ii.

² And now, as oft in some distempered state,
On one nice trick depends the general fate.—*Pope*.

fortunate, Louis should be compelled to grant peace to Spain and the rest of Europe on equitable terms. The treaty was negotiated by Fontrailles at Madrid, in name of the Duke of Orleans, but the Pope's Nuncio in that capital, who frequently observed the envoy of the conspirators in the anti-chamber of Olivarez, communicated his suspicions to Richelieu, and some one shortly afterwards actually sent him a copy. This confirmation of the guilt of Cinqmars was laid before Louis, who did not scruple to give up his favourite to the vengeance of his minister.

This conspiracy was most unfortunate for Spain, since Olivarez, trusting to succeed by such underhand proceedings, arrested, by a positive order, the farther progress of Francisco de Melo, the Governor of the Netherlands, who, having routed the Count de Guiche on the frontiers of France, had opened a way to Paris, and was on his march to that capital at the head of 25,000 men. It is also alleged by some writers, that Louis had about this time resolved to conclude a peace without the consent of Richelieu; but that, incensed at the bad faith of the Spaniards in thus exciting plots even in the interior of his palace, he now issued orders for the prosecution of the war with renewed vigour and activity.

The insurrection of Catalonia had been considered of so much importance by the enemies of Spain, that Louis XIII. had advanced in person, as we have seen,¹ to support it at the head of a powerful army. He was in Narbonne at the time of the execution of Cinqmars, and had marched to the siege of Perpignan, while the King of Spain was still in Saragossa. Every plan devised for the relief of the important capital of Roussillon proved ineffectual, and indeed Olivarez, who now felt himself tottering in his place, was at this time chiefly occupied in withhold-

¹ See above, p. 324.

ing from the royal presence the Cardinal Trivulzio, and one of the Princes of Tuscany, who had arrived in Spain in order to represent to the King the gross mismanagement of affairs in Italy, in consequence of the appointment of Sirvela, a creature of the Count-Duke's, to the government of Milan. Perpignan, pressed by famine, at length capitulated after a blockade of three months, and, by its capture, opened to the French an access into the heart of the Spanish monarchy. As the chief magazine too for the frontiers of Spain, this capital of Roussillon possessed extensive stores of ammunition and artillery, and was, indeed, considered at the time as one of the most complete arsenals in Europe. Stands of arms for 20,000 men, and more than 200 pieces of cannon, with an immense quantity of all sorts of military stores and implements, fell into the hands of the enemy.¹

Philip showed much affliction at this disaster; but Olivarez, as at the revolution of Portugal, assumed an air of gaiety, and pretended to regard the loss of Perpignan as a fortunate event, since the French having gained what was all along their chief object, would now doubtless abandon the Catalans to their fate.²

The capture of Salsas, and the occupation of the whole of Roussillon, quickly followed the surrender of Perpignan, and thus the object of Richelieu was accomplished, who judged that the possession of that province was necessary to facilitate the transport of succours from France to Catalonia. The continuation of such successes by the united French and Catalonian forces, excited apprehensions for the capital of the monarchy, as there was no army, and but few fortresses, to oppose to the incursions of a victorious and irritated enemy. Olivarez could no longer preserve his lately assumed gaiety, or even his

¹ Griffet, *Hist. de Louis XIII*, t. iii. p. 545.

² *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. iii.

usual equanimity. He fell at the King's feet, and embracing his knees, besought leave to retire, or an appointment to some command in which he might have an early opportunity of laying down his life. The King himself never left the palace, except to perform some act of devotion in the public churches, and took little recreation except gazing from his windows at the stream of the Ebro, and at the popular amusements of the inhabitants of Saragossa on its waters.¹

At this crisis the Queen, who was the sister of her husband's most implacable foe, alone preserved any degree of courage and firmness. This princess is said to have had more resemblance in character to her father Henry IV. than any others of his children, and her spirit, like that of her sister Henrietta, rose on great and trying occasions. To save the state, she employed eloquence, caresses, and tears, with the Grandees and the intimidated people. The names of king and country, once so dear and sacred to the Castilian, had still, in the mouth of a Queen so much respected and beloved, the most powerful effect on the spirit of the nation. Each Spaniard vied with another in contributing funds, in supplying provisions, and enrolling themselves under the standard of their Queen. The Count of Monterey alone, and at his own expense, raised and equipped 800 horsemen, chiefly hidalgos of Castile. By means of such exertions, her Majesty, in less than a month, was enabled to raise an army of 40,000 men, whom she marched forward to her disheartened husband at Saragossa.²

That prince, still consulting only the wishes of Olivarez, confided the command of this last hope of the Spanish monarchy to the Marques Leganez, who was nearly related to the minister, and descended from a younger

¹ *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. iii.

² Desormeaux, *Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne*.

branch of the family of Guzman. He had been recently recalled from Italy, and ordered to remain at Valencia till some investigation was held concerning the complaints which had been preferred against him by the Princes of Savoy. But he was now summoned to Saragossa, and placed at the head of apparently one of the finest armies which Spain had ever sent into the field. Such, however, was his dilatory temper, that the King found great difficulty in persuading him to march out with it from Saragossa, though the French were making daily progress; and when he at length took the field he only proceeded as far as Villa Mayor, at the distance of three leagues, where, under various pretexts, his troops halted for several days. At last being furnished with every thing he demanded in the way of supplies, and having also obtained for himself the promise of ample rewards in anticipation of success, he proceeded forward to Fraga.¹ It was the object of Leganez to unite himself with the army of the Marques of Torrecusa, who again held a command in Catalonia, and, having effected this junction, to advance to the siege of Lerida, which was at this time occupied by the enemy. On the other hand, it was the aim of the French General La Mothe (who had been recently reinforced by the troops employed in the blockade of Salsas) to cover and protect Lerida, and if possible to intercept the army of Torrecusa on the plains of Urgel, before its junction had been formed with the main body under Leganez. But Torrecusa, having eluded the vigilance of the French with great quickness and dexterity, reached Lerida without loss; and, covetous of renown, he wished to attack the city himself without abiding the tardy movements of Leganez. As a preliminary to this undertaking, he gave orders to the Marques of Innoiosa, his second in command, to occupy a bridge over the Segra. On

¹ *Mercur.* t. ii. lib. iii.

his way to fulfil the duty thus imposed on him, Innoiosa fell in with the Constable of Castile and the Marques of Mortara, who persuaded him that he ought not at present to commence active operations, but should await the arrival of Leganez appointed by the King as captain-general for this enterprise. Innoiosa having returned without acting, explained what had occurred to Torrecusa, who called before him these disobedient officers, and remonstrated with them on their conduct. The Constable, however, and Mortara, who, in common with the other officers of the army, were jealous of Torrecusa, and unwilling to serve under a Neapolitan, persisted in their refusal to commence operations before the arrival of Leganez. Torrecusa, then, in a transport of rage and indignation, cast away the baton which he held in his hand, as he had done on the heights of Monjuich, and, mounting his horse, rode off to some distance from the camp, leaving the command to Innoiosa, who subsequently attempted, but in vain, to persuade him to return. Leganez, hearing of the confusion consequent on this event, accelerated his march with forty pieces of canon and 25,000 troops, who, in their rank, their arms, and equipments, were superior to any which Spain had for half a century sent into the field. He succeeded in joining Torrecusa's army; and, immediately on his arrival, he compelled that General to retire to Saragossa,—protesting to the King that he could not exercise his command so long as Torrecusa remained in the neighbourhood of his camp; and declaring, before his officers, that he would not conquer all France, if it was to be done by the counsels of this Italian.¹ Though disliked by the superior officers, Torrecusa was highly popular among the soldiery, who were greatly dispirited by his departure. Leganez, however, finding himself so superior in numbers, resolved to

¹ Le Clerc, *Vie de Richelieu*, t. ii.

attack the French army, which had at length arrived before Lerida, but amounted only to 12,000 men. La Mothe stationed himself on some heights in a favourable position, and placed his cannon, so that they commanded the narrow paths and defiles by which his enemy required to march to the assault. The Spanish army having advanced in good order, its vanguard attacked and overthrew the French cavalry,—gained the eminence which they had occupied, and took three pieces of cannon. It was the general opinion among his officers, that had Leganez properly availed himself of this advantage, by prosecuting his success, and turning the captured cannon against the enemy, he might have gained the victory. But he lost much time in securing those pieces of artillery he had acquired and in drawing them off the field. This gave the French an opportunity of recovering from their disorder. La Mothe hurried from his left wing, in which quarter he had already repulsed the Spaniards. He brought up a strong body of reserve, and, after a general attack, forced his foes to retire in some confusion to a neighbouring eminence. The French loss was about 500 killed ; that of the Spaniards was not much greater, but all their standards, and many prisoners of rank, were taken, and the retreat from so inferior a foe, was of itself generally accounted as equivalent to a signal defeat, though the General, in his despatches, boasted of a victory, on account of the three pieces of canon. His army was subsequently much diminished by death and desertion, and was so reduced by famine, that the soldiers were compelled to subsist chiefly on asses' flesh. In this situation, Leganez was obliged to relinquish all farther thoughts of the siege of Lerida, and ingloriously to terminate the campaign, by wholly abandoning that district of Catalonia, in which the French now obtained a more secure footing than any they had as yet possessed.¹

¹ *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. iii.

It had been generally expected at Madrid that, with such superiority of force as he commanded, Leganez should have overwhelmed the French, and at once crushed the insurrection in Catalonia. His misconduct and presumption were universally reviled; but the chief indignation fell on Olivarez, who was now condemned as the author of all the national calamities, by his obstinate disposition and injudicious selection of Generals. Yet Leganez, though he now failed whilst warring against the cause of liberty in Catalonia, had, at one time, highly distinguished himself in Italy, where he had saved the Dutchy of Milan, and broken, with small means, a powerful confederacy of despots: and, perhaps, in the present state of the Spanish army, Olivarez might have found it difficult to select a General of greater talents and experience. However this may be, Philip, in order to save his minister, allowed the whole weight of his displeasure to fall on the head of Leganez. He was arrested, and sent a prisoner to Consuegra; but afterwards, on the entreaty of his wife, he was confined to his own house in Madrid, where forty-two charges of cowardice and embezzlement were preferred against him. But the nation was not to be so easily satisfied, and the King, at his return to Madrid from his unfortunate expedition to Saragossa, was assailed by a general outcry for the dismissal of his favourite. Olivarez, struck by the disgrace of his relative Leganez, which seemed to prognosticate his own, became restless and alarmed. The disastrous news from Catalonia were quickly followed by unfavourable intelligence from Italy. In that country, the Spanish influence had been chiefly supported by the Princes of the House of Savoy. They had frequent debates, indeed, with Leganez, but they had still remained faithful to the Spanish alliance. These disputes were continued with his successor Count Sirvela, the present governor of Milan, who

was a devoted creature of the Count-Duke ; and now sent to the Court of Madrid a statement of accounts, by which he made it appear that the Princes of Savoy were largely indebted to Spain, instead of being entitled to those arrears of pensions which they claimed.¹ Sirvela's representations of the existing differences were implicitly believed by Olivarez, who refused to listen to an emissary of the Princes at Madrid, or to receive their letters. Prince Thomas was also bitterly offended at the treatment experienced by his wife the Princess of Carignano, and sister to the Count of Soissons. When he first quitted his own country to enter the Spanish service in the Netherlands, he had sent her with his children to Madrid, as pledges of his fidelity. She now, however, wished to return to her husband, and permission of departure, as also means of conveyance, to Italy, had been repeatedly promised by Olivarez ; but as these were always delayed from time to time, on various pretexts, she privately escaped with her family from Madrid, and, with the view of procuring a passage to Italy, took the road to Valencia. She had not, however, proceeded far, when she was overtaken, and her journey obstructed, under circumstances of great humiliation and indignity.² While the Princes were thus irritated by the treatment they received from the Spanish minister, they were tempted by the most advantageous offers from the Court of France.³ The Cardinal Prince Maurice having obtained a dispensation from the Pope, was allured by the prospect of a marriage with his niece,

¹ Le Clerc, *Vie de Richelieu*, t. ii.

² *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. iii.

³ The conditions for which they chiefly stipulated, give us no very favourable impression of the spirit of Italian Princes and Cardinals in the 17th century.—

“ 1. Que les Roys de France ayant acoustumé de faire des dons aux personnes, qui ont l'honneur de être de leur sang lorsque elles se marient, il espere que sa Majesté usera de sa générosité en son

—the heiress to the weakly boy who at present possessed the dukedom; and as Prince Thomas had originally taken up arms on pretence merely of vindicating the rights of his elder brother, he had no longer grounds for persisting in his hostility to the Dutchess-Dowager. Being thus disgusted, on the one hand, and enticed, on the other, both Princes reconciled themselves to their sister-in-law as regent of the Dutchy, and for ever renounced the Spanish alliance. They then aided in expelling the Spaniards from all those fortresses or towns in Piedmont, and on the frontiers of Milan, which, a few years before, Leganez had gained under their auspices, and by their assistance.¹

endroit, au cas qu'il conclue le mariage proposé avec Mad. la Princesse de Savoye sa niece.

“ 3. Que sa Majesté luy rétablisse la pension de cinquante mil escus qu'elle luy donnoit, laquelle il tire presentement des Espagnols.

“ Qu'il désire sçavoir, si au cas que M. Le Prince Thomas s'accommode avec le Roy, sa Majesté ne le rétablira ses pensions : et, si mariant son fils à la Princesse Yolante, sa Majesté luy acordera les avantages qu'on peut esperer de sa liberalité.” (Aubery, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. ii. p. 833.)

¹ Prince Thomas of Savoy passed the concluding years of his life chiefly at Paris, where he became a devoted retainer of Cardinal Mazarin. In 1649, that minister wished to place him on the throne of Naples, in preference to the Duke of Guise, who engaged in a rash expedition to that kingdom. Prince Thomas supported Mazarin amid all the dissensions of the Fronde; and for a time he acted nominally as the chief adviser of the Queen-Regent, during the Cardinal's temporary retirement from France. His character is thus delineated by the Dutchess de Nemours, who became acquainted with him amid the intrigues which agitated the early years of the reign of Louis XIV.—“ Ce Prince étoit un homme assez pesant lequel avoit néanmoins de très bonnes intentions; et qui savoit la guerre, quoi qu'il y eût toujours été malheureux. D'ailleurs lorsqu'on pouvoit s'appercevoir qu'il avoit du sens, on trouvoit qu'il étoit bon; mais on ne s'en apercevoit pas souvent, parcequ'il étoit

In spite of all these misfortunes, the King still continued to support Olivarez, though it was now observed that his attachment to him seemed not so blind as formerly; whether it was that he had become wearied and disgusted with his minister's constant bad fortune,—that he had been alarmed by what he had seen or heard at Saragossa,—or that he was touched by the mournful silence of the people when he appeared in public, and by the desertion of his court, from which almost all the grantees had now withdrawn.

Unfortunately for Olivarez, at this crisis of his fate the Dutchess-Dowager of Mantua, who had been Vice-Queen of Portugal, arrived at Madrid. After her expulsion from that kingdom, she had fixed her residence, by the royal order, at Merida in Estremadura, where she was permitted to remain in extreme discomfort and poverty. She, with great difficulty, afterwards obtained leave to remove to Ocana, whence, on pretext of soliciting payment of her pecuniary allowances, which had been for some time withheld, she came to Madrid, at the instigation of the Queen, to aid in the overthrow of the unpopular minister. On her arrival, the Dutchess d'Oliegue, qu'il parloit fort gras, et un mauvais Français, et qu'avec tout cela il étoit encore sourd." (*Mém. de la Duchesse de Nemours.*) After the extinction of the factions in France, he returned to Italy as commander of the French troops, and died at Turin in 1656, at the age of 60. He was married to Maria de Bourbon, sister to the unfortunate Count de Soissons. His eldest son inherited his father's possessions in Italy, and was called the Prince of Carignano. The second, Eugene Maurice, in right of his mother, succeeded to the title of Count de Soissons, and having married Olympia Mancini, niece of Cardinal Mazarin, he became father of the illustrious Prince Eugene: "Mariam Borboniam," says the epitaph inscribed on the tomb of Prince Thomas, shortly after his death, "regali e sanguine virginem duxit qualem *ad heroas progignendos* heros debuit." (*Guichenon, Hist. Geneal. de Savoie, t. iii.*)

varez conducted her to the apartments provided for her accommodation in one of the monasteries of Madrid. Olivarez did all in his power to prevent her from seeing the King. But his efforts for this purpose proved altogether ineffectual, and, at one of her first interviews, she in a great measure succeeded in satisfying Philip that the Revolt of Portugal had been entirely occasioned by the bad policy and misconduct of his minister.

After the defeat of Leganez, and the return of the King from Saragossa, the Queen had placed herself at the head of the party which demanded the dismissal of Olivarez. She had ever been popular with the nation, and she had gained new credit with the King by the talents she displayed in the management of affairs during his absence from Madrid. As Olivarez, from the commencement of his administration, had always depressed her influence, and held her in restraint and subjection, she was ready to embrace the first favourable opportunity of undermining his power. On one occasion she presented herself before his Majesty, holding by the hand the Prince Balthazar, and implored him for the sake and interest of their only son, to drive from his counsels a minister who had brought the monarchy to the verge of destruction. The Austrian ambassador, who always possessed great weight in the Spanish counsels, was easily persuaded to exert his whole influence against Olivarez ; and he now presented a letter to the King from the Emperor, setting forth the decline of the House of Austria during his administration. The enemies of the Count-Duke even condescended to employ the King's nurse, Anna de Guevara, to assist them in their object of undermining his credit with his sovereign. At one time the Dutchess of Olivarez had procured her banishment from Court as a creature of the Duke of Lerma ; and, in consequence, she was not slow of finding an opportunity

to sting Philip, by asking him, if, at his age, it was not time to get out of tutelage.¹

Till the administration of Lerma, the Grandees had not been accustomed to the sway of an engrossing favourite ; and in ancient times, before the union of the crowns, the old Castilians had shown themselves peculiarly jealous of the exclusive rule either of a royal minion or mistress. The offence of Olivarez, in the eyes of the nation, was, that he systematically kept the King immersed in pleasure and voluptuousness, to which he was naturally too much inclined, and that he had occasioned, by the inflexibility of his temper, the revolution in Portugal, and the revolt in Catalonia. But his chief crime, in the estimation of the Grandees, was, that he had removed them from that court favour which they accounted their birthright, and filled those offices of trust or emolument which they considered as their due, with his own creatures and dependents. Though affable and of easy access to the lower and middle classes, Olivarez had always conducted himself with reserve and haughtiness to the Grandees of Spain ; and on the principle that he could command them more absolutely, he had generally appointed persons of inferior condition to the great employments of the state. His favour had been chiefly shared by Leganez, Monterey, and the Duke of Medina de las Torres, who were descended from branches of his own house. Hence, none of the powerful families were interested to support him in his decline. Some, as those of Toledo, Lerma, and Ossuna, were his bitter enemies, and all were so disgusted by his behaviour, that, during the latter years of his administration, they had voluntarily retired to their own seats or jurisdictions, leaving the King a dim and faded court. Philip having one day inquired at the Marques of Carpio, the reason of this thin attendance, was told by him that the

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.* t. vi. lib. xx. c. 9.

Grandeess were viewed with so unfavourable an eye by Olivarez, that they rather chose to deprive themselves of the pleasure of waiting on his Majesty, than expose themselves to the jealousies and suspicions of his favourite.¹ The Castilian nobles, who had recently attended their sovereign to Saragossa, and whom Olivarez had contrived to exclude from his presence during the whole period of his stay in that capital, felt themselves particularly aggrieved, and added, on their return to Madrid, a numerous list of formidable foes.

The minister was even deserted by his own powerful family of the Guzmans, and his distinguished nephew Luis de Haro, all of whom he had alienated by some domestic grievances. Such subordinate family arrangements would scarcely have injured a popular or prosperous statesman ; but as the acts of an obnoxious minister, they mortally offended his relatives, disgusted the public, and, I have no doubt, accelerated his fall.

Olivarez had been as unfortunate in domestic affairs as in those of the state. His wife, Donna Inez de Zuniga, whom he had espoused from motives of ambition, was a woman of the most mean and abject presence, crooked and deformed, and much older than himself.² But by her he had an only and beautiful child, Donna Maria de Guzman, whom he tenderly loved. She was marriageable at the time of her father's appointment as prime minister, and was justly accounted, in every point of view, the greatest match in Spain. Her hand was solicited by her cousin Luis de Haro, son of the Marques of Carpio and of Francesca de Guzman, sister to Olivarez. This young

¹ Ferrante Pallavicino, *La Disgrazia d'Olivarez*, in *Opere Scelte*. Pallavicino and Siri, who wrote nearly at the same period, concur as to the causes of the disgrace of Olivarez, though they differ as to some circumstances attending it.

² Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, book i.

nobleman was in a manner proclaimed, by the voice of the nation, as the future husband of Donna Maria. But her father was somewhat whimsical and eccentric in his views, and was also extremely jealous of the talents and court favour of his nephew. The Count de Niebla, eldest son of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, was another suitor. Olivarez, however, had always hated that branch of the House of Guzman, and he in consequence gave the preference to Ramiro Nunez, Marques of Toral,¹ who represented the line of the Guzmans of Abrados. It was maintained by Olivarez, that the Dukes of Medina-Sidonia had usurped the rights of seniority over the race of Abrados :² and he hoped that, with this claim, and the vast possessions he might bequeath his daughter, he should render his descendants the greatest family in Spain, and the head of all the Guzmans.

Ramiro, Marques of Toral, thus destined as the husband of Donna Maria, was a person of considerable merit and high breeding : and long afterwards, when prime minister towards the close of the reign of Philip, the English ambassador, Sir Richard Fanshawe, bore testimony to his refined compliments and transcendant personal civilities.³ After their nuptials, which were celebrated in 1624,⁴ the noble pair assumed the title of Marques and Marchioness of Liche or Eliche, one of the Count Duke's titles. But this opening scene of the highest earthly dignity and splendour, soon closed on poor Donna Ma-

¹ Yañez, *Memor. para la Historia de Felipe III.* p. 100.

² There appears to have been considerable foundation for the claim of the Marques de Toral to be considered as head of the Guzmans. "Les plus celebres généalogistes d'Espagne," says Vayrac (*Etat present de l'Espagne*, t. iii. p. 174.) "tiennent la branche des Marquis de Toral, dont les Ducs de Medina de las Torres sont issus, pour l'ainée de l'illustre Maison de Guzman."

³ *Letters.*

⁴ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. v. c. 22.

ria. She died in childbed in the year 1626,¹ and the daughter to whom she had given birth did not long survive her. Though the match had been one of expediency and family pride, and the choice of a father, Maria seems to have ardently loved her husband ; and on her deathbed, she recommended to her mother, in the most earnest manner, his interest and promotion.² Nor could these have been more regarded had she herself survived to share in them. Shortly after her death, Ramiro was elevated, through the favour of Olivarez, to the title of Duke of Medina de Las Torres, a town in Estremadura. He was appointed to the high situations of Chancellor of the Indies, and Grand Chamberlain (Sumiller de corps) ; and in this latter capacity he attended the King in 1627 into Catalonia, where he excited the jealousy of the Grandees by his constant proximity to the person of the monarch. Through the same paramount influence, he was afterwards appointed Viceroy of Naples ; and in that kingdom he espoused Anna Caraffa, Princess of Stillano, who was so great an heiress that the King had prohibited her relatives from bestowing her in marriage without his consent, which, however, was readily given to her union with the Duke of Medina de las Torres.

Whether his favoured son-in-law had done ought to alienate the affections of Olivarez, or whether that minister had tired of him when he could do no more for his fortunes, or whether he considered the relationship as in some degree dissolved by his second marriage, he conceived at the time when his fall was approaching, the unfortunate project of acknowledging an illegitimate and unworthy son, and of constituting him, to the exclusion of all the Guzmans, not only the heir of his immense possessions, but the successor to his official dignities.

While yet in early youth, and about ten years before

¹ Cespedes, *Histor.* lib. vii. c. 9.

² Yañez, *Memor.* p. 102.

his appointment to his present elevated situation, Olivarez had much resorted to the house of Donna Isabella de Anversa,¹ who, though a woman of some rank, was noted for the freedom of her manners, and was greatly admired for her beauty by all the courtiers of Madrid. A gentleman named Francisco de Valcarcel paid for the expenses of her household, and spent the greater part of his fortune in gratifying her with splendid entertainments, and magnificent presents of jewels.—A child to whom she had given birth, and who was called Julian, was generally understood to be the son of Valcarcel. But many others, if inclined, might have disputed with him the paternity. Olivarez having soon after married, and become the father of a legitimate daughter, who engrossed all his affections, was little anxious to assert his dubious claim. The mother of Julian lived till he had reached the age of eighteen, and having been brought up by her, both his morals and conduct proved of the worst description. Finding himself entirely destitute at her death, and having no father who had yet acknowledged him as a son, he now implored Valcarcel to be allowed to bear his name, with which, and with his sword, he hoped to push his fortune in the world. This request was at first refused; but the application having come to the ears of Olivarez, he interposed in his behalf, and compelled Valcarcel to grant his reputed son the permission he solicited. Having thus obtained a name, he proceeded to America; and in Mexico he was subjected, on account of some aggravated offence, to a severe and ignominious punishment. He returned to Madrid, but finding there no means of subsistence, he went to serve as a common soldier successively in Flanders and in Italy, whence he

¹ Yañez, *Memor.* Leti (*Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*) and Siri (*Mercurio*) call her Margherita Spinola, by which name she is also mentioned in *Gil Blas*.

again returned to his native country, with morals not improved, but endued with a considerable share of spirit and vivacity. Long before this time Olivarez had lost his daughter, and also all farther hopes of having children, notwithstanding the various and mysterious arts to which he is said to have resorted.¹ Hearing that Julian, who by this time had nearly reached the age of thirty, had arrived at Madrid, he bethought himself that from the period of his birth it was possible he might be his father.

Having now resolved to adopt this outcast, and raise him from the dregs of the people to the highest dignities in the state, Olivarez began by spreading the report of Julian's parentage throughout the capital. At the time when the rumour was first circulated, this adventurer was on the eve of being married to a courtesan called Leonora de Unçqueta,² who had the generosity to inform him of it, and to warn him against completing an union which might prove injurious to him in the new rank to which he might now probably be raised. Julian, however, insisted on proceeding with the nuptials, which were accordingly celebrated in the house of Leonora's mother. Soon after this marriage, Olivarez, by a public and formal document, to which the King interposed his consent and authority, declared Julian his son, styling him, however, Henry de Guzman. This intelligence was immediately communicated to the grandees of Spain, and to all the foreign ambassadors, by one of the Secretaries of State. Olivarez then placed his spurious offspring in a mansion which had been prepared for him, and which was more superb than that occupied by any grandee in Madrid. His household, and the establishment provided for him, corresponded in splendour and magnificence to the palace, where he fixed his residence. In the early days of his prosperity and power, Olivarez had

¹ Yañez *Memor.* p. 108.

² Dama publica della Corte.

erected an immense estate in the neighbourhood of the town of San-Lucar, which is situated about fifteen miles west from Seville, on the stream of the Guadiamar. From this property he took his title of Duke, and styled it San Lucar *la Mayor*, in rivalry and emulation of the elder branch of his family, the Guzmans of Medina-Sidonia, whose chief seat was at San Lucar de Barrameda, which stands on the left bank of the Guadalquivir. This dukedom, which was to have been inherited by Donna Maria, was now destined as the succession of this new and dubious member of the family of Guzman.

Had the infatuated minister rested here, the public perhaps would have had no reason to complain. But he proceeded to invest this profligate upstart with the most lucrative and responsible offices of the state. He bestowed on him several rich Commendaries, and he removed a deserving minister for the sole purpose of appointing him president of the council of the Indies. It was not doubted that he meant this outcast to succeed himself as prime minister of the realm, and he did not conceal his intentions of nominating a man thus snatched from the abyss of infamy and misery to the office of governor to the Prince Balthazar, the heir to the crown, whose education had hitherto been so utterly neglected, that though he had now reached the age of fourteen, he was not yet out of the hands of *Ayas* and *Camareras*.¹

Olivarez next formed the scheme of marrying his son into one of the chief families of Spain, and he fixed on Donna Juana de Velasco, eldest daughter of the Constable of Castile, who at that time was esteemed the first match in the kingdom. In order to accomplish this marriage, he obtained from the Court of Rome the disannulment of his son's previous nuptials. His wife, who had at one time advised him not to conclude any matrimonial

¹ Yañez, *Mem.* p. 109.

alliance with her, now vehemently opposed its dissolution. But her judicial protests met with no regard, though the sole pretext for the abrogation of the union was, that it had been celebrated by the priest of the district in which the bride's mother dwelt, instead of the priest of the quarter in which she herself resided.¹ The annulment of this marriage threw the father of Donna Juana into indescribable consternation. That superb Castilian, who boasted a descent from five lines of ancient Gothic monarchs, and who, besides holding the hereditary office of Constable of Castile, was Duke of Frias, three times a Grandee of Spain, and keeper of the palace of the seven Infants of Lara, justly thought, that no wealth or titles could be a recompence for the contamination of such an alliance. His daughter, likewise, expressed great reluctance to the match, alleging that she had been warned of its unprosperous issue by a vision from Santa Theresa.² But the King, at the instigation of Olivarez, commanded the father to consent without farther hesitation or reply. Even then the Constable declared, that he would not obey the King himself, unless it was inserted in the matrimonial contract, that he had been compelled to grant his concurrence by the royal authority. The shameless monarch, whom this resistance might have awakened to a sense of decency, did not scruple, even on these terms, to insist on the Constable's compliance.³ The approaching nuptials were announced in letters of due form and ceremony to all persons of rank or consideration at Madrid, in which Olivarez pompously styles his son the pledge of past errors (*Prenda de yerros passados*). All the ministers and foreign ambassadors paid this new Guzman visits of congratulation; and such was still the power of Olivarez, that the courtiers, though irritated and disgusted, vied

¹ Yañez, *Mem.* p. 109.

² *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. i.

³ Capriata, *Guerre d'Italia*, liv. xviii.

with each other in the magnificence of the entertainments which they gave on occasion of the nuptials. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, being the person who probably was most seriously chagrined and disappointed, was obliged to manifest the greatest delight, and exceeded all others in the splendour of his banquet, which is said to have cost upwards of 500,000 crowns.

It is seldom that a man does a foolish thing in a wise manner. Had Olivarez acknowledged Julian at the time of his birth, or even immediately after the death of his daughter, while he was yet in boyhood, he would have received a suitable education, and perhaps might not altogether have disgraced the high station to which he was called. But he had been suffered to lead the life of a vagabond, and to pass his youth in taverns and other places of debauchery, among the lowest orders of society, subjected to all those miserable adventures to which men who so live are exposed. Besides, had Olivarez adopted him at an earlier period, and while he was himself still a popular, or at least not an obnoxious minister, the imprudent step would not have met with such censure and reprobation; and the proud race of the Guzmans not yet taught to expect his dignities or inheritance would have endured the injury more patiently.

As it was, the unfortunate measure deeply injured the respectability of Olivarez. It surprised the foreign ambassadors—it exposed him to the ridicule of malicious enemies—it deprived him, when he most required it, of support from the House of Guzman, the most powerful and opulent in Spain, and it disgusted the whole class of grandees, whose horror at the prospect of this unworthy son possessing the territories and titles of Olivarez, was increased by his brutal manners, gross ignorance, and sordid inclinations. The rabble, too, whose voice always goes for something, even in despotic countries, and who

usually detest every one raised from their own ranks to a superior station, spoke of this upstart with the utmost contumely, styling him the man with two fathers, two names, and two wives.¹

It was perhaps unfortunate for the Spanish monarchy, that the whole nation, as if with one voice, should have demanded the removal of Olivarez, at a time when his talents and experience had a fairer chance of proving useful to the state than during any former period of his administration. Richelieu, whose profound policy and superior abilities had so long counteracted all the schemes of Olivarez, with whatever genius they were contrived, died in December 1642, when the plans for the ruin of the Spanish minister had nearly reached maturity. His death was soon succeeded by that of Louis XIII, whose infirmities had been greatly increased by the fatigues of his expedition to Perpignan; and by his decease, France fell under the sway of a minor and a queen-regent, surrounded by a discontented people and a factious nobility. But Olivarez was not permitted to try his political dexterity in these favourable circumstances. The King could no longer resist the united voice of his Queen, his court, and his people—and gave Olivarez some unequivocal hints of his approaching downfall. Having asked the minister what apartments in the palace would best suit the Prince Balthazar, and he having proposed those which had been occupied by the Cardinal Infant, the King rejoined, “And why not yours, which are the proper habitation of the King’s son, and in which I and my father resided when we were Princes.”²

Olivarez, now perceiving the full effect which the powerful combination against him had produced on the

¹ Decia el Vulgo que era hijo de dos padres; que tenia dos nombres y dos mugeres. (*Yañez Memor.* p. 111.)

² Pallavicino, *Disgrazia d’Olivarez.*

mind of his royal master, addressed to him a letter, in which he voluntarily offered to resign his employments, and retire from Court. Nothing, in fact, was farther from his wish or intention. But he flattered himself that this step would recall the lost affections of the King, who, he believed, could not possibly dispense with his services. But he was totally disappointed in these expectations. Philip shortly after, and when just setting out for the chace, wrote to him that, as he found his subjects were discontented because he did not govern the kingdom himself, the permission he had so often asked to retire from Court was now granted, and that he had leave to depart for his property at Loëches, which was situated about four leagues from Madrid. The Count-Duke, though it could not be altogether unexpected, was overwhelmed by this royal communication. He sent an express to the Dutchess, who was then at Loëches, and who, hastening to the capital, arrived there at midnight, for the purpose of concerting with her husband the best measures to be adopted during his approaching banishment, in order to procure his restoration to power.

This virtual dismissal of the minister, when generally known at Madrid, excited universal joy amid all classes of the people. The courtiers and grandees, however, being somewhat suspicious and incredulous, or fearing a change in the King's intentions, were cautious in giving too open manifestations of their satisfaction. Olivarez, also, for some days continued to attend the councils as previously; his Dutchess still remained in her situation of *Aya* to the Infanta Maria Theresa, and his unpopular secretary Carnero was appointed clerk of the king's chamber, one of the most honourable and lucrative offices at court.

Encouraged by these favourable appearances, Olivarez made a last attempt to regain favour, by requesting a

private audience of his Majesty. But the fear which his enemies entertained of the influence he might still possess over the royal mind, prevented him from receiving this indulgence. He was only permitted to see the King at a public levee ;¹ and, lest he should at any time unexpectedly find access to the presence, they contrived to deprive him of the golden key which gave him entrance to the apartments of his master. This was soon followed by a peremptory order for his instant removal to Lœches. Such was his unpopularity, and his dread of being insulted by the citizens, that, in order to divert their attention, he made great preparations of mules and coaches for the conveyance of his household, while he himself,² after having burned a number of state papers, privately set out at an early hour in the morning, in an old vehicle with the curtains drawn, and accompanied only by his confessor. By means of this stratagem, Olivarez arrived, without interruption, at his domain of Loëches, while the other carriages were attacked by a mob, and stones thrown at them. Some of his friends went immediately to see him there, but he declined to admit them, declaring, that he would receive none but the members of his own family, and would open no letters except from his Majesty or the Dutchess d'Olivarez.³

The Dutchess remained at Madrid in the hope of obtaining his recall by her earnest intercessions. But she was not a person calculated to make a favourable impression on Philip, and she was detested by the Queen. She could only communicate to her husband the mortifying intelligence, that the populace were celebrating his fall, as if it were an epoch which was to form the commencement of the prosperity of the state, and that all his friends and adherents had been degraded from their situations, while

¹ Pallavicino, *Disgrazia d'Olivarez*.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. and Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. 1.

his bitterest enemies had been promoted to the chief offices of the state. The Admiral of Castile, one of his most implacable foes, and son-in-law to the late Duke of Lerma, had been appointed Viceroy of Naples, the Count d'Oñate was nominated Mayor-domo-Mayor, and the Duke of Alva was sent ambassador to France. Felipe de Silva, whom Olivarez had arraigned for misconduct in Flanders, was confirmed as successor to Leganez in the command of the army of Catalonia. The King's confessor Sotomayor, a Dominican, who was entirely devoted to Olivarez, and had now reached the age of ninety, was recommended to retire, that he might, without interruption, devote the short remaining period of life to preparations for eternity; and the numerous extraordinary Juntas, which Olivarez had constituted in order to abrogate the authority of the ordinary councils, were at the same time abolished.

Nevertheless, Philip had been so long habituated to the dictation of his minister, as well as to the enjoyment of a life of uninterrupted indolence and pleasure, that he felt oppressed by the weight of the government which he had taken on himself, and distracted by the diversities of opinion on every political topic. In fact, since the dismissal of Olivarez, the delays and impediments in all departments of the state had greatly increased, and from want of a presiding minister, there were ceaseless counteractions in all the offices of government. In this situation the King was on the point of recalling Olivarez not long after his exile; but, at this critical moment, the banished statesman adopted the imprudent step of publishing, from his retreat, an apology for his administration, and an answer to some calumnies concerning him, which had recently been circulated in memorials by his enemies. This production was anonymous, and was entitled Nican-

der, but it was universally attributed to the Count-Duke. The measures of Olivarez had always appeared best on paper : his present memorial was full of spirit and masterly argument, and had he confined himself to a vindication of his own conduct, all might have been well. But he denounced the allies of Spain, particularly the Italian Princes,—he launched out into charges against the Grands and chief characters of the state,—he incautiously revealed some political mysteries, and he professed maxims which would have been more prudently concealed or disavowed. A loud and general clamour was excited. Many of the courtiers complained to the King with so much bitterness and resentment, that, instead of recalling his late favourite, he found himself compelled to banish him to Toro, a town in the kingdom of Leon, thirty-seven Spanish leagues north-west from Madrid, where he retired early in the month of June,

An old man broken by the storms of state.

So long as Olivarez had remained at Loëches, his Dutchess being allowed to frequent the court, had contrived to keep up a party in his favour, and she had even discomfited his old enemy the Dutchess of Mantua, as to the places they were respectively entitled to occupy in the royal coach.¹ But, on the 2d of November, it was suddenly announced to her, on the part of the King, that she should forthwith quit the apartments she occupied in the palace as *Aya* of the Infanta, and retire to her own habitation. On the following morning, before daybreak, she departed for Loëches, where she intended to fix her residence with the view of being in the vicinity of the capital; but she had scarcely arrived there, when it was intimated to her that she must betake herself to Toro, where her husband was now exiled.

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*.

While the Count-Duke had himself continued at the delightful sojourn of Loëches,¹ and his Dutchess had been allowed to remain at Madrid, he bore his misfortunes with apparent equanimity ; and, as he still cherished the hopes of recall, it was easy for him to live as if he was indifferent concerning his restoration to favour. He spent the morning and day in agricultural employments, or in his devotions at the monastery established near his retreat, and the afternoon and evening in walking, in amusing himself with his dogs, and playing at different sorts of games with his attendants.² But after his banishment to Toro, when all his prospects of a return to power seemed completely blasted, a deep melancholy settled on his mind. Like his predecessor the Duke of Lerma, he was a credulous believer in judicial astrology, and its superstitious predictions added a baleful gloom to his political chagrin. It was in consequence of his addiction to this unhallowed art, that he was denounced to the Inquisition soon after his banishment to Toro. He was also accused of having attempted to poison the Prince Balthazar ; and the names of the apothecary at Florence whom he had employed to prepare the dose, and of the Italian monk who had been entrusted with the execution of the odious office, were confidently mentioned. Fortunately for Olivarez, the chief Inquisitor, Diego d'Arce, had been indebted to him for the bishoprics of Avila and Placentia. By his means, and in consequence of the time which was occupied in bringing witnesses from Italy, the proceedings were pro-

¹ The fields of Loëches long retained their delightful verdure. —“ Les campagnes de Loëches,” says the Marquis de Langle, who travelled there more than a century afterwards, “ sont charmantes ; le verd des arbres et celui des plaines est plus riant, mieux verd qu'ailleurs.” (*Voyage en Espagne*, t. i.)

² Siri, *Mécurio*.

tracted till they were at length terminated by the death of the accused.¹

Olivarez had passed about six months at Loëches, and he survived about two years longer at Toro, so oppressed by his sad reflections on the past, and his painful anticipations of the future, that it was reported he beheld a spectre amid "his thick eyed musing." At the end of that period, and when he was in the fifty-seventh year of his age, death at length relieved this victim of ambition and political disappointment. His head having been opened it was found to contain a much larger weight of brain than usual.² His body was removed from Toro and interred at Loëches, where he had founded a church and a convent of barefooted Carmelites, which, in the minister's bright days of power and favour, Rubens, by command of the King, had adorned with some pictures on religious subjects, which were executed in that painter's grandest style, and with his richest glow of colours.³ The day of his funeral was signalized by a tremendous thunder-storm,⁴

¹ Llorente, *Hist. de la Inquisicion d'España*, c. 38.

² Howel's *Continuation of Lennard's Translation of Mazzella's History of Naples*.

The skull of his great rival and contemporary Richelieu, also presented wonderful phrenological phenomena. "Fù osservata da chirurghi la testa come un miracolo della natura, con tutti gli organi dell' intendimento duplicati, e alcuni triplicati ancora; onde venne a cessare la maraviglia di quella sua incomparabile vivacità con la quale concepiva all' istante le cose più difficili." (Siri, *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. 3.)

³ Camargo, *Sumario Anadido a l'Hist. de Mariana*.

⁴ Howel's *Continuation*, &c.

The Dutchess d'Olivarez survived her unfortunate husband about three years, which she passed chiefly at Loëches. Some time after his death, she asked leave to come to Madrid in order to attend a meeting of Jurisconsults, concerning the pecuniary affairs in which she was involved with the relatives of the Count-Duke. This permission was readily granted to her by the Court, and lodgings were assigned to her in the palace of Buenretiro, where she remained a

which the vulgar connected with his supposed knowledge and practice of forbidden arts.

Perhaps of all classes of men, the prime ministers of great empires have been the most unhappy and unfortunate. From the annals of our own country, in more recent times, a melancholy list might be added to the enumeration which a great moral poet has commenced with an early political rival and enemy of Olivarez :

What gave great Villiers to the assassin's knife,

And fixed disease on Harley's closing life ?

What murdered Wentworth, and what banished Hyde,

By kings protected, and to kings allied ?

What but their wish indulged in courts to shine,

And power too great to keep, or to resign.

The close of the career of Olivarez formed, indeed, a melancholy contrast to the proud pretensions and lofty week, and was visited by many of the *Grandeos* and principal ladies of the capital. (Camargo, *Sumario Anadido*.)

Julian or Henry de Guzman, the unworthy son of Olivarez, remained at court for some time after the disgrace of his father, and attended the King in one of his expeditions to Aragon at the close of this year. One morning, however, while mounting on horseback to accompany the King to the chace, he received intimation that he should forthwith quit Saragossa, and should not again appear at court. (*Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. 3.) The Constable of Castile then sent for his daughter, and placed her in a nunnery, where she passed the remainder of her days. A child, who was the only fruit of these inauspicious nuptials, died in infancy ; and Julian himself deceasing without an heir, the dukedom of San Lucar, according to the destination of Olivarez, reverted to the Marques of Leganez. (Yañez, *Memor.* p. 125.) But the right to this splendid succession was disputed by the Duke of Medina de las Torres, who also assumed the title of Duke of San Lucar, and the litigation was still subsisting between their descendents in the year 1723. (Yañez, p. 112.) Luis de Haro succeeded his uncle in the title of Count d'Olivarez, and in the original family property which was attached to it. It is now possessed, through female succession, by the Duke of Alva, a descendant of the celebrated Duke of Berwick. (*Guia de Grandeza*, ap. Lord Mahon's *Hist. of War of Succession*, p. 333.)

anticipations with which he undertook the government of Spain. Yet, it seems wonderful, that he should so long have continued at the head of the state, when we consider his misfortunes, his impracticable temper, and the erroneous political principles he adopted. Olivarez belonged to that class of statesmen, first bred up under Charles V, who had no country or patriotism, and no principle except the will and supposed interest of the sovereign. He had always been intent on his king's greatness ; but he supposed his greatness to consist in the extension of the royal prerogative, and in reigning over a subservient rather than a flourishing people. Believing also, that till the king was rendered absolute at home, he could never dictate to the other powers of Europe, he directed all his internal plans to the establishment of a pure despotism. He despised public opinion, on which the strength, even of the most arbitrary governments, must, in some degree, rest ; and, as he was not aware that the prosperity and content of the people is the only sure basis of empire, he cared little for their welfare or satisfaction. Hence proceeded his fatal attempts to extinguish the liberties and abrogate the franchises of the provinces, which he considered as fetters from which it was his duty to emancipate the hands of royalty. Uncompromising severity was his great principle in carrying into effect the details of government. Every thing in his administration was harsh and rigorous. No error was accounted venial,—the fountains of royal bounty were shut up, except to his own creatures and dependents, and whoever had ability, or popular fame, or favour with the king, was sure to experience his envy and deadly persecution. The greatest services to the state remained unrewarded, and those who had suffered the most for their country, often received the same hard answer as that given to the poor maimed

Captain Chinchilla.¹ Though aware of the odium which his conduct excited, he never changed his system, but gloried in his unpopularity, which he conceived to be the fruit of that ardent zeal which he manifested for the service of his sovereign.

But whatever may have been his errors as a statesman, and misfortunes as a politician, Olivarez was at least entitled to the praise of a liberal, if not invariably of a discerning, patron of literature and the arts. These had been neglected by his enemy Lerma, and fostered by those austere ministers Ximenes and Cardinal Granvelle, whom he affected to imitate. Quevedo he alternately patronized and persecuted, as he had offended him by some tributes in verse to the memory of D'Ossuna. But to Gongora his favour was uniformly extended. Lope de Vega dedicated to him the *Circe*, a heroic poem in three cantos,² and the *Rosa Blanca* to his daughter Donna Maria. Barthelemi Argensola also ventured to address to this despotic minister his continuation of Zurita's Annals of Aragon, though they were written with a freedom calculated to preserve in the minds of the Catalans the remembrance of their ancient privileges. The number of valuable manuscripts and splendid presentation copies which he left behind him, attest his predilection for the studies of literature, and his encouragement of its pursuits. During the whole period of his power he had been a liberal and splendid, though not always a

¹ Seigneur Gentilhomme, ne vantez pas tant votre zele et votre fidélité. Vous n'avez fait que votre devoir, en vous exposant aux périls pour votre patrie. La seule gloire qui est attachée aux belles actions les paye assez, et doit suffire, principalement à un Espagnol. (*Gil Blas*, livre vii. c. 12.)

² *Obras Sueltas*, t. iii. ed. 1776. In this dedication he styles himself his chaplain, and calls his verses "Esclavas nacidas en su ilustrisima casa."

tasteful, promoter of the arts.¹ It was on his invitation, delivered by the court poet Gongora, that Velasquez returned to Madrid after his first visit of disappointment and mortification, and there painted the portrait of Olivarez on horseback, which is still accounted the finest he ever executed.² Through his favour the artist obtained apartments in the palace, and was first introduced to the royal notice. On the disgrace of his patron, this illustrious painter did not, like so many others, forsake him in his misfortunes, but frequently visited him in the place of his exile, where, by the magic of his art and conversation, he charmed away, at times, that demon of disappointed ambition by which he was haunted. The King was aware

¹ Palomino Velasco, in his *Vidas de los Pintores*, relates an anecdote which is rather to the disparagement of the Count-Duke's taste in the fine arts. Having commissioned Francisco de Herrera, one of the most celebrated artists of the age, to inspect a collection of paintings which were exposed for sale, and to choose those he esteemed the best, Herrera put some mark on the paintings which he preferred. But the Count-Duke having afterwards gone to see them, rejected with contempt the whole lot that had received Herrera's approbation, and chose himself some very inferior performances. The irritable artist was so offended, that he flew to his pencil, and represented Olivarez under the figure of an ape in a flower-garden, throwing aside with disdain some beautiful roses, and delighting itself with a coarse thistle. He intended to have sent this caricature to the minister, but was prevented by one of his friends, who convinced him of the dangerous consequences which might ensue. The picture, however, of the *móno* was much celebrated in Madrid; it was frequently shown in private, and was highly relished by the enemies of Olivarez.

² Swinburne, describing the pictures in the royal palace of Madrid says, "The genius of Velasquez shines most conspicuously in the equestrian figure of the Conde-Duque Olivarez, prime minister of Spain, which I really think the best portrait I ever beheld. I know not which most to admire, the chiaro-scuro, the life and spirit of the rider, or the natural position and fire of the horse." (*Travels in Spain*, t. ii. let. 41.)

of the continuance of his attachment, but suffered it without withdrawing any portion of favour from Velasquez. Murillo, who had also enjoyed the patronage of Olivarez, took a great share in the affliction which Velasquez felt on account of the fall of his protector. From that time his residence in the capital became irksome, and he shortly afterwards returned to his native town of Seville.¹ Rubens, chiefly through the intervention of Olivarez, was favourably received at the Court of Philip, and was employed by the minister to decorate with paintings the church and convent of his residence at Loëches. "I found there," says Bourgoing, "a little church, the decorations of which might be envied by the metropolitan of the Christian world. Six capital paintings, by Rubens, of the largest size and most magnificent effect, adorn the altars or enrich the walls. The principal of these, is an allegorical painting of the triumph of Religion. It is over the great altar, and unites all the beauties, and even defects, which characterize its author: richness of composition, brilliancy of colouring, strength of expression, and negligence of design. After this painting, I was most struck with that in which Elias is represented standing in the desert at the moment when an angel appears to comfort him." Olivarez was also magnificent in his architectural embellishments. He greatly extended and ornamented the Alcazar at Seville, and other royal residences of which he was governor. The palace of Buenretiro, which lies at the eastern extremity of Madrid, and overlooks the Prado, was originally built by Olivarez for his poultry, in which he was curious, and called *Gallinero*; but having been gradually extended, it was presented by him to the King,² and thenceforth became one of the chief abodes of royalty.

¹ Cean Bermudez, *Letters and Life of Murillo*, ap. Davie's *Translations of Life of Murillo, compiled from various Authors*, ed. 1819.

² D'Aulnoy, *Voyage en Espagne*, let. 10.

King Philip soon repented of the rash declaration which he had made to his council, after the dismissal of Olivarez, that he would in future act as his own minister. For such a task he was totally unqualified, either by talents or habit. And, accordingly, Olivarez had not long retired when he nominated Luis de Haro, the nephew of the disgraced minister, as his successor. This new favourite was the son of the Marques of Carpio and Francesca de Guzman, the sister of Olivarez. He was nearly of the same age as the King, with whom he had been brought up and educated, and whom he greatly resembled both in temper and manners. At the commencement of the reign of Philip he had been useful in supporting the influence of his uncle Olivarez. But that jealous minister soon became envious of his opening talents, and the favour he enjoyed with his sovereign. In Spain, the ties of consanguinity have ever proved too feeble to restrain the lust of power; and Philip IV. had not been long seated on the throne, when these relatives became watchful rivals and then implacable foes; yet such was the hold that Luis de Haro ever had on the mind of the King, that Olivarez, even in the height of his power, could not succeed in removing him from court, or from the presence of his sovereign. The refusal of the hand of Donna Maria, the daughter of Olivarez, for which he had been a candidate, contributed to augment the enmity of the nephew towards his uncle, and the adoption of Henry de Guzman as the son of Olivarez, completed his exasperation. Amid all the mortifying intelligence which the fallen minister received in his retirement, that by which he felt most sensibly galled and affected, was the appointment of his nephew Luis de Haro as his successor.

Don Luis was a man of totally different manners and disposition from his predecessor, and, knowing the unpo-

pularity of his uncle, it was his great aim to appear in every part of his behaviour and actions the reverse of Olivarez.¹ He was of a mild, placid, patient, and courteous disposition,—of a phlegmatic, and even melancholic temperament. He indulged those who were with him in considerable freedom, both of expression and opinion, provided they uttered their sentiments calmly and quietly, but he could not endure any vehemence of speech or gesticulation; he was delighted with praise, and was so far accessible to flattery, that, while under its influence, he would make any promise, but which, as the impression wore away, was either forgotten, or, owing to the penury of the crown, could not be fulfilled. His intentions were universally allowed to be upright, and he rarely manifested his power by any act of harshness or oppression. His mind was not piercing or acute, but he was prudent and judicious, and made up by wariness and command of temper, what he wanted in quickness of capacity. Though indolent by nature, his industry, after his accession to power, became indefatigable. He had no great talents for rhetoric, but he was well able to defend himself from its attacks, and spoke sensibly and reasonably on all subjects; he was a patient and unwearied listener to others; he thought well of what he had to say, and though he often omitted a strong argument or happy illustration which he might have employed with advantage, he never touched on a topic or used an expression which he had afterwards occasion to repent.²

From long habit, from similarity of disposition, and from his politic care to give his master the credit of all popular acts and measures, De Haro obtained an absolute ascendancy over the mind of the King, who enter-

¹ Zanetornato, *Relazione del Governo della Corte di Spagna*, ed. 1672.

² Ibid., and Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*, books 12 and 16.

tained towards him the greatest personal kindness, unalloyed by that dread which he had always felt for his stern predecessor. With this hold on the favour of the King, his power as a minister was fortified by every thing that birth and wealth and family connexions could supply in Spain. His house was one of the most ancient in that country of Grandees, and during the reigns of the ancient Gothic kings, had been noted for its services against the Moors, and by its dissensions with the rival family of Lara. The territorial possessions of the Marquesate of Carpio, a title bestowed on an ancestor of Don Luis by Philip II,¹ were extensive, and on the death of his uncle, he succeeded to the hereditary property which had belonged to him as Count d'Olivarez. He was himself married to Doña Catalina de Cordova, daughter of the Duke of Cardona.² His second son, Domingo, was united to the heiress of the family of Monterey, and his daughter, to the Count de Niebla, eldest son of that Duke of Medina-Sidonia who had conspired against the state, soon after the revolution of Portugal. But such was the abhorrence in which that suspected traitor was still held by a loyal people, that the minister, at first, rather incurred by this match some degree of censure and odium.³

Thus strengthened and supported, Luis de Haro, though by no means universally popular, had few dangerous rivals. His chief enemies were the Duke of Medina de Las Torres, the Count d'Oñate, and the Duke of Alva, who, at the commencement of his administration, entered into a sort of league against him, which, however, did not prove formidable. Alva was the great grandson of the celebrated Duke of that name, but was

¹ Ernestus, *Bibliotheca Hispanica*.

² Pellicer, *Tratado Histor. de la Comedia*, parte ii. p. 189.

³ Zanetornato, *Relazione*.

most unlike his ancestor, being a generous, courteous, and sincere nobleman, though totally destitute of either civil or military talents, and only possessing political consequence, as the head of the illustrious house of Toledo. Ortiz says that the Count d'Oñate was by far the ablest man in the kingdom, and that he ought to have held the situation which Olivarez had so long possessed. But he died soon after the appointment of Luis de Haro, and the confederacy against that minister was totally dissolved by his decease.¹

Though Luis de Haro had a more entire disposal of the affections and wishes of his master than any favourite of the age, and though nothing was transacted at home or abroad but by his direction, yet no minister ever appeared so little to act from himself, or seemed less to enjoy the delight and empire of a favourite.² His chief defect was want of resolution and self-confidence, which led him to rely in matters of importance on the advice and counsel of others. The Count Pegnaranda (a man of vast knowledge of the world, and great dexterity in negotiations) was his great oracle in what related to foreign affairs and embassies; while in all that concerned the internal management of the kingdom, he was ruled by Giorgio de Gongora, a jurisconsult from Cordova, as absolutely as ever the Duke of Lerma had been by Rodrigo de Calderon. "In the most ordinary occurrences," says Lord Clarendon, "which for the difficulty required little deliberation, and in the nature of them required expedition, he would give no order without formal consultation with the rest of the council, which hindered despatch, and made his parts the more suspected."³ This supposed reliance, however, on the council, may be doubted. He certainly first introduced the practice that each

¹ Zanetornato, *Relaz.*

² Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, book xii.

³ *Ibid.*

councillor should give his opinion on the subject under consideration in a signed note, reserving to himself the final decision. "But in fact," says the Venetian ambassador at the Court of Madrid, "in matters of great importance the councils never were consulted at all. The negotiations preparatory to the peace of the Pyrenees, were all conducted at his own house, with the sole assistance of the Count Pegnaranda and the Marques of Spinola; and, in fact, M. de Lionne the French envoy had been at Madrid three months before it was known in any of the councils of state that a treaty was in dependence."¹

Luis de Haro entered on the administration at a most unhappy and critical conjuncture; and it would have required a statesman greater than ordinary, to have repaired the evils occasioned by the loss of Portugal and defection of Catalonia. But though he witnessed the evil effects of the policy of Olivarez, and though he differed from him so widely in his sentiments and demeanour, he did not affect any of those violent changes of policy which had signalized the accession of Olivarez to power. The new minister either was not aware of the decline of the state, or wilfully shut his eyes on the gloomy prospect; and, perhaps, as Olivarez had left affairs in such a situation, that they were nearly irremediable, it was his most prudent plan to appear blind to the misfortunes of the monarchy.

The commencement of the administration of Luis de Haro, was equally unfortunate with the termination of that of Olivarez; but, of course, the first calamities were represented, and, in fact, deserved to be considered, as consequences of the impolitic measures of his predecessor. Almost at the moment when he assumed the reins of government, the Spaniards suffered the most severe and decisive defeat they had ever yet experienced. For some

¹ Zanetornato, *Relazione*.

time past, the urgency of affairs in Portugal and Catalonia had so entirely engrossed the attention of the Court, that the affairs of Italy and the Netherlands were comparatively neglected, and those fruitless invasions of the French territory, which had been so often attempted, were altogether relinquished. At this period, however, the death of Richelieu, and the unsettled state of France, held out inducements to a renewed attack, which the Spanish Court, and its Generals on the eastern frontier of that kingdom, unfortunately could not resist. To the great loss of the Spanish monarchy, the Cardinal Infant had died about a year ago, much lamented. Having been seized with a catarrh and fever, his Spanish *Sangrados* had bled him profusely, in opposition to the opinion of the Flemish physicians, and soon brought him to an end with weakness and exhaustion.¹ He was succeeded in the government of the Low Countries by Francisco de Melo, a Portuguese, who had gained the favour of Olivarez by adhering to the Spanish interests, and abjuring his allegiance to the House of Braganza at the period of the late revolution. An army of 26,000 men assembled under this governor, with the old Count de Fuentes as Camp-Master-General, and, in order to conceal their real design, threatened the frontiers of Picardy. They then entered Champagne, and advanced to Rocroy, the siege of which was their true object. This small but important place, which was considered as the bulwark of the frontiers of Champagne, and from which Paris could be reached without the necessity of fording a river, lay in the heart of a wood, and was strongly fortified, though, at this time, it was almost destitute of a garrison. To oppose this invasion, and to cover Rocroy, France presented a very inferior force, commanded by a General of twenty-one years of age: but that General was the great

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. i. lib. 3.

Condé, then known by the name of the Duke d'Enguien. Along with intelligence of the death of Louis XIII, he had received orders not to hazard an engagement; and the Mareschal de l'Hopital, who attended the young hero as his military counsellor, dissuaded him from the combat. But he was determined to signalize his first command, and the commencement of a new reign, by a brilliant achievement; and therefore resolved, despite of the timid counsels of his colleague, to give battle to the besieging army, and relieve Rocroy.

The Spanish General, calculating that the caution of the old Mareschal, and the ardour of the young Duke, would produce even more than the usual unhappy effects of divided command, fatally undervalued the force and skill which were opposed to him. With an overweening confidence in his veteran troops and his strong position, he had marched suddenly on Rocroy, without erecting ramparts in his rear, or setting a guard on those narrow defiles which led through the wood and morasses to the camp, which he had formed under the walls of the town. He also allowed the enemy to approach unmolested, and to draw up in front of his lines.¹ The Count de Fuentes wished to await the arrival of the auxiliary German troops under General Bec, which were hourly expected. But his opinion was overruled; and, indeed, it was now too late to decline the engagement, which commenced early on the following morning. The advantages of position,—the superiority of numbers,—the experience of the Spanish commanders,—and the discipline of their veteran soldiers,—could not oppose any effectual resistance to the impetuosity of the French, and the military talents of Condé. If ever man could be considered as having been born a great commander, it was the Prince of Condé;²

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. 3.

² His bitter enemy, Cardinal de Retz, said of him, that he was

if ever fight could be said to have been gained solely by the genius of the commander, it was the battle of Rocroy. The impetuosity with which he routed the Spanish cavalry, led on by the Duke d'Albuquerque; the promptitude with which he remedied the disasters that had occurred on his left wing, commanded by Mareschal L'Hopital,—and the perseverance with which, though three times repulsed, he continued to charge in person the old and renowned Castilian infantry, stationed in the centre of the hostile army, under the Count de Fuentes,—were at length crowned with complete success.¹ After a sanguinary combat of six hours' duration, the Spaniards were totally defeated in every direction. Fuentes, who, on account of his feeble health, required to be carried about in a litter,² and who had placed himself at the head of the veteran infantry which so long withstood the assaults of the enemy, was left dead on the field of battle, with upwards of 7000 men killed and wounded. 5000 prisoners, the whole artillery, the national banners, and camp equipage, fell into the hands of the victors, who lost only 2000 men, and no officer of rank. Towards the close of the combat, Francisco de Melo was taken prisoner, but effected his escape, after having dropped his baton of command, which was delivered to Condé.³ The unfortunate General collected the scattered remains of born a General, which had never happened but to Cæsar, Spinola, and himself. De Retz might have added Lucullus, or, among the Romans, substituted him for Cæsar, who was as much indebted to gradual experience as other Generals.

¹ Reboulet, *Histoire de Louis XIV*, t. i.

² The litter of the Count de Fuentes was placed at Chantilly, along with the armour of the Maid of Orleans, and that in which the Constable Anne de Montmorency was slain at the battle of St Denys. (Gaillard, *Hist. de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*.)

³ Aubery, *Hist. de Mazarin*, t. ii. livre ii. c. 1.

his troops, and fled with precipitation towards Flanders.¹ In the very moment, however, which decided the contest, intelligence was brought that the German General Bec was advancing to support the Spaniards with 6000 fresh troops, and was already within sight of the field. Condé was about to march to oppose them ; but the broken Spanish cavalry had fallen in with the division of Germans coming to their aid, and these auxiliaries, instead of attempting to rally the fugitives, caught their panic, and joined in their headlong flight.²

The immediate result of this victory was the capture of Thionville, and some other places of note, and the consequent command of the whole course of the Moselle. But its ultimate effects were far more important. The Spanish nation never recovered this signal defeat. Its military spirit was completely depressed,—its veteran bands, who once formed a phalanx as renowned as that of Greece, were nearly annihilated, and were never afterwards recruited or supplied. On the other hand, the French arms acquired a lustre which they had not as yet possessed. Their glory, in fact, commenced with the date of the battle of Rocroy.³ Though in the war they had, on the whole, been eminently successful, no great or decisive fight had hitherto been gained ; and till the victory now earned by Condé, the French nation could boast of no triumph to be placed in competition with Pavia or St Quentin. But, from this era, France stood at the head

¹ Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*

² *Mém. de la Maison de Condé*, t. i. p. 23.

³ Voiture, in his congratulatory letter to Condé on his victory at Rocroy, says, elegantly enough, “ La France que vous venez de mettre à couvert de tous les orages qu’elle craignoit, s’étonne, qu’à l’entrée de vostre vie, vous avez fait une action dont Cesar eût voulu couronner toutes les siennes ; et qui redonne aux Roys vos ancêtres autant de lustre que vous en avez reçu d’eux.”

of the military nations of Europe, till she was dispossessed of that pre-eminent situation by the genius of Marlborough and Eugene.

Intelligence of the battle of Rocroy was brought to Madrid by the same courier who conveyed the accounts of the death of Louis XIII. The disastrous news from Champagne was received with deep affliction, and the nation vented their displeasure on the unfortunate General Francisco de Melo, who was already unpopular as a native of Portugal, and a creature of the Count-Duke Olivarez.

At this unfortunate crisis, the King attempted to revive the hopes and drooping spirits of his subjects, by a new excursion to Aragon and Catalonia. He left Madrid in the month of July 1643 for Saragossa, where his stay was distinguished by some partial successes of Felipe de Silva, the Captain-General of Catalonia, and by the recapture of Monçon, in Aragon. At the close of the campaign, he returned for a short while during the depth of winter to Madrid, where he was received with great demonstrations of joy ; and he again took the field early in the spring of the ensuing season. It is to the credit of Philip, that, though he could only muster an army of 12,000 men, he now made a far better appearance in his Catalonian campaigns than when he was under the tutelage of Olivarez. Near a century had elapsed since a King of Spain had been seen at the head of his army ; and Philip greatly delighted his troops by showing himself among them in a purple habit, with a plume of feathers on his head, and a baton in his hand. Amid their acclamations, his Majesty caught a spark of military enthusiasm, and he wrote to the Queen that it had been the happiest day of his life.¹ He made some popular regulations concerning promotion in the army ; and he anew

¹ Di non havere tenido tam buen día en toda su vida.

issued, on condition of their returning to their duty, a promise of pardon to the Catalans, with exception of Margarit, and all those who had been concerned in the murder of Santa-Coloma.

Under his Majesty's orders, Felipe de Silva advanced to the siege of Lerida, and the French General La Mothe-Houdancourt marched at the same time to its relief. A battle ensued, in which, for once, the Spaniards obtained a complete victory : they took 12 pieces of cannon, with all the baggage and standards. The French lost 3000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the remains of their army sought shelter, in great disorder, within the walls of Lerida.¹ This victory gave the Spaniards a firmer footing in Catalonia than any they had possessed since the commencement of the insurrection. But in spite of this brilliant success, De Silva still hesitated to besiege Lerida, till he received the orders of the King himself, who advanced in person within three leagues of the spot, in order to superintend the operations and encourage the troops by his presence. Much sickness prevailed in the royal camp ; and the courtiers who attended the King wished him to relinquish the siege, but he remained firm to his purpose. He went out daily to inspect the carriages and supplies of the army ; and often, in the most encouraging and affable manner, addressed the soldiery. At length, after being bombarded by cannon, and reduced to extremities by famine, Lerida and its garrison, which, at the commencement of the siege, had amounted to 4000 men, surrendered on favourable conditions. Philip then made a triumphal entrance into the town, mounted on a Neapolitan charger, and clothed in a dress of purple-velvet, embroidered with gold. He proceeded with an attendance of the local magistracy and the royal household to the cathedral, where *Te Deum*

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.* t. vi. lib. xx. c. 9.

was chaunted. On this occasion, the King was also accompanied by his favourite painter Velasquez, who executed a magnificent full length portrait of his Majesty in the habit he then wore, and with all the badges of a General.

Soon after the capture of Lerida, Felipe de Silva, discovering that the King had expressed some displeasure at the too favourable nature of the terms granted to its garrison, resigned his command, and Andrea Cantelmo, an experienced but severe officer, who, like his predecessor, had served during the wars of the Cardinal Infant in the Netherlands, was appointed Viceroy and Captain-General of Catalonia in his room.

Subsequently to the loss of the battle before Lerida, the French General La Mothe-Houdancourt had done little for the relief of that place. Indeed, he had received instructions from his Court to hazard nothing for its succour, and rather to compensate its loss by gaining Tarragona. Accordingly, he advanced to the siege of that place; and, after much hard fighting, he succeeded in occupying the mole and some of the outworks. The King was desirous to proceed to the aid of Tarragona in person; but the army which he commanded at Lerida had been greatly thinned by sickness, and was not now in a condition to act. He returned, however, to Saragossa, where, by his presence and indefatigable application, he raised fresh levies, and procured all manner of supplies, which he forwarded under the new General Cantelmo, for the defence of Tarragona. La Mothe's army had been already much diminished by many spirited assaults from the garrison; and the force which still remained before the town, was not protected by lines of circumvallation. He, in consequence, did not conceive himself in a situation to stand the brunt of a battle, and he suddenly decamped from Tarragona at the approach

of the Spaniards. These successes were followed up by the capture of Balaguier, a town which commanded the course of the Segra and the valleys of Urgel, which were considered as the granary of Catalonia.¹

It is probable that Philip might have obtained still more decisive advantages, had he not been recalled to Madrid by the sickness of the Queen. She had been ill from an attack of erysipelas for some days ere the King was aware of her danger, and she expired on the 6th of October, in the forty-second year of her age, before Philip's arrival at Madrid. She left behind her a memory which was long cherished and revered among the Spaniards. Being both charitable and devout, she had founded a number of hospitals and eleemosynary institutions; but she was not an enemy to amusement, and particularly enjoyed theatrical representations, which were frequently exhibited at the royal palace of Buenretiro. During the King's excursions into the provinces, she generally remained at Madrid, and showed, during his absence, much prudence and ability in the management of the government. Philip, amidst his numerous infidelities, always treated her with that kindness and regard which was due to her virtues and her love for the Spanish people.² She

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. iv. part 2.

² Flores, *Memorias de las Reynas d'España*, ed. Madrid 1761. Voltaire, however, in his flippant and inconsiderate manner, calls her "Epouse de Philippe IV. très malheureuse en Espagne, où elle vecut sans crédit et sans consolation." (*Siècle de Louis XIV.*) This is contrary to the testimony of all Spanish writers; and Mad. d'Aulnoy, a Frenchwoman, who travelled in Spain more than thirty years after this Queen's decease, declares that the people still lamented her as if she had been but recently dead. (*Let. 3.*) Bossuet, in his funeral oration for her daughter, the Queen of Louis XIV, styles her "Isabelle digne fille de Henri le Grand, et de l'aveu de l'Espagne la meilleure Reine, comme la plus regrettée, qu'elle eût jamais vue sur le thrône."

had borne many children, most of whom lived but a short time after their birth, and none survived her, except the Prince Balthazar, and the Infanta Maria Theresa, who was subsequently united to Louis XIV. of France.

In the following season, Philip again left his capital for the eastern provinces of the peninsula. This expedition, however, was less fortunate than the previous campaign. He arrived at Saragossa, accompanied by the Prince Balthazar, with the design of having his only son acknowledged as heir to the kingdom of Aragon, and of obtaining some effectual assistance from its States. But far from receiving those marks of duty and attachment which he had anticipated, the Aragonese deputies signified that they would recognise the Prince only on condition that their privilege of not serving in war beyond the limits of the province should be unequivocally restored and confirmed.¹ The ill-timed renewal of these pretensions, in the midst of a destructive war, had such a prejudicial effect on the mind of the King, that he fell sick from vexation and chagrin. As soon as he was able for the journey he set out for Valencia, where he was received with due loyalty and affection. Philip was much delighted with the amenity of that balmy region, the liveliness and gaiety of its inhabitants, and their various amusements. His drooping health was gradually restored, and his mental uneasiness assuaged. He held an assembly of the Cortes of Valencia, in which he delivered a most gracious speech; and in return for his condescension, there was granted to him a levy of 2000 men for six years, to serve eight months each campaign, and to be clothed and paid at the expense of the States of Valencia. With this aid, he expressed himself highly gratified; and, before his departure, conferred many rewards and titles of dignity on the chief inhabitants.²

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

² Camargo, *Sumario anadido al Hist. d'España de Mariana*, an. 1645.

During the illness of the King at Saragossa and his stay at Valencia, the enemy, under the orders of the Count de Harcourt, who had succeeded La Mothe-Houdancourt, laid close siege to Rosas. The Spanish garrison made a gallant defence for two months ; but the bastions being at length taken, and a breach formed in the wall, the place surrendered, in order to prevent its being inevitably carried by assault. At this period, the Spanish General Cantelmo held the line of the Segra from Balaguiera to Lerida. It was the plan of the Count de Harcourt to dislodge him from the positions which he occupied along this river, and then having crossed it, to invade the kingdom of Aragon. In this scheme he partially succeeded, by the capture of Balaguiera, the chief point on the line ; but he did not at present think fit farther to prosecute his success, and he returned at the end of the campaign to Barcelona. As usual, the nation was highly incensed at Cantelmo for the loss of the important post of Balaguiera. In consequence of the blame thus attached to him, he was seized with a profound melancholy ; and having shortly afterwards died of grief, the baton of command was restored to Felipe de Silva,¹ the former Captain-General of Catalonia.

Though discouraged by the recent and unexpected loss of Rosas and Balaguiera, the Spaniards hoped to render all these acquisitions useless to the enemy by the occupation of Barcelona, which, though they were not in sufficient strength to besiege, they expected to obtain by plot and stratagem. Hippolita d'Aragon, better known by the name of the Baroness d'Albi, which she derived from her husband, a Catalan gentleman, was the soul of this enterprise. She was celebrated for her beauty, accomplishments, and gallantry ; and she employed not only gold, but all the force of her charms, to augment the

¹ *Mercurio*, t. v. part 1.

numbers of the conspirators, who were, for the most part, composed of her admirers and lovers. Having obtained the support of the Duke of Torralto, the Spanish Governor of Tarragona, she concerted measures for raising the populace, and delivering up the town to the Spaniards as soon as their fleet, which was to be fitted out from Tarragona, should appear off the harbour. But Margarit, the Governor of Barcelona, having conceived some vague suspicions of treachery, doubled the guards, and kept his troops constantly under arms, so that the conspirators durst not venture to make any demonstration. Twice the Spanish vessels approached within sight of the harbour, but on neither occasion did those on board perceive any movement, on shore, in their favour. By this time, the secret of the plot, which had been communicated to too many persons, was fully developed. The Count de Harcourt hastened from Balaguier to Barcelona, as soon as he received intelligence of the dangerous conspiracy. One of the accomplices, who was first arrested, though he withstood the torture, revealed the names of his associates at the persuasion of his confessor. They were instantly apprehended, and were all without delay delivered over to capital punishment, except the chief contriver of the plot, the Baroness d'Albi. Her talents, courage, and manifold graces, both of mind and person, having won the admiration of Harcourt, he merely commanded her to depart for Tarragona, after she had received a public admonition from the magistracy.¹

The Spaniards were now so completely discouraged by the failure, both of their arms and intrigues, that Philip offered his rebellious subjects, (whom he had once threatened to exterminate by fire and sword,) a truce for thirty years. This boon he tendered at a congress of the ministers of

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.* Reboulet, *Hist. du Regne de Louis XIV.*

the belligerent powers, convoked under the auspices of Pope Urban VIII.; and it would infallibly have been granted, had not the French plenipotentiaries insisted on some stipulations with regard to fortifying certain places they occupied in Catalonia, which showed their intention to preserve, or, whenever they found it convenient, to regain, a footing in that principality.¹

Hostilities being consequently continued, the remainder of the season was spent by Harcourt in attempting to reduce Lerida by famine, but it was nobly defended by a Portuguese officer called Gregorio Brito, who had been long in the Spanish service. Felipe de Silva having died about this time, the King recalled to the command of Catalonia the Marques of Leganez, who, having been acquitted of the charges preferred against him for misconduct in that principality, had been recently employed on the frontiers of Portugal. In the month of November, the French received intelligence that Leganez, with the army now placed under his command, meant to attack their lines before Lerida. The Count de Harcourt, who had been opposed to Leganez in Italy,² and held his military conduct in supreme contempt, did not think that he would venture to assault the camp. The Spanish General did every thing in his power to encourage this belief; and Harcourt, from the false confidence he entertained, having greatly relaxed in his vigilance, Leganez unexpectedly attacked him at midnight, forced his lines, and entered Lerida with one division of his troops, while with the remainder he defeated the French army, and dispersed it in all directions.³

Towards the close of this year, the King and the Spanish nation sustained a severe calamity by the death of the Prince Don Balthazar, in the 17th year of his age.

¹ Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan d'Austria*, lib. i.

² See above, p. 225.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*.

About three years before, a palace had been opened for him, his establishment had been fixed, and a negotiation had been entered into for his nuptials with Marianne of Austria, daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand. But he had never been admitted to any share in public concerns, or initiated into affairs of state. His preceptor, Juan Isasi, ventured to recommend that he should be introduced into the ordinary councils, that he might be gradually accustomed to the details of business. The advice seemed to be taken in good part by his royal father, but he replied, that he would not depart from the principles and practice of his predecessors.¹ A youth of idleness and unrestrained voluptuousness, led to a premature death. While still residing in Saragossa, he was seized with a severe illness, which, as reported to the King, and publicly given out, had been occasioned by overheating himself at tennis. But it was generally believed that it had been caused by the exhaustion² following on those excesses in which he was allowed, and even encouraged, to indulge, by his Governor, Don Pedro d'Aragon.³ The physicians who attended him, being ignorant of the cause of his disorder, bled him profusely, which exhausted what strength remained, and, in a few days, terminated his life. Don Luis de Haro was present at his death, and first communicated the sad intelligence to the King, who had re-

¹ Os agradezeo Maestro lo que me deçis: pero no quiero meterme in lo que non se metieron los mis antepasados. (*Mercurio*, t. iii. lib. iii.)

² “Derivò sua malattia e morte,” says Siri, “dallo sforzo fatto col mezo di certe droghe, per riparare la vergogna di non essere riuscito con bastante vigore in certa lotta amorosa, e dall’ haverlo troppo tardi disvelato a medici.”

³ He is so called by Siri and Mad. d'Aulnoy, p. 75. Mendez Silva says the Governor of the Prince at the time of his death, was Antonio Toledo, Marques of Mirabel, (*Noticia de los Ayos de Principes de Castilla*, p. 104.)

cently arrived at Saragossa to direct the operations in the east of Spain, and who immediately discovered from his countenance, when he entered the royal apartment, the fatal occurrence. He instantly retired to another chamber, where Don Luis, having followed him after a short time, found him engaged in writing circular letters, announcing the calamitous event to the commanders of armies, and the civil officers of state.¹ In these he declared that the loss he had sustained would only render him more anxious for the happiness of his subjects, whom he should henceforth regard as his surviving children,² and that, having lost one, it was the more incumbent on him to watch over the welfare of the remainder. Having subsequently learned the true circumstances connected with his son's death, he was highly incensed at the negligence and misconduct of his governor Pedro d'Aragon. He drove him from the kingdom into an exile, in which he remained till after the death of Philip, when he was recalled by the Queen-Regent, and appointed ambassador to Rome.³

The loss of Prince Balthazar, at this period, was perhaps the greatest misfortune that could have befallen the monarchy. Not that this young prince was particularly promising either in talents or disposition; but he was Philip's only son, and there was every prospect that the crown would descend to a female, or, if the King married again, and had male issue, that there would be, as in fact happened, a long minority. His death also deprived the nation, at least for a time, of those prospects of peace with France which were founded on the probability of an union between the young King, Louis XIV, and the Infanta Maria Theresa. The brother of that princess had been all along a feeble boy, and the prospect of his sis-

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. viii. part 2.

² Camargo, *Sumario*. Ortiz, *Compendio*.

³ D'Aulnoy, *Mem. de la Cour d'Espagne*, part i. p. 107.

ter's ultimate succession to the Crown, was such as to render her a match desirable to the French nation ; and in return for which, advantageous terms of peace might be procured. But now, when, in consequence of Balthazar's death, she had become the actual heiress to the Spanish monarchy, and Princess of Asturias, she could not, by the customs of the nation, be united to a foreign potentate.

In consequence of the loss of his son and of his queen, Philip was led to form and to acknowledge less respectable and less legitimate connexions. There was no country in Europe in which natural children were treated with such attention as in Spain. Hence the peculiar favour now extended by the King to one of his natural sons, proved less revolting to national prejudice than it might have been in other lands.

It had formed part of the detestable policy of Olivarez to allure the King by every species of amusement and sensual pleasure, in order that, his mind being totally abstracted from affairs of state, he might himself possess the uncontrolled management of the empire.

This was the age of the Arsenias of Madrid. Actresses were adored among the courtiers ; and Mad. d'Aulnoy says, that though they were generally far from handsome, their conversation and manners were usually most fascinating and attractive. Philip had always shown a great propensity towards theatrical entertainments ; and, about five years after his accession to the throne, Olivarez, in prosecution of his plans, had assembled from different parts of Spain a troop of the most famous comedians, whom he introduced at Court, to amuse the King by their representations in the royal theatre at Buenretiro. Among these was an actress, at that time about sixteen years of age, called Maria Calderona, who, though not remarkably beautiful, was the most graceful and fascinating

creature in the universe, and was particularly distinguished by her admirable elocution. Philip had no sooner seen her on the stage, than he was smitten with her charms, and expressed a desire to hear her rehearse in private some of her most celebrated scenes.¹ But this young actress had already captivated the heart of the accomplished Duke of Medina de-las-Torres, who had become enamoured of her soon after the loss of his wife Donna Maria, the daughter of Olivarez ; and as she entertained for him a reciprocal passion, she refused to listen to the proposals of the king unless her lover gave his consent. The Duke, fearing to incur the king's displeasure, answered her, that he must yield up to his Majesty a treasure for which he was not in a capacity to contend. Calderona, who had wished to elope with the Duke from Madrid, rather than submit to this exchange, bitterly reproached him with his passive indifference ; but ultimately found herself obliged to listen to the suit of the amorous monarch.² By order of Olivarez she was introduced to the royal apartments, where the King was so much pleased with her recitations, that he declared her his favourite, and offered to grant her whatever she might ask : but such was her moderation, that she replied she wished for nothing but the permanence of the royal favour and protection.

The King continued his intercourse with Calderona till the year 1629, when she gave birth to a son, afterwards so distinguished in Spain by the name of Don Juan d'Austria. Notwithstanding the ardent attachment ma-

¹ Leti *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*, p. 3 & 4. This work is anonymous, but is generally attributed to Gregorio Leti, and of consequence cannot be regarded as of the highest authority. "Scribendi ratio," says Struvius, "omnisque libri forma, auctorem fere prodit Gregorium Leti." *Bibliotheca Historica*, t. vi. p. 362.

² D'Aulnoy, *Voyage en Espagne*, let. iii.

nifested towards her by the King, Calderona still carried on her intrigue with the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres, and Philip having one day surprised them together, rushed on the Duke with his poniard. But Calderona threw herself between the king and her lover, exclaiming, that he must slay her first.¹ The Duke was subsequently removed from court, by being appointed Viceroy of Naples. Calderona for a time was restored to favour; but the King finding that she corresponded with her lover, and that her heart was still devoted to him, ordered her to withdraw into a monastery, as was customary in Spain with a mistress whom the king forsakes. Tired and disgusted with the world, she readily obeyed, and having written to the Duke to bid him an everlasting adieu, she received the veil from the hands of the Pope's nuncio in Spain,² and retired into the convent of Santa Isabella, where she soon after died.³

The son to whom Calderona had given birth, and whom the King at least believed to be his own, was brought up privately at Ocana, where he applied himself assiduously to his studies, and early made the most rapid progress in the learned languages, in mathematics and in history. Philip often went to see him at Ocana, and when he had reached the age of thirteen, he publicly acknowledged him as his son, being induced to show him this preference over his other illegitimate children, either in consequence of the talents which he so early manifested, or the superior love which he had borne towards his mother. Soon after this acknowledgment, Philip appointed him Grand Prior of Castile, as well as nominal governor of the Low Countries, and assigned him an attendance and retinue, which being superior to that of the Prince Bal-

¹ D'Aulnoy, *Voyage en Espagne*, let. iii.

² G. Leti, *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*,

³ Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.* t. vi. lib. 20.

thazar, excited considerable jealousy in the mind of the Queen, as also some degree of discontent in the nation, who as yet were not fully aware of his merits and accomplishments.

Notwithstanding his appointment to these high offices, Don John resided constantly at Buenretiro, beyond the walls of the city, and appeared but little at any public festivals or entertainments. On one occasion, however, he was introduced to the Queen and the Prince Balthazar: the former received him coldly; the latter merely said, that he would love him if he faithfully served his father. He was subsequently ordered to reside at Zafra in Estremadura, as it was intended that he should serve in the war against the Portuguese.¹

After the death of the Queen, and of the Prince Balthazar, the King bestowed on Don John his undivided affection. He now resided constantly at court; he was appointed high admiral of the fleet, and generalissimo of the Spanish armies. He obtained, in short, every preferment and distinction except the title of Infant, which he earnestly strove to procure, but which could not legally be conferred.²

Don John early proved himself deserving of the high situations to which he was prematurely raised. He was popular in his manners, and liberal in his disposition. His understanding was highly cultivated; he had a perfect knowledge of five different languages; and such was his turn both for the useful and ornamental arts, that while he could forge arms, he also painted beautifully, and played as skilfully as the first masters on almost every musical instrument.³ During the siege of Barcelona, he established a lecturer on

¹ *Mercurio*, t. ii. lib. i.

² D'Aulnoy, *Mém. de la Cour d'Espagne*.

³ D'Aulnoy, *Voyage en Espagne*, let. xlv.

mathematics in the camp, whom he honoured with his particular regard. During his hazardous campaign in the Netherlands, he used to discourse, while at table, on various subjects of philosophy, particularly scholastic points, if his confessor, or any other learned person, were present.¹ But he was much addicted to the vain speculations of judicial astrology, and the Earl of Bristol, though detested by the Spaniards, highly ingratiated himself with Don John in the Netherlands, by his knowledge of that imaginary science, and was requested by the prince to calculate his nativity.² “On the whole,” says Clarendon, “his parts were excellent, both natural and acquired, in fancy and judgment; and if he had not been restrained by his education, and accustomed to the pride and forms of a Spanish breeding, which likewise disposed him to laziness, and taking his pleasure, he was capable of any great employment, and would have discharged it well.”³ In person Don John was of small stature, but he was well made, and his countenance was full of intelligence and vivacity. Though without the thick Austrian lip,⁴ he resembled in figure and in some features, his royal father. But he had the brown complexion, the dark eyes, and the long jet hair of his mother Calderona.⁵

About the period when Don John was exalted to such high favour, the King, to the great scandal of all his orthodox and catholic subjects, became fascinated with the charms of a Moorish mistress, who persuaded him, it is said, to the practice of some dark and unchristian rites.

¹ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, book xv.

² Ibid.

³ Id. book xvi. See to the same purpose “*Life of King James II*, compiled from his own memoirs,” t. i. p. 312.

⁴ Senza la solita grossezza delle labbra Austriache. (Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 191.)

⁵ Leti, *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*.

While in this state of guilt and reprobation, a celebrated Beata of Madrid presented herself before him, and predicted that he was menaced with some signal calamity for having thus abandoned himself to the exercise of these profane and superstitious ceremonies. Philip was overwhelmed with confusion at hearing a secret which he had believed to be covered with the most impenetrable veil of silence and of night, thus, as it were, miraculously revealed.¹ He soon afterwards saw, as he believed, the prediction of the Beata accomplished by the discovery of a formidable conspiracy, planned in the very centre of his court, by which he had been nearly deprived at once of empire and of life. The Dukes of Abrantes and Içar, with several other Grandees, were concerned in this plot, and Don Carlos de Padilla was at its head. The mad and wicked design of these traitors was to assassinate the King while he was engaged in the pleasures of the chase, to place the Duke of Içar on the throne of Aragon, and to carry off the Infanta Maria Theresa to Lisbon, that she might there be compelled to espouse the Prince of Brazil, and thus again unite on one brow the crowns of Castile and Portugal. But the plot was discovered by the imprudence of its chief; he disclosed it in a letter to his brother Juan de Padilla, who was then at Milan, and named some who were engaged in it. This letter having been intercepted, Padilla, as head of the conspiracy, and Pedro de Silva, son of the Marques Montemayor, perished on the scaffold. The lives of the Duke of Içar, and the other accomplices, were spared, but they were condemned to close and perpetual imprisonment.²

When the King thus saw the denunciation of the Beata accomplished, he became, it is said, for some time

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronologique*, t. iv.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xii. part 2. Ortiz, t. vi. lib. xx. c. 10.

disordered in his mind. Reason and repentance, however, at length prevailed. He returned to the paths of religion and virtue, and entered into a treaty for a legitimate union with his niece, Mary Anne of Austria—a connection which proved far more pernicious to the Spanish monarchy than that with his Moorish mistress.

So long as the Infant Don Balthazar had survived, the King would not listen to any suggestions for entering into a second marriage. But after the untimely death of that prince, he yielded to the wishes which, in consequence of the state of the succession, were generally expressed by the nation, and, after some discussion, the Austrian princess was preferred to Leonora Gonzaga of Mantua, and to the celebrated Madame Montpensier, daughter of Gaston Duke of Orleans.

Mary Anne of Austria was the niece of her intended husband, being the daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand III, by the Infanta Maria of Spain, who had once been affianced to Charles I, King of England. The nuptials having been resolved on at the close of the year 1647, she was married by proxy at Vienna. After this ceremony, she set out for Trent, where she awaited the arrival of her household, which had been formed in Spain, and which, with the Duke of Maqueda at its head, had left Madrid about the same time that the new Queen had departed from the Austrian capital. At Revoredo, three miles from Trent, she was delivered over by her German attendants to her new household; but her brother, the King of Hungary, accompanied her as far as Milan, and asked permission of the King of Spain to attend her to Madrid, and there receive the hand of the Infanta Maria Theresa. Philip, however, prudently declined this proposal, as he looked forward to the union of his daughter with Louis XIV, which might yet be accom-

plished, if he had a son by his new marriage.¹ He was, therefore, obliged to part at Milan with his sister, who, having made a stately progress through the chief towns in the north of Italy, in which she was received with great honour and distinction, at length embarked at Finale, and, after a tedious voyage, landed at Denia, on the coast of Valencia, where she reposed for some days in the ancient palace of the Dukes of Lerma,² who, before their elevation to that title, were Marquises of Denia. In her journey towards Madrid, she is said to have been much struck with the national customs and manners. In one of the towns through which she passed, distinguished by its manufacture of silk stockings, some of these articles, (it is told,) of various colours and textures, were presented to her Majesty, on the part of the citizens. But her chief Mayordomo was highly indignant at this offer. He collected all the packets of silk stockings, and threw them in the faces of the deputies of the town, asking them at the same time “if they had yet to learn that Queens of Spain had no legs.”³ This expression, which was meant to imply that their exalted rank rendered it unnecessary, or even derogatory, for them to touch the ground with their feet like other mortals, being taken by the young Queen, who as yet knew the language imperfectly, in its literal signification, she burst into tears and insisted on returning to Vienna, which she declared she would never have quitted, had she been aware that her legs were to be offered up as a sacrifice to her new dignity.⁴ On this

¹ Mascareños, *Viage de la Reyna Maria-Anna d'Austria*, ed. 1650, 4to.

² Id.

³ Aveis de saber que las Reynas d'España no tienen piernas?

⁴ It may be doubted if this story, which is told by the Countess d'Aulnoy in her *Mémoires Secrets de la Cour d'Espagne*, has any more foundation in fact than her *Oiseau Bleu* or *Prince Lutin*.

naïveté of his bride being reported to the King, he is said to have smiled, which was a rare occurrence with this monarch, for, whether from temperament or assumed gravity, he was only known three times in his life to have allowed his lips the benefit of that relaxation.

Proceeding on her journey towards the Capital, the Queen was met at Navalcarnero, about four leagues from Madrid, by the King, accompanied by the Cardinal Sandoval, Archbishop of Toledo, who pronounced the nuptial benediction. From this town, where the Queen was entertained with fireworks and illuminations, the royal pair proceeded to the Escorial, and after a short stay in that palace, to Buenretiro, whence the Queen made her public and triumphant entrance into Madrid. At that procession every thing was conducted on a scale of the greatest magnificence. Calderon, the celebrated dramatic poet, who was then a court favourite, and frequently employed in the arrangement of public exhibitions and festivals, was consulted on this occasion ;¹ and Alonso de Cano, who excelled as a painter, statuary, and architect, designed the four triumphal arches through which the Queen passed from Buenretiro to the royal palace within the city. This arcade, which was universally admired, as well for the novelty as the nobleness of the idea,² was adorned with pieces of sculpture, and with paintings emblematic of the four quarters of the world. At one spot appeared a miniature representation of Mount Parnassus, formed of raised planks which were painted so as to figure rocks and trees, and on the summit were placed statues of national poets of three different periods, holding in their hands scrolls of passages from their works, applicable to the joyful circumstances of the day. The Elements, the Seasons, and the Virtues, all appeared

¹ Bouterweck, *Hist. Litter. Espagnole*, t. ii. p. 147.

² Cumberland's *Anecdote of Painters in Spain*, vol. ii.

in allegoric array ; and columns or pillars everywhere met the eye, inscribed with Spanish or Latin verses, most of which appear to have been written by the son of the barber Nunez. One of the most tolerable turns on the Queen's long protracted journey :—

Candidior nivibus, Mariana, nitentior astris,
Surge, veni, et roseo perfice rura pede ;
Surge, veni, dulcesque lares et limina linque,
Quid trahis in longas otia lenta moras ?
Appropera, nec te votis jam subtrahe nostris,
Sacula sunt regnis quaelibet hora tuis.¹

The new queen, at the period of her arrival in Spain, was in the first bloom of youth, being only seventeen years of age, and was of the fair Austrian complexion. Lord Clarendon, who saw her at Madrid a short while after her entrance into that city, says “ that she was not tall, round-faced, and inclined to be fat.” She was of a gay, sprightly temper, and, for some time, of agreeable popular manners. But her disposition was intriguing, and her mind weak, suspicious, and vindictive. She, unfortunately, did not love the Spanish people, and her hatred and jealousy of John of Austria, the only person whose talents could at that time have availed for the preservation of the monarchy, proved highly injurious to its interests, even during the life of Philip ; and she nearly completed its destruction, when, directed by the counsels of her confessor, Father Nithard, she ruled the kingdom with absolute sway during the minority of her son.

This Jesuit had been unfortunately chosen by the Emperor to accompany his daughter to Spain. He was of obscure birth, and for some time taught philosophy, as also the Canon law, at Gratz ; but his subtle, insinuating talents, soon procured him promotion. In all things

¹ *Noticia del recibimiento y entrada de la Reyna D. Maria-Ana,* ed. Madrid, 1650.

he was a complete Jesuit. He was zealous for the interests of his order : he deeply studied, and thoroughly understood, the characters of those with whom he associated, and whom he could employ to advance his purposes. He was highly esteemed and revered by the families in Vienna, and by the ladies of the imperial court, whose religious director he became ; and their good offices aided him in procuring the high situation to which he was now called. During his residence in Spain, he exercised an absolute and baleful influence over the mind of the Queen. But though the King respected him as the confessor of her Majesty, he never conferred on him any additional dignity, or permitted him, at least publicly, to interfere in affairs of state.

CHAPTER VIII.

TUMULTS IN NAPLES.

—— Saevitque animis ignobile vulgus,
Jamque faces et saxa volant ; furor arma ministrat.

VIRGIL, *Æneid*.

IN the kingdom of Naples, to which the sovereignty of the Island of Sicily was annexed, the feudal government had been established in the same form, and with the same imperfections, as among the other nations of Europe. The elements of discord were inherent in its civil polity, and the violent revolutions which from time to time occurred, increased the blemishes in its constitution. The frequent interruptions in the succession of its princes destroyed amongst the nobility the hereditary attachment to the family of the sovereign. Each new pretender to the crown was obliged to court the barons, on whose support he depended for the success of his claims ; and even when seated on the throne, a prince who held his sceptre by a disputed title, durst not venture on any measure which might limit the privileges of the nobles.

While the higher orders were thus indulged in the boldest usurpations, the lower ranks, from their proverbial fickleness, were ready to follow each turbulent leader who addressed himself to their inclination for amusement, and their capricious love of novelty.

From these causes, the monarchy of Naples, almost since its foundation, had been the most distracted in Europe. The rival houses of Aragon and Anjou contended for its crown from the middle of the thirteenth to the

middle of the fifteenth century. At the end, however, of that period, the Princes of the line of Aragon obtained such firm possession of this long disputed inheritance, that they transmitted it quietly to an illegitimate branch of their family.¹ The Count of Maine and Provence, the last heir of the Angevin race, feeling himself unable to cope with his powerful competitor, ceded his rights to Louis XI. of France and his successors. In virtue of this transference, Charles VIII, as is well known, having crossed the Alps, invaded Naples, and dispossessed the spurious line of the family of Aragon. But his retreat was as precipitate as his advance had been rapid; and the fugitive King Fernando, supported by the Spanish General Gonsalvo de Cordova, was quickly reinstated in his realm. His successor Frederic preserved the kingdom which had been thus regained, till his relative Ferdinand of Aragon (who, by his marriage with Isabella of Castile, and his conquest of Grenada, now commanded all the resources of Spain), entered into an alliance with Louis XII, for the purpose of dividing the Neapolitan dominions. These two potentates compelled the unfortunate King to resign his sceptre;² but though they had con-

¹ Robertson's *View of State of Europe*, sec. iii.

² Never was the dethronement and expulsion of a monarch more poetically deplored:

Addit tristia fata, et te, quem luget ademptum

Italia infelix (sive id gravis ira deorum

Seu sors dura tulit) trans altas evehit Alpes,

Mox agit oceani propè littora: denique sistit

Spumantem ad Ligerim, parvâque includit in urnâ.

Heu sortem miserandam! heu pectora cœca futuri!

Hæccine te fessum tellus extrema manebat

Hospitiis, post tot terræque marisque labores?

Pone tamen gemitus: nec te monumenta tuorum,

Aut moveant sperata tuis tibi funera regnis—

Grata quies patriæ: sed et omnis terra sepulchrum.

SANNAZZAR. *Eclog.*

curring in seizing his territories, they disagreed concerning the partition of their conquests. Gonsalvo de Cordova, however, by his prowess and military talents, soon stripped the French of the share which they claimed in the spoil, and secured to his master the peaceable and undisturbed possession of the whole realm. The Neapolitans, like the other inhabitants of Italy, disliked a foreign sway; but the pride, firmness, and energy of the Castilians, bore down the ingenuity of the natives; and Ferdinand transmitted the kingdom of Naples, along with his other dominions, to his grandson Charles V. Thenceforth the country was governed by a Viceroy, with the assistance of what was called the Collateral Council, consisting of six members, three of whom were Spaniards, and three Neapolitans. The civic affairs of the capital were administered by six deputies, chosen from its different quarters. One of these, who usually acted as the chief police magistrate, being chosen entirely by the populace, was styled the *Eletto del popolo*. The city and its harbour were completely commanded by three fortresses. Castelnuovo, which was adjacent to the modern palace and to the mole, had been the residence of the ancient kings of Naples. It was first erected by Charles I. of Anjou, but it had been enlarged, and its fortifications improved successively by Alfonso the first of Aragon, by the Great Captain, and the Viceroy Pedro de Toledo. Castel Uovo, so called from its oval form, was situated on a rock which juts into the sea, and was joined to the shore by a narrow tongue of land. The Fort of St Elmo, which was the most considerable of the three, and may be accounted the Acropolis of Naples, stood on the summit of a hill of the same name, and possessed the entire command of the city. There were also a number of convents and churches, placed on elevated situations, the occupa-

tion of which was important, and was usually a subject of contention during civil commotions.

In order to ingratiate himself with a turbulent nobility and fickle populace, Ferdinand had bestowed various privileges on the Neapolitans, and relieved them from many oppressive taxes with which they had been loaded by their former sovereigns. Charles V. nominally confirmed to his Italian subjects the enjoyment of these immunities: On his investiture in the kingdom by the Pope, he promised on oath that no new taxes should be laid on the people of Naples by himself or his successors, without the consent of the Apostolic See; and if imposed without that sanction, the inhabitants had liberty to resist payment by force, and yet not incur the guilt of rebellion against the prince who governed them. But the expensive wars in which the Emperor was perpetually engaged, and the rapacity of his Viceroy, frequently subjected the Neapolitans to contributions, which, though palliated by the name of donatives, were in fact exactions from which they were constitutionally exempted. Giannone, who in general is highly favourable to the characters of the Spanish Viceroy of Naples, has much applauded the moderate and equitable administration of Don Pedro de Toledo, who governed the kingdom during a great part of the reign of Charles V. But he excited a dangerous insurrection by his attempt to establish the Inquisition; and his attacks on the privileges of the nobility drove the Prince of Salerno, and other malcontents, into open rebellion.

During the reign of Philip II., the interior of the kingdom was harassed by banditti, and its coasts were plundered by Turkish pirates. The former were completely organized, and had formed themselves, under a chief or leader, into a regular army, which often baffled the troops of government. But these evils were light when compared with the exactions of the Spanish rulers.

The prodigious expenses of the wars which Philip carried on in so many quarters of the globe, compelled him to make frequent demands on the Neapolitans for pecuniary supplies. Some of these viceroys were wiser and less rapacious than others ; but, with all of them, it was less an object to render the state flourishing, than, by remitting immense supplies, to ingratiate themselves with the ministry at Madrid. Their chief purpose was to satisfy the everlasting cravings of the Court for money, without driving the Neapolitans to actual insurrection. It is said that Cardinal Granvelle, the celebrated counsellor of Charles V. and Philip II, who was one of the most able and moderate of the number, levied, in the course of his four years' administration, 2,300,000 ducats, exclusive of the sums accruing from the sales of titles and offices. During the Count de Miranda's viceroyalty, which by triennial prorogations continued for nine years, he exacted not less than six millions of ducats. This sum, which was a high price to pay for a bad government, was chiefly employed in building, equipping, and manning ships, to join the Armada of Spain in its unfortunate expedition against England. Olivarez, the father of the Count-Duke, and last Viceroy of Naples during the reign of Philip II, set out with a rigid reformation of abuses, and a retrenchment of superfluous expenses. But he was speedily recalled, on the accession of Philip III. to the throne of Spain.¹

In the first year of the reign of that monarch, and during the viceroyalty of Fernan Ruiz de Castro, Count of Lemos, a conspiracy for the expulsion of the Spaniards was hatched by the philosopher Campanella, but it was quickly discovered, and easily suppressed. It was during the government of his successor, the Count of Beneven-

¹ Giannone, *Istoria Civile de Napoli*, lib. xxxiv. Orloff, *Mem. Hist. sur le Royaume de Naples*, t. ii. c. 7 ; ed. Paris 1819.

to, that the privileges granted by the Emperor Charles V. were first openly violated,¹ and from his time little farther delicacy or restraint was felt in their infringement. After a short interval, the Count was succeeded by that celebrated patron of literature and the arts Pedro Fernandez Castro, Count of Lemos, son of the former Viceroy of that title. During his sway, the viceregal palace was converted into a temple of the muses. Universities were patronized, and academies flourished; but the same system of exaction was still continued by the insatiable Court of Madrid, and the people were no more lightened of their burdens by this mild and amiable viceroy, than by his intriguing, politic, and turbulent successor the Duke d'Ossuna.²

Don Antonio Zapatta, who was Viceroy at the accession of Philip IV, was desirous of restoring order in the monarchy, and dispensing good to the people. At first he was highly popular; but the scarcity with which the kingdom was afflicted for several seasons, rendered all his endeavours ineffectual, and in consequence of laying some additional taxes on grain, silk and wine, he was often grossly insulted by the riotous populace.³ At length some attempts which he made to reform the abuses in the coin, and the little vigour he had shown in repressing the recent tumults, induced the Spanish Court to recall him, and to appoint in his place the Duke of Alva, who would have removed many causes of the public complaints, had not his efforts been counteracted by a frightful series of earthquakes, famines, and other natural calamities, and by the incessant demands from Spain for pecuniary supplies. The wars now commenced by Olivarez were more burdensome than the prodigal domestic expenditure of Lerma; and the Viceroy was obliged to furnish his court

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 15.

² Giannone, lib. xxxv.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*.

not only with money, but troops to serve in the Spanish armies, in the Valteline and Low Countries. Such was the emergency, that he extended pardon to delinquents and banditti, who should agree to follow the royal standard; but all his exertions proving insufficient to satisfy the exorbitant demands of the ministry, he was removed from his situation, and the Duke of Alcala was appointed in his room.

This new Viceroy had the same difficulties to encounter, as those with which his predecessors had so long struggled. As the ambition and mismanagement of the Spanish government increased, the distresses of the country increased also, till, at length, the perpetual demands of the court, both for men and money, occasioned a sort of public bankruptcy; and the crown lands were exposed to sale, in order to supply the necessities of the state. The descents of the pirates and ravages of the banditti were renewed, and the public disorders reached such a pitch, as to bid defiance to civil government, of which almost a total cessation ensued. The impoverishment of the royal treasury was completed by the arrival of the Infanta Maria, once the destined bride of Charles of England, who now came to Naples on her way to Germany to meet her affianced husband Ferdinand, King of Hungary. She was accompanied by the Duke of Alva, the predecessor of the present Viceroy, a splendid court, and a numerous retinue. During her stay at Naples, which she thought fit to protract for four months, she was constantly entertained with tournaments and magnificent festivals. The unfortunate Viceroy, who, from the time of her arrival, continued in daily expectation of her departure, retained all the while a number of horses and various articles hired for her journey. When she at length announced her intention of proceeding, as she saw that the royal treasury was completely cleared out, the Vice-

roy ventured to tell her, that if she had communicated her intentions of honouring Naples with so long a stay, he would have dismissed the horses and suspended the other preparations for her expedition.¹ The Duke of Alva, who had reluctantly quitted the government of Naples, and was extremely jealous of his successor, embraced this opportunity of complaining to the Court of Madrid concerning the disrespect used towards the Most Serene Infanta, and the poor entertainment which had been provided for her. Olivarez listened the more readily to these accusations, as he was desirous to procure the viceroyalty for his relative the Count of Monterey, who was both the brother of that minister's wife and the husband of his sister.²

The Duke of Alcala was accordingly removed in the year 1631, and the Count of Monterey, at that time the Spanish ambassador to the Vatican, was appointed in his place. His administration was rendered peculiarly calamitous at its commencement by an eruption of Mount Vesuvius, which threatened the total destruction of the capital. Never had any country suffered, in so short a time, such a series of misfortunes. The object of the new governor, in accepting his present situation, was to repair his private fortune, which had been mortgaged in Spain,³ and which he quickly relieved by means of those contributions that were now wrung from the people in addition to the sums exacted for the service of the state. The immense revenues, however, supplied by the Neapolitans, and the troops they sent to the Netherlands, Milan, and other quarters of Europe, and which during Monterey's government exceeded 50,000 men, sufficiently testify the vast natural riches of the country, and the resources which its inhabitants possessed in trade and manufactures: and

¹ Giannone, *Istor. Civil. de Napoli*, lib. xxxvi. c. 2.

² Ibid.

³ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 16.

had they been governed at that period by native and resident princes, who would have consulted only the interests of Naples, the fertility of the soil could hardly have failed to render them a wealthy, if not a powerful, people. But the unfortunate land had never once been visited by its sovereigns since the time of Charles V, and it had now for ages laboured under the accumulated weight of the feudal system and of viceregal administration. The former chained and enslaved nine-tenths of its population, while the latter, the most pernicious of all forms of government, subjected the whole nation to systematic plunder, and rendered the country subservient to the interests of a foreign court, proud, rapacious, and vindictive.

Those private motives in the Cabinet of Madrid, which had exalted Monterey to the Viceroyalty of Naples, occasioned his recall. Olivarez was now anxious to bestow this preferment on his son-in-law the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres ; and as his daughter, the beautiful Donna Maria, to whom the Duke had been first married, was now no more, he was desirous that he should espouse the Princess Stigliano, the greatest heiress in Naples, to whom he was accordingly united immediately after his arrival in Italy. This alliance connected him with almost all the great families in the kingdom of Naples, and consequently the licence of the nobility, and their impunity in the oppression of their vassals, increased during his administration. A number of cities and villages were also overthrown by earthquakes, and upwards of 10,000 of their inhabitants were buried in the ruins. On the revolt of Portugal and Catalonia, the imposts were redoubled ; and, from his close connection with the prime minister of Spain, the present Viceroy was disposed to procure whatever supplies might enable him to carry into effect his favourite objects of ambition and policy, among which, at this moment, the chief were, the recovery of the kingdom

of Portugal and the suppression of the Catalonian insurrection.

Olivarez, however, was no sooner driven from power, than the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres was recalled, and on his departure, he declared—that he left the kingdom in such a condition that four respectable families could scarcely extract from it a livelihood.¹ The situation of Viceroy of Naples, however exalted, had become peculiarly painful to every person of humanity, on account of the incessant oppressions which the Court of Madrid compelled the local government to exercise on the inhabitants. The office, however, was accepted by the Admiral of Castile, though, from his rank and eminent services at Fontarabia, he had strong pretensions, after the disgrace of Olivarez, to be appointed to the situation of first minister; and the present favourite Luis de Haro, it was thought, sent him to Naples in order to detain him at a distance from court.² During the short period of his administration, the appearance of the Turks on the Neapolitan coasts obliged him to augment the marine; and, in order to defray the additional expense which was thus incurred, he laid a capitation-tax on every citizen of Naples. In consequence of this new oppression, many inhabitants being expelled from their homes or reduced to famine, were obliged to join the troops of banditti. At length, however, the people became exasperated to such a degree, that, dreading a general insurrection, the Viceroy ordered the impost to be withdrawn. This instance of prudence and discretion³ was so much disap-

¹ Brusoni, *Histor. d'Italia*, lib. xv.

² Giannone, lib. xxxvi. c. 6.

³ Siri says the Admiral was “di retissima mente, limpidissimo, e il più affabile e amabile personaggio che unqua uscisse dalle Spagne, delle cui maniere soave e charitatevoli s’invaghirono li Napolitani,

proved at the Court of Madrid, that he was superseded in the government, and his place was filled by Ponce de Leon, Duke of Arcos.

Though every measure of extortion had been already adopted which could collect the property of the subject into the coffers of the prince, the supplies were still inadequate to the exigencies and demands of the Court of Madrid. The Spanish ministry had been so long accustomed to receive immense remittances from Naples, that they now considered it as an inexhaustible mine, and their only object in the choice of a viceroy seems to have been the selection of one who might work it out. A fitter instrument of oppression and insult could not have been found than the Duke of Arcos. This nobleman, it is said, was specious and plausible; he possessed all the arts of a courtier, and he had unfortunately succeeded in persuading the minister Luis de Haro that he was a man of talents.¹ The new Viceroy arrived at Naples in February 1646, and soon proved himself to be the most rapacious governor to whom the hapless Neapolitans had yet been subjected. He was imbued with all the national pride of a Spaniard,—he despised the Italians, and rejoiced in every opportunity which the discontent, consequent on their miseries, afforded for severity. Soon after his appointment, a Spanish ship of war happened to be burned in the Gulf of Naples, with the loss of 200 lives and 300,000 ducats on board. The Viceroy, affecting to believe that it had been designed set on fire, exercised many unjustifiable severities on inno-

veggendo che compativa alle loro estreme miserie, che si astineva dal chiedere i consueti donativi, e comandava à gli esattori de procedere mitamente nell' astrignere i popoli a pagamenti." (*Mercurio*, t. x. p. 17.)

¹ Meissner, *Masaniello*.—*Historisches Bruchstück*; ed. Leipsic, 1784.

cent citizens ; and his proceedings, on this occasion, tended farther to exasperate those feelings which had already been so highly irritated by incessant oppressions and exactions.

While the public mind was in this state, and the haughty sullen disposition of the Viceroy had confirmed the unpopularity of the cause which it was his duty to uphold,¹ Portolongone in the isle of Elba, and Piombino on the coast of Tuscany, were captured by the French. From these positions, and from Orbitello, the enemy fitted out squadrons which infested the shores of Naples, and a formidable armament now daily threatened a disembarkation of troops in the vicinity of the capital. It became necessary to provide against this imminent danger : but before the appointment of the Duke of Arcos, his predecessor the Admiral of Castile, on pretence of the King's service, had shipped all the disposable troops to Spain, in order, as was suspected, to embarrass him in his

¹ I think, however, that Desodoards, in his *Histoire d'Italie*, (t. vi. p. 398.) is mistaken in attributing to the Viceroy, on the authority of Brusoni, a shameful answer given to the Deputies of the States of Naples when setting forth their inability to furnish supplies. By Brusoni's account, it seems to have been uttered by some minister or secretary of the Duke of Arcos, though even as coming from him it produced an effect most prejudicial to the Spanish interest : " I cui popoli," says Brusoni, " ricorsi a Napoli, esclamando negli orecchi di un principal ministro per trovare qualche sollievo a tanti mali, egli diede loro una risposta assai più grave di tutte le gravezze del mondo, dicendo—Che se non potevano pagare, vendessero l'onore delle moglie e delle figlie e soddisfacessero. Così dura e ingiuriosa risposta, e da non essere mai uscita di bocca di un huomo politico, non che di un huomo cristiano, divulgata dalla fama per le provincie del Regno, sparse negli animi de popoli quei semi di disgusto, che all' primo suono delle rivolte produssero de quei frutti, che sono riusciti loro, e insieme alla monarchia di Spagna, cotanto amari." (Lib. xv.)

government. The new Viceroy in consequence had found the country unprotected, and the fortresses dismantled or without garrisons; and the treasury, in spite of the enormous taxes, was completely exhausted. To defray the cost of the requisite defence of the kingdom, and of an expedition which was meditated for the recovery of Portolongone, the Duke of Arcos saw himself compelled to apply to the Council of the city for the assistance of what was termed an extraordinary donative, which meant a loan immediately supplied by some usurer, and repaid to him by the levy of a new impost. As almost all commodities, however, were already taxed, and the price of every sort of provisions was exorbitantly high, it was found difficult to contrive any device by which the donative, fixed at a million of ducats, could be raised. In an evil hour the Viceroy, with advice, as is said, of the collateral council and the consent of the civil magistracy of Naples,¹ resolved to lay a tax on all sorts of fruit, whether green or dried,—a duty which more than one of his predecessors had attempted to impose, but which had been always withdrawn on account of the discontent it created. As dried grapes and figs formed, in the present scarcity of provisions, the chief subsistence of the lower orders, the enhanced price of their usual nourishment reduced them to the utmost misery, and they were often obliged to sell their furniture, and resort to the most painful extremities, in order to make up their arrears of duties.

Still, however, their sufferings were endured by the inhabitants without much clamour, for four or five months, but in May (1647), when the fruit began to ripen, the women and children often intercepted the Viceroy on the streets, and, with miserable cries and lamentations, implored him

¹ Tarsia, *Tumultos de Cividat y Reyno de Napoles*. This Spanish author drew up his account from the relations he received from his countrymen who were at Naples during the time of the tumults.

to remove the obnoxious tax. On one occasion, the citizens of the district called Lavinaro, and other quarters of the town, placed themselves in bands as he passed through the market-place, and petitioned him in a body to remit the duty. Seeing himself thus surrounded by a clamorous multitude, the Viceroy was forced to appease them by promising, that in a few days he would afford them satisfaction. As he took no steps, however, for redeeming his pledge, he was again beset, while on his way to mass, by a crowd, who did not petition as formerly, but peremptorily demanded the abolition of the unpopular tax, and threatened him with vengeance in case of a refusal. The Viceroy, who appears to have been as timid as he was rapacious and faithless, renewed the pledge he had already forfeited, and returned with precipitation to his palace. From this time he seldom ventured into the public streets of the city, and confined himself to the mole, or that part of the sea shore within sight of Castelnovo,¹ a fortress adjacent to the palace. He indeed consulted the collateral council on the subject of the fruit-tax, but as he found that its members differed in opinion, he still deferred to grant that relief, of which he had twice given the assurance. Father Pepa, a celebrated preacher of the order of Theatins, informed him, in a private conference, that he could perceive, from the confessions of his penitents, that the people were in the highest degree exasperated on account of the new tax, which bore chiefly on the lower classes, whereas former imposts had been equally sustained by the different orders of the state. This warning, however, met with no regard, and the populace, enraged at the Viceroy's fre-

¹ Nicolai, *Storia delle Rivoluzioni di Napoli*, ed. 1660. This author was at Naples during the time of the insurrections. He was afterwards envoy and agent for the Duke of Lorraine at Madrid. His work is dedicated to Don John of Austria.

quent breaches of faith, now claimed his attention to his promises, by affixing placards in various parts of the city, and by setting fire to the office in the market-place, where the obnoxious tribute was collected.¹

While the people were in this discontented and dangerous frame of mind, intelligence reached Naples, that the inhabitants of Palermo had, by means of popular insurrections and force of arms, obtained a total release from some of the most burdensome imposts, and a mitigation of the others, besides an amnesty for all the outrages committed by them in vindication of their privileges. The Marques de Los Velez, so infamous for the barbarities exercised by him in Catalonia, was at that time Governor of Sicily, and to the mixture in his conduct of violence, treachery, and pusillanimity, must be chiefly attributed those tumults in Palermo, by which its populace obtained a remission of their taxes.² Many ringleaders of the Sicilian mob had crossed over to Naples, and by their boasts of success at Palermo, and their inflammatory harangues, excited the insubordination of their fellow-subjects.³ The Viceroy of Naples appears to have been the counterpart of the wretched Los Velez in irresolution. He could neither determine to give up the fruit-tax, nor to enforce its regular payment, by vigorously suppressing disturbances. The dread of popular commotion still led him from time to time to promise its revocation, but his apprehension of incurring the displeasure of his court, and the persuasions of the farmers of the revenue, as also of many among the nobility who had advanced sums on the security of the returns from the new tax, always induced him to protract the periods fixed for its repeal.⁴

¹ Giannone, *Stor. Civil. di Nap.* lib. xxxvii. c. 2.

² Brusoni, lib. xv.

³ Tarsia, *Tumultos de Napoles.*

⁴ Midon's *Rise and Fall of Masaniello*, ed. 1729. This is chiefly a translation from Giraffi's *Rivoluzioni di Napoli*, printed at Venice

It seems marvellous, when we reflect on the restless disposition of the Neapolitans, their frequent insurrections in former times, and the recent provocations they had endured, that they should so long have thus quietly submitted to the iron rule of their foreign oppressors. But the Spanish Viceroys, though indifferent to the interests of the kingdom, and callous to the sufferings of the people, had sufficient skill to prevent dangerous combinations amongst them. They had erected numerous courts of justice, where the judges received so small a salary, that they were tempted to encourage law-suits, to take bribes, and protract their decisions. The fiery and restless temper of the Neapolitans led them, like the fickle Athenians, to indulge in litigation. Dissensions being thus excited amongst families, prevented the natives from uniting in such mutual associations, as might endanger the safety of the government. The taxes too were mort-

1647, as is also Howel's *Exact History of the Late Revolutions of Naples*, first published in 1650.

I find, however, a remarkable discrepancy between the Italian and Spanish authors in their accounts of the insurrection of Masaniello, particularly in all that relates to the conduct of the Viceroy. Tarsia (*Tumultos de Napoles*, c. 7), says that he reluctantly imposed the fruit-tax by advice of the civil magistracy of Naples; that he felt most anxious to repeal it, but that those by whose recommendation it was laid on, represented that if it was removed, the people would insist on the abrogation of all the new taxes, some of which were much more severe than that on fruit. Nevertheless, the Viceroy issued orders to the magistracy, that it should be abolished in twenty days; but unfortunately, five days before the expiry of the appointed time, the great insurrection of the 7th July broke out. Buraña, a Sardinian writer, who was in Naples at the time, says that, in fact, the fruit-tax was not the chief cause of the tumults, but was seized on as a pretence by the restless Lazzaroni, who always expected advantages from change and disorder. (*Batalla Peregrina con Portentoso Triumpho de las armas d'España*, ed. 1651.) Nicolai, though an Italian author, is evidently in the Spanish interests.

gaged to natives of the realm, who thus became interested in the support of the administration which had imposed them, and also shared the obloquy with the Spaniards. A great proportion of the people lived in a state of vassalage to their barons, who were the greatest tyrants on earth to those beneath them. In former times, as we have seen, the successive claimants to the crown of Naples had been obliged to conciliate them at all hazards. The Spanish Viceroy, in their turn, ingratiated themselves with the nobles, by tolerating the oppressions and cruelties which they exercised towards their dependents,¹ and confirmed their own despotism by ever fomenting that dislike and those dissensions which existed between the nobility and the lower orders.

At the present moment, however, a combination of circumstances concurred to kindle into a blaze those latent sparks of irritation and fury which had been long smouldering in the Lavinaro, and other poor but swarming districts of the city. The success of the recent seditions in Palermo, seemed to lead the way to revolt, and the vacillating character of the Duke of Arcos, was neither calculated to conciliate nor overawe. The only laudable part of his policy, rather turned, under the circumstances, to his disadvantage. Shocked by the excesses of the nobility, he had attempted, at the commencement of his administration, to put some restraint on their unlimited power of oppression.² But his vain endeavours failed to

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 10.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 29. This author exhibits in a striking point of view the crimes of the nobility, at the commencement of the Duke of Arcos' administration, and the impunity with which they were practised. "S'era in Diomede Caraffa, Duca di Matalone, abituata à segno la licenza d'opprimere, di rapire, e d'uccidere che cinto perpetuamente da sicarii e assassini, e per leggerissime cause e bagatelle, non contentavasi di far dar la morte à questo e a quello secondo li prendeva la fantasia, se prima con ogni

conciliate the populace, and, by exasperating the nobility, left him in the hour of danger without support in any quarter.

A bold leader now alone was wanting, to organize a most formidable insurrection amongst a people, who, though usually sunk in the apathy of sensual indulgence, have been remarkable for violent, though short-lived, bursts of vindictive feeling. In Sicily, a brazier named Alexis, had headed the mob of Palermo; and from the commencement of the Neapolitan discontents, an old crafty priest called Giulio Genuino, now in the eightieth year of his age, had been secretly encouraging the hostility of his countrymen to the government. Having been convicted of seditious practices, and banished for some years to the citadel of Oran in Africa, during the viceroyalty of the Duke d'Ossuna, he was regarded as a victim to Spanish tyranny, and, as such, had become venerable in the eyes of the people. But they soon found a more youthful, active, and popular leader, in the celebrated Tomaso Aniello of Amalfi, commonly called, by a familiar abbreviation of his name, Masaniello. Few persons who merely directed a blind infuriate mob, have obtained such notoriety as this humble fisherman, and there are few whose unexpected elevation, and sudden downfall, exhibit such a striking example of the vicissitudes attending a popular revolution.

At this period Masaniello had reached the age of twenty-four.¹ His bodily frame was strong and active, sorte di contumelie e di tormenti non gli strasciava, per agguagliare e transcendere l'enormissima immanità de più famosi tiranni E da questo solo comprendasi il macello di gente fatto da lui, uomo di vilissimo cuore, che al Duca de Medina de-las-Torres Vicere, in partido dal governo, osò di presentare una supplica per essere gratiato di sopra trenta atrocissimi misfatti." (Siri, t. x. p. 12.)

¹ It is said by Dreux (*L'Europe Illustre*) that Masaniello was

and his countenance animated. He was superstitious, and so ignorant, that he could not write his name on his manifestoes or documents, which were all marked with the sign of the cross.¹ He was destitute of judgment, self-control or experience, and unshackled by moral restraints. But his mind was confident and persevering, he was possessed of a rude, prompt, and popular eloquence, and he was of a disposition so frank, sprightly, and open, that he was greatly beloved by his own class, and a constant leader in those diversions or popular festivities to which the Italians are the more devoted the more they are oppressed. In those sham fights and mock sieges which at that time were tolerated by the government, he always headed a party, and thus acquired a facility in collecting mobs, and also some dexterity in managing them. The occupation he followed was that of a fisherman, or rather perhaps of a fishmonger.² He wore neither shoes nor stockings, and was dressed in a jacket of coarse blue cloth, with trowsers of white linen, and a red woollen cap, after the fashion of the Neapolitan fishermen and sailors.

About a century and a half ago, the class to which Masaniello belonged had been represented by their countryman Sannazzaro as singing about the Syrens, and Glaucus, and Galatea, under the brow of Pausilypo or Mergellina. But Masaniello was formed of more rugged materials than the Lycons and Mycons of the piscatory born in 1610, which would make him thirty-seven at the time of the insurrection.

¹ Tarsia, *Tumultos de Napoles*.

² Brusoni and Buraña say he was both. Most of the Italian writers call him *pescivendolo*. Giannone alleges he was only an attendant on a fishmonger, whose customers he supplied with paper bags to hold the small fish which they purchased. (*Stor. Civil.* lib. xxxvii. c. 2.)

poet. He had for some time cherished a deep hatred towards the Spanish government. On one occasion, the fish which he brought into the market for sale had been confiscated, from his omission to pay some tax which was due on them.¹ His wife, too, in consequence of being found with a small quantity of contraband flour in her possession, was fined and imprisoned till payment, which compelled him to sell his household-furniture. After these occurrences, when mixing with the crowds in the market, he inveighed bitterly against the taxes, and he sometimes amused his compeers, by declaring how much better the affairs of state could be conducted by him than the Spaniards, if entrusted to his guidance. His detestation of the government broke out on one occasion in a gross insult which he offered to the Viceroy,² and in some satirical verses of his making, which the people were wont to recite or sing on the streets. But the signs of the times soon presented to him prospects of deeper vengeance. At the instigation of the priest Genuino, he readily espoused the cause of the injured people. It was arranged that a tumult should be excited at the festival in honour of "Our Lady of Carmel," which occurs in the middle of July. An usual pastime on this holiday was the mock assault of a wooden fortress, which, according to an ancient custom, was defended by Neapolitan fishermen, dressed in Turkish habits. Masaniello having been chosen captain of the besiegers, was in the daily habit of training and exercising the youth, by whom he was followed; and a Carmelite friar, called Savino, who was one of the chief instigators of the insurrection, supplied as much money as was necessary to place clubs and staves in the hands of his myrmidons.³

¹ Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, anno 1647, t. xi.

² Orloff, *Mem. Hist. sur le Royaume de Naples*, t. ii. p. 323.

³ Giannone, *Stor. Civile*, lib. xxxvii. c. 2.

But though the tumult had been fixed for the festival of Carmel, accident afforded an earlier opportunity for action. On the morning of the 7th of July, an unusual quantity of fruit and vegetables being exposed for sale in the market, a dispute arose between the peasantry, who had brought them to town, and the stall-keepers, whether the fruit-tax should fall on the former as the raisers of the commodity, or on the latter as the venders by retail. The *Eletto del Popolo* having decided that the impost should be borne by the gardeners, a peasant from Pozzuolo, who was a brother-in-law of Masaniello, threw down, in an assumed transport of rage, his basket of figs, which had been a subject of contest, declaring with vehemence, that at least their tyrannical rulers should not participate in the spoil. A Neapolitan market-place was at all times a scene of confusion and bustle; but the dispute which had now arisen, and the scramble for the figs, occasioned an universal uproar. Masaniello was at hand, and his mob of boys and lads from twelve to eighteen years of age, whom he had formed into companies and taught the watch-words "Viva il Re e muoia il mal Governo," quickly mingled in the affray. In the general confusion, this troop succeeded in driving off the magistracy who attempted to interfere. They were quickly joined by the rabble of the town, who had armed themselves with pikes and javelins, or whatever came first to hand. Masaniello then mounted one of the tables in the market and harangued the populace, promising them a redress of all their grievances if they boldly seconded his efforts, declaring, at the same time, that he should willingly die to give freedom to his country. The people, animated by his eloquence and the prospects it held out, immediately proceeded to open acts of insurrection. They destroyed all the offices in the vicinity where taxes were

collected, and then, with Masaniello at their head, proceeded towards the viceregal palace.¹

From all quarters Naples now poured forth her boisterous and indigent offspring,—rudely armed, but formidable from their long smothered ferocity. On their road to the palace, the numbers of the rabble increased, it is said, to 15,000, some of whom carried loaves of bread on their pikes to intimate the dearness of bread. Masaniello's regiment of boys, who were in the van, bore flags of black cloth on the points of their sticks, and uttered, as they advanced, the most doleful cries and lamentations. On their way, which led them through many streets, they forced one of the chief prisons of the city, and having set the inmates at liberty, joined them to their tumultuous bands. Having at length arrived under the windows of the palace, they demanded, with much vociferation, that they should be relieved, not only from the tax on fruit, but from all imposts whatever on provisions, particularly that on corn. The Viceroy, who at the first rumour affected to despise this plebeian tumult, and seemed rather to rejoice at an occurrence which might serve as a pretext for farther oppressions and exactions, was now appalled at the menacing appearance of the riotous multitude, against whose progress he had adopted no precautions. The fate of Santa-Coloma, who had attempted at Barcelona to stem a popular insurrection by force of arms, was fresh in his recollection, and he therefore resolved to renew his system of conciliation. Having shown himself to the multitude from a balcony above, he so far complied with their demands, as to promise that he would entirely abolish the tax on fruit, and partially remit the duties on corn. This concession, as was to be expected, instead of pacifying the mob, rather tended to encourage them in their riotous proceedings. Exclaiming, that they must be

¹ Midon's *Rise and Fall of Masaniello*.

totally relieved from all taxes on bread or wine, they pressed on the gates of the palace, which they burst open in spite of the resistance opposed by the German and Spanish guards. Having broken down these barriers, part of the rabble rushed into the court with violent outcries, demanding audience of the Viceroy, who had only time to leave the state apartments and secrete himself in an obscure corner of the palace. The guards on the outside, who had been thus overpowered, immediately abandoned their posts, and fled with precipitation to their quarters.

The palace being thus left unprotected, the whole mob entered its courts without farther opposition. They burst open the doors of some of the chief apartments, and having thus borne down all resistance, they commenced a strict search for the Viceroy, examining one room after another, till they came to the very chamber in the closet of which he lay concealed. Though the door was strongly secured, they broke it up by the force of their halberds and other instruments, and the Viceroy being then discovered, would have been sacrificed to the vengeance of a crowd whom he had neither braved nor conciliated, had not a few of his retinue, in the midst of the confusion, rescued him from their hands,¹ and enabled him to escape to the adjacent fortress of Castelnuevo. Thinking, however, to appease the multitude, he shortly afterwards returned, and trusted himself amongst them in one of the courts of the palace. Such, however, were their threats and violence, that he attempted to escape in an old vehicle which was at hand. But he was quickly compelled to alight from this conveyance; and, after being tossed and hustled about by the multitude, he sought refuge in the adjacent monastery of St Louis. On his way he retarded the pursuit of his enemies by throwing pieces

¹ Midon, *Rise and Fall of Masaniello*.

of money amongst them, and at length arrived at the convent pale and haggard, without his hat or sword, covered with mud, and so weak that he could not ascend the stairs unsupported.¹

Meanwhile those of the rabble who had forced their way into the palace, ransacked and stripped every apartment. They tore down the tapestry, and broke the mirrors, and having collected all the furniture of value, they threw it into an open court, where, being formed into a pile, it was quickly reduced to ashes. It is remarkable, that in this general confusion, there was one point of order rigidly observed: No one appropriated the smallest article to his own use; every thing was devoted to the flames and utterly destroyed, because, as was said, the wealth of the rich being the heart's blood of the poor, ought neither to be spared nor applied to any purpose whatever.

While part of the mob was thus employed in rifling the palace, another band, armed with clubs, and headed by Masaniello in person, proceeded to the convent of St Louis, with the intention of pulling it down. When they had demolished the first gate, the Viceroy, in order to put a stop to their farther outrages, had recourse to his former wretched artifice. He appeared at a window, and promised that there should be no more taxes levied. But the people, being now justly suspicious of his faith, proceeded to pull down the other gates, and then, without farther obstruction, forced their way into the monastery.

In this fearful emergency, the Cardinal Filomarino, Archbishop of Naples, who had ever been revered for the sanctity of his private life, and zeal in his pastoral charge, ventured to St Louis, and, having obtained a hearing from the insurgents, entreated them to desist from far-

¹ Nicolai, *Rivoluz. de Napoli*. Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 60.

ther violence, and consent to await the legal and peaceable redress of their grievances. But as they answered, that they would not be satisfied unless they obtained an instrument granting them a release from all taxes, particularly those on fruit and corn, he sent a messenger to the Viceroy, begging that this document should be prepared and delivered to him with all possible despatch. This charter being forthwith drawn up and signed, was handed to the Prelate, who, as soon as he had received it, stepped into his litter, and holding it up to the view of the multitude, drew the whole assemblage after him as he moved along the *Strada di Toledo*.

When the deed, however, was read aloud, and presented to the people by the Archbishop, they found that they had been duped, in so far as it contained only a partial, instead of a total, repeal of taxes. They, therefore, hastened to the Market-place, where, having given an account of the contents of the document to their associates, who were there assembled, they unanimously resolved to persist in the assertion of their claims. Having accordingly divided themselves into two parties, one again marched directly to the palace, and the other took their way towards the convent of St Louis. The latter made their attack on a part of the building where several of the nobility had taken shelter; but they were repulsed by a Spanish guard, which gave time for the Viceroy, by the assistance of the Abbot, and, as was supposed, by the connivance of Genuino, to surmount the walls and find refuge in a neighbouring College of Jesuits, whence he was secretly conveyed in an old sedan chair, to the Castle of St Elmo.

The insurgents, hearing that the Viceroy had escaped, next dispersed themselves through different quarters of the city, attacking and disarming the Spanish guards wherever they encountered them. In that district of the

suburbs called the Chiaja, a party proceeded to the palace of the Prince of Bisignano, a highly respectable nobleman, whom they requested to be their intercessor with the Viceroy, and their protector against the taxes. With the design of moderating their rage, the Prince accompanied them along some of the streets, and had the mortification to see all the prisons broken, the records of the courts of justice destroyed, and a number of public buildings burnt to the ground. There were some incendiaries in the crowd who counteracted all the Prince's attempts to restrain their fury. "Among these," says Midon in his translation of Giraffi, "was a Sicilian, who seemed to be rather a devil in human shape, than a man, and dealt about him as if he had been possessed by all the demons of hell. It is incredible with what intrepidity he behaved; he was foremost in all dangers, and was tearing and pulling down, with the flames raging about his ears, and if the rabble showed any signs of fear, he would upbraid them with cowardice, and call them a pack of poor spiritless wretches, who did not deserve the privileges for which they were contending." Bisignano, finding that neither entreaties nor promises could allay their frenzy,—that their numbers had greatly increased,¹ and were still augmenting, recommended to them that, as it was now late, they should separate to their respective quarters, and should burn or sack no more houses till the following morning. The mob thought this respite was not unreasonable; and having formally chosen Masaniello as their

¹ Giraffi says they amounted on this day to 50,000. Buraña swells this calculation to 100,000. Siri, on the other hand, asserts that at no time during the first day of the insurrection did the mob exceed 4000, that the whole of these were "*vile ragazzaglia*," and that there was not one respectable tradesman or artizan among them.

Captain-General, and made arrangements for renewing their operations on the ensuing day, they dispersed in different directions. Through the night, however, several parties searched private houses for arms, and plundered the shops of the gunsmiths; while others gave note of dreadful preparation, by beating drums and tolling the bells of the churches. They also guarded against any risk of surprise, by keeping together in considerable bodies, and setting watches in the suspected places of the city.

The town seemed to be paralyzed with terror, and no steps were taken by the inhabitants to prevent farther tumults except solemn processions through the streets by some of the religious orders. It was generally thought among the higher classes that the Viceroy might easily have suppressed the riots, had he attempted to crush them in their commencement, and before they had become so formidable. Even on this night, had he exerted his authority, and placed himself at the head of the King's troops, it is probable that the insurgents, after the first onset, would have surrendered, and laid down their arms. But instead of adopting those energetic measures which the state of the city imperiously demanded, and the extent of the insurrection fully justified, he thought to win on an incensed and headlong multitude by acts of kindness and popularity. As bread was now scarce and of high price, he issued orders that, on the following morning, a loaf of bread should weigh upwards of 33 ounces instead of 22 as formerly; he farther proclaimed that all taxes on eatables should be utterly abolished, and never again revived; and he offered to Masaniello a large bribe, which was scornfully rejected, if he would endeavour to appease the people.¹

Though the Viceroy failed to adopt those vigorous measures which the emergency required, he did not entirely

¹ Meissner, *Masaniello*, p. 32.

neglect the public safety. He ordered all the gunpowder in the city to be thoroughly damped, and a guard to be placed on the church of St Lorenzo, where much valuable property belonging to the principal citizens, as also a supply of fire-arms and eighteen pieces of ordnance, had been deposited. He likewise set strong guards and planted artillery at the entrance to some of the principal streets, particularly that of St Francisco Xavier. Judging the Fortress of St Elmo to be no longer safe, he provided for his personal security by removing from it to Castel Nuovo, which adjoined the Viceregal palace by a draw-bridge passing between them, and to which his Dutchess, with her children and ladies of the court, had retired when the palace was first attacked. On his arrival at this stronghold, to which he was escorted by Cardinal Trivulzio and some of the Neapolitan nobility, he farther provided for defence by doubling the guard which usually surrounded the castle,—by introducing a reinforcement of German and Italian troops,—and digging deep trenches in the streets adjacent to the palace. These precautions proved of considerable service in securing the thoroughfares, and repelling the mob, when their fury at length urged them to make an attempt on the castle.

With the earliest dawn on Monday the 8th of July, Masaniello appeared in the market-place at the head of his rabble, whom he divided into companies, and distributed arms amongst them. Nothing was heard on the streets but the sound of drums and trumpets, the clash of arms, and the yells of the populace. The banners of sedition were everywhere displayed, and the insurgents mustered in great force, with drawn swords, a few muskets, targets and lances. What was still more alarming, the peasantry from the neighbouring villages thronged into the town, armed with the usual implements of rustic

labour, and joined the rabble in the city. The women and children, if they did not assist the common cause, manifested sufficient zeal, and added by their outcries to the confusion and horror of the scene. On opening their eyes to this day of disorder and anarchy, the Neapolitan nobility fled with expedition to the country, carrying their families and most valuable effects along with them. All public business was suspended, the shops were shut, and the courts of justice were closed.

The people were indeed pleased with the alteration in the weight of bread, which they found to be considerably heavier on this morning : but the change produced no permanent good effects, as the rage of the mob was still fomented by the harangues and gesticulations of their leaders, who seemed resolved that the tumult should not terminate but with the total destruction of the city.

The chief places of rendezvous were the great market, the district of the town called Lavinaro, and Porta Nolana. There the rioters drew up in military array, in separate companies, with officers at their head, and Masaniello as Generalissimo. This bold adventurer applied himself with singular skill to provide against exigencies, to strike terror into his enemies, and inspire his associates with confidence. He had gained a complete ascendancy over the minds of his followers, and much of his success in obtaining this influence was owing to the dexterity with which he wrought on their superstitious feelings. He had persuaded them that he was delegated by Heaven to relieve them from their sufferings : he pretended that a dove commissioned from the sky hovered near him as his counsellor, and in all his gestures he affected the attitudes of one who holds communion with a superior being.¹ But his rule was one of terror and extreme severity, and he gained nothing by conciliation or by flattering the passions of

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*. *L'Espion Turc*.

the multitude. He commenced the proceedings of this day by issuing orders in the different precincts of the city, that the inhabitants should all arm and flock to his standard, under penalty of their houses being burned to the ground,—a mandate which brought him an immense accession of strength. The chief want was ammunition; and a body of the rebels who marched to the royal magazines, with the intention of seizing the gunpowder which they contained, were miserably disappointed to find that it had been completely soaked by the precaution of the Viceroy.

Having received intelligence, by means of his scouts, that a German regiment was marching, by orders of the government, from Pozzuolo to Naples, Masaniello detached a strong and well armed body to oppose its progress. The Germans being encountered on their road by this irregular force, were overpowered by numbers, and, being forced to lay down their arms, were led into the city as prisoners of war.

The Viceroy finding that the populace would not listen to any reasonable terms of accommodation, set at liberty the Duke of Matalone, who had been confined in the Castle of St Elmo ever since the conflagration of the Spanish ship in the harbour, on condition that he and his brother Joseph Caraffa should proceed along the different streets, and attempt to soothe the rioters. Having met with Masaniello, that demagogue declared to them, that, as the people now insisted on the restitution of all the privileges granted by Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V, the original charter in which these were conceded, and which was supposed to be preserved in the archives of the Church of St Lorenzo, must be placed in their hands as an essential preliminary to any future negotiation. With this answer, the Duke of Matalone returned to the Vice-

roy, who convoked the collateral council, in order to consider what measures should be adopted in this crisis.

Meanwhile, the Prior of Rocella, a learned ecclesiastic, was deputed by the people to search for this inestimable charter ; but being unable to find it, he palmed a fictitious document on them, with the view of appeasing their fury for the time. This deception being discovered, his contrivance only served farther to incense them : and when the Duke of Matalone returned from the Viceroy with a copy of the genuine charter, they would not believe in its authenticity.¹

Though Masaniello, on account of his activity and courage had been appointed leader of the mob, the crafty priest Genuino, who was a person of considerable experience in affairs of state, with the noted bandit Perrone, were directed closely to attend and watch him ; and by the suggestion of these two counsellors, were committed all those devastations which now began systematically in every corner of the city.

Instead of restraining the fury of Masaniello, these desperadoes excited him to the work of destruction. As soon as they entered on their office, they made out a list of sixty houses belonging to the commissioners and tax-gatherers, which they devoted to the flames,—all, however, being concerted under show of loyalty to the King, and on pretence of punishing his evil ministers. These dwellings, as also that of Andrea Anaclerio, the *Eletto del popolo*, were accordingly set on fire, amid loud execrations. The valuable effects they contained, tapestry, paintings, and books, were thrown out into the streets, and being heaped into a pile, were, without distinction, reduced to ashes.

¹ It has been disputed, however, among authors, if the original, or a genuine copy, of the privileges granted by Charles V. ever was found. (Meissner, *Masaniello*.)

The whole city now appeared a sheet of flames ; and its utter ruin was universally anticipated. It was in vain that the Archbishop ordered the most solemn religious processions : it was in vain that the Viceroy commanded a legal instrument to be printed and affixed to the public places, by which all imposts were remitted, and a general amnesty was granted for the rebellion : it was in vain that he employed two chief favourites of the people, on whom he could rely, to attempt the arduous task of soothing the irritated multitude, whose rage seems always to have augmented in proportion to the efforts that were used to pacify them. The government had lost all influence or authority ; and before night, Masaniello issued out his orders in name of the faithful people of Naples, for the organization of a general insurrection. He commanded all traders and members of the different corporations of the city to arm for the recovery of freedom. Some of his band also proceeded to private houses, and demanded delivery of all offensive weapons. They thus possessed themselves of a number of muskets, carabines, and other fire-arms, as also of nine pieces of artillery, which a Neapolitan merchant retained in his dwelling, and which he had received as a pledge for repayment of a loan he had advanced to government. Understanding also that a trader from Genoa had a great store of arms, they entered his house, where they found 4000 muskets, which were distributed among the populace. They likewise took seven cannons out of a vessel which they seized at the mole, and placed them advantageously near the entrance to the principal streets of the city.

During the early part of the following day (9th July), the destruction of houses was continued, and the conflagrations were now extended from those of the farmers and commissioners of taxes, to the dwellings of the judges, ministers of state, and retainers of the court. The convent

of St Lorenzo and its tower, the arsenal of the city, were taken by the mob, while the Spanish troops, which were ordered to Naples from the surrounding villages, were disarmed on their route, and were either sent back to their respective stations, or brought prisoners into the city.

Meanwhile, insincere and fruitless negotiations were carried on by the Viceroy. But his Excellency at length perceiving that the people would not be appeased without production of the original charters granted by Ferdinand of Aragon and Charles V, sent for the Archbishop, and delivering them into his hands, along with a ratification by himself of the privileges they conferred, requested him to proceed to the market-place, and exhibit them to the people. The Prelate was received by the multitude with much personal respect: but a majority of them still suspected these documents to be spurious, and did not consider the confirmation so full and explicit as they desired. Masaniello not being a competent judge of the authenticity of charters, Genuino was sent for, who, after perusing these writings, declared them to be the true originals; and the Viceroy being informed of the wish that had been expressed for a more full ratification, desired the Archbishop to intimate, that he would not only sign whatever articles they should themselves draw up, but would also obtain their sanction from the King of Spain. This answer having been communicated to the populace, it was resolved that Genuino should prepare the ratification, as also some general terms of agreement between them and the Viceroy, to be read publicly and considered next morning in the market-place, ere they were laid before the government. One of the conditions proposed by the rabble, was, that the Castle of St Elmo should be delivered into their hands as a security for the fulfilment of the stipulations. But Genuino, who by this time had been gained by secret promises on the part of the Viceroy, dissuaded

them from insisting on this article, which they could not demand without incurring the guilt of rebellion. Masaniello likewise promised to the Archbishop that he would defer the conflagration of thirty-six palaces, belonging to the principal nobility and ecclesiastics, among which were those of the Duke of Matalone, his kinsman the Prior of Rocella, and the Prince of Cellamare, postmaster-general of the kingdom. The day thus closed with every prospect of the restoration of tranquillity, and the adjustment of all those unhappy differences which existed between the government and the people.

Early on the morning of the 10th of July, Masaniello made a general review of his adherents throughout the city, and found they amounted to 114,000 men under arms, besides a number of citizens who were ready to be enrolled. As a stimulation to the government in forwarding the treaty which was in dependence, the Life Guard of Masaniello, consisting of 8000 men, plundered the house of the Duke of Cavano, at that time Secretary of State. Sanguine expectations, however, were entertained that these destructions of property were now nearly at an end. The Archbishop, after having waited on the Viceroy and given him an account of the negotiations he had held, repaired to the market-place in order to be present at the reading of the articles, which had been prepared by Genuino. Every thing seemed now tending to a peaceful result. The populace, delighted with the prospect of those important immunities which they were about to obtain, and satisfied with the vengeance they had wreaked, at length abated of their former fury, and even began to long for tranquillity. In these happy anticipations, the Viceroy ordered a procession to the church Del Carmine, in which all the nobility should join, that the conditions of peace might be there publicly read, and *Te Deum* sung on account of the fortunate accommoda-

tion. This arrangement being intimated to Masaniello, he consented to the proposal, but exhorted his adherents to continue vigilant, and commanded every enrolled citizen to remain in arms at the station assigned him, under penalty of death.

At this crisis, a fatal and unexpected occurrence destroyed these flattering prospects, and excited to greater height than ever the flames of discord. At the moment when the market and the neighbouring church Del Carmine were thronged with an immense multitude impatiently waiting to learn the success of the negotiations, a troop of 500 banditti, well equipped and mounted, suddenly rode into the market-place, and were received with great demonstrations of joy on announcing that they had been sent for by their leader Perrone to aid in the service of the most faithful people. As their assistance, however, did not appear to be now required, Masaniello ordered them instantly to dismount and to disperse into different quarters, in order that their formidable numbers might not cause alarm in the minds of the citizens. But the brigands wished to remain together, and on horseback; and a dispute having in consequence arisen, one of their number discharged his musket at Masaniello. The followers of that demagogue being exasperated at the danger of their leader, and believing that the bandits had been called into the city with some treacherous design on the part of the government, immediately fell on these outlaws, and having sacrificed thirty of them on the spot, pursued their companions into the church Del Carmine, where they in vain sought refuge. Many of them were slain in the sanctuary, and among others Perrone, who had so long possessed the confidence of the people. One of their chiefs called Antino Grasso confessed, before he expired, that the Duke of Matalone, and his brother Caraffa, had brought the troop into Naples in order to re-

venge, by the assassination of Masaniello, the insults they had received from the rabble. Others of their number who were taken alive, acknowledged, before execution, that Perrone had been concerned in the plot,—that concealed mines of gunpowder were to have been fired under the market-place,—and that some additional bands were to have entered the city, at the close of day, to massacre the inhabitants amid the confusion created by the death of Masaniello.

These dying declarations of the outlaws, were confirmed by the remembrance of some suspicious words concerning Masaniello, which had been overheard to pass between Perrone and the Duke, at the time when that nobleman, by desire of the Viceroy, made his unsuccessful attempt to pacify the people.¹ The efforts of the enraged mob were instantly directed to discover the place where Matalone and his brother had concealed themselves. The former escaped with his life, in the disguise of a friar, from the convent of St Ephraim, where he was for some time secreted, and arrived safe at Benevento. But his brother being taken, his head was struck off with a chopping knife by a butcher's son, and his remains were subjected to every species of outrage. In pursuance of the gratification of their resentment, a wooden scaffold was hastily erected by the populace in the market-place, for the execution of such of the nobles and public functionaries as had fallen into their power, and were supposed to have been in favour of the obnoxious tax. Having surrounded the block with a palisade of iron spikes, they affixed on them the bleeding heads of their nobler victims, along with those of the banditti who had been sacrificed to their rage. The spirit of insurrection had now spread itself widely through the city, and the atrocities consequent on a revolution were every where visible; the

¹ Brusoni, lib. xv.

streets of Naples streamed with the blood of its aristocracy, and the continued conflagration of its palaces rendered the scene yet more appalling.

From his mock tribunal in the market-place, Masaniello, surrounded with heads and bleeding carcasses, hourly declaimed against the nobility, who, struck with horror at these examples, fearfully awaited (with exception of those who had fled to the country) the issue of the present disturbances. The Viceroy, it is said, was at first not displeased at the plot of the Duke of Matalone and the banditti, which he flattered himself would occasion a perpetual feud between the people and nobility, and thus ultimately consolidate the power of the King of Spain. But suspicion quickly glanced at himself as the mover of the conspiracy. Masaniello, who had become extremely distrustful since the recent attack on his person, believed, or affected to believe, that it had been at least encouraged by the Viceroy,¹ and therefore, with a view to reduce him to such difficulties as should at once avenge his own wrongs, and force him to accept of whatever conditions he might think fit to impose, he commanded the aqueducts, which serve for the conveyance of water to Castelnovo, to be cut off, and he prohibited all persons from carrying to it any sort of refreshments or provisions. In this predicament the Viceroy used every effort to exculpate himself from the charge of being concerned in the affair of the banditti; and to convince the people of his innocence, he promised to employ his best exertions for the apprehension of all who had escaped from their pursuit.

Having in a great measure satisfied the populace that he was not implicated in the conspiracy of the brigands,

¹ Muratori expressly says, that the Viceroy was concerned in it. *Annal. d'Italia.*

the Viceroy at length on this day (11th July) succeeded in perfecting an accommodation. The treaty having been already drawn up by Genuino, and having received the approbation of the ringleaders of the rabble, was at last subscribed, with assumed alacrity, by his Excellency, and all the members of the collateral council. Besides the exemption from taxes, granted in the charter of Charles V, and an immunity for past transgressions, it was provided by the treaty, that the Elect of the people should be chosen by the citizens once in six months—that their deputies should have as many voices as the nobility in the assemblies of the state—that the articles should be ratified by the King of Spain within three months after their publication at Naples—that they should be inscribed on marble columns, set up in the market-place, and that the people should not be compelled to lay down their arms till they received the royal confirmation of their privileges.

At two o'clock of the afternoon, the Archbishop publicly read the articles of treaty in the Church del Carmine. The old malignant, Genuino, addressed the crowd who were assembled: They had now, he said, obtained those things which they so much desired, and for the sake of which he had himself suffered during the government of the Duke d'Ossuna, and which, though they could not then be acquired, had at length, by much solicitude, been triumphantly attained.¹

It had been arranged, that after this ceremony was performed, Masaniello, accompanied by the Archbishop, should proceed to Castelnuovo, in order to pay his respects to the Viceroy. Accordingly, as soon as the treaty had been promulgated, the procession advanced towards the palace, where the Viceroy had now returned. Masaniello, who, on the Archbishop's persuasion, had thrown off the fisherman's garb, hitherto worn by him, appeared

¹ Buraña, *Batalla Peregrina*, &c. p. 121.

on horseback, attired in a sumptuous habit of cloth of silver, with a towering plume of white feathers on his head, and a drawn sword in his hand. Thus equipped, he moved on before the Archbishop, who was in his coach, and was escorted on one side by Arpaia, the new Eletto del Popolo, and on the other by Mateo, the brother of Masaniello, arrayed in gold brocade, and wearing a splendid dagger.¹ Genuino, who was carried in a sedan chair, and was guarded by several companies of the citizen militia, which he had embodied, brought up the rear of this cavalcade. The streets, it is said (but doubtless with great exaggeration) were lined with more than 100,000 of the followers of Masaniello,² and while the procession advanced, praises and blessings were showered on this bold and successful demagogue, as the saviour and deliverer of his country. Those who went before him, strewed his path with palm and olive branches, as emblematic of his achievements; while, from the balconies of the houses, which were bedecked with the richest silks and tapestries, many of the inhabitants, as he passed, threw down wreaths and garlands. The air was filled with the harmony of musical instruments, and nothing was heard but universal sounds of congratulation and triumph. The procession having at length arrived at the palace, Masaniello stopped to harangue the people, whom he now forbade to follow him farther. He professed to them, that, having obtained such important benefits for his countrymen, he was now ready to return to his former condition, reserving nothing but his hook and net in order to procure his daily subsistence; and he claimed no farther reward for his exertions, than that, after his death, each

¹ Buraña, *Batall. Pereg.* Midon, however, and Nicolai, who calls him Giovanni, say he was partly clothed in his fisherman's dress, but was nearly half-naked.

² Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xv.

should repeat an *Ave*.¹ He, however, recommended that they should continue to be on their guard against the designs of the nobility, who were their inveterate enemies, and should not lay down their arms till they had received the confirmation of their privileges, and a pardon from the King of Spain. And being apparently still suspicious of the designs of the Viceroy, he told them, that if they did not see him again by midnight, they might sack the city, and fire the palace. Then turning with assumed dignity to the Archbishop, he commanded him to give the multitude his benediction.

Masaniello, having finished his address, entered the palace, accompanied by his brother Mateo, the Archbishop, and Genuino. The Viceroy awaited his approach at the head of the chief staircase. On perceiving him, Masaniello threw himself at his feet,² and thanked him, in name of the people, for his gracious approbation of the treaty; and he declared, that having gained this boon for his country, he was personally ready to submit to whatever sentence might be pronounced on him. The Viceroy, raising him up, assured him, that so far from being punished as a criminal, he might depend on receiving daily proofs of his favour and esteem. They then retired, accompanied by the Archbishop, into a private apartment, in order to deliberate on the present posture of affairs. After Masaniello had remained a considerable time, the concourse of people without the palace, not seeing him reappear, began to murmur at his absence, fearing that the Viceroy had violated his faith, and that some mischance had befallen their favourite chief. At length the rabble

¹ Buraña, *Batall. Pereg.*

² Siri (*Mercurio*, t. x. p. 112.) says, that being exhausted by fatigue, long watching, and the heat of the season, he fell down in a faint at the feet of the Viceroy, and was some time before he recovered his senses.

became so clamorous, that the Viceroy, in order to appease the tumult, showed himself at a balcony in a most familiar attitude with Masaniello,¹ who now assured his followers that he was safe, and under no manner of restraint whatever. On a mere motion of his hand, the mob, which had been previously in such a state of turbulent excitement, were calmed into breathless stillness, and by another gesture, he dismissed them instantly from the palace court to their respective homes. This incident testifies both the popularity of Masaniello, and the strict obedience to which he had subjected his adherents.

Before Masaniello took his departure, it was arranged that on the Saturday following, the treaty should be publicly read in the Cathedral, and that his Excellency, with all the officers and magistrates of the realm, should take a solemn oath to observe its conditions, inviolably, and for ever. The hypocritical Viceroy ended by telling his dreaded guest, that as he highly approved of his conduct hitherto, he left the future management of affairs entirely to his care and wisdom. Masaniello then took his leave, and, amid various public demonstrations of joy, he proceeded in the Archbishop's coach to his own hovel, which stood in the vicinity of the market-place. The nobility, on hearing the result of this treaty and interview, were much exasperated at the Archbishop Filomarini, for having thus interposed his influence to secure such favourable conditions for the people, which they attributed to his desire for popularity, and his apprehension of losing his See.

Whatever may have been the intentions or meaning of the Viceroy, in declaring to Masaniello that he confided to his discretion the whole management of affairs, the

¹ "Tenendogli una mano su la spalla, e con l'altra asciugandoli egli stesso, dalla fronte, il sudore cagionatogli dal soverchio caldo, e dalla fatica." (Brusoni, lib. xv.)

fisherman interpreted the words so much to his own advantage, that from the moment he heard them, till the end of his life, he ruled over Naples with the dominion of an absolute sovereign, deciding all matters, whether civil or military, by his own unrestrained authority.

Being aware, however, that voluntary obedience generally ceases with the first transport of zeal, he felt the importance of justifying his usurpation, by a regular form and valid title. Accordingly, on the morning which followed his interview with the Viceroy, he issued a proclamation, whereby he publicly announced, that the office of Captain-General, to which the people had promoted him, had now been confirmed by his Majesty's government. In this high capacity, he applied himself vigilantly to the chastisement of banditti, and of those offenders (among whom was his own nephew), who still continued to levy forcible contributions on the inhabitants.¹ He farther issued some judicious orders, relating to the polity and civil government of the town. He appointed a guard of 30,000 men for the protection of the city and suburbs, and he commanded all the nobility who had sought shelter in convents, to return to their own habitations.

The 13th of July being the day appointed for giving the last solemn sanction to the treaty, in the Church del Carmine, a cavalcade, arranged as formerly, with Masaniello at its head, proceeded to the palace, where, being joined by the Viceroy and chief officers of the State, they all marched in great pomp and order to the Cathedral. There the articles were read aloud, and their observance was sworn to by the members of the different councils and tribunals; every condition, however, being altered or interpreted, without objection, according to the pleasure of Masaniello. The day was one of universal jubilee among the people, and of secret discontent among the nobles.

¹ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xv.

Though young, inexperienced, and of the lowest rank in society, Masaniello had conducted himself with so much sagacity, throughout the important events of the last few days in which he had been so conspicuously engaged, as to have excited astonishment even among the higher classes of his countrymen. His boldness was not that of a vulgar plebeian, but of the leader in a Roman sedition; and by a singular destiny, the city of Naples, containing at that time half a million of inhabitants, became subjected to a fisherman, who, within a few days, raised nearly 100,000 men, so implicitly obedient to his command, that, in the language of a native historian, he slew with a nod, and set fire with a look. There was no act of atrocity or devastation which his followers, at his bidding, scrupled to commit, and yet, through his influence, they refrained, amid the plunder of the richest treasures, from converting the smallest article to private use. But the fiery temperament and audacious courage, that had suggested his resistance to the despotism of the Spanish government, being unrestrained by the influence of education or the lessons of historical experience, which are essential even to the most commanding genius, the fervid tide of success, and the gale of popular applause, soon wrecked the crazy bark of the fisherman.

It seems probable that there was an inherent, though lurking, taint of insanity in the constitution of Masaniello. It was alleged at the time, that during his visit to the palace, he had received from the Viceroy a beverage mingled with a poison, which overturned the brain without injuring the vital functions.¹ But if he drank at the royal residence of any deleterious potion, it was the flattery and honours heaped on him by the Duke of Arcos, who perceiving, perhaps, the incipient whirl of an un-

¹ Varillas, *La Politique de la Maison d'Autriche*. Midon, *Rise and Fall of Masaniello*.

steady and distempered mind, was not unwilling to pour this intoxication also on his giddy brain. These unwonted distinctions,—the apprehensions of treachery produced by the attack of the banditti,—the exhaustion occasioned by the want of sleep and the fatigues of his daring enterprise, with the stimulants to which he had recourse to prepare himself for farther exertions,—and the intense excitement of his sudden elevation, are sufficient to account for his disorder of mind, and for those singular scenes in which the Captain of the people frequently appeared, in a state of mingled insanity and intoxication.

While instituting several salutary regulations, and exercising, in many cases, a rigorous and inflexible justice, some of the punishments Masaniello inflicted, during his brief and fevered reign, were capricious and cruel. Nourished by the lessons of the crafty Genuino and of the bandit Perrone, he suddenly became a suspicious and blood-thirsty tyrant. An idle boy was hanged because he had spread some false political intelligence, and a baker, because he had made his loaf too light, was roasted alive in his own oven. Several of his ordinances were fantastic and unreasonable, resembling those that emanated from the Emperor Paul of Russia. Every one was compelled to cut off his hair, and was forbid, at the same time, to put on a periwig, under pain of death. The same penalty was to be inflicted on those who were found on the streets after a certain hour of night, and priests or ecclesiastics were prohibited from wearing their long upper garments, lest they should conceal under them the dagger of the assassin or the bandit.¹ This mock monarch even compelled cardinals to abandon their purple robes. He also forbade females to wear tails to their gowns, and obliged them to have their petticoats tucked up above their knees. The

¹ Buraña (*Batall. Peregr.*) has given the fullest account of the capricious regulations and cruel executions of Masaniello.

homage he exacted from all classes, and the regal language he assumed, were, in his situation, contemptible and ludicrous. He so far, however, forgot his kingly demeanour, that, when he gave public audience, he generally held a blunderbuss in his hand, ready cocked, to the no small terror of petitioners.

As early as the celebration of the high solemnity at the cathedral, Masaniello manifested signs of disordered intellect. He addressed the populace in an absurd and incoherent harangue; and having finished his discourse, he began violently to tear to pieces the rich dress in which he was clothed, as if indicating his intention of returning to his original station and employment.

On the following day (July 14.) he exhibited still more decided symptoms of phrensy. A gentleman from the town of Aversa having arrived to speak with him on some important concerns, he gave him, at his departure, a kick, saying, "I thus dub you Prince of Aversa." Sometimes he made the round of the city on horseback, railing against the nobility, ordering the shops to be shut, and causelessly imprisoning the citizens. At other times he rode at full speed along the streets of Naples, trampling, and even killing, those of the inhabitants who had the misfortune to come in the way of his headlong career.

In the afternoon of this day, he ran wildly to the palace, accompanied by a vast mob, without his shoes or cap, and dressed in a loose tattered habit. Having made his way to the state apartments, he required the Viceroy to accompany him to Pausilypo, that he might there partake of a collation which he had provided; and, at the same time, he caused some mariners to enter, bearing baskets of fruit and all sorts of dainties. The Duke of Arcos, who was not in a humour to carouse with a crazy fisherman, excused himself on the pretence of indisposi-

tion. But he gave orders to prepare his own gondola to convey him to the place of festivity. In this state barge Masaniello accordingly embarked, being followed by a small fleet of feluccas, which bore a number of dancers and musicians, as also divers, who amused him by picking up small pieces of coin which he threw from time to time into the sea. But this marine excursion, instead of refreshing him after his labours, seems rather to have contributed to deprive him of any portion of reason which yet was left. He feasted immoderately on the choice provisions which had been placed aboard, and drank, as was reported, twelve flasks of *Lachrymae Christi*, which so inflamed his blood that he never afterwards spoke or acted reasonably and calmly.

From the time of his excursion to Pausilypo, Masaniello either remained in a state of inert foolishness and dotage, or rode furiously through the town with a drawn sword in his hand, striking and wounding those whom he encountered, or driving them headlong before him. Even the populace now became disgusted with the spectacle of his intemperance; and it was obvious that he could no longer be permitted to exercise the sovereign power, or even be allowed to roam unrestrained through the city.

At length two noblemen, Ferrante and Carlos Carraccioli, having omitted to step out of their coach to pay Masaniello, as he passed, the marks of reverence which he exacted from all, he ordered them to come on the following day, and kiss his feet publicly in the market-place. These noblemen, unwilling to undergo such a degradation, repaired immediately to the Viceroy, and represented in the strongest terms the miserable and abject condition to which the kingdom was reduced. While they were yet discoursing with his Excellency, the old priest Genuino, and Arpaia the Elect of the people, also sought an audience, and bitterly complained to the Vice-

roy concerning the conduct of Masaniello, who, a few hours before, had struck the one a blow on the face, and mercilessly caned the other. They also informed him, that the capricious and unreasonable proceedings of Masaniello had so alienated the affections of the people, that, provided they were well assured they should never be molested in the enjoyment of their restored privileges, they would gladly return to their former duty and obedience towards the legitimate government. The Viceroy, delighted to hear that his subjects were in this disposition, published a new edict, confirming the former treaty. By his instructions, Genuino harangued some of the heads of the people, and easily convinced them that the death of Masaniello was essential to their safety. That priest then introduced about fifty of their number to the palace, who frankly expressed their sentiments to the Viceroy.¹ His Excellency, seeing that the destruction of Masaniello would not be unacceptable to the people, and might now be attempted without risk of exciting farther commotion, was not long of adopting means for its accomplishment. He employed a person of the name of Michel Angelo Ardizzone, and two others, who engaged to make away with his enemy at the hazard of their own lives, and he promised the assassins 10,000 crowns to encourage them in the execution of their enterprise.

The outrageous conduct of the frantic Masaniello accelerated his fate, and facilitated the blow which had been prepared for him. Having made a second voyage to Pausilypo, and being much overheated, he had no sooner landed at Naples, than he leaped back into the sea with his clothes on, and having again come to shore, brandishing his sword, he rushed in a state of delirium among the crowd who were standing near the beach, and who, for their own preservation, were obliged to seize this unfor-

¹ Nicolai, *Rivoluz. di Napoli*.

tunate lunatic, and place him in confinement, in his own house, under a strong guard of soldiers.

On the following morning, however, (July 16), he contrived to escape from durance, and ran to the church Del Carmine, where about 8000 people were assembled on account of a festival which was to be that day celebrated. Having ascended the pulpit, with a crucifix in his hand, he addressed the multitude in a strain which at first recalled the former recollection of his popular eloquence. In pathetic terms he reminded them of his past services, and upbraided them with their fickleness and desertion. But his harangue soon became incoherent and unintelligible; and amid his ravings, he tore off his clothes, to exhibit his body worn out and emaciated with the inquietude and toil which he had endured in the cause of the people. The priests having withdrawn him from the pulpit, the Archbishop, who was engaged in the celebration of mass, persuaded him to retire to one of the adjacent dormitories, for the sake of some refreshment and repose. A few moments' sleep calmed his agitation, and he placed himself, as if awaiting his destiny, at a window which commanded a view of that element whence he had so long drawn his humble subsistence. Ardizzone, and the other assassins who were leagued with him, sought Masaniello in the cloisters of the church and convent, calling aloud, "Long live the King, and let none henceforth obey Masaniello!" Hearing his name thus vociferated, he boldly presented himself before them, and asked if he was required by the people. For answer the assassins discharged at him a volley from their fire-arms. He fell at their feet mortally wounded, exclaiming, "*Ingrati Traditori*," and almost instantly expired.¹

Intelligence of this assassination was communicated to the multitude assembled in the church, without produ-

¹ Orloff, *Mem. Hist de. Naples*, t. ii. p. 330.

cing any feeling either of regret or indignation. In fact, the popular party were rejoiced to be thus delivered from the control and guidance of a maniac ; and they suffered his body to be dismembered without the slightest emotion or interference. The head of their once idolized leader was chopped off, and being fixed on the point of a spear, was carried to the Viceroy, and thence to the market-place. His mangled trunk was dragged through the public streets by a rabble of boys, who three days before had followed him in triumph, and was then cast into a ditch beyond the Porta Nolana :—

Quem dies vidit veniens superbum,
Hunc dies vidit abiens jacentem !

Those citizens who, during the progress of the insurrection, had almost adored Masaniello, witnessed the indignities offered to his remains, without resistance or emotion. The nobility, with the higher classes, who had all along beheld, with secret indignation, this mock sovereign giving laws to the capital, being now transported with joy, hastened in crowds to the palace to congratulate the Viceroy ; and thence accompanied him, along with the chief officers in the state, to the church Del Carmine, there to return thanks to the patron of Naples, St Januarius. The streets resounded with acclamations from the mob of “ Long live the King of Spain, and our Viceroy the Duke of Arcos ;” and from every quarter multitudes flocked into the presence of his Excellency, boasting that they had been participators in the murder of Masaniello.¹

Thus ended the brief but eventful career of Masaniello, —the Fisherman of Naples,—the avenger of public wrongs, —the terror of the Spaniards,—the idol of the people. History, even in its most romantic incidents, scarcely presents us with an example of a rise so sudden and singular as that of this barefooted monarch, who, wearing

¹ Nicolai, *Rivoluz. di Napoli*, p. 89.

a mariner's cap for a diadem, ruled over one of the most ancient kingdoms and finest cities of Europe, with a sway more absolute than was ever exercised by the most popular princes or the most formidable tyrants.

Had Masaniello resigned his usurped authority into the hands of the Spanish Viceroy, and returned to his former avocation, as soon as he had obtained for the people the confirmation of their privileges, he might have been entitled to the respect and gratitude of his countrymen. His daring activity, subtle contrivances, and disregard of paltry advantages, might have been justly admired, and his successful enterprise might at least have been ranked among those conspiracies which were skilfully planned and boldly executed. But, dazzled by ambition and the fascinations of power,—or instigated, as some say, by his kindred,—or perhaps apprehensive that, if he once resigned his sway, he would speedily fall a victim to the vengeance of the nobility, he retained his usurped dominion; and being disabled by ignorance, as well as mental infirmity, from maintaining the advantages he had acquired, he perished, a memorable example of the precarious tenure of political power, when unsupported by sound judgment or antiquity of possession.

In the lowness of his birth,—in his enterprising spirit and popular eloquence,—in his sudden elevation to power,—in the inflexible rigour of the punishments he inflicted after he had attained it,—in his suspicions, intemperance, and puerile vanity,—and finally, in that extravagant demeanour which preceded his downfall, and betokened a taint of insanity,—the Tribune Rienzi—half knave, half madman—presents us with a striking resemblance to the fisherman Masaniello. But Rienzi had received a liberal, and even a learned, education, and to that advantage alone may be attributed the shades of differ-

ence in the characters and actions of the Roman and Neapolitan demagogues.

The Viceroy, emboldened by the fate of Masaniello, and the apathy with which his loss was sustained by the people, inconsiderately allowed the weight of bread to be diminished on the very day after his death. This reduction immediately produced a commotion : the bakers and grain-dealers were personally ill treated, or their property destroyed, and the mob rushed in great numbers to the palace, bearing the small loaves on their pikes. The fickle crowd now regarded Masaniello as a martyr in their cause. It was reported that, at the time of the attack by the banditti, he had been struck by a number of bullets, which miraculously did not pierce his body, and it was believed that, at the hour in which he was slain, there was seen an angelic figure, hovering in the air over the church Del Carmine, with a sword in his hand, which he was sheathing in the scabbard, and that a voice was heard from on high, saying, " His labour is finished, give him rest !"¹ The credulous multitude, impressed with the conviction that Masaniello had been received into heaven as a martyr and a saint, now eagerly sought out his mutilated remains. They joined his head, by mistake, to the body of a fair-skinned musician of the Duke of Matalone, and as Masaniello had been of a dark colour, it was said the change had occurred in consequence of his being sanctified,² while others spread a report that he was resuscitated. Having dressed the body in a royal mantle, and placed a crown on the head, with a sceptre in the hand, they carried it to the palace, and through the different streets, accompanied with drums and trumpets, and 400 priests holding lighted torches. They then bore it to the church Del Carmine, where the spectators eagerly pressed to touch it with their rosaries, which they afterwards pre-

¹ *L'Espion Turc.* t. iii.

² Buraña, p. 183.

served as relics,¹ and it was then deposited under the altar of the cathedral. Thus, in the course of a few days, was Masaniello obeyed as a king, interred as a malefactor, and worshipped as a saint.

The grievance concerning the reduction in the weight of bread, was speedily remedied; but the agitation and discontents which were the effects of the previous change, did not so readily subside. His Excellency, dreading a new insurrection, and fearing that though he had got rid of Masaniello, some new leader might supply his place, appointed Giulio Genuino, of whom he was chiefly apprehensive, to be President of one of the Courts of Justice, and conferred on him several other marks of favour and esteem. This promotion was bestowed partly to render him an object of suspicion to the people, and partly as a reward for having contributed to delude the populace with regard to the terms of the treaty. The inhabitants of Naples were astonished at the preferment of Genuino, and they could not comprehend what motive had induced the Viceroy to show such distinguished testimonies of regard to one who had all along, and apparently with the utmost eagerness, espoused the interests of the people in opposition to the government. But the mystery was explained when the articles of the treaty came to be engraved on the marble column² which was set up, as agreed on, in the market-place. It was then perceived that the 14th clause contained an exceptive provision, which had not been read in the cathedral Del Carmine, and which, in fact, rendered the whole treaty void and ineffectual. It was declared that all taxes hitherto imposed or exacted should be abrogated and annulled forever, such of them only excepted as had existed in the reign of Charles V, or had been alienated to private individuals, which should always subsist notwithstanding any thing mentioned in this treaty

¹ Buraña, p. 183.

² Nicolai, p. 104.

to the contrary. Now, as there was no tax whatever in the kingdom that had not been thus mortgaged in security to individuals who had advanced sums to government, all the imposts consequently remained in full force ;¹ and this covenant, which had been concluded with such solemnity, and afterwards sanctioned by so many oaths, proved only a political device to lull the people into tranquillity, until the government should find a fit opportunity to sink them again in slavery and subjection.

Those citizens who had first discovered the fraud, immediately communicated it to their neighbours and acquaintances, and these soon divulged it with trumpet-tongue to the whole people, who now comprehended the cause of Genuino's preferment, and concluded that he had sold them to the government. It was in vain, in order to appease them, that the Viceroy sent Genuino to Cerdeña in Spain, where he soon after died ;² and his connivance, about the same time, at the escape of the assassins of Masaniello, confirmed their suspicions that he had been concerned in his murder. As in the former insurrection,

¹ Tarsia, *Tumultos*. Howell's *Hist. of Revol. of Naples*. The words in the treaty were : " Item—Che s'intendano levate tutte le Gabelle, tanto della regia Corte quanto della medesima Città, non solo quelle imposte d'ordine dell' Sig. Vicerè e nobiltà ma anco del popolo : e anco tutte novi imposte e imposizioni che si esigono nella dogana ; (ma assolutamente restino in piedi quelle che si pagavano nell tempo dell' Imperadore Carlo V.) e qualsivoglia etiam in solutum data a particolari." In order to account for Masaniello and the people having been so easily deceived, Meissner (the German author of the historical tract entitled *Masaniello*) supposes that the exceptive clause concerning the taxes in the reign of Charles V, and which is placed here within brackets, had been omitted in the reading, or slurred over so that the phrase *levate*, and not the words *restino in piedi*, seemed to apply to the concluding clause *Qualsivoglia in solutum data a particolari*.

² Tarsia, *Tumultos*. Siri (*Mercurio*, x. p. 157.) says that he died on his passage, not without suspicion as to the mode of his death.

clamorous multitudes began to assemble in the market-place, where they gave loose to their rage and indignation, and flew to arms, uttering imprecations against the faithless government, which had thus deceived them. They blockaded the Viceroy in his palace, and fortress of Castelnovo, which was totally unprovided with the means of defence or subsistence, and they compelled the Prince of Massa, an officer of considerable courage and experience, to act as their leader, in room of the chief whom they had lost. It was with consent of the Viceroy that this nobleman accepted the degrading command which was thus forced on him. He undertook to carry on the siege of Castelnovo, but he had only placed himself at the head of the people, in order to betray them, and accordingly he entered secretly into a correspondence with the Viceroy.

For some weeks the city fluctuated,—occasionally subsiding into a calm, and then, on some trifling or unexpected occurrence, rising in tumult. During this period, each trade and corporation attempted to gain for itself special and unreasonable privileges. The aggrieved mendicants rose up against the Friars of St Martin's, because they dispensed at their own convent gate the alms of a charitable institution of which they were guardians, instead of making their distributions at a spot better suited to the convenience of paupers.¹

Negotiations were meanwhile carried on; but as they were always protracted by the Viceroy, and the people had little confidence in his sincerity, they occupied, with a view to their future security, several convents and other advantageous positions in the city. Those Spaniards whom they found scattered through the town, beyond the walls of the fortress, were treacherously attacked and murdered; while the houses of the nobility, which had

¹ Brusoni, lib. x.

formerly escaped, were now fired and pillaged. The city, too, was reduced to the utmost poverty and distress by the senseless commercial restrictions and regulations of the mob. They prohibited the exportation of grain or any sort of provisions, and also the raw material of silk. All foreign merchants resident in Naples took to flight, the banks were closed, and credit was completely annihilated.¹

The Lazaroni and dregs of the people alone had been engaged in the former revolt. But the bad faith of the government, and the prospect of ceaseless anarchy, had now disgusted many of the more wealthy classes of citizens. The insurrection also had spread more into the country than in the time of Masaniello, and in every quarter the peasantry rose against their feudal barons. Towns in the remotest corners of Abruzzo and Calabria were agitated by similar commotions with those which shook the capital, and the Spaniards were expelled from Capua, Salerno, Sanseverino, and other cities.

The formidable attitude everywhere assumed by the insurgents, and the report of an intended French invasion, induced the Viceroy to enter into terms of accommodation. But the conditions now insisted on by the people were of the most arrogant and unreasonable description. An abolition of taxes was no longer the sole, or even the most prominent, article in their demands. They required that all Spaniards should withdraw from the capital; that they themselves should garrison the fortresses and the royal palace, and command the gallies; that none of the ministry should be chosen from the class of barons; and that the obnoxious noblemen whom they enumerated, should be for ever banished the kingdom.²

To all the required conditions, which in fact constituted the mob masters of the realm, the Viceroy acceded,

¹ Nicolai, *Rivol. di Napol.* lib. iii.

² Brusoni, lib. xv.

with exception of the surrender of Fort St Elmo. The nobility were greatly incensed and disgusted at the favourable terms thus granted to the people. His Excellency, however, had concluded this apparently disgraceful treaty, merely with the intention of gaining time, till he should receive effectual assistance from Spain.¹ Meanwhile he sowed dissensions between the populace and nobility, and persuaded a number of the multitude to lay down their arms. He passed the time in the utmost impatience for the arrival of the expected succours, and was ever ascending the turrets of Castelnovo, to observe the direction of the winds, and descry the fleet as soon as it might be visible.² After being long detained by unfavourable weather, and twice driven back to Port Mahon, an armament of 40 ships of war, and 5000 troops, arrived in the Bay of Naples, under the command of Don John of Austria, a youth of eighteen years of age, and natural son of his Catholic Majesty.³ The fleet anchored on the 1st of October close to Castelnovo, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, and the salutes of the royal fortresses. Don John, who appeared on the deck of the flag-ship, dressed in a military cloak of scarlet embroidered with silver, won by his pleasing countenance and graceful form the affections of the populace, who crowded out in feluccas to see him. Anticipating an end of their miseries from the son of their king, they sent to him a deputation, with their General, the Prince of Massa, at its head, bearing a sumptuous regale of fruits and other refreshments. Don John accepted the collation, and their deputies brought back to the people a favourable report of their reception, and of the disposition in which they had found the Prince.⁴ Preparations had been made in the royal palace for Don John's reception ; but he de-

¹ Brusoni, lib. xv.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x.

³ See above, p. 382.

⁴ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x

clined to disembark till some plan of operations should be concerted. While he remained on board, however, he was perplexed by visits from the heads of the different parties in the state. Besides the deputies of the people, some nobles, who came on board his galley, threw the whole blame of the late commotions on the Viceroy ; while that nobleman and his creatures, eager to take vengeance on the Neapolitans for all those mortifying concessions to which they had been compelled to submit, prompted him to immediate and active hostilities. Don John, and the advisers who had attended him from Spain, and of whom the chief was Melchior Borgia, were inclined to lenient measures. But the Viceroy, desirous that the populace should break out into fresh outrages, or, at all events, should insist on terms so unreasonable as might justify an appeal to arms, fomented by secret emissaries (as was surmised) their discontents and suspicions. The people would have given up those claims which touched the royal prerogative, as their demand that they should garrison the fortresses, and command the gallies ; while Don John, on the other hand, would have agreed to abolish the most obnoxious taxes, and to grant them an amnesty.¹ But the point on which they split was the surrender of arms. Don John considered this as essential to his honour in the execution of the commission delegated to him ; while, on the other hand, the heads of the people conceived that they would not be in safety to give up their weapons, as the Duke of Matalone, and the other nobility, might then avail themselves of their defenceless state, to attack and cut them to pieces. The Prince of Massa attempted a compromise, by persuading the people to deliver up their short arms, as daggers and cutlasses, which in fact were already prohibited by the laws of the realm. But Don John insisted, that they should surrender their muskets

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 200.

and carbines also; and he refused to come on shore till this condition was complied with. A number of troops, however, were disembarked, and the city was attacked, at the same moment, with the utmost fury both by sea and land. Though taken by surprise, and at first somewhat dismayed, as they had not believed that they should be seriously assaulted, the inhabitants made a brave and vigorous defence. During three days there were constant skirmishes in the streets, for possession of the convents or other positions held by the popular and royal parties. The seditious quarters of the town were bombarded from the fortresses and the ships; but although this cannonade destroyed many of the churches and public buildings, the Spanish troops were not sufficiently numerous to occupy a city containing half a million of inhabitants. Their assaults, indeed, were incessantly renewed, but they were ultimately driven back with great loss from many of the stations which it was most important for them to possess. Rendered desperate by the impolitic cruelty¹ of their oppressors, who, it is said, refused quarter, the Neapolitans entered into a resolution among themselves, that no one, under pain of death, should propose a pacification. The Viceroy, and Don John, who withdrew his troops from the city, and re-embarked them on board his gallies, would now gladly have appeased the infuriate populace. But in consequence of their late successes, they rose in their demands, and added to their former unreasonable conditions, that the Duke of Arcos should be deprived of the government, and expelled the city. Some subsequent proposals from Don John were rejected with indignation, and they published a manifesto, setting forth their grievances, proclaim-

¹ Tarsia, however, (*Tumultos di Napol.*) denies that any cruelties were exercised by the Spaniards, or, indeed, that any hostilities were directed against the people, except defending from their attacks the posts which had been occupied by the royal troops.

ing the treachery and oppression of the Spaniards, and invoking the aid of all Christian Powers.¹

The Spanish government was more successful in repressing the insurrections throughout the provinces, than in quelling those of the capital. Don John, shortly after his arrival in the Bay of Naples, issued a mandate that all the Barons of the kingdom should rendezvous, with what forces they could muster, at Aversa, and he appointed Vincenzo Tuttavilla, his Lieutenant-General, in the command of the Baronage. They at first assembled with a few regular troops, and such of their vassals as remained faithful, under cover of an armed neutrality, but they quickly resolved to act for the service of the King of Spain. Their whole troops, when collected at Aversa, were found to amount to 2000 infantry, and upwards of 4000 cavalry, of whom the largest proportion were furnished by the Duke of Andria and the Count of Conversano.² The chief objects of their commander Tuttavilla, were to cut off the supplies of provisions which the insurgents in Naples derived from the country, and reduce to obedience those cities in the Campagna and Terra di Lavoro, which had thrown off their allegiance.³ With a part of the troops, he recovered in person the towns of Amalfi, Salerno, and Sanseverino; while the other barons marched with detached parties to quell those insurrections which had broken out in more remote districts of the kingdom. In this warfare the Duke of Matalone greatly distinguished himself; the Prince of Monteleone acted successfully in Farther Calabria, and the Count of Conversano, who was particularly zealous, and had raised troops at his own expense, proceeded against a popular chief called Blasio, who headed one of the most formidable bands of revolvers. Understanding that this leader

¹ Giannone, *Stor. Civil.* lib. xxxvii. c. 3.

² Nicolai, *Rivoluz. di Nap.*, lib. iv.

³ Ibid.

intended to march from the neighbourhood of Naples to Ascoli, and thus open a way into Apulia, in order thence to obtain supplies of grain for the capital, the Count judged that it would be expedient to attack him on his route. He accordingly intercepted his band, which consisted of 3000 rebels, totally defeated them, and slew their chief. He then reduced all the revolted towns in Apulia, and shut up the passes by which provisions were carried from that district to Naples.¹

Meanwhile the Prince of Massa still continued in command of the rebels in the capital. But some of his proceedings had recently excited suspicions of his fidelity among the chiefs of the insurrection. These were confirmed in consequence of the bad success of the intended explosion of a mine laid under the Convent of Santa Chiara,—a post which was occupied by the royalists, and from which their fire greatly annoyed the people. There seems no doubt that the failure was intentional on the part of the Prince of Massa. That nobleman was fond of popular applause, but he was zealous at the same time for the interests of the King of Spain, and vainly ambitious of the honour of being arbiter between the populace and the Spanish ministry. His ambiguous conduct had led the heads of the people to remove him from his own palace, to a house in one of the most disaffected quarters, where he could be closely observed.² Becoming there apprehensive for his safety, in consequence of the suspicions and threats of the mob, he escaped from this species of durance, and concealed himself in a remote corner of the city. But he was so diligently sought after, that the place of his retreat was quickly discovered, and he was led out encompassed by the rabble. Being possessed

¹ Camargo, *Sumario Anadido a la Hist. de Marian.* Tarsia, *Tumult. di Nap.*

² Buraña, part ii. p. 150.

of considerable eloquence, he harangued them on his whole conduct and the services which he had rendered them. But when he had nearly mollified and persuaded all around him, an armourer called Gennaro Annese, who had lately acquired much influence, coming to the spot, called out that he was a traitor whose head should be struck off, and his body dragged through the streets. This proposal being seconded by the acclamations of the Lazzaroni, who highly relished all such employments, he was beheaded without the ceremony of a trial, and his heart, being torn out from his body, was sent to his wife in a silver basin.¹

Gennaro Annese, who had greatly contributed to foment the discontents of the people since the first commencement of the troubles, was chosen Captain-General, in room of the predecessor whose death he had thus instigated. This new leader was sufficiently designing and crafty, popular among the lowest classes, and fitted for the perpetration of any atrocity. But his talents proved to be neither commensurate to his zeal, nor the importance of the situation to which he had been elevated. As ignorant as Masaniello, he possessed not one spark of his frank and disinterested spirit. His great object, on the contrary, was to amass precious articles, which he heaped up in the tower of the Convent del Carmine, as a place of security. It was soon found that the sordid Annese was utterly incapable of unravelling the confusion in which the affairs of the city were involved when first confided to his direction. The houses of suspected persons were pillaged without waiting for his commands, and a general disorder everywhere prevailed. The want of provisions excited universal discontent, and Annese himself began to be appalled at the bad eminence to which he had been raised. Some regular and efficient form of government seemed to be requisite in order to save the city from

¹ *Mémoires du Duc de Guise*, livre i.

convulsion, and give vigour to the exertions of the people for their defence. Hitherto they had, apparently at least, confined their views to the abolition of oppressive taxes, and the punishment of evil ministers; but, irritated by the public execution of some of their chiefs, who had remained in the hands of the Viceroy since the time of Masaniello, they now, by the counsel of Annese, completely threw off allegiance to the King of Spain, and declared Naples an independent republic, on the model of those of Genoa and Venice.

The new commonwealth, however, required a Doge better qualified, and of higher authority, than Gennaro Annese. During the course of the commotions, some vague propositions had been started, of placing Naples under the protection of France. But from the Italian dislike of foreigners, such proposals had generally been received with coldness or distaste, and Masaniello had ever been decidedly opposed to the project. Mazarin, however, was all along an attentive observer of the progress of the dissensions in Naples, and, at their commencement, he had formed a plan for raising Prince Thomas of Savoy to the throne of that kingdom.¹ But though sufficiently aware of the importance of separating this fair inheritance from the crown of Spain, he was also sensible of the difficulties that would oppose the recognition of any monarch of his nomination. He also dreaded with reason, that his interposition might tend to unite all parties in Naples against the French. The people, besides, were inclined towards the formation of a commonwealth, whereas all Mazarin's negotiations had in view the establishment of a monarchy; and the republic, which had been founded in Holland, and was now forming in England, created considerable alarm as to the prevalence of democratic principles in the European governments.

¹ Denina, *Rivoluzioni d'Italia*, lib. xxiii. c. 7.

On the whole, therefore, the French minister considered it as more expedient privately to foment their discontents, and encourage their rebellion, than to afford the Neapolitans any effectual assistance. After all hopes, however, of accommodation with Don John had come to an end, the people became more urgent in their applications for aid, and they declared that they would acknowledge France as their protector, provided she sent an armament to their succour, under Count Harcourt, Maréchal Meilleraye, or any other officer of distinguished military reputation, to be placed at the head of the new republic. Indeed, the chiefs of the people, in order to induce them to persevere in their rebellion, were obliged to feign that they had received ample promises of assistance from Mazarin ; and having got hold of an old French valet, in the service of a Polish nobleman then resident at Naples, they compelled him to personate the character of an ambassador, despatched from his most Christian Majesty, and bearing full assurances of alliance and support.¹

In fact, however, Mazarin had declined to send forth the required armament, and the two military commanders, whose names had been mentioned, showed themselves little covetous of the honour of presiding over a fierce and inconstant people. But the French ambassador at Rome, through whom these negotiations had been chiefly conducted, suggested to them the Duke of Guise, with whom he had reason to suspect they were already in correspondence, as a fit object of their choice.²

Henry Duke of Guise, grandson of the famous Henry, and great-grandson of the not less celebrated Francis Duke of Guise, was at this time residing at Rome, for the purpose of obtaining from the Pope the dissolution of his unfortunate marriage with the Countess of Bossu. He was now in the thirty-fourth year of his age—courte-

¹ Nicolai, *Revoluz.*, lib. iv.

² Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x.

ous, handsome, eloquent, accomplished, and endowed with that activity and impetuous courage, which qualified him for daring enterprises. His singular adventures, his romantic cast of mind, his chivalrous valour and numerous gallantries, which gave him some resemblance to an ancient Paladin, had obtained for him at Paris the name of *Le Heros de la Fable*, as Condé had merited that of *Le Heros de l'Histoire*. Being descended from the old Angevin line of princes, whose title and arms his family still bore, he possessed plausible and ancient claims to the crown of Naples; and as his sovereign was now at open war with the King of Spain, the present discontents afforded him a favourable opportunity of renewing the pretensions of his race. His attention was first attracted to the state of affairs in Naples by some mariners from the isle of Procida, who came to sell him a cargo of fruit they had brought to Rome, and who being apprized that he was a descendant from their kings of the House of Anjou, threw themselves at his feet; and, having informed him of the disturbances which agitated their country, they declared their conviction, that, if he placed himself at the head of the insurrection, the Duke of Arcos and the Spaniards would be quickly expelled from the kingdom. Guise treated them with much kindness and liberality, and from that moment he kept a watchful eye on all the proceedings at Naples.¹ He entered into close correspondence with the popular party: he received their emissaries at Rome, and employed confidents, whom he sent to Naples, in order to instigate them to perseverance in their expulsion of the Spaniards. His plots, however, were all detected by the Count d'Oñate, the Spanish ambassador at Rome, who forthwith communicated them to the Duke of Arcos.²

¹ Baron de Modena, *Rivol. de Nap.*, ap. Orloff, *Mem. Hist. de Naples*, t. ii. p. 334.

² Nicolai, *Rivol. de Nap.* lib. iv.

The crown of Naples was no doubt the ultimate object of the chimerical and ambitious views of the Duke of Guise, but he pretended to Mazarin and the French ambassador at Rome, that his sole object was to secure it for one of the House of Bourbon; while to the people of Naples he expressed his entire concurrence in the establishment of a commonwealth, of which he was to be merely the elected head. Guise was at this time without either money or powerful friends, and was accompanied only by a few followers of desperate fortunes. The city of Naples, he must have known, was in a state of famine, surrounded too by a hostile fleet, and by fortresses which were in the hands of the enemy. Its nobility were still faithful to Spain, or at least were at variance with the rabble, to whom alone he looked for assistance, but who were of proverbial fickleness, and very inadequately provided with money, arms, or ammunition. Mazarin probably saw through his real designs. That minister was by no means friendly to the House of Guise; he had destined Prince Thomas of Savoy for the crown of Naples in case of a suitable opportunity opening¹, and his thoughts were now in some degree withdrawn from external affairs by the prospect of domestic dissensions. Accordingly, though Mazarin granted the royal permission to undertake this enterprise, and promised the Duke some vessels as an escort for conveying him safe to the shores of Naples, he gave him little encouragement to set out on so desperate an expedition, and extended no positive assurances of farther succour. But the Duke of Guise, though not qualified to conduct a hazardous enterprise to a successful issue, was precisely of a disposition which prompted him to engage in it. Becoming impatient to rush into the adventure, and being informed that if he longer delayed, the Neapolitans would lay down their arms and submit

¹ Aubery, *Hist. de Mazarin*, t. ii. livre iii. c. 4.

to the Spaniards, he threw himself, without waiting for the French vessels, into a felucca, with no more than six attendants, and having almost miraculously escaped the Spanish fleet, he landed safely at Naples.¹

Though the populace made the most extravagant rejoicings at his appearance,—though he received from them a spontaneous oath of fidelity as Duke or Doge of the Republic, and a consecrated sword from the Archbishop, never did a leader enter on command under more discouraging circumstances. While at Rome, the Duke had been informed, that on his arrival at Naples he should find at his disposal four millions of gold, from the confiscated property of the nobles—abundant stores of ammunition, and a force of 170,000 men, well armed and resolute, who only wanted a bold and experienced leader to direct their energies.² But though these troops proved to be sufficiently numerous, they were an undisciplined and disorderly rabble, and not above 5000 could be relied on. The inhabitants were at the time much distressed for want of provisions, and each moment presented to the Duke new difficulties in the execution of his enterprise, from the total want of unanimity, concord, or subordination. A people who, like the Neapolitans, assert their freedom without any generous or steady principle of conduct, and merely because their sufferings are too severe for human endurance, can seldom be depended on for persevering efforts against their oppressors. But the chief obstacles to success originated in the timid, treacherous, and envious disposition of Annese. He had reluctantly concurred with the populace in summoning Guise to Naples, whose arrival, he foresaw, would be the end of his own power and importance. Immediately after landing, the Duke was presented to Annese, who at this time lodged for safety in the tower of the Convent del

¹ *Mem. de Guise*, liv. ii.

² *Siri, Mercur.* t. x.

Carmine. “I was not a little surprised,” says Guise in his Memoirs, “at the blindness of the people of Naples in chusing such a wretch for their general. He was a little black man, very ill made, his eyes sunk in his head, short hair, which exposed enormous ears, a wide mouth, grizzly beard, and a hoarse voice. He had an impediment in his speech,—he was unquiet in all his gestures, and so timorous, that the least noise made him tremble. He wore a buff coat, with sleeves of red velvet, and scarlet breeches,—a cap of the same colour on his head, and a girdle of red velvet, furnished with three pistols on each side. He bore no sword, but, instead of it, carried a huge blunderbuss in his hand, and he was attended by a guard of about twenty, as ill-looking fellows as himself.”¹ The Duke was not very well pleased with his reception by Annese, nor the cheer provided for him at dinner, which was served by Annese’s wife, who was dressed in sky-coloured satin embroidered with silver, and wore a pearl necklace, as also diamond ear-rings, which had been pillaged from the Dutchess of Matalone. He admits that the wine, which was *Vino Tinto*, the bread, sallad and fruit, consisting of pears and apples, were excellent; but the other dishes,—eggs, fried fish, and salted anchovies were filthy and unsavoury.² At night he was much surprised to be conducted, as his place of repose, into the kitchen, which he found confusedly filled with provisions and all sorts of spoil; and his consternation was complete, when informed that he was to sleep in the same bed with Annese. This proposal he resisted as long as possible, on pretence of not incommoding the Signora Annese. But her husband told him, that she should lie on a quilt before the fire with her sister, and that it concerned his

¹ *Mém. de Guise*, liv. ii.

² Buraña has treated his readers with a complete bill of fare of this repast.

safety to share his bed with the Duke, as respect for their new Doge could alone prevent his enemies from cutting his throat. Annese's wife, accordingly, slept on a mattress, and a little blackmoor slave, who was sick of the small-pox, lay in a cradle at the foot of the bed. Still, however, the old wretch was so apprehensive of danger, that he awakened in disorder twenty times in the course of the night, and embracing the Duke, besought his protection against those who would murder him.

Guise, as may be believed, passed a sleepless night, in much personal discomfort, and with many anxious reflections on the difficulties of the new and singular situation in which he found himself placed. He early, however, adopted prompt and vigorous measures¹ for fulfilling the arduous duties of the station to which he had been called

¹ Historians have viewed the character of the Duke of Guise, and his conduct on his first arrival at Naples, in various lights. Two modern and nearly contemporary French writers, have given us very different representations of his behaviour: "Sa conduite, (says one of them), en de telles circonstances, fut vraiment admirable, et n'a point été assez louée par les historiens. En moins d'un mois, il parvint à maîtriser le peuple, à établir l'ordre, à se former une espèce d'armée disciplinée, à balancer les forces de l'Espagne. S'il eût reçu de la France les secours promis, si cette puissance se fût bien franchement déclarée en faveur de l'entreprise, nul doute qu'elle eût réussi." (Orloff, *Mem. Hist. sur le Royaume de Naples*, t. ii. p. 338, ed. Paris 1819.) "Les affaires des Espagnols (says a contemporary author) étaient si désespérées, qu'ils ne pouvoient faire que des efforts impuissans pour ramener les Napolitains sous le joug de la Castille, si le nouveau Doge avoit eû la moindre partie des talens politiques qui distinguaient le célèbre fondateur de la liberté Batave. A peine le Duc de Guise fut installé en sa nouvelle dignité, qu'il aspirait ouvertement au pouvoir despotique: on auroit dit que par ses actions il vouloit servir les Espagnols." (Desodoards, *Hist. d'Italie*, t. vi. p. 412, ed. Paris 1803). Siri says that the Duke of Guise was extremely credulous, and easily deceived by the misrepresentations of the spies and minions by whom he was always surrounded. (*Mercurio*, t. xi. p. 4.)

by the voice of the people, though he now began to suspect that he had somewhat rashly obeyed the summons. By his measures of precaution, he repressed the pillage of houses, and re-established plenty in the capital. He procured money, by melting down and coining the gold and silver plate which had been plundered from the palaces of the nobility. He also occupied some advantageous positions, and raised an additional force of 1000 soldiers, of whom a considerable number were riflemen. These he stationed at garret-windows, on the tops of houses, and the spire of the cloisters of St Sebastian, whence they brought down an immense number of Spanish officers, who went to and fro with orders: "And I repaired every day," says the Duke, "at my leisure hours, to enjoy this pleasure, till driven away by the cannon of St Elmo." He also made several brave, although, for the most part, ineffectual assaults, on the fortresses and positions occupied by the Spaniards. On all his operations the intrigues of Gennaro Annese still continued to shed their malignant influence, though it had been determined in the council that he should conduct only the civil government, and that every thing relating to military movements should be entrusted to the Duke alone.¹

It had early become manifest to Guise, that he could entertain no hopes of ultimate success in his views to the crown of Naples, except by conciliating the baronage, and bringing them to act in co-operation with the people. In Portugal and Catalonia, where the insurrections had recently proved so successful, the nobility had been ranged on the same side with the populace, and a fortunate result at Naples could be anticipated only from a similar combination. The Duke, accordingly, marched at the head of 4000 foot and 600 horse towards Aversa, the chief rendezvous of the nobility, in the hope that by this

¹ *Mem. de Guise*, liv. ii.

exhibition of force, and by his powers of persuasion, he might induce them to join his standard. He had a long conference in the neighbourhood of Aversa with the Duke of Andria, who was sent to him as a representative of the baronage in that quarter. But he found that they were totally disinclined to a mixed form of government, and determined not to abate in one tittle of the tyranny which they exercised towards the people, and which they regarded as their immemorial privilege. The Duke of Andria expressed his surprise, that Guise, who was accounted an intelligent Prince, should have allowed himself to be enticed by the flatteries of a foolish mob incapable of reason, and should have founded his hopes on a state of confusion that must inevitably lead to his own destruction. He recommended, that he should hold a retrospect towards the fate of his predecessors Masaniello and the Prince of Massa, but offered, if he would abandon the people, and throw himself into the power of the nobility, that they would procure for him a safe escort to France or Rome.¹

The Duke of Guise being thus totally disappointed in his expectations of drawing over the nobles to his party, returned to Naples, leaving the Baron of Modena, who had followed him from Rome, and was now his Camp Master-General, to command the army before Aversa. Being unable to contend with so great a force, the nobility retired to Capua, and the Baron entered Aversa without resistance. The capture of this town was hailed by the Neapolitans as a most important acquisition; but the plunder of the inhabitants, which the Baron was not at sufficient pains to restrain, and a disappointment in the expected supplies of corn from the granaries of Aversa, highly incensed his commander, and gave rise to those serious differences which afterwards existed between them,

¹ Nicolai, *Rivol. de Nap.* lib. iv.

and which ended in the imprisonment of the Baron, and discontent of the troops, among whom he was extremely popular.¹

About this time a French fleet, consisting of twenty-nine ships of war, appeared in the Bay of Naples, but they were inadequately provided for any enterprise of importance. Instead of making a diversion in favour of the Duke of Guise, by attacking the Spanish fleet, they only captured some merchant vessels, and, after an inglorious inactivity of three weeks, during which period they landed a very small quantity of ammunition, they returned to Toulon. It was soon discovered by the Neapolitans that Mazarin was by no means favourable to the Duke's enterprise, which he considered as a chimerical undertaking; and by addressing all his despatches to Annese, as the head of the commonwealth, he in a manner disavowed any recognition of the Duke's pretensions. On the other hand, it has been suspected, that Guise was not very anxious for French assistance, because he was apprehensive that it might revive the national jealousy of the Neapolitans, and because he was desirous to reap for himself all the benefits of the adventure in which he had embarked.² It seems certain, that he declined the co-

¹ The Baron of Modena is reported to have been a man of ingenuity, and some literary merit, addicted to magic, and fond of political innovations. Being in consequence viewed with suspicion by Richelieu, he retired to Sedan at the time of the rebellion of the Count de Soissons, and there met with the Duke of Guise, to whose fortunes he became attached. It is said that he was to have suffered a capital punishment on the day after that on which the Spaniards occupied Naples, and triumphed over the party of Guise, (Nicolai, *Rivol. de Nap.* lib. v.) His life was thus saved by their success, and he subsequently published a history of the Revolutions of Naples, in which he justified his own conduct, and bitterly condemned that of the Duke.

² Giannone, *Stor. Civil.* lib. xxxvii. c. 3.

operation of some French troops which were on board the fleet, and which were offered to him in small numbers. But he was eager to receive pecuniary supplies, which were rigidly withheld.

During the stay of the French fleet in the Bay of Naples, Annese, in consideration of the promise of an annual payment of 50,000 crowns, resigned the power he was but ill qualified to support, so that the Duke now remained at the head both of civil and military affairs. As he was thus relieved from a control, by which his best efforts had been frequently baffled, his government began to assume a more regular form. He arranged the different departments of business, he opened courts for the administration of justice, and, having selected one of the finest palaces in the city for his residence, he began to live with a magnificence which bespoke him to be the head of the republic.

The troops, too, which had been raised by the nobility, being dissatisfied with their commander Tuttavilla, began gradually to disperse, and many of them entered the Duke's service. Even the Spanish regular army, being shut up in the fortresses and greatly straitened for want of provisions, was considerably reduced by desertions; and in this situation, the Duke almost daily obtained some advantages in the capital, or in those skirmishes in the provinces, which were chiefly fought by the banditti whom he had enlisted in his cause.

In the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, Don John conducted himself with a prudence and address superior to what could have been expected from his years or experience. He first attempted to enter into a private negotiation with the Duke of Guise, and offered, if he would resign his claims on Naples, to put him in possession of the principality of Salerno, and to obtain for him from the Emperor several other investitures in

Italy. These proposals, however, being rejected by the Duke, and force having already failed, nothing now remained except to bring back the people, by conciliation, to their former allegiance. At this crisis their minds were chiefly fixed on the removal of the Duke of Arcos, and it seemed in vain to make any attempts at negotiation so long as that obnoxious Viceroy remained in the government. To all the overtures, indeed, which were made to them, they invariably replied, that they would not treat till the Duke of Arcos was expelled the kingdom.¹ The Archbishop of Naples, who had been employed as a mediator by Don John, strongly recommended that this concession should be granted to the feelings of the people. The baronage, too, finding that all their exertions were insufficient to reduce the refractory populace, despatched deputies to Don John to urge the immediate resignation of the Duke of Arcos as essential to the prosperity and pacification of the realm. That Viceroy having expressed his willingness to withdraw from the government, provided his retirement was sanctioned by the advice of the Collateral Council, Don John forthwith summoned its members, who were almost unanimously of opinion that the Duke should divest himself of his authority, and that his Highness Don John should meanwhile assume the reins of administration, till farther instructions were received from Spain.² Soon after this decision, the Duke of Arcos embarked with his family, somewhat hastily, for Sardinia; and Don John, having entered on the government, gave indication, by sending back his fleet to Spain, that he was resolved on the attainment of the object which had brought him to the shores of Naples.

It was hoped that as all the late evils were laid by the people to the charge of the Duke of Arcos, a good effect would be produced by his resignation of the Viceroyalty

¹ Buraña, *Battall. Peregr.* part ii. p. 276. ² Buraña. Nicolai.

into the hands of Don John of Austria, whose honourable character, and influence with his royal father, might obtain for the Neapolitans favourable conditions of peace, and be at the same time a guarantee for their fulfilment. Soon after the departure of the Duke of Arcos, Don John, accompanied by a numerous cavalcade, visited the different castles and posts, and showed himself in every quarter which was still occupied by the Spaniards. He also published a manifesto, imputing all the late unfortunate events to the pride, avarice, and misgovernment of the Viceroy, and promising a general pardon, with the preservation of their privileges, to all Neapolitans who should lay down their arms and return to their allegiance.

This proclamation did not at first produce any great impression on the minds of the citizens, but it gradually softened their asperity; while the skilful intrigues and machinations which Don John conducted among the populace, contributed to create disunion, and a distrust of the Duke of Guise. Annese, and a party of which, notwithstanding his nominal retirement, he still continued to be the head, instigated against him various plots and conspiracies. He almost daily laid ambushes for the life of the Duke, and everywhere represented him as haughty, harsh, and tyrannical, and of a character more dangerous than the worst of their Spanish Viceroy. On the other hand, there seems little doubt that Guise, at least on one occasion, had attempted to poison Annese. But the dose he administered to him at table, and of which he partook, had not the expected effect, as he was relieved by vomiting.¹ In fact, at this period the city of Naples was divided into not fewer than five different factions. 1. Those who desired either a republic or a monarchy, with the Duke of Guise at its head. 2. A number of monks and priests, with some of their devotees, who were desirous of

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xi. p. 446.

remitting the crown of Naples to the papacy. 3. A class composed chiefly of artificers, who were inclined to submit to the King of France. 4. The rabble, with Annese at their head, who were now all hostile to the Duke, and wished no form of government which might prevent them from robbing and plundering with impunity. 5. Such as, by reason of their interest in the old gabelles or taxes, were addicted to the Spanish interests, and wished to restore the dominion of their former masters. With the people in general, the Duke's influence was now sensibly on the decline. Though he had performed as much as could perhaps have been reasonably expected in the difficult and embarrassing situation in which he was placed, he had not accomplished, with exception of the capture of Aversa, any very signal exploit, and the Spaniards still held possession of their fortresses, with many positions in the interior of the city. Contemporary writers think that Guise committed a great error in quarrelling so early with Annese, who could turn the lower orders as he chose. However this may be, all parties were now convinced that the political and military talents of the Duke of Guise were inadequate to the importance of his undertaking. He now also became unpopular from the cruelty of the punishments he inflicted, which were often indiscriminate and unjust. Like all those who are frequently themselves the objects of conspiracies, he punished the accused without any nice regard to the evidence of guilt, and the people were thus well prepared to receive the suspicions instilled by the Spaniards, that Guise was in correspondence with them.

In order to redeem his lost credit and popularity, the Duke now considered it necessary to resolve on the execution of some great and decisive enterprise. The city of Naples was certainly at this time placed in a most peculiar situation. Besides the fortresses by which it was sur-

rounded, the Royalists occupied with small garrisons a number of convents and churches throughout the town ; and it appears incomprehensible that matters should have continued for so many months in this state, and that the Spaniards should neither have reduced the city, nor the citizens have expelled the Spaniards. In prosecution of his plan for some important achievement, the Duke resolved to hazard a simultaneous attack, for the purpose of driving the Spaniards from all the positions which they held through the city, and of compelling them at least to retire within their fortresses. Besides 30,000 inhabitants whom he had under arms,¹ he brought into the town several troops of banditti, particularly that commanded by Paul of Naples, which amounted to 3500 men, between twenty and forty years of age. “ They were all of them,” says the Duke, “ tall and well made, with black hair, for the most part curled ; they wore coats of black Spanish leather, with sleeves of velvet ; cloth breeches, mostly of scarlet, with gold lace ; silk stockings, and caps of cloth of gold or silver. Each bore two brace of pistols, fixed in a velvet girdle, laced with gold, and a cutlass about two feet long, hanging at a belt suitably trimmed. Most of them also carried firelocks or blunderbusses, and powder-flasks hung round their necks with broad silk ribbons of various colours.” There were about 3000 banditti besides Paul’s troop, all of whom, though not so well clad, were equally well armed, and apparently as courageous and resolute. Guise was very much satisfied with the review which he made of this force, and entertained no doubt that by its aid he should next day be absolute master of Naples. The assault, however, from which so much was expected, and for which such preparations had been made, failed in almost every quarter where it was attempted. It was commenced before

¹ Buraña, ii. 286.

dawn; but ere midday, the Duke's forces were repulsed from Santa Chiara, Donna Alvina, and Mount Oliveto, and were quickly forced to abandon Gli Angeli, after having possessed it. The banditti proved to be arrant poltroons, or to have entered the city merely to pillage the houses, and not to execute the enterprise entrusted to them. The whole troop under Paul of Naples, on being ordered to advance, threw themselves down on their bellies behind a wall, and could not be persuaded to rise, either by entreaties or blows. When they at length got up, instead of seconding the attack, they began to plunder the palaces in the quarter of the suburbs called Chiaia, particularly that belonging to the Prince of Montesarchio. Though the bad success of this enterprise was chiefly owing to the misconduct of the banditti commanded by Paul of Naples, their Captain had the impudence to demand from the Duke of Guise, as a reward for his services, the commission of Vicar-General in Apulia, and a grant of the estates of the Prince of Avellino, whose vassal he was born. Paul, who supposed that the Duke was intimidated by the presence of his numerous black whiskered banditti, made all his demands with the utmost insolence, and continued his devastations in the city. Guise appeared to yield to his claims, but, having contrived to separate him from his followers, he was seized and put to the rack, where, having confessed the most horrible murders, sacrileges, and abominations of every description, he was, without farther ceremony, put to death.

The total failure of this momentous undertaking, contrived for the purpose of re-establishing the credit of the Duke of Guise, contributed materially to impair it. Anese's party considerably increased, and at length that traitor entered into a private correspondence with Don John, for the purpose of delivering Naples into the hands of the Spaniards.

Intelligence of the communications which had been thus opened between Don John and the native head of the rebels having reached the Court of Madrid, that jealous government became apprehensive lest Don John might embrace the opportunity to declare himself King of Naples. And though his assumption of the office of Viceroy had been only temporary, and subject to the approval of his Catholic Majesty, it was considered that Don John and the Collateral Council at Naples had arrogated too much power. In consequence of this ill-timed suspicion, the Count d'Oñate, at this time the Spanish ambassador to Rome, was appointed to succeed the Duke of Arcos as Viceroy of Naples. He was the son of that Count who had frequently opposed in the Council of State the measures of Olivarez against the Catalans, and had formed a cabal against Luis de Haro at the commencement of his administration.¹ Notwithstanding his appointment, however, Don John still remained at Naples under the title of Plenipotentiary, to co-operate with the new governor and to direct the military movements.

The Count d'Oñate being amply supplied with money and military stores, threw himself, on his arrival at Naples, into Castelnuovo, and from that fortress he continued the correspondence which Don John had commenced with Annese. Guise expected that an emulation between Don John and the new Viceroy would have created a division in the Spanish counsels which might turn to his advantage; but he had ill calculated on the wisdom and discretion which from his earliest years distinguished John of Austria. Though surprised and mortified at being dispossessed of the authority he had assumed, he so far concealed his feelings as to receive his successor with every demonstration of joy, and cordially co-operated with him in all his measures for the reduction of Naples.

¹ See above, p. 364.

At one of their first consultations, Oñate expressed himself unfavourable to the resumption of active hostilities, as he hoped that the disunion among the Neapolitan leaders would quickly place the city in his power, without the necessity of employing force of arms; but Don John strongly insisted on having immediate recourse to military operations, and the seasonable appearance of some fresh reinforcements from Spain, as also the dread of the speedy arrival of a new French armament, decided the adoption of the proceedings he recommended. Every thing was accordingly arranged with as much secrecy as possible for an attack on the seditious quarters of the town and the positions still occupied by the people.

This was the age of judicial astrology, and both among the French and Italians there were many who reposed a blind confidence in the predictions of that occult and visionary science. The desire to pry into futurity, which seems common to all mankind, particularly prevailed among those who, like Guise, had trafficked in state mysteries, and engaged in the dangerous cabals of courts. A few weeks after the arrival of the new Spanish Viceroy, while the Duke of Guise was one night employed in answering the petitions which had been presented to him during the week, his attendants came to inform him of an extraordinary appearance round the moon. Having gone forth to a terrace, he descried that luminary environed, though the weather was fair and clear, by a black circle, of which the circumference was so large that it seemed to encompass his whole palace. This was looked on among the bystanders as an unfavourable omen; but though the Duke himself feared that it portended some misfortune, he affected to draw from it an auspicious augury. Next morning, however, Cocurullo, the greatest astrologer in Italy, desired to speak with him, and announced, that as the stars had signified that fortune was now about to turn to the Spaniards, he had come to desire his passports,

that he might seek some other land, because, as a student, he desired only repose, and avoided all places where he apprehended disturbances. Being farther questioned concerning the destiny that awaited the Duke, whose horoscope he had drawn, this reader of the stars informed him, that the worst possible conjunction of the Sun and Mars threatened him with imminent dangers, which would have struck directly against his life, had not the portentous union been mitigated by some benigner influences ; that Mercury having a sextile of Venus in the eighth house of death, would preserve his existence, but he could not escape imprisonment, since Mars, at the date of his birth, was in the twelfth house, which betokens that calamity.¹

This augury was accomplished a few days after the prediction. Early in April, the Duke set out on an expedition against the Isle of Nisita, with 4000 of his best troops. His object was to secure a safe harbour for a French fleet, of which he was now again in expectation ; and some of his pretended partizans, who had a secret understanding with the Spaniards, exhorted him to this enterprise. Before his departure he used such precautions as he thought necessary to render all the gates and entrances to the city completely defensible during his absence. But while engaged in the attack on Nisita, he received a letter from one of his confidants, saying, “ Naples concerns you more than a barren rock ; hasten back or you will lose it. The enemy have resolved to make some attempt this night.” The Duke, however, being unwilling to forego the advantage he had gained against the island, and suspecting this intimation might be some device of the Spaniards to make him desist from his enterprise, remained where he was. On the night intended, the Viceroy and Don John, having

¹ *Mem. de Guise*, liv. iv.

completed their preparations, were, with the concurrence of Annese and his adherents,¹ admitted with 3000 of their troops through the gate of Alva, and thus, with little or no bloodshed, became complete masters of the capital. Annese gave up to them the tower Del Carmine, and they occupied without resistance the Lavinaro, the market-place, and the palace of the Duke of Guise. The papers of that unfortunate leader were all seized; the Viceroy Oñate pretended that he had burned them, but he subsequently showed that they had been but too faithfully preserved.

No sooner was this successful blow struck by the Spaniards, than the fickle Neapolitans hailed them as their deliverers, and the two nations ran into each other's arms as if they had been but one people.² The Viceroy and Don John, attended by the Archbishop, (who had all along been privy to their designs, and concerted with them the best means for the expulsion of Guise), proceeded through the chief streets of the city tranquillizing the minds of the inhabitants, and assuring them of an amnesty. This unwonted military clemency restored their confidence, and the streets resounded with shouts of "Viva Spagna."

The Duke of Guise received the fatal intelligence of this revolution at the moment when he had completely succeeded in his attempt against Nisita. He hastened, accompanied by a few troops, to the suburbs of Naples, with the view of recovering the city, and succouring his partizans. But what he there saw of the position of his enemies, and heard concerning the inclinations of the people, satisfied him that the event was decisive and irretrievable,

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xi. *Mémoires de Guise*. The Spanish writers, however, deny that there was any secret intelligence with the people or their leaders.

² Giannone, lib. xxxvii. c. 4.

and for ever closed his dream of sovereignty. It now only remained for him to consult his personal safety. Attended by a few followers, whose numbers gradually diminished on his route, he endeavoured to retire into Abruzzo, where his party was still powerful, and where a formidable troop of banditti had been enlisted in his service. He was recognised, however, in one of the villages through which he passed, by a peasant, who conveyed the intelligence to Luigi Poderico, now commanding, in place of Tuttavilla, the forces of the nobility at Capua. Being quickly pursued by a party of cavalry, he was intercepted at a place about four leagues from Capua, and, his followers being too weak to make resistance, he was brought a prisoner to that town, where he says he employed himself in making lampoons on those of his adherents who had shown the least courage in his perilous enterprise, and in writing letters to his own country in the style of Francis I. after the battle of Pavia. He was very courteously received, and for some time handsomely entertained by Poderico, the commander at Capua, who gave him a most friendly advice,—That, in order to gain time, and allow the heat of Spanish resentment to subside, he should feign that he was highly incensed by the French desertion of his cause, during the late transactions at Naples,—that in revenge he was willing to engage in the service of his Catholic Majesty, and aid him in fomenting the troubles in his own country. To this counsel Guise probably owed his life, for even after his proposals had been made, the Viceroy and Collateral Junta at Naples gave their opinion for his immediate execution. This, however, was opposed by Don John in a long and ingenious discourse on the quality of mercy, and the advantageous nature of the Duke's proposals. The difference of sentiment, occasioned, as Guise expected, a reference to the Spanish ambassador at Rome, and then to the Court of Madrid.

Meanwhile, the noble prisoner was conveyed from Ca-

pua to the fortress of Gaeta, where he was consigned to the charge of Don Alvaro della Torre, by whose insolence and brutality he was subjected to much hardship and suffering. He was separated from all his attendants except one chamberlain, and on his way to Gaeta, he was placed between two Capuchins, who entertained him with such discourse as is usually addressed to persons who are to prepare for immediate death. At Gaeta, he was closely guarded, and confined in a dismal tower of the fortress. The chamber assigned to him contained a wretched bed, with sheets in which a cousin of Masaniello, who had been hanged some days before, had lain for two months. Desiring them to be changed, he was told that a person who had but a few hours to live ought not to be so fastidious. On requesting the filth in the apartment to be carried out, he was promised that it should form the subject of consultation and reference on some future day, but that it could not be thus inconsiderately disposed of. Having asked his guards for some books of amusement, one in Spanish was presented to him, entitled a Preparation for Well-dying and a History of Naples, with the leaf folded down at the account of the execution of Conradin. His supper might have excited a longing for that of Genaro Annese. It consisted of a piece of burnt meat, which seemed to have been purposely drawn through the ashes, a stinking salad, seasoned apparently with the oil of the chapel lamp, some musty bread, and two shrivelled apples.¹ At the end of a fortnight he was removed by order of the Count d'Oñate, to better apartments, which commanded a delightful prospect of the sea, with the ships and feluccas passing between Ostia and Naples. But he was still much straitened for clothes and provisions, and was obliged to send some articles to be pawned at Rome, in order to raise funds for his subsistence.

After a rigorous detention of nearly two months at

¹ *Mem. de Guise*, liv. v.

Gaeta, an order was received for his removal to Spain. The Council of State at Madrid deliberated if he should not be led to the scaffold, since having no regular commission from the King of France, he could not be regarded as a legitimate enemy. But the natural clemency of the King—the remembrance of his illustrious ancestors, and the interposition of several potentates of Europe, saved his life. He was conducted to the tower of Segovia, where he was confined more than four years. Mazarin offered large sums for his ransom, but all proposals concerning his release were peremptorily rejected by the King of Spain. His treatment, however, which had been so harsh in Italy, was somewhat softened at Segovia. During his long imprisonment he chiefly employed himself in writing his memoirs, which were published after his death by his secretary St Yon.¹ He was at length released at the intercession of Condé, when that Prince devoted himself wholly to the interests of Spain. As the price of his freedom, he had agreed to join the malcontents in France, but he had no sooner regained his liberty, than he proceeded to court, and offered his services to Mazarin.

After the capture of Naples by the Spaniards, and the

¹ These Memoirs are very amusing, but, having been written as a defence against the various calumnies by which he was assailed, they, of course, exhibit every thing in the most favourable view for the Duke ; and they everywhere display an inordinate vanity. Doubts have been entertained of their authenticity, but if not written by the Duke himself, they must at least have been compiled by his secretary, from information and notes furnished by him. The Duke survived twelve years after his release from the tower of Segovia. But it is probable the Memoirs might never have seen the light, if, after the Duke's death, the Baron of Modena, with whom he quarrelled, had not written a history of the revolutions of Naples, in which the conduct of his commander is represented in an unfavourable light, and the Memoirs seem at length to have been published as a refutation of his calumnies.—(Orloff, *Mem. Hist. de Naples* t. ii. p. 341.)

imprisonment of the Duke of Guise, the Neapolitan nobility having formed a junction with the Viceroy and Don John, defeated the French party in Abruzzo, and thus finally reduced the whole kingdom under the despotism of Spain. Its yoke was thus again fixed on the necks of the prostrate Neapolitans, and was rivetted more firmly and grievously than ever. Mazarin then began to regret that he had been so remiss in supporting the Duke of Guise, and sought to repair his error by ordering a French fleet, under command of Prince Thomas of Savoy, to appear once more before Naples, in the hope of renewing the insurrection. But this tardy naval demonstration had no other effect than to afford the Viceroy an opportunity of accusing Gennaro Annese of a treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Agostino Lieto, who had been Captain of the Guard to the Duke of Guise, was on board the fleet of Prince Thomas, and employed a person of the name of Carlo Rosa to convey letters to Annese and other heads of the old popular party, stimulating them to a new revolt. But Rosa, instead of delivering the letters to those for whom they were intended, placed them all in the hands of the Viceroy, who, anxious to ascertain the disposition of the persons to whom they were directed, desired that they should be delivered by Rosa, according to the address of each, and that the answers should be brought back to him. All of them went personally, and carried the letters unopened to the Viceroy, with exception of Annese, who, as he could neither read nor write, retained his letter, probably with the view of showing it to those who were in his confidence, in order to learn its contents. In consequence of this suspicious circumstance, the Viceroy sent for him to the Castle, and closely interrogated him; and on his denying all knowledge of a treasonable correspondence, he was subjected to the torture, and his head was shortly after-

wards struck off, on the esplanade of Castelnuovo. Anese thus paid the forfeit of a suspicious character; but though a traitor and a coward through life, he displayed on the rack and on the scaffold the utmost composure and intrepidity.¹

The new Viceroy was a man of distinguished abilities and of high character in his own country. But he showed at Naples all that unrelenting severity which had characterized so many of his predecessors, without any of the vacillation or timidity of the Duke of Arcos. He re-established, indeed, the forms of civil government, and introduced some arrangement into the finances: he also agreed that the tax on fruits and herbs should never be revived; and he passed a nominal act of indemnity with regard to the late commotions. But he found means to elude it, under pretence of guarding against a new revolt; for in the form of a council, he established a sort of political inquisition,² by which the chief partizans of the French interest in the kingdom, and the banditti, who, though enemies of Masaniello, had favoured the late insurrection, were summarily tried, and sentenced to public execution. Nor was his vengeance confined to such culprits as had taken a prominent share in the late troubles. Those who were suspected of disaffection, and who, he feared, might be capable of heading future insurrections, fell the victims of his precautionary policy, on various pretences of having meditated new disturbances. It was besides an invariable maxim of the Spanish government, from which the Count d'Oñate did not swerve, that no subsequent merits or services should be allowed to atone for previous rebellion. Acting on this principle, he strang-

¹ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xvi. Gaillard, *Hist. de la Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, t. vii. c. xi. Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xi. part 2, p. 627.

² Giannone, *Stor. Civil.* lib. xxxvii. c. 4.

led one of the traiterous adherents of Annese, who, on the night on which the Spaniards obtained possession of Naples, delivered up to him a principal post in the city, having first, however, deprived him of 500 crowns which he had received as the reward of his treachery.¹ The correspondence and papers found in the palace which the Duke of Guise had inhabited at Naples, and which Oñate gave out that he had burned, were subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and betrayed many citizens who might otherwise have escaped detection. On the discovery of a sedition which had been excited against him by Annese and the Elect of the people, the Duke of Guise had vowed their destruction and that of their followers; and he somewhat vindictively sent to the Viceroy, from his confinement at Gaeta, a list of thirty-five individuals, all of whom he denounced as enemies of the Spanish government, and advised their death as essential to its permanence.² This recommendation was too well adapted to the taste of the Viceroy, not to be implicitly followed. It is said, though probably with exaggeration, that, during his arbitrary sway, not fewer than 18,000 natives of the kingdom fell under the blow of the executioner.³ His rigorous administration continued for five years, during which period he completely disregarded or subdued that popular influence which, in the days of Masaniello and Annese, had occasioned his predecessors so much trouble and alarm. When recalled to Spain—whether it was that he felt mortified by the loss of power, or stood ap-

¹ Siri, *Mercurio*, t. xi. part ii. p. 601.

² Orloff, t. ii. p. 340.

³ In una sola città di Napoli il Conte d'Ognate hà fatto sì horribile macello di gente con varie genere di morte che, per quanto ascoltasi fama (ma sopra il vero) hà trasceso la crudeltà tanto nota del Duca d'Alva, che nelle provincie delle Paesi Bassi ne havra immolato diciotto mila per le mani di Boia! (Siri, *Mercurio*, t. x. p. 216.)

palled at his “hangman hands”—he retired into a convent, founded on the most rigid system of the Chartreuse, where he terminated his days.¹

When tranquillity was re-established at Naples, Don John sailed for Sicily, where he followed the system of conciliation adopted by the Cardinal Trivulzio, the successor of Los Velez, and completely calmed the popular agitation left by the recent storms.

The sedition of Masaniello, and the enterprise of Guise, made a noise at the moment ; but they produced little effect, even in Italy, on the future train of affairs. Though not devoid of interest in themselves, they have none of that importance derived from an influence exercised during a long continuity of time. They must therefore be classed with the number of those political events,

Which, while they last, allure the dazzled mind,
But fleeting pass, nor leave a trace behind.

¹ Orloff, t. ii. c. 7.

CHAPTER IX.

REDUCTION OF CATALONIA.

—Celsam oppugnat qui molibus urbem,

Aut montana sedet circum castella sub armis.

VIRGIL, *Æneid*.

THE Court of Spain derived considerable satisfaction from the termination of the troubles in Naples, and the failure of the Quixotic expedition of the Duke of Guise. But this partial success was about the same period more than counterbalanced by the loss of the sole ally who supported the nation in their contest with France. In spite of all the efforts and persuasions of Spain, the Emperor of Germany, overwhelmed with disasters, finally concluded, at the end of a thirty years' war, the celebrated Peace of Westphalia, which proved so fatal to the interests of the House of Austria and the Catholic faith. Spain was not comprehended in this pacification; and the Emperor saw himself compelled to abandon his faithful and hereditary ally. The conditions which were proposed by France to the Court of Madrid, and which included the perpetual cession of Roussillon, and all the recent French conquests in the Netherlands and Catalonia, were too severe, and urged in a tone too arrogant for the acceptance of a high-spirited people. Though aware that they should now be left without a single ally, and though the prospect of success from their single efforts could not be cheering, when it had cost them such a

struggle to maintain their independence, even with the co-operation of the Emperor, they yet rather chose to hazard the chance of war, than agree to terms so derogatory to the honour of the kingdom.

And though excluded from the general pacification of Westphalia, Spain was enabled to conclude a most advantageous treaty with Holland. The Dutch, indeed, had renewed with Mazarin the alliance into which they had entered with Richelieu, and of which the chief object was the partition of the Spanish Netherlands. They had recently, however, become jealous of the formidable power of France, and were convinced that it was their true interest to have the barrier of a Spanish territory interposed between them and their potent neighbours. Accordingly, they had of late co-operated but feebly in the efforts of their French allies to drive the Spaniards totally from Flanders. A negotiation was at length entered into between these ancient enemies. It was artfully conducted on the part of Spain by the Count Peñeranda, and brought to a successful termination. By the terms of this treaty, the Spaniards departed from all pretensions to the sovereignty of the United Provinces—recognised their independence, which for seventy years they had refused to admit with an obstinacy to which history affords no parallel, and agreed that the States should remain in possession of the territories they had occupied in Brabant or Flanders.

After the ratification of this treaty, the Court of Madrid became more indifferent to a peace with France, being aware that it could now carry on a campaign with greater advantage than formerly, when pressed by the French on one side, and the Dutch on another. The internal dissensions of France also revived at this time the hopes of the Spaniards. New efforts were made; and they resolved, as their future line of policy, to prose-

cute the war in Flanders with the fresh vigour which their improved situation in that country inspired—to foment as much as possible the disturbances in France—and to make one great and last attempt to reduce the rebellious natives of Catalonia.

It was to this domestic object that their principal efforts and attention were first directed.

On the failure of the plot by which, in 1646, the Baroness d'Albi had attempted to deliver Barcelona into the hands of the Spaniards, the troops of his Catholic Majesty had in a great measure abandoned the province to the French and to the rebellious population—confining themselves to the fortresses of Lerida, Tortosa, and Tarragona, with the surrounding districts which they commanded. In 1647, the great Prince of Condé, who now bore that title in consequence of the death of his father in the preceding year, had been appointed governor of the province, with a French army of 8000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. The Catalans were highly encouraged by the nomination of this renowned hero to the chief command in their principality. But his success was by no means answerable to their expectations. Mazarin, it is suspected, wished to depreciate his fame, and Condé, on arriving in Catalonia, found that there was a deficiency in money, stores, ammunition, and every thing necessary to render his arms triumphant. He for some time hesitated, which of the great towns in Catalonia, still possessed by the Spaniards, he should first besiege. Tarragona was pointed out in the instructions he had received from Mazarin. But Condé, it is said, actuated by emulation of the Count de Harcourt, and by eagerness to surpass that general, who had failed before Lerida, resolved on the attack of this fortress. Harcourt had warned him, that it would be found impracticable to carry the place by storm. Condé, however, supposing that his prede-

cessor was unwilling that another should succeed in an attempt in which he had himself been defeated, resolved on the assault. But the Governor, Gregorio Brito, a Portuguese, who had already foiled all the efforts of Harcourt, again made a noble and successful defence. "The place," says the amusing historian of Grammont, "was nothing, but Gregorio Brito was not a little. He was as brave as the Cid, as proud as all the Guzmans, and as gallant as the whole Abencerrages of Grenada. He suffered us to make the first approaches without showing the least sign of life, and the Prince, proud of Rocroy and Nordlingen, in order to tease the garrison and the governor, opened the trenches with his own regiment, at the head of which marched twenty-four violins, as if we had been at a wedding. Night came, and we all set about amusing ourselves as we best could. Our violins were full of tender airs, and good cheer reigned throughout. Many jests were thrown at the little governor and his Spanish ruff, both of which we fancied we should have in our hands within twenty-four hours. All this passed at the trenches, when we suddenly heard a cry of bad augury from the rampart, repeated twice or thrice 'Alert to the wall,' which cry was followed by a discharge of cannon and musketry, and the salvo by a sortie, which having swept our trench, drove us back fighting to our camp. Next morning Gregorio sent a present of iced fruit to our commander, begging him to excuse his not having violins to return his serenade, but assuring him, that if the music he had sent out the night before had proved agreeable, he would endeavour to keep it up so long as the Prince did him the honour to remain before Lerida."¹

¹ This passage is quoted by James in his *Memoirs of Commanders*; but I have not been able to find it in the *Mémoires de Grammont*.

The governor kept his promise, and Condé was obliged to raise the siege, and return to France, leaving the command of the troops, in the mean while, to the Count Marsin, who had served under him in his campaigns in 1644 and 1645.

Condé was succeeded as viceroy by Mazarin's brother, the Cardinal Santa-Cecilia, who, on his arrival, found Barcelona resembling rather a haunt of banditti, than the capital of a principality. Dismayed by the untoward appearance of his government, he decamped from the province soon after his entrance: he scarcely halted till he arrived safe at Rome, and no persuasions could induce him to return. His place was filled by Mareschal Schomberg, under whose auspices Tortosa was taken by assault in 1648; and, on the whole, the affairs of the King of Spain continued to proceed unprosperously in this principality.

But the state of the province did not even at this time betoken continued success to the patriots, or the acquisition of permanent independence. The commotions of Catalonia had, unfortunately, called forth no leader of pre-eminent talents to direct the enthusiasm of the people, or to combine the interests of its disjointed towns and districts. There was no Prince of Orange to head the armies or guide the counsels of the Catalonians. The intrigues and wars of the Fronde, prevented them from longer receiving effectual succours from France; and Mazarin, alternately expelled from Paris and recalled to it, could neither exert the activity of the early part of his administration, nor the consummate wisdom which marked its concluding years. Hence, though it was easy for the Catalans to murder Santa-Coloma, to defeat Los Velez, and intercept Povar, they were unable to oppose successful resistance when more prudent and skilful commanders were appointed to act against them.

It was in the beginning of the year 1650 that the King nominated the Marques of Mortara Viceroy of Catalonia ; and to his energy and talents the Spanish nation were indebted for a total change in the affairs of the province committed to his care. The insurrection which could not be crushed in its commencement by the incapable Santa-Coloma and the violent Los Velez, was quelled, after ten years' endurance, by the skill of the Marques of Mortara, followed up by the prudence of John of Austria.

Francisco de Orosco, Marques of Olias and Mortara, though of high birth, and living in an age and country in which military promotion depended chiefly on court favour, had passed honourably through all the gradations of the service, and obtained each step of advancement as if he had been an adventurer or soldier of fortune. He had acquired considerable experience in the Italian campaigns, and had also been employed through the whole course of the Catalonian insurrection. He had been present at the siege of Salsas, under the Marques of Balbases ;¹ he had distinguished himself at the relief of Fontarabia by the Admiral of Castile ; and he had served in Languedoc, under Serbellone, at the disastrous siege of Leucate.² Though in a subordinate situation, he executed whatever was entrusted to him with intrepidity and skill, and he had dissuaded many enterprises which proved unfortunate. A high opinion was in consequence formed of his military talents, and his ability did not escape the observation of the King.

Such at least was the rise of Mortara according to the graver Spanish historians ; yet anecdotes are afloat which might lead us to suppose that he owed his promotion, however highly merited, to sources less pure and honourable. It is said that the King, soon after his accession to the

¹ Malvezzi, *Sucesos*, &c.

² Gualdo, *Guerre d'Europa*.

throne, had an intrigue with the sister of Mortara, and he soon after contrived, for “cogent reasons,” to marry her to the Marques of Quintana. She revealed the truth, shortly after the nuptials, to her husband, who died in a few months of shame and vexation. Out of respect to his mother, the offspring of this amour never was acknowledged by the King, but the secret was confided to himself. Having entered into the ecclesiastical state, his royal father in due time bestowed on him the rich bishopric of Malaga, and he was afterwards appointed preceptor to his brother Charles II. of Spain.¹

The Marques was nominated Viceroy and Captain-General of the army of Catalonia, at a time when the troops were diminished and discouraged by a long series of disasters,—when they had lost all confidence in their leaders,—and when the only places in the principality which remained to the Spaniards were Lerida and Tarragona, with very limited districts around them. The appointment, however, of Mortara, revived the drooping spirits of the soldiers, and was hailed with delight by the officers of the army.²

Before leaving Madrid, he arranged every thing with the ministry as to adequate supplies and reinforcements; and his preparations formed a remarkable contrast to the confusion and mismanagement which preceded the fatal campaign of Los Velez. These essential preliminaries having been adjusted to his satisfaction, he took his departure from the capital, and arrived on the 31st July 1650 at Saragossa, whence he entered the province of Catalonia, near Lerida, where he established his headquarters.

The first concern of Mortara on assuming his new go-

¹ *Universal Hist.* t. xxi. b. 19. c. 1.

² *Conquista de Cataluña por el Marques de Olias y Mortara*; folio, without date.

vernment, was to renew a correspondence with the few Catalans who had all along retained their loyalty, and to open a communication with those who were yet willing to return to their allegiance. Severity having failed to bend the minds of the Catalans, clemency now became the policy of the court ; and the Marques was not more remarkable for his skill and valour, than his mildness and generosity of disposition. As soon as it was known that the gates of mercy were opened, numbers crowded to obtain an entrance. Many of the patriots were now wearied with civil dissensions, and those who had received the French with open arms, were, at length, disgusted with these strangers, and felt eager for their expulsion. Owing to the instability of their government at home, the French armies were neither very well disciplined, nor regularly paid. The peasantry had frequently with them the same sort of quarrels as with the Castilian troops at the commencement of the insurrection ; and, in the course of the ensuing campaign, often aided the plans of the Spanish General by acting as guides, and intercepting letters between the Catalan governors of towns and the French commanders.

Mortara's plan for the campaign was, in the first instance, to possess himself of the whole course of the Ebro ; and, with this view, on entering Catalonia, he laid siege to Flix, a strong fortress, situated on a peninsula formed by that river. He occupied this important position in the course of a few days, in spite of the efforts of the Duke of Mercœur, the French commander, who advanced to protect it with the chief part of his army.

From Flix, the Marques marched to Miravet, another fort about three leagues lower down the Ebro than Flix, and half-way betwixt that place and Tortosa. Miravet having surrendered after a trifling resistance, he directed his attention to more important operations, by besieging

Tortosa, situated on the declivity of a hill, about four leagues from the mouth of the Ebro, the waters of which wash its ramparts. The capture of this town, which he intended as a *depôt* for stores and provisions, and a rendezvous for reinforcements, had all along been included in his plan of operations; and while engaged in the siege of Miravet, he had taken measures that no succours should reach it by land, while the Duke of Albuquerque, Admiral of the gallies, prevented aid from entering by the river. After it had been besieged for some weeks, intelligence arrived that the Duke of Mercœur had assembled forces, consisting of 7000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, French and Catalans, in the plains of Tarragona, with the design of relieving Tortosa. Mortara prepared for his reception; but the Duke made no serious attempt in favour of the besieged, and failed in all his plans for introducing reinforcements. His last ineffectual attempt was the immediate cause of the surrender of Tortosa. An intercepted letter was delivered to the Marques, addressed from Mercœur to one of his officers, directing him to proceed from Cambrils by sea to the relief of Tortosa, as the gallies which guarded the Ebro had been blown off the coast by a storm. Mortara sent the letter to the Duke of Albuquerque, who, in consequence, was enabled to capture the French detachment while on its voyage from Cambrils to the relief of Tortosa. The governor of that town, who had placed all his hope on the succours of which he was thus disappointed, capitulated as soon as he received the disastrous intelligence.

Mortara having taken possession of Tortosa, razed its fortifications; and winter having now commenced, he returned to Saragossa, to settle his plans for the ensuing campaign. Having brought up artillery, and prepared all manner of stores and provisions, he again took the field in May 1651, and advanced to the neighbourhood of Cer-

vera, with an army of nearly 10,000 men. The acquisitions he had made in his former campaign, had given him the command of great part of the principality, and opened up the access to its capital Barcelona. It would have been fair, and might perhaps have been expedient, for the Spanish government to have allowed the Marques of Mortara, whose exertions had produced so favourable a change in the affairs of the province, to finish what he had thus prosperously commenced. But the King wished to reserve the glory of the conquest of Catalonia for his favourite son Don John of Austria. No sooner had intelligence of the successes in Catalonia reached the Court, than despatches from the King and Luis de Haro were forwarded to that Prince in Sicily, requiring him to return to Spain, that he might assume the command of the army in Catalonia, and at the same time directing him to bring along with him all the Italian gallies, and as many land forces as could be spared. The letters from the Court of Madrid informed him that he should receive farther instructions when he landed on the coast of Catalonia. After the suppression of the insurrection at Naples, Don John had highly distinguished himself by a well concerted expedition against Portolongone in Elba, whence he drove the French, who from that harbour infested the Mediterranean with their cruisers; ¹ and at the time when he received these despatches, he was residing at Palermo as Viceroy of Sicily, where the mildness and equity of his administration, compared at least with that of his predecessor Los Velez and other governors, had endeared him to all the inhabitants. Before sailing from Palermo, he adopted such measures as he thought might tend to secure his success in the ensuing campaign. He conceived that a chief cause of the frequent failures in Catalonia had been the want of sufficient supplies of provisions for the

¹ Leti, *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*.

army. Catalonia itself having been now ravaged and desolated for ten years, could furnish no adequate stores, and the resources of the neighbouring provinces were precarious. Accordingly, before leaving the fruitful Island of Sicily, he made such arrangements as secured the embarkation of plentiful supplies of provisions for the use of his army.

The gallies having been assembled at Palermo, Don John sailed on the 28th of May. His voyage was tedious and unprosperous. The fleet was dispersed by a storm, and after being with difficulty again collected, was obliged to make for Cagliari in Sardinia. Don John landed, and was received with great magnificence by the Viceroy. His arrival was celebrated by a festival: the soldiers and sailors were hospitably entertained, and were gratified with presents according to their respective ranks. The wind was still unfavourable when the fleet sailed from Sardinia, but Don John ordered that, at all events, by the labour of rowers and galley-slaves, it should reach the coast of Majorca in eight days. At that island, he learned that almost the whole province of Catalonia was now desolated by the plague. This intelligence induced him to alter his original intention of landing at Tarragona, and led him to resolve on making for Denia, on the coast of Valencia, there to await farther instructions from the King. On his voyage thither, he was obliged to seek shelter in Yvica, where he was informed that a powerful French squadron was cruising about and infesting all the neighbouring islands. Some of Don John's council were of opinion that he should allow nothing to divert him for a moment from the great enterprise to which he was called in Catalonia: but his Highness, reflecting on the interruption which such flying squadrons occasioned in the communication between Spain and Italy, and considering that they might intercept his convoys of provisions

from Sicily, resolved to sail in quest of the hostile fleet, and soon came up with it. A few shots having been exchanged, Don John then gave the signal to board, and after a bloody contest and brave resistance, the whole of the French ships were taken or destroyed.¹

After this exploit, which occasioned great rejoicings at Yvica, Don John arrived, without farther adventure, at Denia, where he received despatches from Madrid. He thence proceeded to Tarragona, in order to hold a conference with the Marques of Mortara, whom he had directed to meet him in that city. The plague had spread there, but Don John having landed his troops in safety at Denia, was not deterred by the personal risk he incurred, and did much, while in Tarragona, to arrest the progress of infection.

On Don John's arrival, Mortara hastened from Cervera to meet him. At their first interview, the Marques informed Don John, that ever since he had heard of his appointment he had confined the operations of his troops within very narrow limits, till the arrival of his Highness with more powerful means should open up a wider sphere of action. But he delivered it as his opinion and that of all his general officers, that even now, considering the advanced season of the year, it would be sufficient to take possession of Cervera and Balaguers, which would form a line of defence from Tarragona to the Segre, and protect the obedient villages in the plains of Urgel. Don John was not much pleased with a plan of operations little commensurate to the preparations he had made, and the ideas he had been revolving in his mind since his departure from Palermo. The Marques perceiving from the countenance of Don John that he was dissatisfied, declared, before concluding, that he was ready to assist in carrying into execution any more bold or extensive move-

¹ Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan d' Austria*.

ments which might be projected by his Highness. When he had finished, Don John briefly replied, that he intended to besiege Barcelona. He stated the arrangements he had made in Sicily for an adequate supply of provisions, as well as his expectations of a reinforcement of 3000 or 4000 Germans from Milan, and he declared, that to expend on the capture of Cervera and Balaguers all the care and trouble which had been taken, would lose the opportunity now presented by the dissensions of the French nation which might probably never recur, and would allow the enemy time, before the following spring, to fortify Barcelona in such a manner as to render it impregnable.¹ The Marques having acquiesced in these reasons, the siege of Barcelona was resolved on, though without farther communication at that time to any one except the Duke of Albuquerque, who now received a farther reinforcement of gallies to guard the coast. Don John remained in the mean while at Tarragona, and the Marques of Mortara advanced his army of 10,000 men to the Llobregat, which, being then shallow even at the mouth, he crossed on the 7th of August in sight of the enemy, who on his approach retired under the protection of the cannon of Barcelona. The place which he chose for his encampment had not recently been much exhausted by hostile armies; and, soon after his passage of the Llobregat, he was joined by the expected reinforcement of Germans promised him by John of Austria.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Barcelona were adopting vigorous measures for their defence. The successes of Mortara, and particularly his capture of Tortosa, had induced the local government to send as ambassador to the

¹ *Conquista de Cataluña.* Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan.*

² *Conquista de Cataluña.*

Court of France one of their most distinguished citizens, called Don Josef Piños, in order to represent the unfortunate situation of the principality, the progress of the Castilians, and the necessity of obtaining farther assistance from his most Christian Majesty.

At the time when Mortara marched his army to Barcelona, the Count Marsin was confirmed in the command of the French force in Catalonia, amounting to 8000 men, and Josef Margarit, a native of the province, was governor of Barcelona. This chief proposed to the council of the city, that in respect of the present imminent danger, the French troops under Marsin should be admitted as a garrison within the town. His proposition, though at first vehemently opposed as a dangerous expedient, and injurious to the privileges and liberties of the inhabitants, was at length agreed to, and a detachment from the army of Marsin, with himself at its head, was received within the walls, before they had been completely invested by Mortara. About the same time, Margarit also collected provisions, for a lengthened siege, from the surrounding country, by enjoining the peasantry to deposit victuals in certain places in the vicinity, where money should at the same time be left as their price.

As soon as he had crossed the Llobregat, Mortara was permitted, without interruption, to entrench himself in the plain under Monjuich, and to lay regular siege to the city.

The town of Barcelona was nearly a square, standing in a small but fertile plain which lies between the river Llobregat on the west and the Besos on the east. Except where washed by the sea, it was environed by a semicircle of mountains, which reached at both extremities to the shore.¹ Like most other considerable cities of

¹ Libertino, *Movimientos de Cataluña*.

Spain, it had been walled and enclosed from the earliest age, and in the course of successive commotions in Catalonia, its fortifications had been from time to time improved and repaired. The moats and fosses had been cleared, ramparts had been formed along its walls, half-moons, bastions, and curtains had been added, and its ancient crown-work with turrets, had been converted into parapets. In the exterior angles of the precincts, masses of fortification had been raised; but from the unskilfulness of the engineers, or the haste employed in their construction, much was wanting in contrivance though not in solidity.¹ On the side towards the sea, the fort called Levanto was the chief. But the most remarkable point in the situation of Barcelona, was the fortress of Monjuich, situated on a hill of the same name, at the distance of one thousand paces to the south-west of the town, with which it communicated by a covered passage. At the time of the attack by Los Velez in 1641, it had been but slightly fortified: there were only some half formed bulwarks on the summit, and a small fort which served as a watch-tower to the sea and harbour.² Since that time, however, the works had been improved. The old tower had been converted into a tetragon of bastions with a rampart, and in places most exposed to attacks from batteries, it was protected by covert-ways and palissades.³ Its situation, aided by the support of a strong garrison and artillery, rendered it nearly impregnable; and of all the assaults during the siege, those for the possession of Monjuich were the most eager and most sanguinary—both parties being convinced, that on the occupation of that eminence depended the fate of Barcelona. On the opposite side from Monjuich

¹ Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan*.

² Libertino, *Movim. de Cataluña*.

³ Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan*.

there was a castle or citadel within the walls. Barcelona was also surrounded by a number of strong towers, situated on heights lower than the hill of Monjuich, which had once been the residence of a feudal nobility ; and most of these fortresses had been in some degree strengthened during the late unhappy disturbances in Catalonia.¹

The first military operation on the part of the royal army, was the capture and destruction of one of these holds called Cap de Riu. But Mortara afterwards repented of having blown it up, as he found that its possession might have been highly serviceable in the prosecution of the siege of Barcelona. Its capture was followed by that of a number of other castles of a similar description, and by the discomfiture of an advanced guard of French cavalry, who were surprised near their encampment, in consequence of the Spanish troops being secretly conducted to the spot by a Catalan peasant, who, in the general defection of his countrymen, had still preserved his loyalty.

Mortara soon afterwards changed his position to the sea shore, about 1500 paces from the bastion of Barcelona, named the Levant. Here he enjoyed a plentiful supply of water, and an open communication with the sea for the reception of provisions. He was also enabled to intercept and cut off from the enemy the benefit of the stream called the Besos, which turned their mills within the city. Having fixed on this advantageous position for his head quarters, he drew double lines of circumvallation round the town, at the distance of two and three thousand paces from the walls, and describing, on their exterior, a circle of three leagues. Forts and bastions were raised all along the lines, except where the old towers, already mentioned, answered the purpose of completing the chain.

Notwithstanding this favourable commencement of mi-

¹ Fabro Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan*.

litary operations, Don John, who still remained at Tarragona, encountered many difficulties in the prosecution of his plans. The army before Barcelona had got into a state of disorganization from want of regular pay, and the foreign auxiliaries, particularly the Germans, died in great numbers, in consequence of the too free use of the fruits and wines of the country. Don John pressed the Court of Madrid to exert itself in levying fresh troops, and in raising sufficient funds for the arrears due to the soldiery. The despatches, however, of the King were little satisfactory on these points; and though he did not prohibit the siege of Barcelona, it was evident from their tenor, that his Majesty and the ministry strongly inclined to the original plan of laying siege to Cervera and Balaguers, which had been proposed by the Marques of Mortara, previous to the appointment of Don John. In a long letter, addressed to the King, Don John combated the reasons which he understood had been assigned by Mortara and his officers against prosecuting the attempt on Barcelona; and at the close of his letter he suggested that as Count Marsin, the commander of the French army, was a friend and dependent of the Prince of Condé, now in hostility with the Court of France, a negotiation might perhaps be opened, which would lead him to withdraw his assistance from the Catalonians. The King, in answer to this letter, commanded that Don John should immediately proceed with the siege of Barcelona; but in adopting this resolution, his Majesty seems to have been chiefly influenced by the consideration, that as his arms were in fact already engaged in the enterprise, it would now be disgraceful to retire from before a city which had been regularly invested.

At this period, an event in some degree anticipated in the letter of Don John to the King, materially changed the situation and prospects of the assailants and the besieged.

The Count Marsin no sooner learned that his patron, the Prince of Condé, had reared the standard of revolt against the Queen-regent of France in his province of Guienne, than he resolved to march for Bordeaux on the first opportunity, in order to place himself with all his forces under the Prince's command. During the period of Condé's imprisonment, Marsin had been placed in custody by the Duke de Mercœur, on a charge of tampering with the troops. But on the Prince's release he also was set at liberty, and appointed to his former command in Catalonia.¹ He then not only contrived to remove whatever suspicions of his fidelity might at one time have existed in the republican council of Barcelona, but, before his departure, prevailed on the Governor to procure from the city an advance of 1000 crowns to supply the necessities of his soldiers, and prevent their frequent desertion. He next persuaded Margarit to allow him to withdraw altogether from the town, on the plausible pretext of relieving the inhabitants from the burden of so numerous a garrison, and of joining to his main body all the French troops which might be scattered through Catalonia, with which, when united, he promised to return, on the first opportunity, to render more effectual succour to Barcelona. Being thus supplied with money, provisions, and all necessaries for his troops, Marsin issued forth from the gates with 1000 infantry and 500 cavalry. He took the route by Manresa and Ponz to Urgel, whence he crossed the Pyrenees, and joined the adherents of Condé in Guienne. Mortara either had not been apprized of Marsin's escape, or did not think proper to intercept him; and soon after his departure the Marques received from him a communication, in which he stated that he had been called into France, in consequence of the revolution by which that country was agitated, and he likewise request-

¹ Daniel, *Journal Histor.* Quincy, *Hist. Milit.*

ed the release of any French prisoners taken in the course of the siege, engaging at the same time that they should never be hereafter employed against his Catholic Majesty. Mortara, fully aware of the motives by which the French General was influenced, forwarded to him the prisoners, who amounted to about 400. The conduct of Marsin excited a considerable sensation at Paris, though strong suspicions of his loyalty had been previously entertained. But the court, in its present situation, was unable to replace the force which he had treacherously withdrawn from Barcelona.

As soon as the besieged inhabitants of that city became aware of the deception practised on them by Marsin, they were greatly disheartened ; but they nevertheless resolved to persevere in their defence, and having been thus disappointed in succour from France, they turned their attention to obtaining assistance from the Court of Lisbon. Josef de Piños, who had been their envoy at Paris, was accordingly despatched to the Portuguese Capital, in order to solicit aid, against the common enemy, from the House of Braganza.

Mortara was not slow in availing himself of the advantages presented by the unexpected secession of the French troops from Barcelona. He immediately directed a formidable attack on the district called Sanz, a kind of fortified suburb, lying on the side of Barcelona nearest Monjuich. Having been carried with little resistance, it formed a sort of second quarters for the soldiers ; and lines of communication were established from it to the other positions occupied by the Spaniards, so that all intercourse was now completely cut off between the beleaguered city and the surrounding country.

Margarit, in order to supply in part the loss of the troops which had marched off with Marsin, called in a regiment of French cavalry stationed at Mataro under

Joseph de Ardennes, which contrived to enter the city, in spite of all the precautions of the Spanish General. Their presence, however, could not prevent the Marques from seizing on several important stations, on heights surrounding the town, particularly the hermitage of San Ferriol, and the convent of Santa Madrona—the first situated about 500 paces from Monjuich, and both placed on such elevations as to command all the contiguous quarters of the city. He put a small garrison in each; and at Santa Madrona he constructed strong fortifications, with the view of contesting the predominance of Monjuich over Barcelona.

The arrival of Don John at the seat of war had hitherto been delayed by indisposition. He had been affected at Tarragona with symptoms of the plague, and had in consequence departed for Binaros in Valencia. Being now fully recovered, he resolved to proceed in person to Barcelona, and at length appeared before it, with some reinforcements, on the 19th of October.

In the midst of the difficulties which he experienced, from want of provisions, and the incessant attacks of the enemy, Don John appointed in his camp a public Professor of Mathematics, particularly for those branches of the science which bore on the military art. This teacher delivered his lectures at head-quarters, in the apartments of Don John. He was high in the esteem and confidence of that Prince, and his discourses were attended by all whom their military duties permitted to be present at the hour of his instructions.

A few days after Don John's arrival, the besieged made a sally, to dislodge the Spaniards from their quarters at Sanz. Margarit, who commanded in person, commenced his operations, by directing the artillery of Monjuich against San Ferriol, the garrison of which was obliged to leave it, and seek shelter in Santa Madrona. San Ferriol

was immediately occupied by the Catalans, and their infantry was disposed in due order for scaling the convent, but a reinforcement of the royal troops coming up, checked their progress, and instead of attacking Santa Madrona, the possession of which, as it commanded San Ferriol, had no doubt been the object of their sally, they hastily retreated with their scaling-ladders, and even abandoned their new acquisition of San Ferriol. They were briskly attacked on their retreat, and as the cannon of Monjuich could now no longer act against the Spaniards, without injuring the fugitives, they suffered severe loss, and at length escaped with difficulty into the city about sun-set, leaving behind them the whole artillery and engines employed in this unfortunate expedition.

The bad success of this enterprise materially injured the credit of the governor Margarit in Barcelona; and the French officer whom he had recently admitted into the city, in the place of Marsin, began to dispute with him the right to the supreme direction of affairs. This internal dissension added greatly to the other distresses of the besieged. But the difference was soon rendered of little importance, by the appointment of the celebrated Mareschal La Mothe-Houdancourt, who had formerly commanded in the province, to be Viceroy of Catalonia. He was supplied by the French government with a considerable body of troops; and such was his zeal for the service, or for the dukedom of Cardona, which had been granted to him in Catalonia, that he mortgaged his private fortune in France to expedite the equipment and march of his army.

La Mothe having passed the Pyrenees, arranged with the inhabitants of Barcelona, that they should make a sally previous to his approach, in order to attract the attention of the besieging army, and thus allow him to throw reinforcements into the city. The operations, however,

of the Catalans, were not such as to induce the French Mareschal to avail himself of them. He kept his army in quarters at Samboy, a short distance from Barcelona, where he remained for some time unmolested, as the proposal of Don John to force him to a general engagement was overruled in a council of war. The inhabitants of Barcelona, unsuccessful in most of their encounters with the army of Don John, and straitened for provisions, despatched messengers repeatedly to the French general, to induce him to make some attempt for their relief. But he answered, that he waited the arrival of the Portuguese Armada, of which he was in daily expectation; that its appearance on the coast would compel the Spaniards to withdraw their troops from the different posts which they at present occupied, and that he should then have an opportunity of affording effectual succour. At the same time he promised, that if the armament from Lisbon was much longer delayed, he would risk every thing for their preservation. At Barcelona the long expected aid from Portugal was now considered hopeless, as Piños, during his embassy at Lisbon, had been unable to obtain any promise of assistance, except a vague proposal to form a diversion in favour of his countrymen, by an invasion of Castile. Don John, meanwhile, took an opportunity of proposing terms to the city, and extending promises of the royal clemency. But the Marquis de Marsilli, who commanded one of the outposts, and received the cartel, told the Spanish messenger to return for his answer in a year, and never communicated the contents of the despatch to the chiefs of the city.

The besieged now resolved to make a general attack on the whole lines, and La Mothe, in order to fulfil his last promises to the city, sent forward troops to co-operate in the attempt. Santa Ysabella, a tower occupied by the Spaniards, was the chief object of assault. The Ca-

talans were repulsed in all their attacks ; but during the conflict, La Mothe contrived to throw himself into Barcelona with the greater part of his forces. In the present dearth of provisions, this perhaps was not the species of relief most desirable for the inhabitants ; but they received the French Mareschal with great demonstrations of joy. After his entrance within the walls, he took the supreme command, which he had no sooner assumed than he greatly exerted himself in inspecting and improving the fortifications.

From that time forward, during several months, the hostile parties were constantly engaged in sallies, and attacks on San Ferriol, or other positions, of which the most important was the capture by the Catalans of the Fort of Juan de los Reyes, and its re-capture by the Spaniards.

In one of these sallies from the town, La Mothe was dangerously wounded. Not being satisfied with the medical skill in Barcelona, he sent a trumpeter with a message to Don John, requesting that he should grant him his own surgeon. Such attendance could at this time be ill spared, as the plague, which had so long afflicted the cities of Catalonia, had broken out with violence in the Spanish camp, and had carried off a great number of the household of Don John. The surgeon, however, was sent, and contributed to the cure of the French General, who, during his illness, was the guest of the Governor Margarit ; but, on his convalescence, he went to reside in the palace of the Duke of Cardona, whose title and estates in Catalonia had been conferred on him by the French government.

After his recovery, La Mothe quickly rendered himself obnoxious to the inhabitants, by demanding large pecuniary supplies for the exigencies of his troops. Their spirits, however, and good humour, were kept up by con-

stant prospects of relief. When hopes of the Portuguese armament could be no longer entertained, they were amused with promises of the arrival of a French squadron from Marseilles. A proposal was also made by Cardinal Mazarin, through Don Josef Piños, of raising troops in Languedoc, to be paid by borrowing the superfluous church plate. But this shocked the piety of the citizens, and they did not yet consider themselves in sufficient extremity to render such profanation justifiable.

When matters, however, were becoming worse, the Mareschal repaired to the Council of a Hundred, accompanied by the Doctor Peralta as an interpreter, by whose means, among other topics, he enforced the necessity of applying the church plate to the uses of the army,—pledging himself at the same time to replace it, within a certain period, from the revenues of the confiscated estates in Catalonia; and, in order to persuade the assembly that this appropriation was lawful, he referred to the Scriptures, the writings of the fathers of the church, and the Canon law. After long deliberation among the theologians and jurisconsults, and much opposition from the Bishop and his Chapter, it was at length agreed that the plate should be used, on condition that the city came under an obligation to replace it in three years, in the same form and quantity. In consequence of this determination, fourteen large silver chandeliers were removed from the Sanctuary of the Virgin, twenty-eight smaller lamps were taken from the adjacent chapel, and five more were abstracted from the Convent of St Oleager. The priors and prebends of some churches resisted this spoliation. But where the articles were not willingly surrendered, they were seized by force; and, having been melted down, were employed, conformably to the declaration circulated by the Mareschal, in paying his troops du-

ring the month of August,—in purchasing swords for the soldiers, and in defraying some other necessary expenses.

It is remarkable, that, while Mareschal La Mothe-Houdancourt was not only apparently but really exerting himself to the utmost for the defence of Barcelona, and exposing his life in daily skirmishes, he was all the while engaged in a treasonable correspondence with the Spaniards. La Mothe had commanded in Catalonia about eight years ago, and, though for some time fortunate, he had at length signally failed in an attempt to raise the siege of Lerida, which was at that time besieged by the King of Spain in person. He threw the blame of his bad success on Cardinal Mazarin, and that minister in return brought him to trial, before the Parliament of Grenoble, for misconduct. Hence the Mareschal, having conceived a bitter enmity to the Cardinal, became one of the principal leaders of the party called the Fronde, which had associated to accomplish his destruction, and he was afterwards, though secretly, united to the faction of the Prince of Condé, which was bent on the same object. Soon after the entrance of the Mareschal into Barcelona, some private letters from him to his family and relations in Paris had been intercepted, from which it clearly appeared to Don John, that he was hostile to the party of the Queen-regent and Mazarin, and attached, in his heart, to that of the Prince of Condé. Don John did not fail to intimate this discovery to the King and his Minister Luis de Haro, and received in return a private communication, in cypher, which was to be imparted only to the Marques of Mortara,—recommending that he should adopt some means (such as a proposal for an exchange of prisoners), by which he might enter into a secret correspondence with the French Mareschal: That if he succeeded in drawing him into this negotiation, he should repre-

sent to him the impossibility of much longer defending Barcelona, and should offer for his choice two schemes; one to retire from the city with all his forces, and join the army which was forming for the service of the King of Spain, on the banks of the Loire, under the auspices of the Duke of Orleans and the Prince of Condé;—or, if this measure should appear to him an act of infidelity, that he should withdraw privately to Paris, and there range himself with the French princes, opposed to Cardinal Mazarin,—a plan which, though not so beneficial as the other, since his troops would still remain behind, might nevertheless create great confusion in Barcelona, and excite distrust of the French alliance. In the event of La Mothe's adoption of either proposal, Don John was empowered to make him large pecuniary offers for the *expenses of his troops*, and was enjoined to communicate intelligence to the Prince of Condé, in order that he also might take measures to confirm the Mareschal in his interests.

Don John, as soon as he received this despatch, addressed a letter to the French General, in which he entreated him to send at night, to any spot he should select, a confidential person with whom he might hold a secret conference on a matter of the highest importance,—or, if the Mareschal preferred it, he would direct a private agent to meet him within the city. On receipt of this letter, La Mothe despatched his Captain of the guard, but sent him by day, as the time least liable to excite suspicion, and merely stated in the note with which this officer was entrusted, that Don John might have full confidence in the bearer. The Captain proceeded to a place between the city and the Spanish lines, where cartels were usually received, in order that this act, being one of frequent occurrence, might not attract observation. He was thence carried to the quarters of the Marques of Mortara, who

entered at full length into the military and political reasons which should induce the Mareschal to embrace one or other of the propositions that had been made to him. The French officer gave no reply, saying he was merely sent there to listen; and before his departure the Marques enjoined him, that if the proposals were favourably received, he should return as quickly as possible, but if they were not accepted, he should merely write to say that the proposed exchange of prisoners was inadmissible.

A few days afterwards another agent of La Mothe's came to Mortara's quarters and announced that the Mareschal himself was willing immediately to pass through the Spanish camp on his way to France, and would pledge his honour never again to return to Catalonia; but that he could not consent to take any step in hostility to his King, or to the prejudice of the Catalans. This messenger was to return in ten days for an answer. But in the mean while Don John intercepted some letters, from which he suspected that the Mareschal was guilty of double treachery, and was now giving intelligence of the negotiation to the Court of France. There was one letter, in particular, from his wife, recommending him to leave Barcelona, in order to repair to some baths for the benefit of his health, and enclosing the King's license for that purpose. This suspicion, and the conviction which Don John entertained, that, even if he were so disposed, it would not be in the Mareschal's power to carry his troops along with him, entirely changed his views. He now demanded that he should at once surrender the city, and promised him in return a large sum to be immediately paid down, and a considerable annual pension. La-Mothe, who seems to have been a person of matchless impudence, returned for answer, that he was now desirous to have his health re-established within the walls of Barcelona, and he requested that Mortara should allow his

people to pass from that city through the Spanish lines, in order to draw the waters from some salubrious springs in the neighbourhood, which he thought might prove beneficial. The Spanish commander, aware that a compliance with his request would enable the Mareschal to receive information, whenever he chose, of all the movements and dispositions in the Spanish camp, refused his consent, but offered to get the medicinal waters drawn by some of his own soldiers or domestics, and carried by them within the walls of the city.¹

Though Don John was thus disappointed in the result of the communications which he had opened with the French General, there were many inhabitants of Barcelona to whose aid he trusted for the furtherance of his main object. There never was a sally from the city but he had previous intelligence through his confidents of the time when it was to be made, and of the precise spot against which it was to be directed.² He was sometimes indeed kept in unnecessary alarm by false rumours, but he was enabled effectually to defeat and counteract every attempt of the besieged. The most frequent and valuable information was imparted by the Captain Antonio Font, who had deserted from Don John's service at Tarragona, and retired to Barcelona. Repenting of his disloyalty, he had found means to entreat his former commander to be again received into favour, and restored to his military rank. But Don John considered that he could be more usefully employed within the walls of the city; and for four months previous to the surrender of Barcelona, he communicated every thing within the scope of his observation which had occurred or was in agitation. Many of the citizens too, particularly of the higher classes, had, amid the defection of their countrymen, se-

¹ Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan*.

² *Conquista de Cataluña*, c. 22.

cretly preserved their feelings of loyalty ; and others, who at first were engaged in the revolt, were inclined to an accommodation with their King, as they now believed (having despaired of effectual aid from France) that farther resistance was hopeless. Their numbers and consequence had gradually increased, and they had begun to hold private meetings, at which they resolved to enter into a secret treaty with the Spanish commanders, when their farther proceedings were interrupted by the long expected French fleet being at length descried on the coast of Catalonia.

This squadron consisted of eight ships of war, with four fire-ships, and brought in its convoy twelve *settees*, loaded with all sorts of provisions. It was first discovered off Cape Creus, and soon steered for the harbour of San Feliu de Quixoto, at a short distance from Barcelona, where the Commodore formed his plan for introducing the supplies into that city. Don John had no sooner heard of the appearance of this fleet, than he resolved to sail in quest of it, and intercept it if possible. Leaving Mortara to command the troops before Barcelona, he accordingly embarked. The enemy had by this time left San Feliu, and put to sea ; but Don John never could bring them to an engagement, and only succeeded in capturing a few of the provision-ships. After they had been some time at sea, they returned to their moorings at San Feliu, without making any farther attempt to enter the harbour of Barcelona ; and Don John was soon spared all farther trouble and anxiety with regard to the movements of this fleet. The French Admiral turned a deaf ear to all the entreaties and remonstrances of the government of Barcelona. He even refused its last request, that he should hover on the coast, in sight of the Spanish troops, in order to alarm them, by the fear of a disembarkation, and occasion a diversion, while an attack should

be made from the city on their lines. At length, after much acrimonious discussion, he set sail for Marseilles, without having attempted ought for the relief of the city, and bearing with him the shameful, and probably well-founded imputation, of having received a pecuniary bribe from the Spanish commanders.

The only advantage derived from this feeble demonstration of French assistance was, that the Mareschal had availed himself of the revived hopes excited among the inhabitants by its first appearance, to renew their exertions in strengthening the fortifications, and concerting a plan for one great attack on some part of the Spanish lines, so as to open up a free communication between the half-famished city and the country. The indefatigable Don Joseph de Piños, in consequence of a commission for this purpose, had raised in the districts around Barcelona a formidable militia, which he united to a small French force, commanded by St André, in the town of Llissa, about four leagues from Barcelona. La Mothe directed this united force to attack the entrenchments from without, at the point which he considered as most accessible, and he undertook to aid them by a sally from the city, directed against the same quarter. A deep ravine which intersected the Spanish *cordon*, and prevented the construction of any adequate protection, was selected as the spot for the assault. Don John, however, received certain intelligence concerning the meditated point of attack, and made his preparations accordingly, by defending, with artillery and cavalry, this weak part of his circumvallation. An attempt was made on the quarter that had been chosen, but it proved altogether abortive. The sally from the town was too long delayed, and the militia, which had begun the attack from without, had been almost totally repulsed before it commenced. The garrison being thus left unsupported, was driven

back, and pursued with great slaughter, to the gates of the city.¹

After this defeat, the newly raised militia dispersed to their different cantons, while St André resolved to march back to France, and, in spite of the opposition of Don Joseph Piños, he soon carried his design into execution.

At this time, however, the Court of France had issued an order, which would have more than compensated for his loss, had it been duly carried into effect. The Count of Harcourt, who commanded an army in the province of Guienne, was directed to proceed with 3000 infantry and 1200 cavalry to the immediate relief of Barcelona. But when the mandate arrived, the Count was absent from the army, having retired from his camp, and proceeded to Alsace, in consequence of some discontent. His second in command would not venture to undertake the expedition in his absence, and before he returned it was too late to succour Barcelona. The Court of France appears, at this time, to have been sincere in its wish to serve the Catalans, but it could place no dependence on its generals, many of whom were secretly attached to Condé and his party.

Being now tired with the long continuance of the blockade, the officers of the Spanish army were eager to relinquish the plan of reducing the city by famine, and to attempt to carry it by assault. But Don John, who knew the state of the city, and the desire of many of the inhabitants to surrender, persisted in his original intention.

The lines of circumvallation were drawn so close round Barcelona, that no provisions could enter it by land. Supplies, however, were frequently sent by sea from places on

¹ Bremundan, *Hechos de Juan d'Austria*, lib. viii. Some French writers represent this combined attack as having proved successful. Quincy, *Hist. Militaire de Louis Le Grand*, &c.

the coast of Catalonia, and found their way into the harbour of Barcelona, in spite of all the vigilance of the Duke of Albuquerque; and it was to be dreaded that an entrance would be still more easily effected in the stormy season, which was approaching, when his gallies might often be forced off their stations. It therefore appeared to Don John, that it would now be expedient to clear the whole province of the enemy, or, at all events, to reduce the towns on its coast. He was farther induced to adopt this plan of operations, by the accounts received of the retreat of the French parties in every direction towards their own frontier, and the reports concerning the renewed sense of loyalty among the inhabitants, which led him to believe that many towns would now voluntarily return to their obedience, and that others would present no great resistance to his arms. Accordingly, while Don John remained to prosecute the siege of Barcelona, the Marques of Mortara was despatched with such part of the force as could be spared, to receive the submission of those sea-ports whence provisions were exported to Barcelona. He marched on the 19th of September, with 1600 infantry and 600 cavalry, along the coast, while part of the squadron, under Albuquerque, sailed to co-operate. He successively reduced or received the submission of Mataro, San Feliu, Palamos and every fort or harbour lying on the shore to the north-east of Barcelona, as far as the Gulf of Rosas—Blaves being the only place which offered any serious resistance.¹ The voluntary surrender of so many towns was greatly facilitated by the recommendation of Don Joseph de Piñós, who now despairing of the cause in which he had so zealously engaged, advised unqualified submission as the only chance of preservation from total ruin. Mortara everywhere treated the inhabitants with the utmost mild-

¹ *Conquista de Cataluña*, c. xxiii. xxiv.

ness, and removed that dread of military execution, which, since the time of Los Velez, had been the chief excitement to resistance. Small garrisons, however, were left in all the places he had occupied, which effectually prevented any farther supplies of provisions from being transmitted to Barcelona. The inhabitants of that unfortunate city were thus reduced to extreme distress, and even the Council of a Hundred, while representing their calamitous situation to La Mothe-Houdancourt, now hinted at the necessity of entering into conditions for surrender. The French Mareschal still attempted to cajole them with hopes of relief. But, at length, while protesting that he did not consider that matters had yet reached such an extremity as to justify a surrender, he agreed to concur with the citizens, in any treaty into which they might enter for a capitulation. This reply diffused universal joy, and a document was drawn up, to be presented to Don John, in which they set forth their demands, and the conditions on which they were willing to surrender. The Governor, Margarit, alarmed at these preliminaries to a submission, and fearing that, as he had taken so active a share in the revolt of Catalonia, he would be excluded from any pardon or amnesty which might be extended to the other inhabitants, secretly escaped from the city. By favour of the night, and a swift sailing felucca, he passed through the harbour, unobserved by the crew of the Spanish gallies. He had proceeded some leagues to sea, when he was overtaken by a tremendous storm, and with difficulty arrived, on the third evening of the day from his embarkation, half-dead from hunger and fatigue, at the Cape of Begur, where, having landed, he fled with the terror of a traitor, by unknown and precipitous paths, to the mountains in the neighbourhood of Girona.¹

¹ Margarit afterwards resided at Perpignan, which now belong-

From the information he obtained, Don John had been for some time aware that a proposal would speedily be made to him for the surrender of the town, and he was even apprized of the terms on which the inhabitants and French garrison were likely to insist. He had thus leisure to communicate with the Court of Madrid, which finally entrusted him with full powers to treat according to his own judgment and discretion.

In the beginning of October Don John received the conditions on which the local government and the French Mareschal were willing to surrender. On the part of the city, there were thirty-five stipulations, chiefly relating to indemnity for past transgressions,—the future security of their natural rights and provincial laws,—the restoration of prisoners, and perpetual exemption from lodging or maintaining soldiery within the walls of the town. The articles in behalf of the French garrison were only eleven, and stipulated that they should be freely allowed to return to France with all their artillery, baggage and military stores,—that quarters, provisions, and carriages should be provided for nine days, which would be occupied in their march to the frontiers,—that as many of the Catalans as chose should be permitted to accompany them,—that there should be an exchange of prisoners, and that French vessels lying in any harbour of Catalonia, should be allowed to sail under safe conduct for France.

All the articles demanded by the French garrison were granted, with some little variation in its proposed line of march, and the disposal of the property of those Catalans who might chuse to go along with it. Don John

ed to the French, and had a house in that city, at the time of the treaty of the Pyrenees, in which the French commissioners, who were appointed to adjust the boundaries between France and Spain, fixed their residence. *Marca Hispanica. Praef.*

was at first disposed to send the French to their own country by sea ; but La Mothe declared that he would prefer remaining to be cut to pieces in Barcelona.

The conditions, however, required by the citizens occasioned more serious difficulties, particularly that in which they claimed exemption from receiving a Spanish garrison within their walls. Don John remonstrated, that to leave the city without troops, would expose it to an immediate attack from the French King, and give scope to the seditious for anew fomenting those discontents and disorders by which the province had been so long agitated. He strongly recommended that they should place themselves with confidence in the hands of the King, without any stipulation except that of an amnesty, which, he assured them, would be extended to all except their former governor Margarit, who, from his eagerness in exciting and maintaining the late revolt, could merit no favour. But he added, that after having thus surrendered, they might present a petition to his Majesty, in which they should prefer any reasonable request, not in the form of a condition, but of a supplication.

This answer having been communicated to the Council of a Hundred, they unanimously resolved to follow the recommendation of Don John, in spite of all the arts and intrigues employed by the French Mareschal to break off the treaty. The President of the Council was accordingly despatched to the tent of Don John, to express the desire of the citizens to return to their allegiance ; but he earnestly implored, that no greater number of troops should be stationed within the city than was absolutely necessary, and that they should not be quartered in the private houses of the inhabitants, or prevent free egress and ingress at the gates of the town. The chief of the council was received with much ceremony in the Spanish camp, and the general indemnity was forthwith

promulgated. At the same time, the citizens, as a proof of their sincerity, placed in the hands of Don John a letter from their late governor, Margarit, which had just reached them, and in which he apprized them that he had received certain advices, that the army of Guienne was on its march to their relief, and was so powerful that Don John had no force which could possibly resist it.

As had been arranged, the French garrison marched out on the 13th of October. Few of the Catalans availed themselves of the privilege which had been granted them, of following the foreign troops. Don John made his entrance into the city with his army, in great pomp, on the same day the French garrison quitted it. He was received with general acclamations, and *Te Deum* was sung in all the churches. He had intended to have fixed his residence in the palace of the Dukes of Cardona, which La Mothe had just left. But the French Mareschal, when about to get into his litter, observing one of Don John's domestics, who had been sent forward to make preparations, told him that his master ought on no account to enter it, as it would inevitably tumble down in the course of a few days. Its foundation was laid on planks, which, during the siege, had been pulled out from time to time for firewood and other purposes. In consequence of this friendly warning, Don John chose another residence; and in the course of five days, as the Mareschal had prognosticated, down fell the palace of Cardona.

Thus ended the siege of Barcelona, fourteen months after the city had been regularly invested. In his despatches to the King, Don John handsomely attributed the whole success of this important enterprise to the skill and exertions of the Marques of Mortara.

At the time, however, of the final surrender of Barcelona, that eminent Commander was absent, and was directing his march from the coast of Catalonia, on which he had occupied so many towns, to the interior of the principality. He proceeded, in the first instance, to the vicinity of Girona, with the view of capturing the noted rebel Margarit, who, it was supposed, still lurked in that neighbourhood. Though disappointed in this object, he obtained possession of the strong town of Girona, which surrendered as soon as it was summoned, and admitted the Marques with great demonstrations of joy.¹ Here, too, he received Mareschal La Mothe and his army, on their march towards the frontiers of France, and expedited them on their route. He then rejoined Don John at Barcelona, and though his mildness to the conquered inhabitants met at first with some unjust censure from the Court, his eminent services were at length rewarded with the governments of Aragon and Valencia, in addition to that of Catalonia, which he already held. In this high situation he continued to display great military skill, and, while the Spanish arms were unfortunate in every other quarter, he successfully repelled those invasions of Catalonia which the French attempted from Roussillon.²

Before finally leaving Catalonia, Don John made a progress through the principality, quieting and soothing the irritated minds of the inhabitants, graciously accepting their renewed vows of allegiance, and adopting the

¹ *Conquista de Cataluña*, c. 27.

² Mortara held the situation of Viceroy of Catalonia at the time of the Peace of the Pyrenees. In 1668, during the following reign, when he had nearly reached the age of seventy, and was worn out with the gout, he was appointed to the government of Milan. He retained this office only a twelvemonth, when death deprived the country of one of the last of her warriors. (Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xxxvi).

proper precautions to prevent the renewal of sedition and disorder.¹

Rosas was the only place which held out against both his arms and his lures. He blockaded it for some time, and then proposed to carry it by assault. But his army was now weak, and he was forced precipitately to retire, partly in consequence of the inclemency of the season, and partly from the exertions of the French Mareschal Hocquincourt, who, in this emergency, had penetrated through Roussillon into Catalonia, in order to keep such of its inhabitants as were still inclined to France from falling into absolute despair.²

Had a minister of the moderation of Luis de Haro ruled Spain in 1640, or had such men as the Marques of Mortara and John of Austria been then employed in Catalonia, instead of the indolent Santa-Coloma, or the sanguinary Los Velez, much blood and treasure, which were wasted for ten years in Catalonia, might have been spared to the State. And had Spain been thus early freed from her domestic enemies, the sovereignty of Portugal might have been preserved, or at least a different and more favourable turn might have been given to the great contest in which she so long struggled with France in the Netherlands and the North of Italy.

¹ Bremundan, *Hechos de Don Juan*.

² Batt. Nani, ap. *Universal History*, vol. xxi. b. 19. c. 1.

CHAPTER X.

FARTHER PROGRESS OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE.

Enfin Bourbon l'emporte.

VOLTAIRE, *Henriade*.

A revolutionary spirit seems to have been abroad on the face of Europe in the middle of the 17th century. The Portuguese reinstated their native princes; the Catalans, Sicilians, and Neapolitans, attempted to throw off the yoke of Spain; the Turks strangled their Sultan Ibrahim, and the English closed the Great rebellion by the execution of their sovereign.

France, now under an infant king and a weak regency, had been for some time threatened with disorders. But the French were not yet prepared to apply to the neck of their monarch the bow-string or the axe, or that ingenious instrument in which they so much delighted towards the close of the succeeding century. They, however, got up a sort of gay rebellion, in which the fair were among the chief leaders, and the events of which were celebrated in *vaudevilles*, epigrams, and pasquinades.

The son and successor of Louis XIII, being at his father's death a minor of five years of age, the Queen Dowager Anne of Austria became Regent of France, unshackled by any of those restrictions which the late king had intended to impose on her. Soon after assuming the reins of government, she unexpectedly appointed Mazarin (so long the creature of her bitter enemy Ri-

chelieu) to be prime minister, and reposed in him her whole confidence. For some years the nation continued internally in comparative tranquillity; but the seeds of dissension had been already sown, and were fast springing up to maturity. The capital was thronged with a restless and excited population, and the Court was surrounded by a factious and self-interested nobility. Mazarin, though he assumed a mildness and moderation which were remarkably contrasted with the haughtiness and severity of his predecessor, was nevertheless, as a foreigner and a royal favourite, the object of public detestation. The tedious war in which France was still involved with Spain and the Emperor, joined to the Queen's thoughtless liberality, required enormous and still increasing pecuniary supplies. Heavy and unwonted impositions were daily laid on the murmuring citizens, who perceived that the produce of these taxes was often diverted from their proper purpose, and lavished on avaricious peers or courtiers, whose support of the government could be gained only by such distributions. For some time past, it had been artfully insinuated to the members of the parliament of Paris, that their duties were not merely to interpret laws and dispense justice to individuals, or submissively record the edicts of the crown, but that they were called on to regulate affairs of state, to reform the abuses of government, and control the conduct of their kings. At length, in 1648, the parliament being solicited by the people to undertake their protection, refused to register some pecuniary edicts transmitted to them by the Court, of which one of the most obnoxious was a tax on all provisions which entered the gates of Paris. Two counselors of parliament having distinguished themselves more than others by their strenuous opposition to the financial measures of government, were arrested and thrown into prison. This arbitrary proceeding excited great disorders

at Paris. Cardinal de Retz, known at that time by the name of the Coadjutor (being assistant Archbishop of Paris) was the chief agitator in this commotion. Being jealous of the greatness of Mazarin, and being naturally of a factious and turbulent temper, he roused the people to sedition, and infused suspicion into the nobility and princes of the Blood. Under the auspices of this intriguing prelate, the party was formed so well known by the name of the *Fronde*,—a party noted for its frivolous intrigues, its idle levity, its weak and puerile contentions. The Court having refused to release the counsellors of parliament whom it had placed in confinement, the populace rose in tumult and barricaded the streets; nor would they desist from their outrages till the prisoners were set at liberty.

The Queen being subjected to daily insults in the capital, and being apprehensive of more serious evils, retired to St Germain, accompanied by the young King and her minister. Their absence rendered the faction at Paris still more audacious. By a solemn decree, the Parliament declared Mazarin an enemy to the public peace. The Prince of Conti, younger brother of the great Condé, his brother-in-law the Duke de Longueville, the Dukes of Beaufort and Bouillon, with the Mareschal La Mothe-Houdancourt, being instigated by the Coadjutor, placed themselves at the head of the malcontents, in the hopes of rendering the turbulent proceedings of the parliament and the people subservient to their own ambitious projects. Influenced by the example of Paris, other towns and even provinces, particularly Guienne, Normandy, and Provence, raised the standard of revolt, and gradually involved the whole kingdom in confusion.

But the conduct of the insurgents was in general ludicrous and absurd. Having no distinct aim, they had neither sufficient concert nor consistency in their opera-

tions to execute any enterprise of importance. The troops of the parliament were undisciplined, and each chief pursued the views which he thought would prove most conducive to his own aggrandizement.

At this period the Prince of Condé was, in every point of view, the person of highest consideration in the kingdom. From the time of the battle of Rocroy, which he gained a few days after the death of Louis XIII, and when only twenty-one years of age, he had proceeded in a career of victory, unchecked by a single interruption except his failure at the siege of Lerida. In Germany and the Netherlands the Austrians and Spaniards everywhere yielded to his arms. Not a fortress was besieged but surrendered, not an army was attacked but was conquered; till at length, in the year 1648, he crowned all his glories by the decisive battle of Lens in Flanders, in which he defeated the Spaniards commanded by the Archduke Leopold, Governor of the Netherlands, with a loss of 8000 men left dead on the field of battle, and 1500 prisoners.

The services of Condé were eminent, but his pretensions and expectations of reward were boundless, and no distinctions or honours could satiate his inordinate ambition. He was at present highly incensed at a refusal he received from Mazarin of the office of High Admiral, which had been held by his brother-in-law the Duke de Brezé, who was killed about this time in a naval engagement with the Spaniards. Aspiring to the chief direction of affairs, he was aware that the elevation of Mazarin was inconsistent with the supremacy at which he aimed. His military duties, which detained him with the army, removed him for a time from the scenes of faction in the capital. On his arrival, however, at Paris, to which he repaired after his victory at Lens, he was warmly solicited by De Retz and other leaders of the Fronde

to espouse their party. But being convinced that, in consequence of the martial glory he had obtained, he might now easily engross the sole administration of affairs without having recourse to seditious practices, he resolved to maintain a strict neutrality between the Court and the people. At length, however, though dissatisfied with Mazarin, he engaged in the royal cause at the earnest entreaties of the Queen Regent; and, by his skilful military operations, placed the capital in a state of complete blockade, with an army of only 7000 men.

Meanwhile the Spaniards availed themselves of the civil broils by which France was distracted. In consequence of these tumults, they had risen in their pretensions at the congress assembled in Munster for the negotiation of a general peace. The Governor of the Netherlands had also retaken a number of important places, and now formed an alliance with the Prince of Conti, Generalissimo of the Fronde, who, in consideration of money and troops to be supplied by the King of Spain, agreed that he should not lay down his arms till France had given peace to her rival on reasonable conditions.

Mazarin, alarmed at this treaty, the existence of which he early discovered, and also at the wide spread of the rebellion, now entered into terms of accommodation with the Fronde. A general indemnity was granted, and the Court having returned to Paris, a temporary quiet was procured, but without any diminution of mutual hatred on the part of these virulent opponents.

So long as this rancour subsisted, no cordial or lasting peace could be expected. The leaders of the Fronde only waited for a favourable opportunity to recommence hostilities, and it was soon presented by the dissensions which arose between Mazarin and Condé. That prince claimed for himself or his adherents all offices of dignity or emolument, and treated the Cardinal with personal in-

solence and contempt. Mazarin, on the other hand, by his intrigues and deep dissimulation, contrived to undermine the popularity of Condé, and soon rendered that hero as much an object of hatred to the Fronde as he was himself. Having gained this object, and having also embroiled the Prince with the Duke of Orleans, he ventured on the bold step of arresting him, at the council table in the *Palais Royal*, along with his relatives the Prince of Conti and the Duke de Longueville. These noble prisoners were first confined in the Castle of Vincennes, and afterwards, from apprehension of escape or rescue, they were transferred to Havre de Grace.

But the government of the Regent was not sufficiently confirmed to support so hazardous a measure. Though persecuted by the Court, and abandoned by the malcontents, of whom Longueville and Conti had once been the leaders, the Princes were not left without friends and partizans. Of these, the most powerful and estimable was Mareschal Turenne. That renowned and consummate warrior, who had already highly distinguished himself in several German campaigns, proceeded to Stenai in Champagne. He there concluded a treaty with an envoy despatched to meet him on the part of Spain, by the Archduke Leopold,¹ who agreed to supply him with money and 5000 troops, to effect the release of the captive Princes, and reinstate them in their rank and prerogatives, on the former conditions that, when restored to freedom, they should use their influence, or, if requisite, their arms, to procure peace for Spain on more favourable conditions than those which had been offered her at the Congress of Munster. Being placed at the head of a small Spanish army, Turenne, accompanied by the Count de Boutteville, afterwards so well known by the name of Mareschal Luxembourg, accelerated his march to Paris through the

¹ Ramsay, *Hist. de Turenne*.

province of Champagne. He occupied several towns in his progress, particularly Rhetel, and had advanced as far as Montfauçon, between the Meuse and the Aisne; till, hearing that Rhetel was besieged, he returned to its relief, but was too late to save it, as the Spanish garrison he had left in it had capitulated before his arrival.¹ In the neighbourhood of this town, he encountered one of the royal armies, commanded by Mareschal Plessis-Praslin, which was greatly superior to his own force in numbers, and was encouraged by the presence of Cardinal Mazarin, who, in imitation of Richelieu, sometimes showed himself in the camp. After a fierce engagement, which Turenne could not avoid, the Spanish troops were totally discomfited. Their whole artillery, commanded by Don Estevan de Gamarra, was captured: the Count de Boutteville was taken prisoner, and Turenne saved himself with difficulty by flight. In consequence of this disaster, he was obliged to retire to Montmedi, and lost all his previous conquests in Champagne.

Turenne, however, had not intended to continue longer in league with the Spaniards than he was bound by his promise to exert himself for the release of the Princes; and hearing that efforts were now making by their followers in France for their deliverance, he gladly broke off all farther connection with those enemies of his country, to whom he had reluctantly allied himself.²

The adherents of Condé had been somewhat disheartened at the unfortunate result of this attempt by Turenne. But his party was neither dissolved nor materially diminished. Among the nobility, it was chiefly supported, at Paris, by the Dukes of Beaufort, Bouillon, Rochefoucault, and Nemours; while the Count de Tavannes first reared the standard of revolt in Burgundy, of which Condé had once been governor. Mazarin likewise, being elated by his

¹ Ramsay, *Hist. de Turenne*.

² Ibid.

recent victory at Rhetel, had given new cause of disgust to the Fronde and to the coadjutor De Retz, whom he refused to place in nomination for the Cardinal's hat, which was the great object of his ambition. That prelate, in consequence of the disappointment he had thus experienced, secretly entered into communication with the declared partizans of Condé, and, by means of the intrigues which the Duchess of Chevreuse conducted, the Duke of Orleans, whom Mazarin had slighted, was brought over to the same party. The Queen persisted most obstinately in the detention of the Princes, and for a long while refused or eluded all the solicitations of the Parliament and the friends of Condé. She had even proposed, rather than yield, to fly with the King from Paris; but, finding that the Coadjutor had armed the citizens, and stationed them at all the gates of the capital to prevent her escape, she at last reluctantly signed the mandate for the release of the captives. It is not, however, ascertained whether she issued this order by consent of Cardinal Mazarin, or without his knowledge and participation.

In plotting the deliverance of the princes, it had been a great object with De Retz, in order that they might still continue enemies of Mazarin, to make it appear that their enlargement was due to the intervention of the Fronde or Parliament, and not to the favourable disposition of the minister. No sooner, however, had the orders for their freedom been expedited, than Mazarin set out post for Havre, and arrived there before the Duke of Rochefoucault, who was eager to convey to the princes the first news of their deliverance. In announcing this intelligence, Mazarin used every art to ingratiate himself with Condé, and to bring him over to the party of the court, that he might unite with it for the destruction of the Fronde. But Condé treated the self-interested minister with the most marked contempt; and Mazarin,

aware that he could now no longer be safe in Paris, where he was the object of universal hatred, proceeded by rapid journies to Liege, and afterwards to Cologne, whence, however, he continued to govern the Queen-regent, as absolutely as if he had remained in the Capital.

The release of Condé failed to appease the discontents of the nation, and it furnished an able leader to the insurgents, who now hoped successfully to renew the civil war, under the auspices of that transcendent hero. The offences of Condé had been forgotten during his imprisonment and misfortunes, and he was now highly popular among the Parisians, who received him, on his return to the Capital, as the protector of France and the glory of his age and country. But Condé was too inconsiderate and impetuous to be the head of a political party, and he was continually entrapped by the dissimulation of Mazarin, the intrigues of De Retz, and the artifice of the Queen. Her Majesty, in order to render him odious to the Coadjutor, entered into a negotiation with him, and proposed terms highly favourable to his interests, to which he seemed disposed to accede. But when, by the pendency of this treaty, she had succeeded in rendering him suspected to the popular party, as a creature of the Court, she suddenly broke it off. It was then that Condé, feeling how he had been duped, and perceiving that he had at once lost the benefits he expected to reap from the favour of the Court, and the advantages he might have derived from a union with the Fronde, secretly prepared for civil war. The Queen, having promulgated a declaration against him, he escaped from Paris to a seat he possessed near St Maur, where he completed his warlike measures, and sent the Marquis de Sillery to Brussels to renew his engagements with Spain, and stipulate assistance in the event of civil discord. He was chiefly prompted to these decisive steps by his military

associates, and by his sister the Duchess de Longueville, who exercised a strong ascendancy over his mind. Noble, but intemperate and factious, partizans thronged round him at St Maur, and it was resolved, as their influence chiefly lay in the south-west of France, that Condé should first rear the standard of revolt in Guienne. The Duke de Richelieu undertook to raise levies in Saintonge,—the Duke de Rochefoucault answered for the support of Poitou, and the Marquis de Montespan reckoned on numerous auxiliaries from Gascony.

Condé had recently received the government of Guienne in exchange for that of Burgundy; and the province had long considered itself as under his special patronage and protection, as he had obtained an indemnity for its inhabitants, on account of an insurrection which they had raised at the first formation of the Fronde. On his imprisonment, the Princess of Condé, with his infant child the Duke d'Enghien, had fled to Guienne for shelter, and had been enthusiastically received by the inhabitants. The vicinity too of the province to the frontiers of Spain, afforded Condé an opportunity of speedily receiving reinforcements from that kingdom with which he had now entered into a strict alliance. Manifestoes, indeed, were everywhere circulated through France, in name of his Catholic Majesty, acknowledging the league which he had concluded with the rebellious princes, but setting forth at the same time his earnest desire of peace,—his abhorrence at contributing in any manner to the disturbance of his neighbours, and the purity of his intentions in supporting the adherents of Condé against the open violence or secret artifices of a politician who was an alien to France, and who, to promote his own private views of ambition, trampled on the laws of that country, and held it constantly involved in unjust wars with surrounding nations.¹

¹ *Universal History*, vol. xxi. 19. 1.

The Prince of Condé was received at Bordeaux with the greatest demonstrations of joy, and its Parliament pronounced whatever decrees he dictated. He was soon joined in the capital of Guienne by the Prince of Conti and the Duchess de Longueville; and most of the peers who had assembled round him at St Maur kept the faith they had there pledged to him. A considerable Spanish reinforcement, which was embarked in eight vessels of war under the orders of the Baron de Batteville, arrived in the harbour of Bordeaux, and the Prince was joined about the same time by his steady adherent Marsin, with part of the French garrison, which, (as we have seen),¹ that general had treacherously, or at least deceitfully, withdrawn from Barcelona. At first Condé gained considerable successes, but his troops, with exception of this small garrison, and the Spanish auxiliaries, were newly levied and undisciplined. The Count de Harcourt was appointed to the command of the King's troops in Guienne; and Condé, in consequence of the inferiority of his force, as also the dissensions which had arisen among his partizans, was unable to keep the field against him. Perceiving that his interests could be no longer supported in Guienne, and being urged by his adherents in Paris to march to the Capital, he adopted the resolution of quitting that province, and entrusting to Marsin the command of the troops which he left in it. Soon after his departure his friends also abandoned that district, and Bordeaux opened its gates to the Count de Harcourt. Marsin, ever zealous for the interests of his patron, proceeded to Madrid, where he was received with much distinction; and in a private audience which he obtained of the King of Spain, he proposed a plan to his Catholic Majesty for reviving the cause of the Prince of Condé in Guienne. Philip promised his assistance, and immediately despatched both a naval and military force; while

¹ See above, p. 497.

Marsin, full of hope, returned to the province. Owing, however, to the timidity of the Spanish commanders, and their want of co-operation, he was disappointed in all the schemes he had formed, of which the chief was the capture of the Isle of Rhé.¹

When Condé first declared open war against his sovereign, he had been much chagrined by the secession from his party of the Duke de Bouillon, and still more by the defection of his brother Turenne, on whose support he had firmly relied. But Turenne, though he had undertaken a bold enterprise for the release of Condé when unjustly imprisoned, refused to league himself with one who had been proclaimed a traitor to his King, and who was now confessedly in alliance with the enemies of his country. Turenne being detached from the party of the Princes, the Queen-Regent ventured, during the absence of Condé, to recal her favourite Mazarin, who re-entered France with an escort of 6000 troops. His return, however, was so far favourable to the interests of Condé, that the Duke of Orleans, being grievously offended by it, entered into a treaty with him, and agreed to unite to that Prince's army the force which was under his own special command, for the ostensible purpose of driving the obnoxious Cardinal from the counsels of his sovereign, and again expelling him from the kingdom. The troops of the Duke of Orleans, amounting to 6000 men, were at this time stationed at Montargis, in the Orleanois. Thither, Condé, as soon as he had determined on quitting Guienne, sent forward his Spanish reinforcements, with part of the new levies, under the Duke de Nemours. He himself having soon afterwards crossed the Loire, accompanied by the Duke de Rochefoucault, secretly repaired to Montargis, and placed himself at the head of the army,

Baltazar, *Hist. de la Guerre de Guienne*, ap. *Pieces fugitives pour l'Hist. de France*, t. ii.

now amounting to 12,000 men, collected in that neighbourhood. From this place, he resolved to march straight to the gates of Paris : but he learned that two royal armies had assembled to oppose him,—one under Mareschal Hocquincourt at Blenau, and the other at Briare under Turenne, who had now fairly ranged himself with the party of the Court. Condé received information that these two armies intended to effect a junction on the following day ; and, accordingly, on the very evening he obtained the intelligence, he suddenly attacked Hocquincourt with irresistible force, and totally overthrew him, before Turenne could be apprized of the assault. The King and his Court, who were in the vicinity, were overwhelmed with dismay by the defeat at Blenau, and they seem indeed to have been on the point of being themselves captured. But Turenne reassured them, and though he was not sufficiently strong to offer battle to Condé, he took up a position which his rival in vain attempted to force.

Leaving Turenne and the scattered troops of Hocquincourt in their rear, the army of Condé advanced to Estampes, about thirty miles south of Paris. There they were quickly followed by Turenne, who attacked them in the suburbs, and after a conflict of three hours, compelled them to seek refuge in the town. Turenne then invested Estampes, and would probably have carried the place, had he not thought it prudent to raise the siege, on account of the intelligence which now reached him, concerning the approach of the Duke of Lorraine. Condé finding himself closely pressed by his enemies, had persuaded the Governor of the Netherlands to send to his assistance, Charles, Duke of Lorraine, with his celebrated corps, which was at that time in the pay of the King of Spain. The Duke accordingly marched as far as the environs of Paris, and came in sight of the army of Turenne, which had advanced against him. But being

corrupted by the gold of Mazarin, who offered him a larger sum to retreat than the Prince had given him to advance, he betrayed the cause which he had engaged to support, and, without effecting any thing for its behoof, he retired to the Netherlands, plundering and ravaging the country on his way, and carrying with him the cash of both parties. Condé, who had quitted Estampes in the hope of effecting a junction with the Duke of Lorraine, being thus abandoned to his own resources, and urged by a superior army commanded by so able a leader as Turenne, was forced to quit a position which he had taken up at St Cloud, in order to seek one more advantageous, near Charenton, at the junction of the Seine and the Marne; but being still pursued and harassed by the royalists on his march, and finding he might be attacked by them before he could reach it, he was soon compelled to throw himself into the Fauxbourg St Antoine, where there were some strong entrenchments which had been formed by the inhabitants for their own security during the civil wars. The Parisians, though at the time not ill disposed towards Condé, would not allow him or his followers to enter their town, because they were exasperated at some excesses his soldiers had committed in their neighbourhood, and because they considered it as unworthy of good Frenchmen, to admit within their walls an army which was partly composed of Spanish troops. Turenne, by the express orders of Mazarin, attacked Condé in the Fauxbourg, where he had fixed his quarters. On its streets a furious conflict ensued wherein the two greatest Generals of France exhibited prodigies of valour and military skill. The combat was surveyed by the King and his Court from the heights of Charonne, and by the Parisians from their walls. The Prince sustained for several hours the furious attacks of his enemy, who at length desisted from his assaults; but he only paused to give time for the arrival of fresh reinforcements,

under Mareschal La Ferté, of which he was in momentary expectation; and it was evident that in the event of a renewal of the engagement with this additional force against them, Condé and all his partizans must have suffered death or captivity.

In this emergency, the Duke of Orleans, doubtful what course to pursue, remained, with his usual timidity and irresolution, shut up in his palace. His spirited daughter Mademoiselle Montpensier, who had often acted as her father's agent in his negotiations with the Princes, attempted to persuade him to adopt some measures for the preservation of Condé. He could not himself be prevailed on to move, but he gave his daughter permission to act as she chose. More resolute than her father, she repaired to the *Hotel de Ville*, and having obtained the consent of the magistracy, who were influenced by her courage and authority, she ordered the gate which leads to the Fauxbourg St Antoine, to be opened for the reception of Condé and his troops. She then proceeded to the Bastille, and on the first appearance of the reinforcements under Mareschal La Ferté, she boldly directed its artillery against the royal army. This unexpected cannonade compelled Turenne to retire, and snatched from him a victory which must have proved decisive, and which he had all but obtained.

Condé was received with the utmost joy and congratulations in the capital. The Parliament was struck with awe, the people were filled with admiration, at his valour; and all classes appeared for a time devoted to his interests. But these favourable sentiments were not of long duration. A popular tumult of a bloody and disgraceful nature, in which several citizens were killed, and which Condé was believed to have excited, ruined his credit among the more respectable inhabitants; and the Spaniards, who had advanced in considerable force as far as

Chauni, always fearing an accommodation between the rebels and the Court, again retreated. Cardinal Mazarin, who was still as obnoxious as ever, consented a second time to a voluntary exile, in order to appease the people, and retired to Sedan. He did not, indeed, depart till he had taken due precautions for ruling the kingdom during his absence, and re-entering it as speedily as possible. But he had no sooner quitted Paris, than its citizens, who only waited for this step on the part of the minister, in order to return to their duty, sent deputies to the King, who was hovering with his court in the vicinity of Paris, and now readily granted his subjects, with some few exceptions, an amnesty for past offences. Louis, who had already declared his majority and assumed the reins of government, accordingly entered his capital, amid universal rejoicings and acclamations.

The King was no sooner fixed in the Louvre, than the Fronde disappeared. Its leader, De Retz, was imprisoned in the castle of Vincennes,¹ and afterwards at Nantes; and the Duke of Orleans was ordered to quit Paris. He readily obeyed this mandate, leaving those whom he had involved in his intrigues to extricate themselves, as they best could, from the consequences. This unworthy son of Henry the Great retired to Blois where he finished his days, having neither merited during life the character of a good citizen, nor the reputation of a skilful leader of a faction.

Louis, finding himself thus reconciled to his subjects, and delivered from all his domestic enemies, ventured on the recall of Mazarin. That minister, once the object of so many conspiracies and so much hatred, returned to

¹ After his escape from this place of confinement, De Retz fled into Spain, where Luis de Haro sent him some presents, and afforded him the means of conveyance by sea from Valencia to Rome. (*Mémoires de Gui Joly*, t. ii.)

Paris in a species of triumph, and was received with the highest honours both by the people and parliament. This subtle Italian soon rendered himself as absolute by mildness and duplicity, as Richelieu had been by means of vigour and severity. The nation then began justly to appreciate his profound judgment, and his deep policy of which the chief object was still the humiliation of Spain, and the conclusion of a treaty with that kingdom which might eventually transmit its succession to the House of Bourbon.

As for Condé, when he became aware that his interests were ruined in Guienne—when he saw that his party could be no longer supported in Paris, and that the King was on the eve of returning triumphant to his capital, he threw himself wholly into the arms of Spain, in order to prosecute the war against his country. Accordingly, having concerted with the Duke of Orleans such measures as he thought best calculated to prevent or defer the return of Louis, and having obtained from him a promise that he would never enter into an accommodation with Mazarin, or consent to his recall, he fled from France, to seek an asylum in the Netherlands, and was met on the frontiers, between Champagne and Luxembourg, by the Count of Fuensaldagna, who had advanced there to receive him. He was attainted of treason, in his absence, by sentence of the Parliament of Paris: he was declared to have forfeited all his honours and dignities, and was condemned to death as a rebel and a traitor.

This great, though inconsiderate Prince, cannot be justified in having reared in Guienne the standard of revolt against his Sovereign. Yet the rivulet once passed which separates allegiance and rebellion, it was difficult to retrace his steps. During the whole course of the civil war he was constantly engaged in negotiations for peace, and

was most anxious to obtain it. But the Court was not sincere in its proposals for accommodation, and Mazarin, who always viewed in him a formidable rival to his power, wished to drive him to despair. Condé, too, in order to obtain the support of his noble and ambitious adherents, had entered into engagements with them, not to lay down his arms till he had obtained for them those honours and advantages to which they so eagerly aspired. The Court could not admit all the unreasonable pretensions of those whom it regarded as rebels. Governments of provinces were required for the Dukes of Nemours and Rohan,—large sums of money, and princely rank for the Duke of Rochefoucault,—a mareschal's baton for the Count Marsin, and a dukedom for the Marquis of Montespan. From a principle of honour, and of fidelity to his engagements, Condé was thus compelled to persist in rebellion : and he was at the same time exposed to temptations sufficiently trying to an ambitious spirit. The Spaniards solicited him to become the generalissimo of all their forces, and agreed that whatever towns or districts might be conquered by their joint arms from France, at the distance of three leagues from the frontiers of the Netherlands, should be erected for his behoof into a separate and independent principality.

On his arrival in the Low Countries, Condé found the affairs of the Spaniards in a prosperous situation. The Archduke Leopold having recently availed himself of the disturbances in France, had succeeded in reducing Gravelines, Dunkirk, and several other places of importance ; and, with the connivance of the Emperor, he had received into his army, from time to time, nearly 30,000 of the German troops, disbanded after the Peace of Westphalia. Condé now brought to their aid his own military genius and that of Mareschal Luxembourg, by whom he was accompanied ; and his steady adherent Marsin, who posses-

sed all the cunning and enterprize of a partizan, soon afterwards joined him from Guienne.¹ Condé also commanded an army of 6000 followers, who had been disciplined under his own eye, and were devotedly attached to their leader. With such support, he might have inflicted as many evils on his own country, and conferred as many benefits on Spain, as were bestowed on it in former times, by the Constable de Bourbon. But the Spanish ministry, knowing that Condé had been once their enemy, feared he might again become so. Accordingly, while nominating him their generalissimo, they, at the same time, by a fatal distrust, appointed the Count of Fuensaldagna to follow his camp, and narrowly watch all his movements.

Fuensaldagna had come to Flanders in 1634, in the retinue of the Cardinal Infant, and had been constantly employed there since his arrival.² He had fought in all the wars in the Netherlands from that period, and had been for some time past the military secretary of the Archduke Leopold. He was a genuine Spaniard in indolence, in observance of prescribed forms, and in contempt of foreign nations; and being named to a commission in which control and suspicion were enjoined to him as duties, the Count often arrested, by his ill-timed circumspection, his colleague's victorious career.

The Spaniards were sufficiently sensible of the importance of the acquisition they had gained in the alliance of Condé, and treated him with every degree of external respect. But he was much, and perhaps justly dissatisfied. He complained of the ineffective state of the Spanish troops, the want of artillery and ammunition, and the bad repair of the fortresses. Nor could he, with all his ener-

¹ *Mem. de la Maison de Condé*, t. i.

² Aedo, *Viage del Cardinal Infante*.

gy and vivacity, inspire the Spanish generals with any degree of vigour, or accelerate their tardy movements. An attack on any place by night was entirely out of the question. They would only march during the most pleasant part of the day. They required in the afternoon a long *siesta*, and, whatever might be the emergency, none of their domestics could venture to disturb them, nor durst any inferior officer act without their express commands.¹ During the campaign in the Netherlands, Turenne, accompanied by the Duke of York (afterwards James II.) was one morning reconnoitring the lines which the Spaniards had drawn round a town they were besieging. The French mareschal, who intended to force them, pointed out to his Royal Highness a spot where he would that day make his attack at noon. One of the chief officers in attendance, on hearing this, showed him another part of the line, on the opposite side, which was much weaker. "It seems, indeed, to be so," replied the Mareschal, "but there Condé holds his post, and he never sleeps; while in this quarter, which is apparently the strongest, lies the Count of Fuensaldagna; and I will tell you what will happen, for I have marched in the Spanish army, and know well their customs. For a long while they will suppose that we only mean to give a false alarm; but when they at length find we are in earnest, they will send for Fuensaldagna, who at that time of day will be asleep, and his servants will not be persuaded to awaken him in a moment. And when he is at length roused, he will take a look of the line, and then repair to the tent of the Archduke, who will be likewise at his siesta, and when he is awake, they will consult what *is to be done*, by which time *we shall have done*." And they did enter the line accordingly, and afterwards found, from the pri-

² Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV. Life of James II.*

soners, that every thing had fallen out as the Marshal had foretold.”¹

Condé opened the campaign at the head of an army of 20,000 men, on the frontiers of Champagne. He took Rhetel without opposition, and St Menehould after a slight resistance. Having placed garrisons in these towns, he next advanced into the Dutchy of Bar, where he seized the principal fortresses. But an army was now formed to stop his farther progress, and was placed under the command of Turenne, who, by his military skill and conduct, prevented his antagonist from fixing his winter-quarters, as he had intended, within the limits of France. Condé retreated before him through Lorraine to the frontiers of Luxembourg, and Turenne then succeeded in regaining all the acquisitions which had been made by the Spaniards in the Dutchy of Bar.

The contest was renewed in Champagne, in the year 1653, with the recapture of Rhetel by Turenne. The possession of this town was accounted of considerable importance, as it was an inlet to Champagne, and parties might thence make incursions almost to the gates of Paris. Its loss, therefore, materially disconcerted the plans of Condé, and, in consequence of its recapture, he transferred the seat of war, and made an irruption into France on the side of Picardy, which he invaded with an army of 27,000 men. He took and plundered Roye, which was only defended by its townsmen, and advanced as far as Ham. But Turenne no sooner heard that the Spaniards were again within the limits of the kingdom, than he marched from the vicinity of Rhetel to oppose their farther progress in Picardy. Condé remained for some days within sight of his antagonist, but, though superior in numbers, did not venture to attack him, and when the

¹ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xv.

Prince decamped from his position, Turenne used every stratagem to bring him to a general engagement. This he contrived to avoid, but Turenne so hung on his rear, and harassed his march, that Condé perceived it would be dangerous to advance farther into the country with such an army on his flank, and no fortified towns behind him. After a fruitless campaign of six weeks in France, he retreated to the frontier, and then, in opposition to the opinion of Fuensaldagna, he advanced to the siege of Rocroy, where he had earned his first laurels, in a more honourable warfare than that in which he was now unfortunately engaged.

Details as to the capture and recapture of towns and forts, of which the loss or acquisition does not materially affect the result of a campaign, are in general neither amusing nor instructive. But modern history has seldom presented a more interesting spectacle than this struggle between the armies of the two chief powers of Europe, conducted on the one part by Condé, and on the other by Turenne, the greatest captains then on earth. These illustrious rivals gained but little advantage over each other on the spot where they were mutually opposed. Condé took Rocroy, and Turenne recaptured Mouzon and St Menehould. Though these losses or acquisitions were not apparently attended with any important results, they interest us from the manner in which each commander, by his military resources, and warlike expedients, so long foiled his antagonist, and rendered no advantage on either side permanent, or loss irreparable. "It was," says Lord Clarendon,¹ "a wonderful and pleasant thing to see and observe, in attacks or in marches, with what foresight either of them would declare what the other would do. Thus the Prince of Condé, when the armies marched near each other, and the Spaniards would

¹ *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. vi.

not alter their former lazy pace, nor the rest at noon, would in choler tell them, if we do not make haste to possess such a pass Turenne will take it. This often gave rise to some *ruse de guerre*, for each being aware that his rival penetrated his designs, and knowing that he would act on the belief that the most dexterous and judicious manœuvre would be performed by his adversary, often took him by surprise, by means of a stroke, contrary to the rules of war, and which would otherwise have been accounted bad generalship." The Duke of York, who served alternately under Turenne and Condé, informs us, "that these two great men, without being any other way advertised of each other's being there, yet found it out, on both sides, by their mutual conduct. Turenne, affirming that Condé was on the other hill, and that otherwise he would have pressed those troops more than now he would adventure to do; and Condé, saying the like of Turenne, adding farther, that if any one besides him had been there, he would certainly have charged him."¹

The military genius of both commanders, and the number of their troops, were nearly equal, and they had similar difficulties to contend with. For if Condé was controlled by Fuensaldagna, and thwarted by his capricious ally the Duke of Lorraine, the enterprises of Turenne were often traversed by the jealousy and animosity of his colleague, the Mareschal de la Ferté.

About this time Mazarin proposed terms of accommodation to Condé, chiefly with the view, as is supposed, of rendering him suspected by the Spaniards. That Prince was now too far advanced to recede from his engagements with the enemies of his country; but their knowledge that proposals had been made to him, by increasing their jealousy, tended to cramp and paralyse his ex-

¹ *Life of James II.* t. i. p. 228.

ertions, and, of consequence, to perplex and embarrass their own affairs.

Previous, however, to the commencement of the next campaign, Condé fortunately got rid of his troublesome colleague Duke Charles of Lorraine, whom the Spaniards now began to consider as an ally more dangerous than useful. This Duke had the misfortune to inherit dominions which suited more powerful neighbours. But though driven by the French from his states, he retained an army of 8000 devoted followers, whose services he annually sold to the Spaniards. Restless, capricious, and unprincipled, no reliance could be placed on his promises, and the most solemn treaties and engagements could not bind him. Except a general license to pillage, he gave his troops no pay, that he might hoard in his coffers the subsidies which were annually remitted to him from Spain; nor would he ever consent to expose either in a siege or battle, an army which to him was in the place both of kingdom and subjects. The bitter and provoking railleries with which he was wont to assail both the Spanish generals and ministers perhaps accelerated his fate. Express orders were transmitted from the Court of Madrid to place him under arrest. Though habitually cautious and suspicious, means were found to entrap him, and to separate him from his troops. He was seized at Brussels, whence he was transported to Antwerp; but was afterwards conveyed to Spain, and confined in the Alcazar of Toledo, where he was detained till the conclusion of the Peace of the Pyrenees. A new oath of fidelity was exacted from his troops in favour of his brother, Francis of Lorrain. But the disposition of this Prince was not much more accommodating than that of his relative. Causes of irritation were constantly arising between him and Condé, and he had no sooner assumed the command of his mercenary bands, than he refused to per-

mit their march to Stenai, where Condé was desirous to lead them in order to raise the siege of that town, which, in the commencement of the present campaign, had been closely invested by the army of Turenne.

As Condé could not procure a sufficient force to relieve Stenai, he resolved on laying siege to Arras, judging that this might effect a diversion in favour of Stenai, or that he should take Arras before the capture of that town, which at present occupied a large portion of the French army. To this enterprise the Prince of Lorraine gave his concurrence. Accompanied by the Archduke and Fuensaldagna, and followed by an army of 30,000 men, of whom about 6000 were Lorrainers, Condé invested Arras. Large as was this force, it was not more than sufficient, because, from the position of the town, and nature of the surrounding country, the Spanish lines of circumvallation were not less than six leagues in circuit. The garrison was small compared with the extent of the place, having been recently weakened by frequent detachments to other quarters. The Court of France was much alarmed by the operations directed against this town, as it was supposed that, if it were taken, there was little to prevent Condé from marching to Paris, and again exciting the changeable inhabitants of that capital to sedition and revolt. Arras was equally important as one of the keys to the Spanish Netherlands, which could not be considered in safety so long as the French possessed it. By exaggerating its consequence to their security and commerce, Fuensaldagna (having been disappointed of a promised loan from Genoa) persuaded the Flemings voluntarily to defray the whole expenses of the undertaking. But though urged with his utmost vigour, the enterprise did not gain Condé's object of raising the siege of Stenai; for while Turenne proceeded in person with part of his army, in order to save Arras, he left a

considerable force behind him under Mareschal Hocquincourt, to continue the blockade of Stenai. Having advanced towards Arras, Turenne encamped in the vicinity of the Spaniards, with the design of throwing supplies into the city when an opportunity should offer, and of intercepting the Spanish convoys, so as at length to compel his enemies to raise the siege from want of provisions. Condé wished to attack Turenne on his march, or immediately after his approach. But his opinion was overruled by Fuensaldagna, in consequence of which the French General had leisure completely to fortify his camp, and to station his troops in such a position as to cut off in almost every direction the communication of the Spaniards with the surrounding country. Meanwhile, in consequence of the surrender of Stenai, the other division of the French army, amounting to 8000, advanced under Hocquincourt, to join Turenne before Arras. The Governor of that town was deficient in ammunition, and he had to contend not only against the besiegers, but against the inhabitants, who were all favourable to the Spanish cause. No other means now remained of saving Arras, which was reduced to the last extremity, except hazarding a general attack on the Spanish lines. This was regarded as a desperate attempt by all Turenne's officers, with exception of the Count de Broglio and the Duke of York, who was at that time serving in the French army. Turenne, however, persisted in his plan, and resolved to make his real assault on the position occupied by Don Fernando de Solis, which was accounted the weakest, and was the farthest distant from the station of Condé. At the same time, three false attacks were projected on the quarters of Fuensaldagna, the Duke of Lorraine, and particularly on that part of the lines where the Prince of Condé commanded, in order to detain him at his post, and prevent him from rendering the assistance

of his admirable skill and conduct to the Spanish Generals. "Turenne," says the Duke of York, "when the night for the attack drew near, did on all occasions discourse with the officers concerning the manner of the assault, and what resistance we were likely to find,—instructing them how to behave themselves according to the several occasions which might arise. These kind of discourses he had every day with his officers, as occasion presented in common talk, and more especially with the general officers."¹ Two days before the attack, the Count de Grammont arrived as a volunteer from Peronne, to which Louis XIV. and his Court had advanced. He was received with much cordiality and frankness by Turenne; and from what the Count knew of the disposition of Mazarin, he informed the Mareschal of the peril in which he should be placed if he did not beat the enemy in an enterprise which he had undertaken without consulting the minister. On the subject of his meditated assault, Turenne discoursed with the Count in private, and concealed nothing from him except the time fixed for its execution. Grammont had been an old adherent of Condé, and that Prince having heard of his arrival in the French camp, sent to express a desire to see him. The Chevalier, in consequence, with consent of Turenne, set out next day for the rendezvous, and found Condé at the spot where he had appointed the meeting. That Prince, though he knew that Grammont was instantly to return to the French tents, took him within the Spanish

¹ *Life of James II.* Whatever variations or interpolations may have been made in other parts on the original Memoirs of James II. by those into whose custody they had fallen, there can be no doubt of the authenticity of all that concerns the campaigns of Flanders, as the relation nearly coincides with the extracts furnished by James himself to the Cardinal de Bouillon, the nephew of Turenne, and inserted in Ramsay's *Histoire de Turenne*.

lines, showing all his works, the plan of the entrenchments, and disposition of the troops. In exchange for this frankness, Grammont informed him that, so far as he could trust to appearances, though he was not in that part of the secret, he might depend on being attacked early the following morning. After his return to the French camp, Grammont acquainted Turenne that his opponent was aware he should be assailed on the morrow by day-break: "For you great captains," he added, "see in a wonderful manner through each other's designs."¹

Condé had either not believed the information of Grammont, or had not thought proper to give notice to his colleagues, for the Spaniards seem to have been completely taken by surprise. "On our march to the Spanish lines," says the Duke of York, "we had a still fair night, besides the benefit of the moon, which set as favourably for us as we could desire, that is, just as we came to the place appointed. As the moon went down, it began to blow very fresh, and grew exceeding dark, insomuch that the enemy could neither see nor hear us, as otherwise they might, and they were the more surprised, when the first news they had of us, was to find us within half cannon shot of them. I remember not to have seen a finer sight of the nature, than was that of our foot when they were once in battle array, and began to march towards the lines; for then, discovering at once their lighted matches, they made a glorious show, which appeared the more by reason of the wind, which kindled them and made them blaze through the darkness of the night, for the breeze keeping the coal of their matches very clear, whensoever any of the musketeers happened to shog against each other, the matches struck fire, so that the sparkles were carried about by the wind to increase the light."²

¹ *Mem. de Grammont.*

² *Life of James II*, t. i. p. 219.

When the Spaniards at length discovered the advancing enemy, they fired some cannon at them, and set lights all along their lines. But the assault proved completely successful; the entrenchments were forced at the spot where they were meant to be seriously attacked, and, the French artillery also coming up, the Spaniards began to draw off in every direction. Their baggage, ammunition, and artillery, were already seized, and the whole army was about to be cut to pieces, when, in the midst of the general consternation, Condé sought the Archduke, and recommended to him to sound a retreat, while Condé himself undertook to interpose between the retiring army and the French with a small body of cavalry which he had drawn together in the present emergency. In prosecution of this plan, Condé fell on a number of plunderers, who, being persuaded that they had completed their victory, were engaged in pillaging the Spanish camp. These Condé put to the sword,—repulsing Mareschal La Ferté who advanced to stop the slaughter, and keeping at bay a *corps d'élite* commanded by Turenne in person. He was still engaged in combat, when the Archduke, with some broken remnants of his troops, had nearly reached Douai in his flight. The garrison of Arras, however, having now sallied forth, Condé found it was necessary to retreat. Having collected all the forces which still remained within the entrenchments, he led them out unmolested, and making front from time to time in order to check the enemy, who pursued him for a considerable distance as he retired over a wide plain, he finally conducted his troops in perfect order as far as Cambray.¹

In this conflict the Spaniards lost 3000 men killed, and as many prisoners, with an immense quantity of ar-

¹ Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV*, t. i. *Hist. de La Maison de Condé*, t. i.

tillery, ammunition, and all kinds of stores ; yet the disaster might have been so much worse, had it not been for Condé's presence of mind and courage, that King Philip addressed to him a letter of acknowledgement for having thus covered the retreat of the Spaniards, and saved the shattered remains of his army. But the Prince obtained no higher confidence than before, and Fuensaldagna was still continued in his baneful superintendence.

This rout before Arras was followed by the capture of Quesnoy and Clermont, which opened up to the French complete access to the heart of the Spanish Netherlands, and prepared the way for the fall of Landreci and St Guillain, which surrendered to them in the following campaign. The Spanish army having failed in all attempts to relieve either Clermont or Quesnoy, retired behind the Sambre and Scheldt.

In the course of the year 1655 the Spaniards were deprived of the farther service, such as it was, of the troops of Lorraine. Duke Charles, tired of his imprisonment at Toledo, had agreed, as the price of his liberty, to transfer his predatory bands to the King of Spain. This intelligence had no sooner reached Prince Francis of Lorraine, who commanded them in the Netherlands, than he resolved to evade the compact between his brother and the Court of Madrid, and to preserve his independence, by passing with his army into the service of the King of France. Having persuaded the Archduke to employ him and his Lorrainers in the siege of some town in the Netherlands, he marched off, apparently to accomplish the enterprise entrusted to him. But as soon as he was out of view, he changed his route and proceeded to Landreci, which by this time was occupied by the French, with whom he now agreed to act on the same terms as those on which he had formerly served the Spaniards.¹

¹ Reboulet, *Hist. du Regne de Louis XIV.*

But the loss of the Lorrainers, if such indeed it can be considered, was more than compensated to the Prince of Condé, by an auspicious change which at this time took place in the administration of the Spanish Netherlands. The Archduke Leopold, mortified that he had been able to effect so little for his own reputation or the service of the King of Spain, solicited his Majesty for leave to resign the government. This permission he at length obtained, but he agreed to remain in the Low Countries till the arrival of his successor. His adviser, or rather director Fuensaldagna, who in reality had always possessed the chief share in the confidence of the Spanish Court, also took his departure, and was soon afterwards appointed to the government of Milan.¹

At this period Don John of Austria was still in Catalonia. That province, after the suppression of the revolt in Guienne, had been again invaded by a French

¹ Whatever may have been the faults or remissness of Fuensaldagna, he preserved, till the close of life, the full confidence of his sovereign. After having acted about four years as Governor of Milan, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to Paris on occasion of the nuptials of Louis XIV. with the Infanta Maria Theresa. He was still in this situation when, in 1661, the celebrated quarrel concerning precedence occurred at London between the French and Spanish Ambassadors. In consequence of that dispute, Louis XIV. ordered him immediately to quit the kingdom. As soon as he received this mandate he retired to Cambray, where he sickened and died after a few days' illness. Though scarcely qualified to cope with Turenne or counsel Condé in the important wars of Flanders, he had deserved, I presume, some approbation in his capacity of Governor of Milan, as the Italian historians of that period talk loudly both of his civil and military talents. Brusoni calls him, "Ministro e Capitano incomparabile nella prudenza, benche talvolta sfortunato per l'altrui condotta, e degno di lunghissima vita per le sue egregie qualità, e sovra tutto per la fedeltà al suo Re, e per la gelosia dell' onore della sua nazione." (*Hist. d' Italia*, lib. xxix.)

army under the Prince of Conti, who had now been reconciled to the Court, and gained at first, in his new command, some important advantages over the Spaniards. But his success was not of long duration, as the few places which had received French garrisons were quickly retaken, and the invading force was compelled by Don John to retire both from Roussillon and Catalonia into Languedoc. After these events, the war on the side of Catalonia became comparatively of inferior importance; and the Netherlands being now the chief sphere of action, it was resolved to send Don John as governor to that country, with a plenitude of power never granted to any of his predecessors.

This distinguished prince determined to pass by sea into Italy, and thence by land to the Netherlands; and his short voyage in the Mediterranean affords a strong proof of the decline of the naval power of Spain. No country, it might be supposed, should have been more careful to maintain its marine in good condition, since the number and distance of its colonies, separated by immeasurable oceans, required powerful fleets to connect them with the mother-country, and safely convey to it their various treasures. A century ago, Spain had been as supreme at sea as on land; her ordinary naval force was 140 gallies, which were the terror both of the Mediterranean and Atlantic. But now, in consequence of the decline of commerce and fisheries on the coast, instead of the numerous squadrons of the Dorias and Mendozas, which were wont to attend the movements of the first great John of Austria, and the Emperor Charles, the present High Admiral of Spain, and favourite son of its monarch, put to sea with three wretched gallies, which, with difficulty, escaped from some Algerine corsairs, and were afterwards nearly shipwrecked on the coast of Africa.¹

¹ Leti, *Vita di Giovanni d'Austria*.

Having landed at Genoa, Don John continued his route to Milan, where he passed a few days in conference with the Marques of Caracena, who was then governor of that Dukedom, but had been appointed to accompany Don John as his lieutenant-general to Flanders, as soon as Fuensaldagna should arrive in Italy.

The Archduke Leopold received his successor at some miles distance from Brussels, and conducted him into that capital with great state and ceremony. He shortly afterwards took his departure for Cologne, accompanied by Don John, to the identical spot where he had advanced to welcome the Spanish Prince to the Netherlands.¹

Don John's arrival was hailed by all ranks of people in these provinces as a sure harbinger and omen of success. This high-minded prince was an associate not unworthy of Condé, and, though far inferior in military genius, he bore in character some resemblance to that hero. He was bold in his plans, and impetuous in their execution—somewhat reckless of consequences, and brave even to desperation.

No sooner had Don John arrived at Brussels, than he entered with the utmost spirit and cordiality into all the daring schemes of Condé. During the forms and ceremonies attendant on his reception as governor of the Netherlands, the French had taken the field ; and Turenne, though his army at present was not very numerous, had invested Valenciennes, a large and well fortified town, lying in the centre of the Spanish strongholds. It was defended by Count Henin with a garrison which did not exceed 2000 soldiers ; but there were 20,000 armed burghesses within the walls, who supplied the place of regular troops. On the approach of the enemy, the governor, who possessed the command of the reservoirs in the vicinity, took the precaution to inundate the adjacent mea-

¹ *Universal History*, vol. xxi. 19. 1.

dows, so that the French were obliged to build a bridge, or rather a dike along them, in order to keep up a communication between the quarters of Mareschal La Ferté, who was stationed on one side of the town, and those of Turenne, who commanded on the other. The besieged made several successful sallies, in one of which the French lost 400 men ; but it was evident that the garrison must soon capitulate unless aided by external assistance ; and its surrender, it was believed, would inevitably be followed by the subjection of the whole province of Hainault. Accordingly, the Prince of Condé and Don John, having determined to advance to its relief, encamped with an army of 20,000 men in the vicinity of the enemies' lines, which were by this time completed. The French generals, from an idea that they had not a sufficient number of troops, had failed to comprehend an important height within their lines of circumvallation. When Condé went to reconnoitre them, he instantly perceived the omission, and fixed on this rising ground as the spot from which to break into their entrenchments. The Spaniards, accordingly, after having distracted the attention of the enemy by a number of false alarms in different directions, made a real and furious assault, during night, on the quarter occupied by Mareschal la Ferté. His lines were forced by the Walloon infantry, animated by the presence of Condé ; and the fortification having been broken down, Don John rushed into the entrenchments at the head of the Spanish cavalry, and caused a tremendous slaughter of his foes. At the very instant of this attack, the Governor of Valenciennes opened the sluices of the Scheldt, which flowed through the town, and sent down by one of them a barge loaded with stones, which was carried with such force against the dike formed by the French, that it beat

part of it down, and thus cut off the communication which it had established between the enemies' opposite quarters. La Ferté could thus receive no succour from his colleague, and was himself taken prisoner with all the troops in his division who had escaped the carnage. Turenne, finding it impracticable to afford him assistance, or restore the fortune of the combat, retired in good order with his baggage and artillery, under the cannon of Quesnoy. Don John and Condé would have pursued him, and might in all probability have rendered their victory complete, if the gate of Valenciennes, on the side where Turenne was stationed, had not unfortunately been walled up, and before it could be thrown open, or the Spanish troops could make the circuit of the town, the Mareschal was beyond the reach of their pursuit; and when they followed him two days afterwards, they found his army drawn up in such admirable order that they did not venture an attack. A French mareschal, however, and 4000 of his men taken prisoners, with nearly as many put to the sword or drowned, and the capture of all the artillery and baggage belonging to that portion of the army commanded by La Ferté, added considerable lustre to the arms of Spain, of late somewhat tarnished; and as this was the first enterprise of Don John in the Netherlands, it greatly signalized the commencement of his administration. That Prince having entered Valenciennes, bestowed on the governor the highest marks of his esteem and approbation, and with his usual liberality distributed ample rewards among the soldiery.

This splendid success, which was at least equivalent to that gained by the French at Arras, in nearly similar circumstances, was quickly followed by the capture of the town of Condé and the relief of Cambray by the Spaniards, after which Turenne re-crossed the Scheldt, and

retreated on Arras, in order to draw his enemies into Artois, and thus save the frontiers of France from the incursions of the Spaniards.

Thus by the address of two able ministers,—Mazarin and De Haro, and the skilful operations of two consummate Generals,—Condé and Turenne, the balance of success between France and Spain was for a time kept nearly equal; and it seemed at this moment difficult to predict which nation might ultimately prevail in the arduous struggle. But when the crafty Mazarin, by sacrificing largely both to the pride and interests of Cromwell, had drawn over England to the assistance of France, the scale of victory hung no longer doubtful.

About this period Great Britain began to assume an importance in the affairs of the Continent, which it had not exercised since the days of Queen Elizabeth. The feeble interposition of James I. with regard to the Palatinate, and the expedition of Buckingham against Rochelle, as also of Cecil to Cadiz in 1625, had tended only to render the English Government contemptible in the eyes of foreigners. After the date of these unsuccessful enterprises, the nation had been entirely engrossed by its civil dissensions, and, among the northern nations, Sweden had taken that commanding attitude, which England, from her strength and situation, was better entitled to assume.

As soon, however, as Cromwell had placed his power at home on a foundation apparently more firm than that of a hereditary monarch, he directed his policy to the foreign and colonial aggrandizement of his country. Immediately before his usurpation, the Thirty Years' War had been terminated by the treaty of Westphalia, and the struggle which still subsisted between France and Spain was the chief object of attention among the Potentates of Europe. Philip IV. had embraced the earliest opportunity of interesting Cromwell in his favour. He

was the first sovereign who had acknowledged the authority of the new republic, and had despatched an ambassador to the Protector: he received in return an English minister at Madrid, and attempted to cajole Cromwell by offering to put him in possession of Calais, Boulogne, and other sea ports of France, after they had been conquered by their united arms.

But these compliances of the King of Spain had little effect in propitiating the stern Protector of England, who conceived that no line of policy could be so advantageous to Britain, as that which might procure for her the possession of the Spanish settlements in South America and the West Indies. Having dictated a peace to Holland, he offered the King of Spain the assistance of the whole strength of his new republic, on condition that he should abolish the Inquisition throughout all his dominions, and allow England the benefit of a free trade to America. Both these conditions, as was no doubt anticipated, having been unequivocally rejected, by the Spanish ambassador replying "his master had two eyes, and that he would have him to put them both out at once,"¹ Cromwell prepared to seize by force the advantages he could not gain by negotiation. Two powerful English fleets were accordingly fitted out. Blake sailed with one squadron to the coast of Spain, in the design of capturing the rich flotillas from South America. The other fleet, after an unsuccessful attack on Hispaniola, bent its course to the valuable Island of Jamaica, which was surrendered without a blow.

It would, perhaps, have been wiser policy in the Protector to have supported the declining condition of Spain against the dangerous ambition of France, or, by maintaining a strict neutrality between these monarchies, to have preserved that balance of power in Europe, on which the greatness and security of England had long so much

¹ Ludlow's *Memoirs*, t. ii.

depended. Britain, however, had now become so considerable a State, that Cromwell probably supposed that her policy ought no longer to be restricted as heretofore, to adjusting the balance betwixt adverse powers ; and he had some reason to expect that, when clothed with the spoils of Spain in the New World, she might occupy the station once held by that kingdom, and become in time the rival, or perhaps the conqueror of France.¹

However this may be, Cromwell, having now so far committed himself with the Crown of Spain, by these unprovoked attacks on its flotillas and colonies, judged it expedient to draw closer his connexion with France, and to oppose also in Europe the interests of a power which he had rendered his irreconcilable enemy. Some advances which he had voluntarily made towards an alliance with France, shortly after his usurpation, and

¹ The alliance which Cromwell formed with France has been generally condemned as impolitic by statesmen and historians, who may, however, in examining this question, have been in some degree influenced by their knowledge of the power which France subsequently attained, and the imbecility into which Spain declined. (See Ludlow's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 107, where it is said, this alliance was to the unspeakable prejudice of all Europe, and this country in particular ; also Hume's *History*, c. lxi.) Sir William Temple, writing some years afterwards, says, " I am of opinion that our present interest, and that of all Christendom besides, is the defence of Spain ; and not only in Flanders, but in all other parts where it shall not be able to defend itself against the power and ambition of France ; and for the reasons which formerly engaged us so firmly to bear up France and Holland against the House of Austria, I think it is our common interest to bear up Spain now against France." Whatever may have been the wisdom of this policy on the part of England, the Duke of York does Cardinal Mazarin the justice to admit " he had been a very ill minister if he had not made that treaty with Cromwell in such a juncture of affairs ; and the King of France would have had just reason to be ill satisfied with him if he had missed that opportunity." *Life of James II*, vol. i. part ii. p. 265.

while his hands were yet stained with the blood of his sovereign, were rejected by the Queen-regent with horror and disgust. A Latin letter, which he subsequently addressed to Louis XIV, in which he subscribed himself *Vester bonus amicus*,¹ did not much tend to conciliate the Court of France. But after Cromwell had for some years held the reins of government, Mazarin, who placed his glory more in the dexterity than in the honour or magnanimity of his measures, despatched a minister to England, who showed all manner of deference and respect to the Usurper, and at length concluded with him a treaty by which a free commerce was established between the kingdoms. Cromwell was to lend his succour to France both by sea and land, and France was to share with him all her conquests.

After the disaster which befel the French arms at Valenciennes during the year 1656, Mazarin, apprehensive concerning the result of the campaign in the Low Countries, renewed this league between France and England, with some additional stipulations in reference to the Netherlands. A considerable auxiliary force was to be despatched to that country from Britain, and the united armies were, in the first instance, to be chiefly employed in the reduction of towns near the sea-coast, which were afterwards to be delivered up to Cromwell.

In pursuance of this treaty, 6000 English troops, commanded by Reynolds, now landed on the continent, and placed themselves under the orders of Turenne. This, indeed, was no great army, but it was composed of veteran fanatics, who had fought for years amid the civil disturbances of England. And when the fortune of war hangs so equally balanced as it was between the French and Spaniards in the Netherlands, the most inconsiderable accession may prove of decisive importance.

¹ Vattel, *Law of Nations*, b. ii. c. 3.

On the other hand, indeed, the Spaniards were joined by the exiled King of England, and his brother the Duke of York. One of the articles insisted on by Cromwell, in his treaty with France, was, that these Princes should be expelled the kingdom, and Mazarin, in order to gratify the usurper, submitted to this humiliating condition. Charles, in consequence, removed his small court to Bruges, and having concluded an alliance with Philip IV, persuaded Lord Muskerry, the colonel of an Irish regiment in the pay of France, to desert his present service, and enter into that of Spain. He also found means to raise four regiments of his Scotch and English subjects who were then in the Netherlands, amounting to 2000 men. This number might have been increased, had it not been for the jealousy of the Spaniards, and their bad faith in failing to perform the stipulations with regard to the pay and equipment of the soldiers. Count Marsin, who was decorated with the order of the garter, and obtained many other marks of favour from Charles, was appointed lieutenant-general of this British force, under the Duke of York. That Prince was desirous to have continued in the French army, and wished to go to serve in Piedmont, which Cromwell would have permitted, though he would not consent that he should remain with the French troops in the Netherlands. But his Royal Brother sent peremptory orders that he should join him in Flanders;¹ and the Duke, who, while in the French army, had obtained the esteem of Turenne, now gained, when opposed to him, considerable credit by his valour and military conduct.

The accession, however, of British force thus obtained by the Spaniards, was by no means equivalent to the English veterans, who had so formidably augmented the army of Turenne. Indeed, if we may believe Ludlow, "it was

¹ *Life of King James II*, t. i. p. 271.

confessed by all present, that the English, who took part with the French, behaved themselves with more bravery than any in the field; but it was observed, that those of the Cavalier-party who had joined with the Spaniards behaved themselves worst.”¹

Accordingly, from the period of the junction of the English force under Reynolds with the French, the Spanish arms experienced the most decisive reverses. Montmedy and St Venant were captured, and the Spaniards were compelled to raise the siege of Ardres.

In virtue of the treaty between France and England, by which the troops were to be early employed against the sea-ports, Turenne found himself obliged to march towards the coast. He first laid siege to Mardyke, a harbour of Flanders about four miles west from Dunkirk, which surrendered in five days after it had been invested. Mardyke, however, was the only maritime place which the season of the year permitted him to attack. Soon after its capture, the troops on both sides retired into winter-quarters. Reynolds, who commanded Cromwell's troops when they first landed in the Netherlands, did not long remain in that situation. Towards the close of the campaign, he had several interviews with the Duke of York, and it was suspected in his army, not without reason, that he had made an offer of his future services to aid the royal cause in England. Some of the Republican officers whom he commanded, gave intimation to Cromwell of what they had observed. Reynolds set sail for England, to justify himself from these accusations. But he perished, by the wreck of his vessel on Goodwin Sands,² and, before the opening of the next campaign, he was succeeded in the command by Lockhart, a Scotchman, who had at one time been envoy from the English Commonwealth to the Court of France.

¹ Memoirs, t. ii. p. 109.

² *Life of James II*, t. i.

Cromwell, who always had his eye fixed on the possession of Dunkirk, required from Mazarin, with much arrogance, that the French army, according to agreement, should advance to besiege it at the opening of the campaign in 1658. There was much hazard, however, in attacking this town (the most important fortress in Flanders,) without having previously occupied Gravelines, Bergues, Furnes, and the other towns by which it was surrounded, and from which the Spaniards might, in their turn, have besieged the French lines formed round Dunkirk. On the other hand, to commence with the siege of these places, would have apprized the Spaniards of the hostile designs against Dunkirk, and given them time to strengthen it with an increased garrison, and additional fortifications. But there was no evading the demand of Cromwell; and Mazarin was at length constrained to issue orders to Turenne that he should make preparations for the siege of Dunkirk, but with as much secrecy as possible.

In the Netherlands, the fortresses are so thickly set, that one party may easily menace a number at a time, and the other not know which is really to be attacked. By the feints Turenne made, and by some intelligence the Spaniards received, and which, as Lord Clarendon remarks, they always purchased at a great price, to deceive themselves, their generals were fully persuaded that Turenne meditated an attempt on Cambray or Hesdin. They could not believe that the French durst venture to besiege Dunkirk without reducing the surrounding forts, although the King of England assured them he had ascertained by his letters from London, and by others which he had found means to intercept, that their object must be Dunkirk, and though its governor, the Marquis de Leyde, the best officer they had in their service, came to head-

quarters at Brussels, to announce the certainty of an attack, and to solicit supplies. With the usual infatuation which attended the Spanish counsels, they discredited all his assertions, and left him almost without provisions or ammunition, and with a garrison of only 1800 men, to defend a fortress, the main strength of which consisted in outworks, which were easily accessible, and of great extent.¹

Within three or four days of its governor's return from his fruitless mission, the French army appeared before Dunkirk. Turenne found some difficulty in investing it,—the surrounding country being so inundated as to cut off his communication with Mardyke. He proceeded, however, to draw his lines of circumvallation: beginning at the sea-shore, they passed through the Dunes, which are hillocks formed of sand heaped up by the wind from the coast, and then beaten and consolidated by the rain and vapours, so as to bear infantry, or even cavalry, like firm ground. The circumvallation then crossed the canals of Mardyke, and joined the shore at the opposite side of the town from that at which it had commenced. A strong stockade protected the strand, which was left dry at low tides, and a fleet of twenty English vessels blocked up the harbour, in order to prevent the besieged from receiving supplies by sea.

The French had completed their lines, and rendered it impossible to throw any succours into the town, before the Spaniards, whose army was much dispersed, had begun their march to its relief. If Don John committed a mistake in at first delaying too long to send assistance to Dunkirk, he was guilty of a more fatal error in at length hastening to its succour with too great rapidity, and before his artillery had been brought up, or all his troops collected. As soon as he received intelligence of the block-

¹ *Life of James II*, t. i. p. 337.

ade of Dunkirk, he called a council of war for the 11th of June, at the place which he had appointed as the rendezvous for the army. At this meeting, besides Don John, there were present the Prince of Condé, the Marques Caracena, the French Mareschal Hocquincourt, who had thrown off his allegiance to his sovereign, and the Prince de Ligne. As soon as they were set, Don John informed them that they had been called together to consult on the best method of relieving Dunkirk. He explained to them the present condition of the place, which was such as to require a speedy succour; and after having enlarged on these heads, he proposed that the army should march, and encamping among the Dunes, as near as possible to the enemy's lines, should watch a favourable opportunity of attacking them. After this proposition there was a long silence, and no one rising to oppose it, Don John next called their consideration to the time and manner of advancing to the Dunes. It was resolved that, on the following morning, all the general officers should proceed with 4000 horse to view the ground, and pitch a camp for the remainder of the troops, which were ordered to march on the day after the cavalry.¹

At the time appointed, the Spanish army encamped

¹ *Life of James II.* t. i. p. 339. The resolutions of this Spanish council of war proved so unfortunate, that those who were present at it subsequently endeavoured to clear themselves of having given advice, or even having consented to the plan which was then adopted. A Relation was printed and published by a friend of the Marques de Caracena, in which the author endeavoured to lay the whole blame of that resolution on Don John, and there was an answer to it, wherein Don John was justified. "In this reply," says the Duke of York, who had read it, "it was made to appear, that in case the Marques had so been pleased, he might easily have hindered that march, by only declaring himself against it, he having practised that very way in things of far less consequence than this, for his power was such that he had but to say he thought it not for

on the Dunes, at the distance of about two miles from the enemy's lines of circumvallation. Its Generals were in the firm persuasion that, as at Valenciennes, the French would continue on the defensive, and abide an attack. Don John accordingly resolved to remain till his artillery and other essential articles came up, and then to assault the entrenchments at his own slow conveniency. But Turenne penetrated his designs, and he also received intelligence of his present deficiency in cannon and ammunition. He therefore determined, instead of waiting to be attacked within his lines, to move out immediately, and give the Spaniards battle. Though embarrassed by the apprehension of sallies from the town of Dunkirk, which obliged him to leave behind a considerable force to check them, he marched forth to the combat the very morning after Don John had encamped in his vicinity.

Meanwhile, though both the Prince of Condé and Duke of York foresaw the event, and gave warning of its approach, the Spaniards continued lulled in a false security. "While the French," says the Duke, "were preparing to come out upon us next morning, we took no measures in our army as if any enemy were to be expected, for when the orders were given in our camp at night, there was no prohibition made to our horse of going out to forage, as is usual in the like cases. But they were permitted to go abroad as if no enemy had been near us. And happening myself to be at supper that night with the Marques de Caracena, and the company falling into discourse on the subject of our coming thither, and what the French might probably attempt against us, I said that, for my own particular, I liked not our being there on such terms as we were then, having no lines nor any the King's service to put in execution such a resolution, and Don John must acquiesce in it: in Spanish it is more strongly expressed, *no sera de servicio del Rey.*"

thing to cover us from the enemy ; and that it was my opinion if they fell not upon us that very night, I was confident they would give us battle the next morning : To which both the Marques and Don Estevan de Gamarra answered, that it was what they desired : to which I replied, that I knew M. de Turenne so well, as to assure them they should have that satisfaction."

Even on the following morning, when the Prince of Condé and the Duke, who had been out reconnoitring, announced that they saw the whole army coming forth from their lines, Don John would hardly believe it, maintaining that the design was only to drive in the Spanish horse-guards.

When, at length, there was no longer room to doubt of the enemy's intentions, it was resolved to await the attack in the present positions, the Spaniards having the advantage of the ground, which must have been lost had they advanced to meet the foe. Don John drew up his army, however, in a manner totally different from that in which they ought to have been ranged, according to the opinion of Condé, who foretold, it is said, to some friends around him, the inevitable result of the ensuing conflict.

Higher political interests had not for a long while been at stake in Europe. The sovereignty of the Netherlands was to be decided, and the final result of a 40 years' war seemed about to be determined by the two hostile armies which were now drawn up on the Dunes adjacent to the east side of Dunkirk, and on the borders of the sea. The Spanish foot did not exceed 7000 : the cavalry ought to have been 8000, but, at the time, they were scarcely half so strong,—great numbers of them having gone out to forage, and not having returned till after the battle was over. In consequence of this unfortunate diminution, the Spanish force was somewhat inferior to that brought against it. The right wing, which consisted of native Spa-

niards, and stretched to the sea-shore, was commanded by John of Austria, while the left, comprehending his own battalions, was led by the Prince of Condé. The Walloon and German regiments, supported by those troops which had been levied by the King of England, were placed in the centre, under the orders of the Marques de Caracena. Both parties occupied the highest of those sandy hillocks which lay within their range. The Spaniards, all along their line, appeared dispirited and disheartened, and, it is said, that the French soldiers from their aspect predicted their defeat. The combat commenced with an attack by the French left, consisting partly of Cromwell's troops, on the Spanish right. On this occasion the English were led by General Morgan—their commander Lockhart, being confined by indisposition, according to some accounts, and, according to others, being stationed, for some reason, on the French left. These regiments highly distinguished themselves in their attempt to gain the hillocks on which the Spaniards were posted; and for some time so close was the engagement, that the pikes of the combatants were crossed with each other. At length the English completely succeeded in driving their opponents from the heights which they occupied. The guns, too, of the British ships which had approached as near the shore as possible, had begun to open on the Spaniards as soon as they were formed in battle array. The tide likewise receding left their extreme right unprotected on the strand; and the French, availing themselves of this advantage, attempted to turn them. The Spanish right wing gave way whenever it perceived that it was about to be taken in flank. When it fled, the English immediately planted a flag on the highest of the Dunes, as a signal for attack all over the line. The centre seeing the right wing routed, quitted the field almost without a blow. Don John remained nearly alone at the scene of action,

fighting on foot with a pike in his hand. When he at last left the Dunes, he collected the fugitives, and reunited them on the road towards Oudenarde. Meanwhile, Condé was performing prodigies of valour on the left. The wing he commanded was about to follow the example of the centre and right, but Condé rallied the soldiers, and disputed the victory long after he was informed that Don John had been put to flight. He even attempted to break both through the right wing of the French and their entrenchments, in order to throw himself into Dunkirk. He had two horses killed under him, and must have been slain or taken, but for the magnanimous devotion of Luxembourg, Coligni, and a few others who fell on the field of battle, or allowed themselves to be taken captive, in order to facilitate his escape.

The Duke of York, while severely censuring the tactics of the Spanish commanders, has done ample justice to the personal bravery of their general officers during the whole of this fatal day. "I shall not give," he says, "a particular account of what was done in this engagement by our general officers, because I have received no particular information of it: Only this I know in gross, that all of them behaved themselves bravely, excepting Don Estevan de Gamarra; the rest of them so far exposing their persons, that they escaped not without great hazard. For the Prince of Condé and myself, I have already given a relation of our fortunes: And concerning Don John, I have been informed that he staid so long, that he was in danger of being taken; and the Marques de Caracena was so near it, that before he got out from among the sand-hills, a horseman of the enemy's had laid hold on his bridle, but the Marques at the same time striking him over the face with his cane (having nothing else in his hand), so stunned him that he let go his hold, and so the Marques had leisure to escape. As to what con-

cerns the Prince de Ligne, I have already mentioned how handsomely he behaved himself when he charged; but how he got off, I am not certain. But for Don Estevan de Gamarra, who commanded as Mestre de Camp-General, and was at the head of the foot, he went away *at first*, and never stopt till he came to Nieupoort." The Duke also bears favourable testimony to the conduct of the inferior officers of infantry, but those of the cavalry do not appear to have fulfilled their duty so bravely.

In this disastrous battle, the Spaniards had about 2000 men killed and wounded, and they lost 3000 prisoners. As for artillery, they had none to lose, the train not having come up before the action. The defeat was more fatal and decisive even than that of Rocroy, and it tarnished the military fame of their soldiers, that, at Rocroy, they were conquered by Condé, and that at Dunes Condé himself was vanquished when he fought on the side of Spain. The loss of the French was quite inconsiderable. Turenne, in his despatches, modestly attributed his victory to the manoeuvre of the Count de Castelnau, who, without his direction, had, with his cavalry, attacked the flank of the Spanish right on the strand.

This was the first reverse of fortune which had befallen John of Austria. But he was vanquished by a superior force, and by the great Turenne; and he shared the defeat with the Prince of Condé. Complete as his discomfiture had been, he might still have transmitted to posterity the character of a skilful general and noble-minded prince, had he died on the sands of Dunes; but he lived to be vanquished by the Portuguese, and sully his name by miserable cabals against a worthless Queen and an intriguing Jesuit.

Turenne did not think fit to pursue his flying enemies to any great distance. When he had beaten them, he marched back into his lines, and carried on the siege of

Dunkirk. That town continued to hold out for some days after the battle of Dunes, and would have resisted longer, had it not been for the death of its spirited governor the Marques de Leyde. Having resolved to retake the counterscarp, which had been occupied by the enemy, he appeared at the attack of this work, armed with a cuirass. An Italian regiment having fled from the combat which ensued, the Marques reproached its men with cowardice, and wished again to lead them on. A soldier belonging to it upbraided his commander with his timid precaution, in guarding his person with armour, while his troops had no such protection. The Marques immediately threw off his cuirass, and advanced to the assault with a halberd in his hand. He was almost immediately wounded on the shoulder by a musket-shot, and forced to retire. Though anxious to conceal his absence from the troops, he was quickly followed by them in disorderly flight. He died some days subsequently, deserving, according to contemporary historians, the rare eulogy, that he was equally regretted by the master whom he served, and the troops which he commanded. After his death, the garrison became dispirited, while the citizens, on their part, were desirous to be delivered from the miseries of a siege, and to be restored to their commerce, which the English fleet, and the garrison of Mardyke, completely intercepted. The governor who succeeded the Marquis, having received discretionary instructions not to wait till the last extremity before he surrendered, at length capitulated on favourable terms.¹ The place, according to agreement, was given up to Cromwell, who, almost at the moment when he was gratified by the attainment of this object of his ambition, expired amid those disquiets, and cares and tremors, which are inseparable, at the latter end, from tyranny and usurpation.

¹ Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrénées*.

Though Turenne had allowed the Spaniards to retreat unmolested to Furnes, and afterwards to Nieuport, it was to be dreaded that, now when he had possessed himself of Dunkirk, he would adopt measures for their pursuit. Don John, accordingly, called one of his *juntas* or councils of war, in which he proposed to take up a position along the canal between Nieuport and Dixmude, and endeavour to defend it. Those who spoke after him, agreed to this plan, or did not oppose it. But the Duke of York, when it came to his turn, delivered a decided opinion against so hazardous a scheme, because there was not a sufficient strength of foot to maintain the post against a victorious army. He also represented the miserable condition to which they should be reduced if that pass were forced, for then it would be too late to think of securing their principal towns, since the enemy would have the choice of attacking, and also of mastering such of them as they pleased. He therefore recommended that the army should disperse, and that its different divisions should throw themselves into the great towns of the Netherlands which still remained to the Spaniards. On coming out from this council, the Prince of Condé asked the Duke, how he could thus venture to contradict Don John; to which he answered—because he had no desire to be forced to run away again, as he had done so lately at Dunkirk.

The opinion of the Duke of York was ultimately followed. His Royal Highness and the Marques of Caracena remained at Nieuport with 2000 infantry and as many cavalry. Don John with a considerable force went to Bruges. The Prince of Condé, who, during his exile had drunk deep of the bitter cup of mortification, retired to Ostend with a body of men sufficient for the defence of that strong place, and the Prince de Ligne, with the remainder, shut himself up in Ypres.

Although a good many of the fugitives, and even prisoners, taken at the battle of Dunes, contrived soon after to join their standards, the Spanish force was not sufficient to protect and garrison all the larger towns. The surrender of Dunkirk to the French was quickly followed by that of Bruges, Furnes, Gravelines, and Oudenarde. Turenne accidentally fell in, near Ypres, with the troops under the Prince de Ligne, and having totally defeated his band, pursued it to that town, which he took in a few days. "This blow," says the Duke of York, "proved of worse consequence to the Spaniards than the defeat they received near Dunkirk, as it gave the French an opportunity of taking many other towns which otherwise they durst not have attempted."

Soon after these disastrous events, Don John received orders to return to Spain without delay. This command he reluctantly obeyed, and the Marques of Caracena, who had nominally acted as his lieutenant-general during the last campaign, but had in fact been a viceroy over him, was appointed governor of the Netherlands in his room.¹

¹ Ramsay, *Vie de Turenne*. Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV.* *Life of James II.*

CHAPTER XI.

PEACE OF THE PYRENEES.

————— Bellum. ———
Pax rursum. HORACE.

THE fatal battle of Dunes placed Philip in a situation of difficulty for which he had no longer any resource. The Netherlands were irretrievably lost, as new armies could be no longer raised or equipped for their recovery. And the misfortunes which occurred in Italy, as also on the frontiers of Portugal, during the period of these disasters in the Low Countries, compelled him to turn his thoughts on peace, and to prepare himself for receiving it on whatever terms France might be disposed to dictate.

Spain had long since lost that ascendancy and influence she had once possessed among the native princes of Italy, and of late years she had begun to tremble for the continuance of her dominion in Naples and Milan. She had relied much, for the re-establishment of her preponderance, on the talents of the Count of Fuensaldagna, who had been sent to Italy at the time when Don John was appointed to the government of the Netherlands, and who, whatever might be his want of vigour in the field, was noted for his skill in the intrigues of the cabinet. But Spain was in too tottering a state to support her ancient alliances, and the Houses of the Italian princes seemed to dread that she might crush them by her fall.

Immediately after his entrance on his government,

Fuensaldagna had the mortification to lose Valenza, one of the strongest places in the Milaneze, which surrendered to a French army under the Duke of Mercœur. The dominions of the Duke of Mantua, the only ally of Spain, were ravaged by the enemy, without the possibility of resistance, and that prince himself, in consequence, withdrew from his unpropitious alliance. A combined French and Italian army, under command of the Duke of Modena, who had also renounced his ancient union with Spain, advanced within sight of the city of Milan ; and so alarmed was Fuensaldagna by its approach, that he quitted his capital, and retired to a strong position beyond it, leaving the most fertile part of the dutchy to the mercy of the foe.¹

While matters were in this situation, Mazarin addressed letters to the Count of Fuensaldagna, in which he pointed out to him the necessity of the Spaniards either preparing for irreconcilable hostility with France, or at once accepting of peace on the conditions that had been repeatedly offered. These despatches were transmitted by Fuensaldagna to the Court of Madrid ;² and he, at the same time, represented, from himself, that affairs in Italy were irretrievable except by a peace,—that the Dutchy of Milan was on the point of being lost,—that its internal strength was completely exhausted,—and that to draw troops from the two Sicilies, was to expose them to constant hazard,—that the Emperor was bound by treaties to afford no farther succours to the Spanish cause in Italy,—and that France was now negotiating a league, offensive and defensive, with the Republic of Venice, the conclusion of which would be the term to the Spanish dominion in Lombardy.³

Though the Count of Fuensaldagna had been unsuc-

¹ Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV.* p. 476.

² *Id.* p. 478.

³ *Universal History*, t. xxi. b. xix. c. 1.

cessful as a general, he still retained his credit at the Court of Madrid, where he was considered as its most able minister and diplomatist. His alarming remonstrances tended greatly to shake the obstinacy of the Spaniards, and to induce Philip to renew the negotiations which he had always broken off when the most distant gleam of success appeared in any quarter of the horizon. But the events which were at this moment occurring on the frontiers of Portugal, probably did more than even the representations of Fuensaldagna or the battle of Dunes, to effect a pacification, as they passed under the eye of Luis de Haro himself.

King John of Portugal being of a pacific and somewhat indolent disposition, had never, since his accession, made any great efforts to carry his arms far into the Spanish territories, and had for some time kept no more forces on foot than he conceived sufficient to secure his own frontiers from attack. On both sides, while the campaigns were marked by monstrous excesses, they were disgraced by the deplorable imbecility of the commanders, who seem to have been utterly ignorant of the first principles in the art of war. But after the death of John IV, in 1656, the Queen Regent, who was a woman of extraordinary vigilance and spirit, abandoned that defensive policy on which the nation had hitherto acted. Availing herself of the multifarious embarrassments of Spain, a considerable army had recently, by her command, crossed the frontier and laid siege to Badajoz. Philip entrusted the command of the forces destined to repel this invasion to his Prime Minister Luis de Haro. But he could not have selected a worse general. Though a skilful statesman, Don Luis was destitute of military talents or experience, and seems even to have been deficient in personal courage. Some successes, which, however, were not owing to his skill or conduct, signalized the

commencement of the campaign. The Portuguese were compelled to raise the siege of Badajoz, and a portion of their army was cut off in its retreat. Don Luis having pursued them to a considerable distance, seized on some important frontier positions, and then, with an army of 20,000 men, invested Elvas, the reduction of which might probably have led to that of Lisbon itself. But the imminent hazard to which the country was exposed,—the horror entertained by the Portuguese at the Castilian yoke,—the fear of being treated by their conquerors as revolted slaves,—and, above all, the eloquence and courage of the Queen, reanimated the exertions of the nation, and in a few days an army was raised, which, however, was more formidable from its antipathy to the Spaniards than its numbers or discipline. This force proceeded to the relief of Elvas under the orders of the Count of Castanheda. From his ignorance of the art of war, Don Luis had not yet been able to render himself master of that fortress, and he now permitted his army to be surprised, within its own lines, by the enemy. Owing to the bad disposition which he made of his troops, and other numerous faults which he committed during the engagement, he was totally and signally defeated. In this combat, the courage of the Spanish General shone as little as his talents. He viewed the conflict only from a distance, and was one of the first to fly when the fortune of war began to declare against him. The field of battle, which he thus quitted, was covered with 4000 of his best troops killed or wounded, and he left in the hands of the enemy 1000 prisoners, among whom were four of the *Grandeos* of Spain, the whole artillery, baggage, and military chest, the standard of Charles V, and his own strong box, which was full of important state documents. His second in command rallied the fugitives, and, by fortifying a post in the rear, made a good retreat. But Don Luis never

halted till he reached Badajoz, whence he set out for Madrid. He was cordially received by his good natured master on his ignominious return to the capital from the unsuccessful military career which he had run; but in consequence of his defeat, that monarch became fully convinced, that unless he concluded a peace with France, he could have no chance of regaining the crown of Portugal, which was still the chief object of his wishes and policy.

The way to a pacification between France and Spain was already smoothed by many preliminary, though hitherto fruitless negociations, that had from time to time been opened between the two nations, during the course of the long warfare in which they were engaged. As far back as the year 1636, Pope Urban the VIII. lamenting the contests by which Christendom was torn, exhorted the Kings of France and Spain to lay aside their animosities. He indeed prevailed on them to agree that their respective envoys should meet at Cologne, in order to treat of peace, and his Holiness had even despatched a legate to preside as mediator at the conference. But the ministers of the two nations, being in fact at this time but little inclined to an adjustment of differences, opposed so much delay and so many obstacles to the proposed congress, that the Apostolic Nuncio, after long awaiting, at Cologne, the expected arrival of the plenipotentiaries, at length quitted it in despair. Subsequently to this period, Louis XIII. had at different times seriously meant to give peace to Spain, but his intentions were always frustrated by his ambitious minister Richelieu, who, in his instructions, given a few weeks before his death to d'Estrades, says, "Qu'il n'y a point d'autre moyen de faire une paix sure, qu'en la faisant à des conditions si cuisantes pour l'Espagne, qu'elle apprehende de rentrer en guerre, de peur de recevoir un pareil traitement."¹

¹ Aubery, *Mem. de Richelieu*, t. ii. p. 844.

In the year 1644, negotiations were again opened under the auspices of Pope Urban and the Venetian Republic. The ministers of the belligerent nations assembled at Osnaburgh and Munster. Philip IV. entrusted the chief management of this treaty to the Count Pegnaranda, at that time accounted one of the ablest diplomats in Europe. The disinclination, however, of Spain to peace on the one hand, with the exorbitant demands of France on the other, and the hopes still entertained by the Emperor that he might obtain more favourable terms by the continued prosecution of hostilities, retarded the proceedings of the congress, or confined them to mere disputes on points of form and ceremonial; and during the three following years, the negotiations ever varied with the fluctuations of the war. At first the demands of the King of Spain were as arrogant as if his arms had been successful, and as if he held the same place in Europe as his ancestor Charles V. after the battle of Muhlberg,—professing that he only agreed to any pacification whatever, because the Queen-regent and Louis XIV. had no share or blame in the commencement of the war. At length, however, the Count Pegnaranda received instructions from his court to accede to the terms proposed by France. But that minister, influenced by a personal antipathy to Mazarin, and by the hope of concluding a separate peace with Holland, which might altogether save the necessity of a treaty with France, still continued to protract the negotiations. The Dutch wished to preserve their conquests in Brazil and the East Indies, and their interests there were not very reconcilable with those of the King of Portugal, whom the French had taken under their protection. Pegnaranda at length, as we have already seen, by alarming the Dutch with fear of the French power in the Netherlands,—by alluring them with com-

mercial privileges, and by paying, as has been alleged, a sum of 500,000 gueldres to the Prince of Orange,¹ succeeded in concluding a separate peace, by which Spain,—now too happy to receive as allies those whom she had so long treated as rebels,—acknowledged the independence of the new republic, and permitted the States to retain their conquests in the Netherlands, with all their colonial acquisitions. Having accomplished this master stroke of policy by the address of its ambassador, the Court of Madrid, now placed in a far more advantageous situation, and encouraged by the prospect of civil dissensions in France, was no longer desirous to accept of peace on the hard conditions proposed by the enemy. The appearances of negotiation, however, were still kept up, and of the fifty-three articles under discussion, forty-eight had been agreed on. But these were chiefly points of form or of undoubted rights established by ancient treaties; and, with regard to the remaining five, which touched on grounds of recent difference, or which had emerged during the war,—Lorraine, Portugal, the restitution of Casal, and the occupation by the French of certain fortresses in the Netherlands and Catalonia,—there was little prospect of an adjustment. Indeed the Spanish plenipotentiary never entered seriously or with good faith into the consideration or discussion of these disputable articles; and, during the subsequent period of his residence at the congress, his real efforts were solely directed to break off the negotiations between France and the Emperor. In this object, however, he entirely failed; for, whatever might have been the inclination of Ferdinand to follow the line of policy pointed out to him from Madrid, the continued disasters he experienced, and the resolution of his allies among the Germanic body to conclude a separate peace, compelled him to reject the solicitations of Spain; and the tedious

¹ De Witt's *Political Maxims*, part iii. c. 4.

conferences at Munster, were at length followed by the conclusion of the celebrated Peace of Westphalia.

Though Spain was thus excluded from the general pacification, the hope of an advantageous treaty was, about two years afterwards, again opened up to her. The Duke of Orleans, seeing his country torn both by foreign war and by intestine dissensions, resolved, if possible, to deliver it, at least from the former scourge. He, therefore, privately, and without the knowledge of either the Queen-regent or of Mazarin, opened a communication with the Arch-Duke Leopold, at that time Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. This negotiation was far advanced, and was on the eve of being concluded, when the Duke suddenly broke it off, from the mere fickleness and inconsistency which marked his character and all his proceedings. The proposed terms were not unfavourable to Spain, but she never could have reposed in security on the continuance of a peace concluded without the concurrence of the Queen-regent, who was then the sole legitimate depositary of the regal power.

When, in the following year, Mazarin was driven from Paris, and forced to seek shelter in Cologne, he forwarded from his place of exile a proposal to Philip, that he should name plenipotentiaries with whom terms of peace might be adjusted. But the King replied, that it was not consistent with the dignity of Spain to treat with a disgraced and banished minister, whose proceedings the government of France might afterwards disavow. The true motive, however, that prompted this rejection by the Court of Madrid, was the hope now entertained of profiting by the dissensions which agitated the hostile kingdom. For the same reason, the conferences, commenced at Stenai with Turenne and the Dutchess of Longueville, led to no result. In consequence of the success of his arms in Catalonia and Flanders during the ensuing campaign, Phi-

lip congratulated himself on having refused the proposals of Mazarin. But he had soon reason bitterly to regret that he had not availed himself of the opportunity presented to him, of concluding a peace on terms more favourable than had been hitherto submitted for his acceptance.

In the year 1655, Pope Alexander VII. offered his mediation between the two crowns. While Cardinal Chigi, this Pontiff had acted as Pope's legate at Munster, previous to the Peace of Westphalia, and he was in consequence well acquainted with the claims and policy of the belligerent Powers. But Mazarin, believing his Holiness to be wholly devoted to the interests of the House of Austria, was jealous of his interposition, and the negotiation broke off on some preliminary differences with regard to the place where the congress should assemble. Mazarin, however, now resolved to bring the matter to a final issue, by despatching a minister to the Court of Madrid, entrusted with full powers to conclude a treaty. It may appear singular, that Mazarin, while the arms of France were everywhere victorious abroad, and internal tranquillity had now been completely restored, should have been so intent on giving peace to a fallen enemy. But, at this period, the French finances were in a great measure exhausted. Richelieu and Mazarin, however expert in the foreign department, had not the financial skill of Sully or Colbert. Besides, the grand object of Mazarin's present policy was the union of his master with the Infanta Maria Theresa, by which he hoped eventually to secure for the Bourbon line the sovereignty of Spain; and, in order to obtain a match so desirable, he was eager, in the mean time, to reconcile all national differences, and to make far larger sacrifices than could otherwise have been expected in the relative condition of the two belligerent nations.

In prosecution of this favourite project, Mazarin despatched the Marquis de Lionne to Madrid, with powers conceived in very brief but explicit terms. This minister passed through Spain in the disguise of a travelling merchant;¹ and having reached Madrid, had several conferences with Luis de Haro during three months. But a preliminary difficulty occurred with regard to the Prince of Condé. The Spanish court made it a point of honour to stipulate that he should be restored to all the honours, employments and privileges, which he had enjoyed previous to his revolt, and the French minister was equally obstinate in refusing such concessions to a rebellious subject. It seems probable, however, that this obstacle might have been surmounted, had Philip at once consented to the proposition concerning the union between his daughter and the young King of France. But the hand of the princess was, at this time, also solicited by the King of Hungary, who soon afterwards became Emperor of Germany, and reigned nearly half a century by the name of Leopold I. In the eyes of the king and nation, this prince had the advantage of being a member of the House of Austria, whereas Louis XIV. was of a rival family and country, which had done all in their power to humble and reduce the Spanish monarchy.

The Emperor, too, as the price of this matrimonial alliance, offered to declare war anew against France, and to send at once 60,000 men into the Netherlands.² Philip, divided between partiality to the Austrian family and the duty he owed his subjects, to whom peace was now requisite, and could only be obtained by bestowing the princess on the King of France, remained for a long time in a state of the most painful irresolution; but

¹ Aubery, *Hist. du Cardinal Mazarin*, t. ii. p. 515.

² Courchetet, *Histoire du Traité de Paix de Pyrenées*, t. i. p. 325.

at length, after much hesitation, he gave as his answer to the French minister, that he could not bring himself to consent to a match which was at once so advantageous and so dangerous. He did not, however, judge it expedient to preclude all future hopes of peace, by uniting his daughter to the King of Hungary.

Mazarin, in order to put an end to this procrastinating policy on the part of the King of Spain, openly set on foot a negociation for a matrimonial union between his master and a daughter of the Duke of Savoy. To give the greater publicity to the proceedings, and alarm Philip with the fear of being cut off from his last chance of peace, it was resolved that the Courts of France and Savoy should meet during the following winter at Lyons, where, as arranged, they in fact assembled, and passed the time in those amusements and festivals which might be supposed the harbingers of royal nuptials. Louis was, or pretended to be, captivated by the Princess, who possessed considerable beauty and accomplishments. This stratagem had the desired effect. Philip, though not blinded by it, perceived the eager desire of the Court of France to accomplish this union with the Infanta, and he was aware, that, in consideration of it, he might receive much more favourable terms of peace than from any successes which his arms were now likely to obtain. The recent birth too of a son, Prince Philip Prospero, who now became the heir to the Spanish monarchy, removed one obstacle to the French alliance, since there would no longer be a certain or immediate prospect of the dreaded union of the crowns by a marriage between Louis XIV. and the Infanta.

Accordingly, the King of Spain despatched to Lyons one of his ministers, called Pimentel, who had nominally full powers from Madrid, but was directed to consult the Count of Fuensaldagna on any points of difficulty or im-

portance not provided for in his instructions. On his arrival, Pimentel did not rashly offer the hand of the Infanta, but merely hinted that this precious gift should depend on the easy terms of peace which France might be willing to grant. The Queen-dowager of France, who was earnestly desirous to terminate the destructive war in which the two nations had been so long embroiled, and was anxious to behold her niece seated on the throne which she herself had so unhappily filled during the life of the late sovereign, contributed her best efforts to promote a treaty of peace. Mazarin was somewhat unwilling to arrest the successful career of the French arms in the Netherlands; but he owed a deep debt of gratitude to the Queen, and he found that he must expect an irreconcilable breach with her Majesty, unless he consented to forward an object which she had so long and passionately desired to accomplish. The recent death, too, of Cromwell, with whom he had concerted many projects, and whose alliance was particularly serviceable in the low state of the French marine, had much perplexed him. It had deranged all his measures; and, in particular, had rendered a continuance of success in the Netherlands more doubtful. He was thus, at length, disposed to believe that, besides the advantage of gratifying the Queen, he should best consult the future interests of France, and provide for his own security, by promoting a peace with Spain.¹ Accordingly, he no sooner heard a hint of the marriage with the Infanta, than he relaxed as to all the other conditions in which he had previously persisted. He now agreed to restore Valenza in Italy, Rosas in Catalonia, and many of the recent acquisitions in the Netherlands, which he formerly insisted on retaining; and he offered an amnesty, with a restitution of his patrimonial estates, though not of his governments, to the Prince of

¹ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*.

Condé. The ardour and caresses of Louis were quickly changed into cold civility towards the Princess of Savoy. Mazarin, as if in consternation, explained to her mother the Dutchess, that the most unexpected and disconcerting proposals had just arrived from Spain, which it would require all their united wisdom and policy to evade. The Savoy family having been at length talked away from Lyons, a suspension of hostilities between France and Spain was agreed on for an indefinite period; and the Court having returned to Paris, it was arranged that the prime ministers of the two nations, Mazarin and Luis de Haro, should meet as early as possible at the foot of the Pyrenees, in order to discuss and finally settle the conditions of peace.¹

An obstacle, however, arose from an unexpected quarter. Louis himself had never evinced any inclination for this union with the Infanta; and it was soon discovered that his repugnance to it was occasioned by the violent passion which he had conceived for Maria Mancini, one of the nieces of Cardinal Mazarin. Though not beautiful, her accomplishments and agreeable lively manners had made a deep impression on the susceptible heart of the young King. The Cardinal being apprized of this attachment about the time he quitted Paris on his journey towards the Pyrenees, sent his niece with her sisters to a convent in Brouage, a town in Saintonge, about seventeen miles south of Rochelle. Louis was at this time so submissive to the will of the Cardinal, that he offered no opposition to her removal, though she parted from him shedding many tears, and pronouncing these well-known words of such weighty import, “Ah sir! you are a King—you love me—and I leave you.” From the nunnery in which she was placed, she carried on a constant correspondence

¹ Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV.* Courchetet, *Hist. du Paix de Pyrenées.*

with Louis, who entertained serious intentions, by espousing her, to raise her to the throne of France. It was much to be dreaded that this impolitic amour might prevent the King from agreeing to the marriage with the Infanta ; or that a knowledge of it having reached the Court of Madrid, might indispose the Princess and her family to the alliance. Mazarin, though it has been suspected that he was at first not disinclined to a match which would have formed so proud an event in his family, yet, seeing the repugnance of the Queen-mother to such a degrading connection, pretended at least, to be infinitely hurt and annoyed. On his journey to the rendezvous at the Pyrenees, he wrote the most urgent letters to the King, imploring him to conquer this unfortunate inclination. He also addressed letters of the utmost severity to his niece, upbraiding her with her imprudent conduct, and recalling her, by every argument in his power, to a sense of duty. The correspondence, however, between the lovers still continued ; and though the Queen had sufficient influence to prevent her son from proceeding, as he had proposed, to Brouage, in order to visit Mademoiselle Mancini, she was obliged to permit an interview at St Jean d'Angely, through which the Court passed in one of its progresses. After this meeting, the passion of the King became more vehement than ever. He passed the whole day in writing letters to his mistress, and reading those which he received from her. At length, however, reflection, and the cogent arguments applied by the Cardinal and Queen-mother, induced the King to conquer or smother his passion ; and the object of his affections, when she saw there was no hope of sharing the throne, obeyed the injunctions of the Cardinal by precipitately breaking off all farther correspondence or communication with her royal lover.¹

¹ Courchetet, *Hist. du Paix de Pyrenées*, t. i. p. 338.

This obstacle being removed,¹ Mazarin, attended by a numerous and brilliant escort, arrived at St Jean de Luz. He was accompanied by many civil as well as military officers of the highest distinction in the realm, and was followed by 300 domestics, of whom 150 were in livery, and by a guard of 300 infantry with 100 cavalry. For himself and the gentlemen in his train, he had seven coaches, drawn by six horses, and thirty other carriages yoked with a pair. The baggage and state papers were conveyed in twenty chariots with six horses, and on twenty-four mules, all covered with cloth of gold and silver.² Luis de Haro repaired to the rendezvous with a retinue equally brilliant, and a guard as numerous. The French Cardinal fixed his residence at St Jean de Luz, and the Spanish minister at the frontier town of Fontarabia,³ a few miles distant, on the banks of the Bidassoa. It was arranged that the ministers should meet on a footing of perfect equality, and the place immediately selected for their conferences was the Isle of Pheasants, half a league above Fontarabia, about 500 feet long and 70 broad.⁴

¹ Bossuet, in his Funeral oration for Maria Theresa, Queen of Louis XIV. has delicately alluded to this early and imprudent attachment of the French monarch. "Cessez, princes et potentats, de troubler par vos prétentions le projet de ce mariage. Que l'amour, qui semble aussi le vouloir troubler, cede lui-même; il peut bien y soulever des tempêtes, et y exciter des mouvemens qui fassent trembler les politiques, et qui donnent des espérances aux insensés: mais il y a des ames d'un ordre supérieur à ses loix, à qui il ne peut inspirer des sentimens indignes de leur rang. Il y a des mesures prises dans le ciel qu'il ne peut rompre; et l'Infante, non seulement par son auguste naissance, mais encore par sa vertu et par sa reputation, est seule digne de Louis."

² Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV*, p. 487.

³ Colmenar, *Annales d'Espagne*, t. i. p. 258. Aubery says at Yrun. *Hist. de Mazarin*.

⁴ Castillo, *Viage de Rey Felipe IV. à la Frontera de Francia*, p. 222.

This island was formed by the River Bidassoa, which, descending from the Pyrenees, separates the kingdoms of France and Spain. On this spot, which was supposed to belong to neither kingdom, a wooden building was erected, consisting of two private apartments and a saloon fifty-six feet long and twenty-eight broad, in which all the discussions were to be held.¹ It was agreed that Luis de Haro should pass over a bridge from the Spanish side of the river, at the same moment that Mazarin advanced across a bridge extending from the other bank, to the Isle of Pheasants. It was also settled, that these ministers should enter the hall of conference, by two doors of equal size, at its opposite extremities; and in the middle of the room were placed two arm-chairs, accurately formed of precisely the same height, shape, and dimensions, with tables before each.² Certain restrictions were, at first, imposed on the intercourse of the French and Spanish retinue, but these were afterwards relaxed, and the two nations frequently met with the utmost harmony, in social intercourse, at the neighbouring towns of Yrun and Fontarabia, where the progress of the negotiation, or the various reports concerning it, supplied them with a constant topic of conversation and mutual interest.

The conferences between the two ministers were opened under circumstances unwonted in the history of negotiations, being conducted personally by the two chief ministers of the belligerent nations, without the intervention of any mediator, or the presence of any of the representa-

¹ Castillo, *Viage*.

² Colmenar, *Annales d'Espagne*, t. i. p. 488. It was subsequently called the Isle of the Conference. Captain Carleton, who visited it half a century afterwards, found it, at that period, a little oval island, overrun with weeds, and surrounded by reeds and rushes. (*Memoirs*, p. 333.)

tives of other crowns. They commenced on the 3d of August; and then began between the two ministers, that species of political combat which continued for three months, during which these celebrated statesmen exhibited all the skill and address which could be displayed in the tactics of diplomacy. In early youth, and when the Pope's legate, Mazarin had shown his expertness and indefatigable perseverance, as a pacific negotiator, at Cherasco, where, mediating between the pretensions of so many hostile powers, he perhaps accomplished a more difficult task than that which he had now undertaken. The dexterity and art of the Italian often found great obstacles in the imperturbable temper of the Spaniard. But Lord Clarendon says, "that the Cardinal had much the advantage over Don Luis, in all the faculties necessary for a treaty, excepting probity and punctuality in observing what he promised."¹ De Haro, confident in his own command of temper, alternately irritated and soothed the Cardinal as suited his purpose; but he was himself extremely irresolute, and could generally be brought round by the Cardinal threatening, as he frequently did, altogether to break off the negotiations. Both, while practising much artifice and deceit, were constantly reproaching each other with insincerity; and while both attempted to disguise, as closely as possible, their real sentiments and motives, it was the object of each to penetrate this veil of mystery at an unguarded moment of conversation.

The eyes of almost all Europe were now turned to the wooden building on the small Isle of Pheasants, for not only were the interests of France and Spain to be there discussed, but those also of Italy and Portugal,—of the Duke of Lorraine and the Prince of Condé.

It had been arranged that before the ministers met

¹ *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xvi,

at the place appointed for their conferences, the leading points should be previously discussed by inferior agents, who should draw up a report of what appeared to them fair and equitable, and thus clear the way for the more delicate deliberations. The Cardinal entrusted this care to the Marquis de Lionne, while Don Pedro Coloma, one of the Secretaries of State, was appointed for this purpose by the King of Spain. Twenty-four solemn conferences¹ which generally lasted about four hours, took place during the stay of the ministers on the banks of the Bidassoa. Luis de Haro, having acquiesced in the proposed matrimonial alliance, which was the great object of Mazarin, found him extremely moderate in all his claims and pretensions relating to Italy and the Netherlands, and he scrupled not, by abandoning Portugal, to leave that kingdom unprotected, to the future vengeance of the Spaniards. The most serious difficulties arose in the adjustment of the affairs of two princes, who had acted a conspicuous part during the late war,—the Duke of Lorraine and the great Condé. The Duke, it will be recollected, having frustrated, by his turbulent and avaricious disposition, many of the best concerted plans of the Spaniards in the Netherlands, had been at length arrested and sent prisoner to the Alcazar of Toledo.² At the commencement of the pending negotiations, he had been set free at the solicitation of Mazarin, and had first sent an envoy, and afterwards repaired himself, to the Isle of Pheasants, in order to attend to his interests and those of the Dutchy. Though he had of late been rigorously treated by the Spaniards, they now espoused his interests, as they were unwilling that France should obtain those parts of his dominions which it was so eager to grasp. The Duke declared—that it was his intention to resign the possession of his states to his ne-

¹ Daniel, *Journal Histor.*

² See above, p. 541.

phew, Prince Charles, the son of his brother Francis, who was desirous to espouse one of the nieces of Cardinal Mazarin—that for himself he would retire to Germany, England, or any other place which the King of France might prescribe to him—but that he considered it as a point of honour, though one of mere form, that, previous to his abdication, he should be put in full possession of his whole Dutchy of Lorraine, in the partition of which, he would never, under any circumstances, acquiesce. The Cardinal was too well acquainted with the Duke's artful and faithless character to be deluded by these proposals. He replied, “that he was quite overpowered by the offer of an alliance with the illustrious House of Lorraine, but that he was thereby precluded from rendering the Duke any political services, lest it should be suspected that he was acting with an ambitious view towards the interests of his own family.” Neither by his artifices, nor the threats to which he had alternately recourse, was he able to preserve the integrity of his dominions. He was compelled to cede the Dutchy of Bar and county of Clermont to France, and agree to the demolition of the fortifications of his capital Nancy. But he was in some measure appeased by the King of Spain paying him all the sums which he owed him, and assigning him an yearly pension of 60,000 crowns, from the revenues of certain districts in Flanders.¹

Much greater obstacles were opposed to the conclusion of the treaty, by the adjustment of the interests of a far more important and estimable personage than the Duke of Lorraine. It had been agreed, in the preliminaries arranged between Pimentel and Mazarin at Lyons, that the Prince of Condé should, on due submission, be restored to his patrimonial estates, though not to the governments or offices which he held in France previous

¹ Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrenées*, t. ii. p. 454.

to his revolt. But the King of Spain and his minister had determined to make the restoration of Condé to all his appointments, an essential and indispensable article in the negotiation. This was the subject of discussion which chiefly prolonged the conferences between Mazarin and Luis de Haro, and called forth all the skill which these crafty politicians possessed in diplomatic warfare. It was honourable for Spain thus to preserve inviolate, at all hazards, her engagements with the Prince of Condé ; and, though disappointed in the advantages she had anticipated from his services, to risk the peril of another war, rather than forfeit the pledge which she had given him of her protection. The King of Spain was besides aware, that it would increase the dignity of his crown, to procure for a rebellious subject of France a restitution to all his former rights ; and he knew that if he now deserted Condé, no discontented leader of a French faction would ever again court his protection or alliance, so that he would be in future disabled from availing himself of those civil dissensions in the neighbouring kingdom, from which he and his predecessors had, in former times, reaped such advantages. On the other hand, Mazarin was determined to refuse the re-establishment of Condé for the very reasons which rendered the Spanish minister so eager to obtain it. He was desirous to give a striking example to the French nobility of the little dependence to be placed on foreign princes, to whose service they might attach themselves in violation of the allegiance due to their native sovereign. Mazarin was besides animated by an ancient spirit of political rancour towards the Prince. Condé had wronged his country, but he had injured Mazarin more ; and though that minister did not oppose his return to France, he wished him to come penitent and humiliated, and not in the triumph which the King of Spain attempted to procure for him.

The subject of the interests of the Prince of Condé began to be agitated at the very first conference, and continued to be discussed in almost all those which followed. Being earnestly and repeatedly pressed to grant a full restitution to Condé, at least as a boon to the solicitations and feelings of the King of Spain, Mazarin at length answered, that he was willing to yield whatever was required in favour of Condé, and much more, provided Philip would desist from all farther attempts against Portugal, the ally of France, and relinquish his pretensions to the crown of that kingdom, in order that peace might be re-established from one end of Europe to the other. But De Haro was particularly sensitive on the subject of Portugal, and his cheeks were yet crimsoned with the shame of his recent defeat at Elvas. His natural phlegm and composure left him for an instant, and he replied, with much emotion, that there was a wide difference between the Prince of Condé and the Duke of Braganza. The Cardinal admitted there was so—the one being an outcast and a beggar, the other in possession of a splendid crown, which he had worn for twenty years. The Spanish minister was not disposed to forward even the interests of Condé at such a price. Indeed his great object in the treaty of the Pyrenees was, by relieving his country from other enemies, to turn its undivided force against the Portuguese. He did not conceal that he was determined to punish their treason and rebellion, and that as soon as the peace with France was concluded, he would turn all the troops and treasures of the Spanish dominions to the invasion of Portugal.

Perceiving that Mazarin obstinately refused the restoration of Condé, except on the most inadmissible terms, De Haro in a subsequent conference proposed, that as France would not reinstate him in his rights and dignities, the King of Spain should be at least permitted to

grant him indemnification, by erecting for him an independent sovereignty in some part of his own dominions. The spot to which he particularly pointed was in the Low Countries, and he even named the towns and territory which he thus intended to convert into a small principality. Though this proposal seems scarcely to have been seriously made, it had the effect of highly alarming Mazarin. He remembered, in the ancient history of France, how injurious to its interest and repose had been the possession of the Netherlands by the Dukes of Burgundy; and he foresaw how dangerous it would now be for France to have on the frontiers of the kingdom a warlike and resident enemy, who would always be ready to avail himself of whatever troubles might arise in it, and who would afford a safe and speedy shelter to its discontented subjects. This proposal, therefore, was peremptorily resisted, and Mazarin would not even permit that Condé should receive from Spain, though only for a limited time, the sovereignty of Sardinia or the two Calabrias.

There now appeared to be something harsh and unreasonable in thus refusing permission to the King of Spain to dispose of his own dominions in favour of Condé, and De Haro being considerably piqued, so far forgot his caution as to say, that if the King, his master, thus, in the sight of all the world, abandoned the Prince of Condé, after the promises he had made, he could never again reckon on obtaining the assistance of allies. To this the Cardinal replied, 1. That subjects who rebelled against their own king, and put themselves under the protection of a foreign prince, were not entitled to be called allies, an appellation which should be reserved for independent sovereigns. 2. That it was much the interest of France to prevent Spain from obtaining any more of these sort of *allies*. And, lastly, that since the earnest desire of peace had induced the King of France to abandon

Portugal, Spain should imitate the example, and give up the Prince of Condé. De Haro then expressed his astonishment, that Louis should be so unrelenting towards a hero of his own blood and lineage, when it was well known that subjects who had been equally or more guilty, had often experienced the clemency of their sovereign, as, indeed, had been manifested in the recent instances of the Prince of Conti and Mareschal Turenne; and he insinuated, that it was very common in France for its nobility to revolt, and not only to obtain pardon, but to derive advantages from their treason. This suggestion, that, in France, rebellion was not considered as a very grievous offence, excited the indignation of the Cardinal, who rejoined, that traitors had never been pardoned, except when it was found conducive to the advantage of the state, or when they submitted themselves to the clemency of their offended sovereign, without advancing any claims or pretensions, except forgiveness, and restoration to the royal favour. He added, that Spain herself had set the example, as in the case of the Dutch, of not only granting indemnity, but conferring new and valuable privileges on revolted subjects: that if the French forsook their allegiance more readily, they also returned more quickly to obedience than those under the Spanish dominion, who, having once thrown off the yoke, persevered to the utmost extremity, as had been exemplified by the Catalans and the Portuguese; and that, at all events, no revolt had ever occasioned to the King of France the loss of one inch of territory.

At last Mazarin declared, that the farthest length he could go in favour of Condé, would be, in order to save appearances, to permit him to receive some fortresses in Flanders from the Spaniards, on a promise that he should, within a certain time, relinquish them in favour of the King of France, who, perhaps, in consideration of this act

of obedience, might feel disposed to grant him more favourable terms than those which had been already agreed to at Lyons.

Matters were in this situation, when the Prince of Condé, who still remained in the Netherlands, hearing that his claims interposed the chief obstacle to a pacification between the two crowns, now gave directions to the agents whom he had employed in Spain, to cease all farther solicitations in his favour, and to inform Luis de Haro, that he would approve of whatever arrangement he should make with regard to his interests; and he himself wrote that minister nearly to the same purpose. Condé thus returned to France, on that footing of implicit obedience and submission, which was perhaps ultimately most conducive to his interests, being best suited to gain the favour of Louis XIV; while Spain had the credit, in the eyes of Europe, of having made an honourable effort for the fulfilment of her engagements, which was strongly contrasted with the abandonment by the French of the Portuguese, and their neglect of the Catalans. "Don Luis," says Lord Clarendon, "would not sign the treaty till he had sent an express to the Prince of Condé, to inform him of all the particulars, and had received his full approbation. And, even then, the King of Spain caused a great sum of money to be paid to him, that he might discharge all the debts which he had contracted in Flanders, and reward his officers, who were to be disbanded; a method France did not use at the same time to their proselytes, but left Catalonia to its King's chastisement, without any provision made for Don Joseph de Margarit and others, who had been the principal contrivers of its disturbances, and were left to eat the bread of France, where it is administered to them very sparingly, without any hope of ever seeing their native country again, except they make

their way thither by fomenting a new rebellion.”¹ This, however, is not strictly accurate. No special provision, indeed, was made for Margarit, or other individual leaders of the Catalonian insurrection ; but one of the articles of the treaty secures generally an indemnity to the Catalans, and provides for the return of the expatriated rebels to their own country.

All impediments to the adjustment of the treaty of peace being now at length removed, it received, on the 7th of November, the signatures of the ministers acting as plenipotentiaries ; and in celebration of its auspicious conclusion, *Te Deum* was sung at St Jean-de-Luz and Fontarabia, where the ministers held their residences. It was ratified by the King of France at Toulouse on the 24th November, and by the King of Spain at Madrid the 10th of December following. This celebrated treaty consisted of 124 articles. The first 32 heads relate to the commerce between the two kingdoms, and the reciprocal privileges to be enjoyed by the subjects of France and Spain. The 33d article announces the nuptials which were to take place between the King of France and the Infanta, and it refers to the contract of marriage of the same date, which was in fact held to be a part of the treaty. This document provides for a dowry of 500,000 crowns, which was to accompany the hand of the Infanta ; and in consideration of this sum, that Princess agreed to renounce for ever, for herself and her children, all right or pretension to any part of the Spanish dominions,—only this exclusion was not to apply to herself in the event of the succession opening to her while in a state of widowhood, without any family by the marriage. Luis de Haro laid great stress on this renunciation, to which Mazarin readily consented, as he conceived that it could not abrogate the rights of the Infanta’s children, should the crown of

¹ *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xvi.

Spain ever devolve on them, since time would wear out, or power might rend, all such parchment agreements; and it is said that Philip, forgetting his usual dignity, declared that the renunciation would prove a *patarata* (humbug). The moderate dowry, besides, which was to accompany the Infanta, never was paid,—an omission which formed an additional pretext to the Court of France for ultimately disregarding the renunciation.¹ The subsequent articles, as far as the 54th inclusive, fix what places acquired during the war were to be retained or surrendered by the two Kings. Those towns which Louis XIV. was to keep in the Netherlands, as Arras, Lens, Gravelines, St Venant, Thionville, and those which he was to deliver up, as Oudenarde, Dixmude, Furnes, are all enumerated. Louis was to possess the whole of Roussillon and the districts of Conflans, on the French side of the Pyrenees; while, on the other hand, he relinquished Rosas, Cape de Quiers, Urgel, and all his other acquisitions in Catalonia. In Italy—Valenza and Mortara were restored to the King of Spain, and he also obtained restitution of several places in those ancient possessions of his family, Burgundy, Charolois, and Franche Comté. The five following stipulations provide for the indemnity of the Catalans, and their restoration to their possessions and ancient privileges. The 60th article concerning Portugal, is that in the whole treaty which is the most dishonourable for France, and which was concluded in spite of all the remonstrances of the Count of Soura, the Portuguese ambassador at Paris, who attended the conferences at the Pyrenees, to uphold the interests of his country. Indeed, the feeling of Mazarin on this subject is evident, from the long preamble by which, as a sort of apology to other nations, this article is introduced. It announces that his Christian Majesty had often refused the most earnest solicita-

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

tions to make peace without including Portugal ; yet finding that this resolution would be a perpetual and insurmountable barrier to the conclusion of a treaty, he had thought it incumbent on him to prefer the general repose to the special interests of Portugal : but he had obtained from the King of Spain his consent to suspend operations against that kingdom for three months, during which period every exertion was to be employed to effect a satisfactory adjustment of differences, and his Christian Majesty offered his mediation for that purpose. If, however, these efforts ultimately failed, he engaged, on the faith and honour of a king, to afford no assistance either publicly or secretly, to the Portuguese, nor to allow them to make levies within his dominions, nor permit any auxiliaries from other nations to pass through his states to the succour of Portugal. The subsequent heads, as far as the 79th, relate to the intricate affairs of the Duke of Lorraine. Then follow ten articles concerning the Prince of Condé, which set out with a preamble of his penitence for having taken arms against his king, as also of his unqualified submission and desire to return to his obedience, without any terms or stipulations on his part whatever : But the King of France, in consideration of this implicit disposal of his person and property into his hands,—his relinquishing all those indemnifications, in money or territory, which he had received from the King of Spain—disbanding all his troops, and renouncing all leagues into which he may have entered with foreign powers, agrees to receive him into favour, to restore his paternal estates, to reinvest him in the government of Burgundy, and appoint his son, the Duke d'Enghien, Grand-Master of France;—all, however, on condition that the King of Spain gives up the town and citadel of Juliers to the Duke of Neuburgh, the ally of France, and the town of Avennes, between the Sambre and Meuse, to his most Christian Majesty.

Condé's adherents, too, were pardoned, with exception of the Count Marsin, and were allowed to return to France, where they were restored to their former possessions, but not to their offices or employments. The final articles of the treaty relate chiefly to the affairs of the Italian Princes, particularly the Duke of Savoy, to whom the King of Spain surrendered the town of Vercelli and its dependencies. Fuensaldagna had already signed a preliminary treaty with the Duke of Modena, which was now confirmed from the Isle of Pheasants. The treaty of Cherasco, which had been concluded in 1631, was assumed as the basis of the other Italian arrangements; and the peace of the Pyrenees produced little difference on the affairs of Italy, except terminating a war which had for some time past been carried on very languidly in Milan.¹

Luis de Haro congratulated himself highly on the conclusion of this treaty. Pending the negotiations, indeed, he had, as a politician, attempted to disguise the weakness of his country, and the extremity to which it was reduced; but when they were at length completed, he publicly declared that Spain had been utterly lost, but now was saved.

The King, too, and the Spanish nation, received with transports of joy, the grateful intelligence of the settlement of peace. Philip loaded with honours, caresses, and favours, the minister to whom he was indebted for this desirable event, which had almost become necessary for the existence of the country. He erected the Marquisate of Carpio, to which Luis de Haro was heir, into a Dukedom of the first class, and conferred on him the title of Principe de La Paz,—an appellation which, from this

¹ Abreu, *Tratados de Paz de España*, part vii. Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrenées*. Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*

example, was recently bestowed in Spain on a far less deserving minister.

The joy of the Court of Madrid was enhanced by the arrival of the Mareschal Duke de Grammont, not in the pomp and state of an ambassador, but habited as a royal courier, and accompanied by sixty peers of France in a similar equipment, which was meant to denote the impatience and eager desires of their sovereign to obtain the hand of the Infanta. He was met at Mandez, a small village at the distance of a mile from Madrid, by a troop of Spanish postmasters, couriers, and outriders, with led horses for his retinue. At this place the cavalcade was formed: Postilions, dressed in rose-coloured satin with silver lace, went first. Then came the Mareschal, accompanied by his French escort, and followed by a numerous train of servants in livery, all on horseback. They set out from Mandez, entered Madrid, and passed along its streets at full gallop. The novelty of the spectacle, and the nature of the ambassador's errand, attracted an immense concourse of spectators, who hailed his arrival by shouts of joy and exultation. Without alighting, and followed by all his retinue, he rode into the court of the royal palace, where he was received by the Admiral of Castile and eighteen Grandees of Spain. He was conducted by them, through an immense crowd which had thronged to see him, to an audience of the King who awaited him, surrounded by his courtiers, in a splendid saloon. As soon as the Mareschal appeared, his Majesty rose from a throne placed on a platform at the end of the chamber, and uncovered his head for a moment. The King received him with many testimonies of regard, expressed his satisfaction at his arrival, and continued with him for some time in familiar conversation. Having presented his letters and credentials, he was next led to the apartments of the Queen, where the Infanta also was seated. Her Ma-

jesty replied in Spanish to the Mareschal's address, but the Infanta only asked, "*Come esta la Reyna mi Tia?*" After the appropriate compliments had thus passed, the Admiral of Castile conducted Grammont to a palace which had been prepared for his reception, and was furnished with some of the richest moveables belonging to the crown. On the following morning he was visited by the foreign ambassadors, and the royal carriages were placed at his disposal. Festivals and rejoicings were held all over the capital, and the Admiral of Castile gave an entertainment which vied, it is said, with the most sumptuous banquets of antiquity. Eight hundred dishes were placed on the table besides the dessert, and after the feast a comedy was represented. At the end of the time devoted to festivity, the King sent the French envoy a letter granting the hand of the Infanta, and informing him, "that he would explain his views on the subject of the nuptials at greater length during the ambassador's audience of leave." At this final interview, the King pronounced a very moving discourse on the evils of war and the superior advantages of peace. In the evening of that day, Mareschal Grammont was conducted to the theatre at Buen-Retiro, where he was placed directly opposite to the Infanta, that he might have an opportunity of contemplating her features and person at leisure, and reporting on them to his court. The King, who on this occasion was attended by a dwarf, never moved his hand, head, or foot, except turning once to say a single word to the Queen; but he rolled his eyes sometimes from one side to the other.¹ The humour of the play consisted in the Archbishop of Toledo commanding an army and appearing on the stage in his mitre and bishop's robes, with

¹ Pellicer, *Tratado Historico sobre el Origen y Progresos de la Comedia en España*, parte i. p. 191. ed. 1804. Pellicer, quotes as authority the journal of one of Grammont's *suite*.

a shoulder-belt and sword over them, wearing also boots and spurs.¹ This seems a strange subject for a Spanish theatre, as the King's brother the Cardinal Infant had been Archbishop of Toledo, and one of the least unsuccessful Generals during the late war. It is little to the credit of the taste or spirit of the Spanish Court, if it intended to flatter French vanity by showing disrespect to the memory of a commander who had invaded their territories and made all Paris tremble. After this absurd representation was over, the ladies, one after another, made obeisances to the royal party, which lasted a quarter of an hour. The King then performed a reverence to the Queen, and the Infanta to the King, and the Queen to the Infanta.²

Grammont, and his retinue, held the dramatic entertainment in utter contempt. But the Infanta, who was then in the twenty-second year of her age, and possessed a very fine complexion, as also much spirit and vivacity,³ had the good fortune to meet with the unqualified approbation of the Mareschal,—an eminent judge of the attributes of female beauty. In a letter to Cardinal Mazarin, he says, “ I thank God, with all my soul, that I can in truth assure you, that no princess can be more beautiful or agreeable than the Infanta ; and to the various subjects of satisfaction, which your Eminence must have, on account of the great number of important services you have rendered the State, you may add the gratification of having obtained for his Majesty the most amiable and lovely woman in Christendom.”⁴

The season, however, being already far advanced, and it being necessary, on account of the relationship between the King of France and the Infanta, to wait for a dis-

¹ Pellicer, *Tratado*, &c.

² Ibid.

³ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xii.

⁴ Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrenees*, t. ii. p. 445.

pensation from Rome, it was resolved to defer, till the following year, the espousals, which were destined to take place on the frontiers, near the spot where the treaty had been concluded. When the spring, by clearing away the snow from the mountains of Leon and Old Castile, rendered the roads passable for the royal family and their enormous train, the King, who had determined to be present at the ceremony, set out on his long journey. When he departed from Madrid, his equipage extended six leagues. In front of all, went eight of the city trumpeters, clothed in red and yellow garments richly embroidered with the arms of France and Spain. Next followed four state-coaches, and as many horse-litters; then two coaches with the gentlemen of the bed chamber; then a great number of the nobility and gentry, and after them the *grandees*, each of whom had several coaches and gentlemen attending them, and a multitude of servants in rich liveries, of which each had three suits,—one for the day of departure, another to travel in, and a third for the wedding. The Duke of Medina de las Torres surpassed all the *grandees* in the number of his domestics, and the magnificence of their equipments. The royal pages followed on horseback, carrying rich portmanteaus of crimson velvet laced with gold. After them was the King's coach, in which he and the Infanta were seated; then the sumpter mules and 72 long waggons. His Majesty had on this journey 18 horse-litters, 70 coaches of his own and the nobility, 2600 mules of burden, 70 state-horses, 900 saddle-mules, and 32 long waggons. The Infanta's *trousseau*, as it has been called in modern days, required of itself no inconsiderable train. She had twelve trunks lined and covered with crimson velvet, the hinges, locks, and keys of silver, containing twenty-three full suits for the Princess, all extremely rich; and other twenty trunks, covered with Russian lea-

ther, and the iron-work gilt, which were filled with an immense quantity of all sorts of linens; also six more trunks overspread with amber leather, and lined with crimson satin, their hinges, bars, and locks, of gold enamelled,—two of them full of amber gloves, whisker cases, purses, and other curiosities for the Duke of Anjou; the other four containing rich presents, to be distributed among the French ladies. It required 50 sumpter horses to carry the Infanta's dressing plate and perfumes; other 25 sumpters bore most exquisite hangings and tapestry. For her entrance into Paris, there were eighteen costly cloths, embroidered with gold and silver, and many liveries for the domestics who were to lead the horses. For the Princess' use in Paris, there was conveyed a sedan chair, adorned with silver, wrought like Flanders lace. To give in charity and other gifts, she had 50,000 pistoles.¹

Besides the Infanta, the King was accompanied by his minister Luis de Haro, and all the great officers of state. Velazquez, the celebrated painter, had set out before the court, that he might fit up the pavilion on the Isle of Pheasants, so as to render it suitable for the interview and conference of the two greatest potentates on earth. On their way to the Pyrenees, the royal party were entertained at Burgos, Victoria, St Sebastian, and the other towns through which they passed, with allegorical masquerades, bull-fights, fireworks, and theatrical representations. On their arrival at Fontarabia, the Infanta solemnly swore to her renunciation of the crown of Spain; and, on the 3d of June, the day appointed for the performance of the marriage ceremony, the King, decked with the richest jewels of the crown, and the Infanta, dressed in a robe of white satin, embroidered with gold, repaired to the cathedral, where Luis de Haro, as proxy

¹ Thurtle's *Hist. of Spain*.

for the King of France, awaited their arrival, and in that capacity was united to the Princess by the Grand Almoner of Spain, assisted by the Bishop of Pampeluna.¹

Meanwhile, the French King and his Court had reached St Jean-de-Luz. The first royal interview (somewhat private) was between Anne of Austria, Queen-mother of France, and her brother the King of Spain, accompanied by the Infanta. Through the management of the Spanish minister, Louis XIV. was placed in a situation where (himself unseen) he enjoyed the first view of his beautiful bride. When she departed in the royal barge, Louis followed it on horseback along the banks of the Bidassoa, and was then, for the first time, recognised by the Infanta.²

At the second conference, which was of a more formal nature, the two kings met expressly for the purpose of swearing to the observance of the treaty of the Pyrenees. The royal personages present were the King of Spain and the Infanta, the King, and Queen-mother of France. Mazarin and Luis de Haro left them alone for nearly an hour and a half, and then returned to remind them that it was now time to swear to the treaty. When it came to the turn of Louis to read the oath, he added, "I vow not only peace but friendship."³ After this ceremony, the French nobility were introduced to Philip, and the Spanish grandees to Louis. The former were richly attired, the latter more plainly, except that they wore jewels of immense value. Among the crowd of French peers who were presented to him, the King of Spain particularly distinguished the great Turenne, and paid him many flattering compliments,—telling him that no one

¹ Castillo, *Viage de Felipe IV. à la Frontera de Francia.* ² Ibid.

³ The *French* authors say, that Philip was so struck by the noble and majestic countenance of Louis, that at all their interviews he gazed on him incessantly with admiration and delight.

had ever made him pass so many sleepless and uncomfortable nights. The painter Velazquez officiated during the whole of this ceremonial, in his capacity of *Aposentador Mayor*, an officer of the household, who precedes the royal family, to prepare suitable accommodation for their reception. He was adorned with the decorations of his order of knighthood, and other dignities, and was magnificently apparelled in a vest and collar of rich silver lace of Milan, according to the fashion of the times. The red cross on his cloak was profusely adorned with diamonds and other precious stones; a beautiful silver-hilted sword of exquisite workmanship, with figures in relief, made in Italy, hung by his side, and a costly gold chain was placed round his collar, with the order of St Iago appended to it, in a magnificent setting of diamonds.¹

At the third and parting interview, or that of the *entregas*, as it is called, the King of Spain formally presented the Infanta to Louis, and consigned her into his hands. In his last adieus to his daughter, whom he loved with unbounded affection, Philip, though ever anxious to conceal his feelings under a dignified demeanour, exhibited much sorrow and tenderness, and was deeply affected by the emotion with which Louis received his blessing. The acclamations with which the French rent the air at sight of this beautiful and accomplished Princess,²

¹ Cumberland, *Anecdotes of Painters in Spain*, t. ii.

² Reboulet, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.* Maria Theresa lived in the high station of Queen of France till the year 1683. She was modest and simple in her character, and passed a devout and almost private life. She always retained at least the respect and esteem of her husband; but she is seldom mentioned by French historians, and at Court she was eclipsed by La Valiere, Montespan, and Maintenon. Clarendon says of her, that, while Infanta, "she was the fullest of spirits and wit of any lady in Spain, which she had not improved afterwards, when she had more years upon her." (*Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xii.) "Our Queen," says the

wherever she appeared, so far from communicating any consolation, overwhelmed him with grief; and he mournfully remarked, that he feared this joy of the French would one day cause the sorrow of the Spaniards.

Luis de Haro remained some time at the Pyrenees to complete a number of subordinate arrangements with Mazarin.¹ King Philip, on the way back to his capital, passed some days in the royal palace of Valladolid, the place of his nativity. He was received with great demonstrations of joy, and was entertained, as usual, with bull-fights and fireworks, and a most exquisite *mogiganga*—a species of diversion in which the performers appear in fantastical masks, and particularly in the figures and attitudes of wild animals. The present mimic representation surpassed all former *mogigangas* in variety and skill of adapta-

Dutchess d'Orleans, "was excessively ignorant, but the kindest and most virtuous woman in the world. She had a certain greatness in her manner, and knew extremely well how to hold a court. She could not forget her country, and her manners were always remarkably Spanish. She had such affection for the King, that she watched his eyes to do what was agreeable to him. It may be truly said, that with her died all the happiness of France."

¹ It had been determined that Catalonia should be restored to the Spaniards, and that Roussillon should be retained by the French; but a new strife had nearly arisen between the two powers, with regard to the limits of these provinces. Mazarin appointed Pierre de Marca, at that time Archbishop of Thoulouse, and already known by his geographical and antiquarian researches on the frontiers, to join with Spanish commissioners in adjusting the boundaries. They met at Coret, a small town in Roussillon, fifteen miles from Perpignan; and after frequent discussions, drew a line of demarcation, which was traced according to the authority of ancient monuments and the writings of geographers. Marca communicated the fruits of this investigation and of his previous studies, in a learned work on the antiquities of Roussillon and Catalonia, published after his death, under the title of *Marca Hispanica sive Limes Hispanicus*, 1688.

tion : it was exhibited in front of the palace, and consisted of not fewer than sixty different figures.¹

Though Philip had declared that the joy of the French would one day prove the sorrow of his subjects, and though, forgetting his royal gravity, he had declared the Infanta's renunciation to be a *patarata*, the Spaniards, in the mean while, as they seldom looked forward to remote consequences, universally rejoiced at being relieved from the pressure of an unsuccessful contest, on conditions less mortifying to the national pride than might have been anticipated. In France, where there was a more restless and buoyant spirit, and where the people had been exhilarated by the recent successes of the conflict, opinions were somewhat divided on the policy of the treaty of the Pyrenees. The enemies of the Cardinal alleged, that he had not been sufficiently aware of the weakness and exhaustion of Spain, and had not obtained such favourable terms for his country as she was entitled to expect, in recompense of the blood and treasure she had lavished during a prosperous war. They maintained, that he had been over cautious and timid in his dread of the renewal of hostilities, for the issue of which there were no reasonable grounds of apprehension,—that the French were already masters of the principal holds in the Spanish Netherlands, and that the districts which the enemy still possessed, were eager to throw off the yoke of their ancient masters,—that the French troops had ready access to Italy, through their alliance with the Duke of Savoy, and that even Spain was open to them, from their possession of Rosas and a part of Catalonia,—that the once formidable reputation of the Spanish troops had greatly declined, and that even the Portuguese, who had been their conquerors at Elvas, might, with a little aid, have carried the war into Castile, and have thus effected

¹ Castillo, *Viage de Felipe*, &c.

a powerful diversion in favour of the French arms. The peace was particularly unpopular in the French army ; and Turenne, who vehemently remonstrated against it, engaged to conquer, in two more campaigns, all that was left to Spain of Flanders. St Evremond, who, along with other military officers, had attended Mazarin to the Pyrenees, expressed the sentiments of the party opposed to peace with much force and pleasantry, in a letter addressed to his friend Mareschal Crequi. This epistle remained for some time unpublished ; but was discovered soon after the death of Mazarin, in a search for papers during the prosecution of Fouquet, and was the cause of the author's perpetual exile from his native country. On the other hand, the supporters of Mazarin, and the great majority of the nation, while they admitted that France had made some sacrifices for the sake of peace, maintained that the late brilliant successes in the Netherlands had been chiefly gained by the co-operation of the English ; but that their domestic troubles would preclude them from sending troops to the Low Countries, and that there was now an immediate prospect of the restoration of the royal family of England, who were the allies of the Spaniards, and had combated in their ranks at the battle of Dunes : That it was also to be feared the States of Holland, from their jealousy of French aggrandizement in the Netherlands, might convert their present neutrality into a league offensive and defensive with Spain : That the Emperor had engaged to send 6000 troops to Flanders, in the event of Spain breaking off the treaty : That armies were maintained in Italy at an enormous expense : That the Duke of Modena was but a feeble ally, and that without weakening too much the force in Flanders, it would be impossible to march troops across either the Alps or the Pyrenees : That Sweden, at war with Denmark, and embroiled with Poland, and having no longer

a Gustavus for a king, a Banier for a general, or an Oxenstiern for minister, could not afford the able assistance she had rendered during the Thirty Years' War : That, above all, there were still a number of malecontents in France, who only waited the renewal of hostilities to recommence their seditions : but that the pardon extended to Condé, deprived the discontented of the leader to whom they chiefly trusted, and from whose well-known military talents, when employed in the service of his country, the most beneficial consequences might be hereafter anticipated.¹ As the Infanta had agreed to a renunciation of all contingent rights to the Crown of Spain, the advantages of the matrimonial union could not be so publicly enlarged on. But the royal family of France, and the confidants of Mazarin, exulted in the eventual prospect which it opened up of the Spanish succession. The King and his minister were also aware, that Maria Theresa had already a claim on that part of the States of Philip IV, which comprehended the ancient inheritance of the House of Burgundy, and which, by their local laws (as Louis afterwards maintained), descended to the Infanta, as the eldest child surviving of the first marriage of her father. These pretensions gave rise to wars at no distant period from the conclusion of the treaty of the Pyrenees, and were the subject of adjustment at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nimeguen.

But while Spain received with universal and unmingled satisfaction the intelligence of the recent peace, and while the majority of the French nation did justice to the diplomatic skill of Mazarin, the treaty of the Pyrenees was viewed in a very different light by the other powers of Europe. Their ambassadors had crowded to the congress to retard its conclusion, and appeared in such numbers, that Mazarin remarked, " that he could not doubt the

¹ Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrenees*, t. ii.

drama was hastening to its close, as all the actors had now entered on the stage." None of them could view, without apprehension and alarm, the danger which now presented itself, that the two chief crowns of Europe might be placed on the same head, or at least might be worn in the same family. But some nations had separate and peculiar grounds of dissatisfaction. Portugal complained, and justly, that she had been deserted in the quarter where she had treasured her chief hopes. The Pope was offended that he had not been called to assist at the treaty, and that the high contracting parties had altogether dispensed with his mediation. The Emperor Leopold was mortified at not obtaining the hand of the Infanta, which he had so earnestly solicited; and he was displeased that it should have been bestowed on that enemy of his house, whose aggrandizement he chiefly dreaded. As for Charles II. of England, he had repaired *incognito* to Fontarabia, on the first intelligence he received of the opening of negotiations at the Pyrenees. But, owing to some unaccountable delay in his journey, he did not reach the banks of the Bidassoa till the treaty was nearly completed. After his arrival, however, he spared no effort in order, if possible, to induce the ministers of the two nations to concur in an attempt for his restoration. But the memory of Cromwell awed them still; and Lockhart, the ambassador of the Commonwealth, though he did not take much share in the negotiations, had arrived at Bayonne, in order narrowly to watch all the proceedings. Mazarin carried his timidity or caution so far, that he refused to see Charles, lest he should give umbrage to the English republicans. Luis de Haro, who indeed had given the exiled monarch considerable encouragement to attend the congress, was somewhat more favourable to his interests. He received him with the utmost civility, and made all possible protestations

concerning his desire to serve him.¹ He even proposed to Mazarin, that something should be attempted to support his cause, and expressed his belief that in the present state of England, 5000 troops might be sufficient to effect his restoration ; to which the Cardinal replied, “ that if so small a force sufficed for so noble a purpose, he was sure the King of Spain would not wish to share with any other Power the glory of the enterprise.”² At length, however, both ministers agreed that the present was not the fit time or opportunity to interfere for the re-establishment of Charles on the throne of his ancestors ; and that Prince was in consequence obliged to quit the scene of negotiation and return to Flanders, without having received any explicit pledge or promise of assistance. Perhaps it was fortunate for Charles that France and Spain did not yield to his intercessions and raise an army to conduct him to his capital. It was more gratifying to English pride and national feeling, that he owed his restoration to his subjects alone. With the succour of the French or Spaniards it would have been less rapid, and at all events less universally popular. Nor was his disappointment of long endurance ; in less than six months he was recalled by a delighted nation, and made his triumphal entrance into London, within a few days of the celebration of the nuptials between Louis XIV. and the Infanta Maria Theresa in the Cathedral of Fontarabia.

¹ Clarendon, *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xvi. Charles, it would appear, had not been personally dissatisfied with the conduct of Luis de Haro towards him, for, after his restoration, in his instructions to Sir R. Fanshawe, his ambassador at Madrid, he recommended particular courtesy and attention to the family of the minister, who was himself by that time deceased, and deeply interested himself in procuring the freedom of his son, the Marques of Liche, who was then detained a prisoner in Portugal. (Fanshawe's *Memoirs*.)

² Courchetet, *Paix de Pyrenées*.

No sooner was he placed on the throne of his ancestors, than Philip restored to him all the English vessels captured during the war with Cromwell. A peace was not long afterwards concluded between the two nations, which, however, cost the Spaniards the cession of Dunkirk and Jamaica.

Mazarin completed at the Pyrenees what the arms of Turenne had prepared, and terminated that war between France and Spain, which involved in its consequences most of the powers of Europe, and had been carried on for nearly thirty years, to the scandal and reproach of humanity. "It was a war," says Lord Clarendon, "wantonly entered into, without the least pretence of right and justice, to comply with the pride and humour of the two favourites of the crowns, who would try the mastery of their wit and invention at the charge of their masters' treasure and the blood of their subjects, against all the obligations of leagues and alliances,—a war prosecuted only for war's sake, with all the circumstances of fire, sword, and rapine, to the consumption of millions of treasure and millions of lives, of noble, worthy, and honest men, only to improve the skill and mystery and science of destruction. All which appeared the more unnatural and the more monstrous, that this seemed to be effected and carried on by the power of a brother and sister against each other, (for half of the time had been in the Regency of the Queen of France), when they both loved and tendered each other's good and happiness, as the best brother and sister ought."¹ The result of such bitter hostilities was that of most other wars;—one party lost some towns and territories, and the other paid, at least at the time, too highly for its acquisitions.

The Treaty of the Pyrenees, which completed the great work of pacification that had commenced at Munster, is

¹ *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xvi.

justly celebrated as having put an end to such bitter and useless animosities. But, it is more famous, as having introduced a new æra in European politics. In its provisions all the leading events of a century to come had their origin—the wars which terminated with the Treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle, Nimeguen, and Ryswick, and that concerning the Spanish succession. So great an epoch in history has the Pyrenean Treaty been accounted by politicians, that Lord Bolingbroke was of opinion, “That the only part of history necessary to be thoroughly studied, goes no farther back than this treaty, since, from that period, a new set of motives and principles have prevailed all over Europe.”¹

¹ Spence's *Anecdotes*, p. 167.

CHAPTER XII.

WAR WITH PORTUGAL.—DEATH OF PHILIP.

Amazement in his van, with Flight combined.

* * * * *

Lo! on his funeral couch he lies.—

GRAY'S *Bard*.

THE most disastrous war in which Spain had ever been engaged, was that for the recovery of Holland. It was not so much the loss of her possessions in the Netherlands, as the desperate efforts she made to regain them, and the haughtiness with which she scorned an acknowledgment of their independence, long after all hope of their subjugation was at an end, that brought her to the brink of ruin. By her obstinate pertinacity, she long estranged them from her friendship, and not only lost her dominion over them, but by throwing them into the arms of France, forfeited all the future advantages of commerce or alliance with a people both industrious and warlike.

In the present age, Spain was still poignantly tasting the bitter fruits of her war with Holland; but she profited not by the page of her own history, which was, as it were, shut and sealed to her eyes; and she was now preparing to act again in Portugal a like sanguinary drama with that which had elsewhere terminated so fatally for her interest and honour.

Philip, though he could not recover the crown of Portugal, would not renounce it. He had never yet acknowledged the Duke of Braganza as King of Portugal; nor,

since the revolution by which that prince was called to its throne, had peace existed between the two countries. But the contest in which Spain was engaged with France prevented a vigorous prosecution of the war against Portugal, and hostilities had for many years been chiefly confined to skirmishes on the frontiers of the kingdoms. The inroads reciprocally made by these two nations, who were incensed against each other with an implacable hatred, more resembled predatory incursions than military exploits. On both sides the hostilities were disgraced by the most horrid excesses. All manner of cruelties were mutually exercised, and for twenty years the frontiers had never been free from slaughter and rapine, without any material advantage being gained by either of the belligerents. The villages and open towns in Alentejo and Estremadura were burned and pillaged—the cattle were driven off, and the defenceless inhabitants of the country were put to the sword. In these invasions the Portuguese generally had the advantage, as they were not distracted like the Spaniards by other contests. But their troops chiefly consisted of irregular militia, better fitted for predatory attacks than methodical warfare. Nor had the House of Braganza, at this time, the means of supporting a large standing army. For the sake of popularity, most of the taxes had been abolished on the accession of the present family to the throne,¹ and its authority was not yet sufficiently confirmed to venture on their renewal. The king, besides, was of an indolent pacific disposition; and though the impatience of his soldiers often led them to retaliate on the Spaniards, by hostile invasions of the adjacent provinces, his great object was not aggression, but the defence of his own territories. He conceived, that it was both his easiest and securest course to build ships, to replenish his exchequer, and fortify his

¹ Vertot, *Revol. de Portugal*, p. 159.

towns ; while the Spaniards, by wasting their strength in the wars of Italy or Flanders, were incapacitated, at least for the present, from endangering the safety of his kingdom.

Had Philip concluded a peace with France immediately after the revolution of Portugal, and directed all his forces against that country while he had still some adherents in Lisbon, it is probable that he might again have reduced it under the Spanish dominion. But his arms being otherwise occupied, the King of Portugal had full leisure to consolidate his power at home, and to strengthen it by foreign alliances ; and after his death, which happened in 1656, the best interests of the country were ably supported by the Queen, who acted as regent for her son, the imbecile Alfonso. With exception, therefore, of that recent effort, in which Luis de Haro had been so disgracefully foiled, the Spanish monarch was obliged to limit his attempts for the subversion of the Portuguese throne to predatory incursions,—to some fruitless assaults on the fortified towns of Elvas and Olivenza, and to the encouragement of those domestic conspiracies which from time to time were formed against the house of Braganza.

The object, however, of again annexing Portugal to the crown of Castile, had never been relinquished ; and Philip had been often heard to declare, “ that he would rather risk the loss of his whole kingdom than abandon the conquest of Portugal.” Indeed one of his chief inducements in signing the peace of the Pyrenees was, that he might thenceforth, without distraction to his arms, prosecute the war against that country. Accordingly, as soon as he had effected an accommodation with France, he directed his most strenuous exertions to its subjugation. The Cortes having been assembled, granted a considerable sum to Philip, in order that he might be enabled

to continue a war which was highly popular in Spain. The house of Braganza, being now abandoned, in consequence of the recent pacification, by all the powers in Europe, and being engaged in a ruinous contest with Holland, both in America and the East Indies, judged it prudent, notwithstanding some recent successes, to propose an accommodation. It offered to hold Portugal as a nominal fief of the crown of Castile—to pay an annual tribute, and to furnish, on the demand of the King of Spain, 4000 troops and eight ships of war.¹ Fortunately for the honour of Portugal, these humiliating conditions were not accepted. Philip would grant no terms to the house of Braganza, except the possession of its patrimony and the perpetual viceroyalty of the kingdom. A family which had now sat on the throne for twenty years could not be expected altogether to relinquish sovereign power, and an appeal to arms was the sole alternative which remained for resisting the exorbitant pretensions of Spain.

The hatred of the Portuguese to the Castilians, which had been exasperated by a bitter, though undecisive, conflict of twenty years, and by the degrading conditions recently prescribed to their sovereign, supplied the Queen-regent both with troops and treasures. The restored monarch of England, who had little cause for satisfaction with the King of Spain or his minister, secretly lent assistance, and the hostility of the Dutch relaxed for a time. Though the Portuguese ambassador to France, who attended Mazarin during the whole progress of the treaty of the Pyrenees, had failed to obstruct its conclusion, or even to prevent the interests of his master being apparently abandoned, the Cardinal had nevertheless as-

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.* Ortiz, the *Spanish* historian, says, that this proposal being rejected, the house of Braganza offered to resign all its dominions except Brazil and the petty kingdom of Algarva. (*Compend. Cronol.*, t. vi. lib. 20. c. 13.)

sured him, "that Portugal should not be in fact forsaken, and that a pretext could never be wanting for interposing in its behalf."¹ The Portuguese were allowed to keep in France a secret agent called Joaom d'Acosta, Count of Soura, who, with the connivance of Mazarin, lived under the protection of Turenne, and resided in concealment at the country seat of his nephew, the Cardinal de Bouillon. Through the intervention of this envoy, the King of France agreed, that money, troops, and a skilful general, should be sent to the aid of Portugal.² During his mission to Paris, and while attending the conferences at the Pyrenees, the Count had been allowed to persuade 600 French officers, who were left unemployed by the peace, to enter the Portuguese service.³ Mareschal Schomberg, an experienced French commander, who was already engaged in it, had under him some French troops who were actually paid by Louis XIV, though they were nominally maintained by the King of Portugal. This renowned General, who, as is well known, passed into the service of William III. after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, was the great instrument of all the unexpected successes gained by Portugal in this hazardous war. Having obtained the implicit confidence of the Queen and all the real military authority, though, to spare the pride of the Portuguese, a native General was nominally at the head of their armies, he soon brought the troops into a state of complete discipline. He taught them the order to be observed in their marches, as well as the most advantageous plans of encampment, and he fortified, with his best skill, many important places on the frontiers, which had hitherto been left defenceless.

In fact, the situation of Portugal, notwithstanding her

¹ Stevens *Continuation of Faria y Sousa's History of Portugal*.

² Ramsay, *Histoire de Turenne*.

³ Silva, *Hist. de Portugal*, t. iii.

alarm, had been much improved by the peace of the Pyrenees. She had been but nominally abandoned by France, and the military adventurers whom the recent peace had left unemployed, now flocked in crowds to her standard.

It was chiefly with the view of placing him at the head of the army destined to act against Portugal, that Don John had been recalled from the government of the Low Countries in the spring of the preceding year. Concealing from the disappointed and discontented inhabitants of the Spanish Netherlands the order which he had received, he departed privately from Brussels. He returned through France, and on his arrival at Madrid, he found its court still chiefly occupied with the momentous treaty of the Pyrenees, but fully resolved on the subjugation of Portugal. The King conceived, that now, when (as he thought) the house of Braganza was entirely abandoned by France, it should be contented with the enjoyment of its ample private patrimony; and Luis de Haro was impatient to be revenged for the loss of the battle of Elvas. Don John, however, wisely persuaded them to wait till the finances, exhausted by a long war, and by the recent marriage of the Infanta, had been recruited, and till the peace with France had been so completely established, that some veteran regiments might be drawn from Italy or the Low Countries, since, without these reinforcements, he could not answer for the success of the campaign. As soon as they arrived, Don John was placed at the head of the Spanish army, and was ordered to penetrate with the land force to Lisbon through the province of Alentejo, while the Duke of Veraguas should at the same time present himself before the Portuguese capital with a formidable fleet. But the ships of the naval commander were sunk or scattered during a storm on the coast of Andalusia, and the invasion of Portugal

was in consequence postponed to the following year. The Queen-regent availed herself of this precious interval, to augment her army, to amass stores and money, and to press for succour both from France and England; while Spain, exhausted in her finances, and stript both of her fleets and sailors, was unable again to equip such an armament as might attack Lisbon by sea, and thereby form a diversion in favour of the invasion by land.

Early, however, in the ensuing spring, two considerable Spanish armies entered Portugal—one, consisting of 20,000 experienced troops, under John of Austria, invaded Estremadura, and the other, commanded by the Duke d'Ossuna, crossed the northern frontiers from Galicia. As the Portuguese could only muster 13,000 troops to oppose the army of Don John, he was enabled to carry some border towns; but he obtained no decisive or permanent success, and he failed in all his attempts to bring the enemy to a general engagement. The force under the Duke d'Ossuna experienced from the commencement of the campaign various disasters. Several corps were cut in pieces, and the army was weakened by frequent desertions, especially among the Neapolitan soldiers. The courage of the Portuguese was much raised by the events of a contest which had proved far less unequal than they had anticipated. About the same time, they concluded a peace with Holland, and by the marriage of the Infanta Catherine with Charles II. of England, they cemented their alliance with that monarch, who, in return for the cession of Tangiers and Bombay, as the portion of the princess, agreed to furnish a body of infantry, to serve as auxiliaries, under the command of Mareschal Schomberg.¹

Luis de Haro was much displeased and mortified by the result of this campaign. In undertaking it, he had

¹ Steven's *Continuation*. Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

flattered himself with the total conquest of Portugal, and yet during its progress there had not been a battle fought, or one inch of territory permanently gained. On the other hand, Don John complained to the king that he was in want of recruits, and all sort of supplies, without which kingdoms could not be conquered. He also represented, that the enemy acted with the greatest caution, and that if the army which he now commanded was allowed to perish for want of succour, he knew not how his majesty could raise another. The disputes which were thus commencing between Don John and Luis de Haro were terminated by the decease of the minister towards the close of this season, in the 64th year of his age.

Spain unquestionably sustained a severe loss by the death of Luis de Haro, who was one of the wisest and most disinterested statesmen who had ever presided at the helm of the Spanish government. His private character was unimpeachable, and the chief aim of his public life was to render the nation tranquil and happy. He enjoyed the rare felicity of uniting, during his whole administration, the friendship and confidence of his sovereign with the esteem of the people; and his death was at present the more deeply regretted by all, as no statesman existed who could adequately fill the place of the deceased minister.

His eldest son, the Marques of Liche or Eliche, aspired to that eminent situation, but being frustrated in this ambitious view, and being even refused the government of Buenretiro, which his father had long possessed, he became so exasperated, that he entered into a most atrocious conspiracy against the life of the king. He persuaded some miscreants to place a quantity of gunpowder under the private theatre at Buenretiro, with orders to set a train to it on the first occasion when the royal family should attend to witness the dramatic representa-

tions which were there enacted; and it was confidently expected that an opportunity would be quickly offered, as Philip was extremely fond of theatrical exhibitions. The plot, however, was discovered, the very day on which it was intended to have been carried into execution. The miserable accomplices of the marquis having been arrested, accused their employer; but the eminent services of the father saved the son from a scaffold.¹ He was even speedily released from the prison into which he had been thrown, and acted, as we shall see, a distinguished part in the following reign, during which he rose to some of the highest offices in the state.

Meanwhile, the employments and power of Luis de Haro were shared among the Cardinal Sandoval, the Count of Castiglio, and the Duke of Medina-de-las Torres. Both the Count and Duke had been members of the Council of State when Lord Clarendon] visited Spain in 1650.² Castiglio originally studied law at Salamanca, and for some time practised the legal profession, which he exchanged for that of arms; and having earned some reputation in his military career, he was appointed to the situation of Viceroy of Naples, which he held from the year 1653 to 1659.³ The Duke of Medina de Las Torres had also filled that high office for several years, through the influence of his father-in-law the Count-Duke Olivarez. On the disgrace of that minister he was recalled, and his second wife,⁴ the Princess Stigliano, who was the greatest heiress in Italy, having fallen a victim, nearly about the same time, to that disease which is said to have proved fatal to Sylla and Philip II. he had no longer any inducement to remain at Naples. He accordingly returned to Madrid, where he entered into a third marriage, and was replaced in the situation

¹ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.* ² *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xii.

³ Giannone, *Stor. Civil.* lib. xxxvii. c. 6. ⁴ *Id.* xxxvi. c. 6.

of *Summiller de Corps*, which he held previous to his departure for Italy. Through the favour of the king he had continued to fill that office during the long administration of Luis de Haro, who was always extremely jealous of his influence, and of the access which this employment at court gave him to the person of his sovereign.¹ Zanetornato, who was the Venetian ambassador at Madrid towards the close of the reign of Philip, describes him as a man of talents, and distinguished personal merit; and Sir Richard Fanshawe, who was in Spain about the same period, bears testimony to his refined compliments and distinguished civilities.²

Nearly at the same time when this change occurred in the counsels of Spain, an important revolution took place in the government of Lisbon. Alphonso VI, who had succeeded his father in 1656, was a prince equally deformed in person and depraved in mind. In his freaks, in his violence, and in his wayward capricious disposition, he strongly resembled Don Carlos, the unfortunate son of Philip II. of Spain. His mother had acted as Queen Regent during his infancy, and perceiving, as he grew up to manhood, his incurable imbecility, she wished to continue her own sway, or to call her second son Don Pedro to the succession. The King, at the persuasion of his favourite the Count Castel-melhor, deprived her of the regency, and assumed the reins of government himself. The Count, to whom all affairs of state were henceforth entrusted, was a man of strong ambition; and, by grasping at unlimited power, he excited the envy and resentment of his countrymen. But his administration was the most fortunate which Portugal had experienced since the days of the great Emanuel. It was a period alike felicitous by internal prosperity, and renowned by the glorious

¹ Zanetornato, *Relazione del Governo della Corte di Spagna*.

² *Letters, &c.*

victories gained over the Spaniards ; and Castel-melhor was well entitled to boast, “ that there is not a prince in Europe to whom a subject has done greater services than I have to your Majesty.”¹

During these changes at the Courts of Lisbon and Madrid, Don John had possessed himself of nearly the whole province of Alentejo. Since the death of Luis de Haro, his interest had been so great with his royal father, that he readily obtained whatever supplies or reinforcements he required. He was thus enabled to carry on the war with greater vigour than formerly ; and had his army continued its march as it began, he probably might have surprised Lisbon, which was thrown into the utmost consternation by his movements. But he spent his time in plundering the country or besieging insignificant towns ; and, during these operations, a large proportion of the troops which had been supplied by the Emperor of Germany fell victims to diseases occasioned by the heat of the climate.

In the following spring (1663) Don John took Evora, a large and ancient city of Portugal ; and which, though not strongly fortified, was defended by a garrison of 4000 men. Intelligence of the siege of Evora having been brought to Lisbon, the young King sent orders to relieve the place at all hazards. But the Count of Villa-Flor, who was at the head of the Portuguese army, did not receive this mandate till the evening of the day on which Evora surrendered. As the object for which he had been commanded to fight was now lost, the Portuguese general, instead of risking a battle against a superior force, contented himself with intercepting and cutting off the supplies for the Spanish army. Accordingly Don John, finding that provisions were beginning to fail,

¹ *Letter of Castel-melhor to the King*, ap. Sir R. Southwell's *Letters*.

left a small garrison in Evora, and then marched out to give the Portuguese immediate battle, though the Duke of San-German, his lieutenant-general, advised him to wait the arrival of some reinforcements which were daily expected from Castile. The Portuguese were advantageously posted about half a league from Evora. They were nominally commanded by the Count Villa-Flor, but Mareschal Schomberg, though sometimes thwarted by the jealousy of the Portuguese, in fact directed all the movements and operations. Don John, being repulsed in an attempt to dislodge his enemies from their favourable position, resolved to retire into Spain ; but he was pursued and overtaken on the second day of his march, in the vicinity of Estremos. A battle being now unavoidable, Don John possessed himself of two hills, on which he planted his cannon and the greater part of his infantry. His baggage was placed in the rear, and the cavalry was drawn up in four bodies on the plain below. The fight continued for a long while doubtful, till the English auxiliaries, in the service of Portugal, undertook to climb on their hands and feet, the steep hills on which the Spaniards were posted, and, though many of them were slain in the attempt, the greater part gained the summits. This exploit encouraged three regiments of Portuguese infantry to ascend by an easier and more circuitous path. The Spanish foot were so daunted by this unexpected boldness of the enemy, that they immediately betook themselves to flight, though Don John, alighting from his charger, used every exertion to induce them to rally and face their antagonists : and now the Portuguese horse, which had also been successful against the Spanish cavalry, advancing to second their foot, a dreadful slaughter ensued. Don John, as if in despair at the frustration of his hopes, appeared unwilling to survive the defeat. After having two horses killed under him, he rushed amid the

ranks of the enemy, and fought for some time on foot with a pike in his hand. The Duke of San-German, who had led the Spanish van on its march, and had been sent on before, to mark out a camp, hearing the report of artillery, hastened back, and finding the whole army dispersed and routed, he with much difficulty persuaded Don John to save himself by flight. In this battle the Spaniards had nearly 10,000 men killed or taken prisoners. Among the latter were Don Añello de Guzman, second son of the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres, and the Marques of Liche, who attempted by his valour and good conduct on this occasion to atone for his recent act of treason.¹ The governor who had been placed by the Spaniards in Evora after its capture, defended it for some days against the assaults principally of the English ; but being informed of the discomfiture of Don John, he surrendered with his garrison on honourable conditions.

In the Lisbon Gazette, giving an account of these successes, the victory of Estremos, or Ameixal, as it is sometimes called, was chiefly attributed to the English ;² and Charles II. was so pleased with the gallantry of his troops on this occasion, that he caused a gratuity of 40,000 crowns to be distributed among them : but they nevertheless suffered much from the neglect and ingratitude of the Portuguese. The respect in which the services of the English were held by the Court of Madrid, was still more flattering to their valour and conduct, than the applause of the Portuguese, or the approbation of their own sovereign :³ A treaty of commerce was at this time in dependence between Great Britain and Spain, but the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres would agree to no terms unless the King of England desisted from supporting the

¹ See above, p. 620.

² Pepy's *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 68.

³ "La victoria se debio" (says the Spanish historian Ortiz) "à la infanteria Inglesa." t. vi. lib. 20. c. 13.

Portuguese with auxiliary troops : and he attempted to entrap the English envoy, Sir R. Fanshawe, into a dereliction of Portugal, by introducing a provision into one of the articles of the proposed treaty, that neither king should assist rebels, under which name the Spanish ministry comprehended the Portuguese and the family of Braganza.¹

The ascendancy which the signal victory of Estremos had gained for the Portuguese, was preserved during the ensuing campaign in 1664. At the opening of spring, the chief army of Portugal, consisting of 15,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry, assembled at the scene of their recent triumph, and thence marched to the frontiers of Castile, which, having crossed, they laid siege to Valencia de Alcantara, a place strong by nature, though not regularly fortified. Don John, who was by this time at Badajoz, had collected the remains of his broken army, and received some recruits from Galicia. But though he had a powerful body of horse, he was neither possessed of a sufficient number of infantry, nor sufficient stores of ammunition to enable him to encounter the Portuguese in the field. He ordered his cavalry, however, to follow their motions, in order to prevent them from straying in bands to waste the country ; and he also caused the frontier towns to be strongly garrisoned. He likewise attempted to raise the siege of Valencia de Alcantara ; but all his exertions for its relief having proved ineffectual, the fortress capitulated, after having made a vigorous resistance.²

About the same time, the Duke of Ossuna, who had been so unfortunate during his recent campaign in Galicia, bethought himself of retrieving his lost reputation, by such successes as he anticipated would form a striking contrast to the disasters of Don John. He accordingly marched with an army of 7000 men, to a Portuguese town called Castel-Rodrigo, which was encompassed by

¹ Fanshawe's *Letters*, p. 248.

² Stevens, *Continuation*.

an old but strong wall, with several outworks, and was still better secured by the courage and experience of its governor Ferreira, who had there in garrison some regiments of tried valour. After being foiled in all his attempts to take it by storm or by surprise, Ossuna resolved on a regular siege, and having raised his batteries, he had nearly beat down the walls with his heavy artillery, when Pedro de Magalläens, who commanded some Portuguese troops in the vicinity, marched to its succour. When he had approached near the Spanish quarters, he so disposed his bands that the Duke d'Ossuna could not judge of their number, and believing the force brought against him to be much more formidable than it really was, he drew off his troops from the siege. Having gained this point, the Portuguese General resolved to pursue him, and, if possible, compel him to an engagement before he received the reinforcements of which he was in expectation. The Duke, who was not distinguished by his prudence or conduct, was easily drawn into a battle; and his troops, by their precipitation at the first onset, having thrown themselves into confusion, were totally routed, with the loss of 2000 killed, 500 prisoners, the equipage of the Duke d'Ossuna, and the whole artillery,¹ consisting of nine brass cannon, which had been cast by order of Charles V. and placed in Burgos, whence they had been brought to Ossuna's army a very short while before this catastrophe.² On the whole, the defeat was accounted so disgraceful, and the misconduct of the Duke so glaring, that the Court of Madrid imposed on him a fine of 100,000 crowns, as a penalty for his gross mismanagement.³

The chief Spanish army, which had been reinforced and concentrated under Don John, was prevented from retrieving affairs by the hatred and jealousy which the

¹ Stevens, *Continuation*.

² Fanshawe's *Letters*, p. 143.

³ Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

Queen entertained towards its commander. Wishing completely to ruin him, or at least to involve him in some signal disgrace, she intercepted the pecuniary supplies, and the provisions which were destined for his troops.¹ After reiterated complaints, which never reached the ear of the King, Don John resolved to leave the army, and repair in person to Madrid, in order to lay before Philip the situation in which he was placed, and to inform him that he had received little more than one half of the sum which had been provided for the exigencies of the soldiery. But the mind of Philip being now pre-occupied by the insidious representations of the Queen, he was refused an interview, and, as a punishment for his late disasters, as also for quitting the army without leave of absence, he was ordered to withdraw to Consuegra, which was his abode, as Prior of Castile.² After his retirement to that residence, he was farther injured in his reputation by a calumnious report spread abroad by the partizans of the Queen, and very generally believed, that he had carried to Consuegra, for his own use, the funds which had been sent to the frontiers for the service of the army.³ He shortly afterwards obtained leave to remove from his priory to Ocana, which is within two leagues distance of Aranjuez; and during a short residence of the Court at that palace, in the spring of 1665, he was permitted to visit his majesty. The interview between them was very short, and all that passed was mere form. *Como venis—Como estays—Dios os guarde*, were all the words he received from his once tender father. On quitting the king, his Highness was admitted to an audience of the queen, and after the same brief ceremony, and receiving a present of a jewel, he departed to the

¹ Ortiz, *Compend. Cronol.* t. vi. 20, 13.

² Desormeaux, *Abregé Chronol.*

³ Fanshawe's *Letters*, p. 193.

place whence he came.¹ During the remainder of the life of Philip, the queen never ceased to render odious to him a son who had been once so esteemed and beloved, and who, though he had recently proved unfortunate in his military operations, was still the only Spanish general in any degree capable of leading an army, or retrieving the almost desperate affairs of his country.

On the departure of Don John from the army, he had left the command with the French officer Count Marsin, who, as we have seen,² had entered the Spanish service on the revolt of his patron the Prince of Condé. In a short while, however, the direction was assumed by the Marques of Caracena, who had been recently summoned from the Netherlands, and Marsin declining to serve except under Don John, returned to Madrid. The Duke of York, in his *Memoirs* says, "that Caracena was certainly a very good officer, had served long, and passed through all the degrees, insomuch that, by his own merit, he had advanced himself to the post which he then enjoyed in the Netherlands."³ Caracena undertook this command with much reluctance, and would only accept of it under specific conditions of adequate preparations, and faithful performance by the ministry of all the stipulations.⁴ Supplies of every sort were in consequence provided, and 5000 Swiss auxiliaries being taken into pay, were landed in Catalonia, and marched forward to his army.

Notwithstanding these preparations, the Marques of Caracena suffered even severer losses than those which had been sustained by his predecessor. Having reviewed his forces, which, when fully mustered, he found to con-

¹ Fanshawe's *Letters*, p. 300. App. *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe*. Besides the old printed collection of Sir R. Fanshawe's letters, edited in 1702, extracts of several others have been appended to Lady Fanshawe's *Memoirs*, from the MSS. in the British Museum.

² See above, p. 497. ³ t. i. p. 311. ⁴ Fanshawe's *Lett.* p. 413.

sist of 12,000 infantry and about 7000 cavalry, he marched into Portugal, with the design of laying siege to Villaviciosa. This delightful town, the ancient seat and patrimony of the Dukes of Braganza, was divided into three parts,—the town properly so called, encompassed with an old wall, and but thinly inhabited,—the suburbs containing several monasteries, and the palace of Braganza,—and, towering above all, the castle, which was tolerably fortified, having a moat, a covert way, and a half-moon, with various other works. Christopher Brito was governor of the place, and had under him 1000 soldiers of the garrison, besides those townsmen who were fit to bear arms. After some defence of the suburbs, the governor, considering that these were too far removed from the town to be retained, without hazard of weakening his main strength, resolved to abandon them to the Spaniards, who, on entering them, committed many cruel outrages on the inhabitants. Being thus possessed of the suburbs, Caracena planted his cannon against the town, and having made some breaches in the wall, he carried the place by a general assault. The garrison and armed citizens were then forced to retire into the castle, which the Marques now summoned to surrender, and receiving no answer, raised a formidable battery against it.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese army, under the Count of Castanheda¹ and Mareschal Schomberg, was advancing to its relief. The generals on both sides being resolved to hazard an engagement, the two armies met on the plain of Montesclaros, in the vicinity of Villaviciosa. This space was encompassed with hills, and was intersected by ditches and other impediments to military operations. The Portuguese force amounted to 22,000 men, and was stronger than the Spanish army, which had been much weakened by losses sustained in the siege of Villaviciosa,

¹ He was about this time created Marques of Marialva.

and diminished by the absence of a detachment left before the castle.

The battle commenced with a charge made by Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, General of the Italian cavalry, on the right wing of the Portuguese, which was executed with a spirit and valour worthy of the illustrious name he bore. In consequence of it, the first line of the Portuguese army on the right, which consisted chiefly of horse, was driven in great disorder on the rear. Schomberg having advanced to rally them, the Prince of Parma, who had an eye on all his movements, engaged with him in personal combat, by striking him on the breast two blows with his sabre, which nearly threw him from the saddle, and would have slain him, had not the Prince's sword been shattered, at the second stroke, on the cuirass which the mareschal wore under his uniform.¹ But, though this first attack proved in a great measure successful, the Spaniards having broken their ranks in the pursuit, fell among the pikes of the foot-soldiers, who were stationed in the rear, or were mingled among the horse. Being sorely galled by these weapons, and the enemy's cavalry now rallying, they were in their turn thrown into disorder. The fight was soon restored by the exertions of their General, and was continued for some hours with various vicissitudes, till at length, when the success still hung doubtful, a body of Switzers, who were serving in the Spanish army, being discontented for want of their pay, which had been long withheld, went over to the enemy during the heat of the engagement. The Spaniards, dismayed at this unexpected occurrence, began to retire. At first they retreated in good order, because the Portuguese were scarcely in a condition immediately to follow them. But some troops of horse at length pursuing them, and wheeling round till they came in their front, arrested

¹ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xxxiii.

their march, while the Portuguese general overtook their rear with his main force. Being thus surrounded, without hope of safety either from resistance or flight, the Spaniards were finally overthrown, and cut to pieces. About 4000 infantry, composed of Italians and Walloons, who, before the Spaniards were enclosed, had retreated to a place of strength, seeing the whole army lost, surrendered at discretion. Near 1000 more, who had fled to some adjacent woods, either perished there, or were taken prisoners. The total loss of the vanquished amounted to 5000 killed, and the same number taken prisoners, being more than one-half of their whole force. The Marques Caracena, seeing the irretrievable ruin of his army, made his way with all possible expedition to Villaviciosa, where he ordered the troops which he had left there instantly to raise the siege of the castle, lest they should be overwhelmed by the victorious enemy. They, accordingly, with all speed, drew off their artillery, and marching in good order, though often attacked by the Portuguese, effected their retreat to Badajoz, whither the small remainder of the discomfited army had likewise fled.¹

The decisive battle of Montesclaros completed the misfortunes and national disgrace of Spain. It finally fixed the crown on the head of the King of Portugal, and highly raised that country in the scale of European nations. For this splendid victory, however, as well as all their previous successes, the Portuguese were chiefly indebted to the military skill of Mareschal Schomberg, and the valour of the foreign auxiliaries.

Following up their triumph at Montesclaros, the Portuguese insulted the Spanish territory by an irruption into Andalusia, where they entered several open towns, and carried off an immense booty. Discontent and alarm

¹ Stevens, *Continuation*.

became general at Madrid, the ministry lost all credit and authority, and the populace openly upbraided them with betraying Don John, and sacrificing the glory of Castile to the interests of a faction.

The depreciation of brass coin, which had recently been lowered by order of government, produced a dearth of provisions in the capital, since, from the standard of value being reduced, the villagers did not chuse to bring in and dispose of their victuals at what they conceived to be an inadequate price. In consequence of this deficiency in the usual supplies, there were constant uproars and disturbances on the streets, and on the very walls of the palace there was written, in open day, this piece of quibbling but audacious treason,—*Si el Rey no muere, el Reyno muere.*¹ The grievance at length was only remedied by the most extraordinary measures of compulsion. “Since my last to you of yesterday,” says Sir R. Fanshawe, who was in Madrid at the time, “the President of Castile having, by the King’s special and angry command, gone forth to the neighbouring villages, attended by the hangman, and whatsoever else of terror incident to his place and derogatory to his person, the markets in this town begin to be furnished again plentifully enough.”²

About the same calamitous period, insurrections in the different provinces, particularly a serious revolt in Valencia, filled up the measure of national misfortunes, and contributed to render Spain the most unhappy country in Europe.

Amid all these foreign and domestic distresses, Philip scarcely knew in what quarter to apply for counsel or advice. Since the death of Luis de Haro, his confidence had been chiefly shared by the Count of Castiglio and

¹ Fanshawe’s *Letters*, ed. 1702, p. 260.

² *Id.* p. 265.

the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres, who were amicably inclined towards each other, and had hitherto acted without dissension. But one evening in May 1664, after a dramatic representation at Buenretiro, the Marques of Albuzan, a near relative of the Count Castiglio, in consequence of some offensive expressions which had been used towards him, challenged Domingo Guzman, son of the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres. A mortal combat ensued on the spot, and the challenger was slain by his adversary under the walls of the palace.¹ This fatal occurrence produced an enmity between the two ministers, which soon increased to such a height, that each opposed whatever measures the other promoted. A species of interregnum consequently ensued in all the affairs of government; and both the king and nation lamented even the times when Olivarez conducted all things with absolute sway. Subsequent to this period, however, the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres was usually considered as holding the rank of prime minister, and was addressed as such by the ambassadors of foreign states.

The spirits of King Philip had visibly declined after the dreadful defeat of Don John at Estremos, by which he had been deeply affected; but when he received intelligence of the disaster at Montesclaros, he had only strength to say, It is the will of God; and dropping the fatal despatches, he fell down in a swoon. Grief, anxiety, and apprehension, presented themselves in every shape to injure his health and abridge his days. During a long reign of almost ceaseless misfortunes, he had endured adversity with singular equanimity. The losses he sustained from the arms of France, he probably felt as no degradation; but he could not brook discomfiture from those whom he accounted as rebels against his authority, and whom he had been taught from his youth to detest

¹ Fanshawe's *Letters*.

and despise. The deep mortification which he in consequence experienced, and a mental despondency inherent in his race, at length induced, or at least aggravated, those bodily ailments and sufferings with which he now began to be afflicted.

Philip's constitution was naturally robust and sound ; and in so far as regarded extreme temperance in diet, he had used every precaution to preserve his health. Lord Clarendon, who was introduced to his presence at Madrid, in the year 1649, says, " that at that time he appeared to have great vigour of body, having a clear ruddy complexion : yet he had been accustomed to fevers from his debaucheries with women, by which he was much wasted." ¹ In fact, however, his constitution was first seriously impaired by a severe cold which he caught on a journey to Aranjuez in 1659, from which he had not fully recovered, when he set out, in inclement weather, to meet Louis XIV. on the Pyrenees. He never was completely relieved from the effects of that illness, and it was succeeded by a slight paralysis in one of his arms and in his right foot.² He was seized with a fit of the stone at Aranjuez in spring 1664,³ and in the summer of that season he was so debilitated, that though occasionally receiving the foreign ambassadors, he was obliged to give them but short and interrupted audiences.⁴ At the close of the year he had a renewed attack of the complaint with which he had been afflicted at Aranjuez in its commencement.⁵ In April following he passed a fortnight with

¹ *History of the Rebellion*, b. xii.

² Rodriguez de Monforte, *Honras de Felipe IV.* p. 6.

³ Fanshawe's *Letters*, p. 78.

⁴ *Id.* p. 113.

⁵ Sir R. Fanshawe, in a letter dated about this time (January 1665), says, " By what I can collect, crazy as he is, the King may rub out many years. His Majesty eats and drinks ordinarily, with a very good stomach, I am told, three comfortable meals a-day ;

the Queen at Aranjuez, and, though before going there it was doubted whether he had sufficient strength to perform the journey of seven leagues in two days in a coach or litter, he had been so much recruited by the salubrity of the place in that season, that he one day sat on horse-back three hours, and killed a wolf with his own hand.¹ On his return, however, to Madrid, a stone, which had formed and lodged in the kidneys, having produced ulceration, occasioned excessive torture and frequent discharges of blood. He continued in this state for four months, enduring his sufferings, not only with fortitude, but almost without complaint, and, even during this aggravated stage of his complaint, he spent some time daily in business with his ministers, the Count of Castiglio and the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres.² Those emollient drugs and fomentations, which had often produced temporary relief, failed of their beneficial effect in the more advanced and exasperated stage of the disorder; and it was reported, that one of the potions which had been administered to him, while it assuaged his sufferings, debilitated his constitution, and daily rendered him more feeble.³

At length, on the morning of the 12th September, after a sleepless night, he was attacked with a calenture, accompanied by a dysentery of extreme violence, though probably both were only symptomatic of the primary and full of merry discourse, when and where his lined robe of Spanish and royal gravity is laid aside," p. 421. Sir Richard was mistaken in his prediction as to the endurance of the King's life, and I suspect he was misinformed as to the state of his appetite and spirits.

¹ Fanshawe's *Letters ap. Memoirs*, p. 300.

² Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. xxxiii.

³ La cagione ne viene attribuita a certa bevanda, che gli davano col latte di asina per temperar l'acrimonia dell' orina, che se bene con questo rimedio se gli mitigavano i dolori, egli ne restava però ogni giorno piu debole. (Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. 33.)

complaint. On the appearance of these accessory disorders, Philip gave up all hope, and became fully convinced that his end was approaching. A comet had been seen in the sky at the commencement of his serious illness, but his attendants did not then wish to alarm him by announcing this prognostic of the fate of monarchs. When, at length, the appearance of the portent was communicated to him with all imaginable delicacy and reserve, he replied, that the calenture would be sufficient for him without the comet.¹

The dysentery, in a short while, produced such extreme weakness, that the physicians could not venture to apply the remedies proper for the calenture.² Conscious that his debility was increasing, the King ordered 100,000 masses to be performed after his death for the repose of his soul, observing, “that if he ceased to need them before the number was concluded, they would serve to assist his parents and other relatives who might not yet have reached heaven.”³ On Monday the 14th, he issued orders, that the Eucharist should be communicated to him, and by his own desire, this religious ordinance was performed in presence of his household, the Ecclesiastics and Grandees of the Court. The Patriarch of the Indies, Alonzo de Guzman, solemnly announced to Philip, that the King of Heaven was now about to be present with the greatest potentate on earth.⁴ Having obtained absolution and concluded his creed in these words, “*Lo creo y lo confesso, y quisiere morir per defenderlo,*” he received the chief emblem of his faith amid many tears and repeated protestations of his own unworthiness. On the same day he acknowledged before witnesses the validity of his last testament, drawn up some time before, by which he ap-

¹ R. de Monforte, *Honras de Felipe IV*, p. 19.

² Id. p. 7.

³ Marquis de Langle, *Voyage en Espagne*, t. 1.

⁴ R. Monforte, *Honras*, p. 9.

pointed the Queen, with four councillors, regent of the kingdom, and earnestly recommended his successors to protect the holy office of the Inquisition—excluding from the crown all who might fail in this sacred duty. In his testament, he farther bequeathed to his son a cross which the Emperor Charles had held in his hand at the moment of dissolution. To his Queen he left a small crucifix formed from the true *lignum crucis*, which had been presented to him by the Count-Duke Olivarez, and which he styles a most estimable relic; also all the relics which he had been accustomed to wear on his person, and the precious images which stood at the head of his bed, of which she was to reserve for herself such as she thought proper, and divide the others among the children of the marriage.¹ On the day after he had ratified this document, he took leave of his queen and family, praying Heaven that his infant son and successor might enjoy a reign more prosperous than he had himself experienced.² He enjoined to his daughter due care of her mother, and obedience to all her commands; and then entreated them to withdraw, that human affections might no longer interrupt the contemplations solely due to eternity.³ Don John of Austria, on hearing of his royal father's extreme illness, had hastened from his residence at Ocana, and solicited to see him, through the intervention of the President of Castile. This high functionary, having informed the King that Don John had arrived to implore his blessing, he replied that he had not called him, and desired he should return presently to the place whence he came. But though he carried his displeasure against this once favoured son so far as neither to see him nor vouchsafe his blessing, he recommended to the Queen and her appointed councillors, to employ

¹ Abreu, *Tratados de España*, t. vii. p. 697.

² Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. 33.

³ Monforte, *Honras*, p. 13.

him in the service of the State, and to augment his revenue if the means he already possessed were found to be insufficient for his support.¹

Being now disburdened of all earthly concerns and occupations, the King received extreme unction, and the image of the Lady of Atocha was carried to his chamber in solemn procession. The Duke of Medina de-las-Torres having asked his Majesty if he wished that the relics of St Isidore should be brought to his apartment, he returned an answer which, given at any other time, or proceeding from a less orthodox prince, might be regarded as jocular or sarcastic ; he said that it was more proper they should remain where they were, and that, if they felt disposed to intercede in his behalf, their distance from him could be no obstacle.² In consequence of this reply, which seems to have occasioned some little scandal, he was spared any farther visitations from relics or images : but he was exorcised, according to the most approved form, by his confessor and another Franciscan father, who, while so many natural causes were hastening his decay, believed or pretended to believe, that the apparent extenuation of his frame was but the effect of magical delusion.³ On the following day (16th September), having expressed a wish again to communicate, one of his chaplains, Rodriguez de Monforte, who has left a circumstantial account of his decease and interment, entered his chamber to celebrate mass, and from his hands he received the last sacrament of the altar. He also craved absolution from Borromeo, the Pope's Nuncio, who was introduced for this purpose. He lastly required that an image of our Saviour, which stood by the wall of the apartment, should be placed on his bed. His parting words were expressive of the confidence with which it inspired him ; and fervent-

¹ Fanshawe's *Letters*, ap. *Memoirs*, p. 303.

² Monforte, *Honras*.

³ Brusoni, *Hist. d'Italia*, lib. 33.

ly embracing this emblem of the faith he followed and professed, he at length, after a series of convulsive paroxysms, breathed his last.¹

Philip IV. apparently expired with the same pious sentiments as his father, *Felipe pio y bueno*. But in Spain there was a fixed royal ceremonial for the deathbed as much as for the dress or the table. I doubt not that Philip comported himself according to rule; yet, had he deviated from the ritual, the ecclesiastical functionaries by whom his couch was surrounded, would doubtless have spread the report that he had passed to a better life, with all the usual appliances and accustomed observances.

King Philip died between four and five in the morning of the 17th of September 1665, in the 61st year of his age, and the 45th of his reign. His decease was instantly notified by the tolling of all the bells in the capital; and it appeared somewhat observable to Sir Richard Fanshawe, the English ambassador, who was in Madrid at the time, "that neither his Majesty's sickness nor his death was concealed one moment from the people."²

"After his decease," says Lady Fanshawe, "the body of Philip IV. lay exposed from the 18th of September till Saturday night the 19th, in a great room in his palace, where he died, in which room they used to act plays. The room was hung with fourteen pieces of the King's best hangings, and over them rich pictures round about, all of one size, placed close together. At the upper end of the room was raised a throne of three steps, upon which there was placed a bedstead, boarded at the bottom, and raised at the head. The throne was covered with a rich Persia carpet, the bottom of the bedstead was of silver,

¹ Monforte, *Honras*. His body having been opened six hours after his death, it was found that a stone of great magnitude had been formed and lodged in the kidneys.

² Fanshawe's *Letters*, ap. *Memoirs*, p. 302.

the valance and head-cloth (for there were no curtains) were cloth of gold, wrought in flowers with crimson silk. Over the bedstead was placed a cloth of state of the same with the valance and head-cloth of the bedstead, upon which stood a silver-gilt coffin, raised about a foot or more higher at the head than at the foot, in which was laid a pillow, and in the coffin lay Philip IV. with his head on the pillow, upon it a white beaver hat, his head combed, his beard trimmed, his face and hands painted. He was clothed in a musk-colour silk suit, embroidered with gold, a golilla (or ruff) about his neck, cuffs on his hands, which were clasped on his breast, holding a globe and a cross on it therein; his cloak was of the same, with his sword by his side: stockings, garters and shoe-strings of the same, and a pair of white shoes on his feet. In the room were erected six altars for the time, upon which stood six candlesticks, with six wax candles lighted, and in the middle of each altar a crucifix; the forepart of each altar was covered with black velvet, embroidered with silver. Before the throne a rail went across from one side of the room to the other. At the two lower corners of the throne, at each side, stood a nobleman, the one holding an imperial crown, the other the sceptre; and on each side of the throne six high candlesticks, with six tapers in them. The doors of that room were kept by the Mayordomo of the King and Queen, then in waiting, and the outward by the Italian guard.”¹

All this at first sight appears an idle and empty pageant: but in a moral view, it is perhaps not injudicious, ere the final transfer to the tomb, thus to link the emblems of regal dignity to the remains of mortality; for never can the nothingness of all earthly power and splendour more forcibly strike the fancy than when we thus behold the attributes of royalty associated with the image of death.

¹ Lady Fanshawe's *Memoirs*, p. 221, &c.

After the body had lain during the appointed time in melancholy magnificence, it was conveyed to the Escorial, to be enshrined in that superb pantheon, where the Spanish monarchs vainly attempted to guard themselves with sepulchral pride against the common destiny of man.

Philip II, who founded the Escorial, declared that he had formed a habitation for God, but that he left it to his successors to construct their tombs. His son Philip III. accordingly commenced that subterranean receptacle, or burial chapel, for the kings of Spain, their consorts and descendants, which was called the Pantheon, because it was built in imitation of the Pantheon at Rome, founded by Agrippa, where each of the gods had his niche and statue. Being left imperfect by the third Philip, it was continued by his successor, and was completed by that monarch in the year 1654. When the edifice was finished, Philip IV. gave the following directions, by a mandate, dated Madrid, March 1654: "You shall place in the Pantheon the Emperor Charles V. and Donna Isabella his queen; Philip II. and his queen Donna Anna; Philip III. and the Queen Donna Marguerita, and the Queen Donna Isabella my much loved wife. The first urn shall be for the Emperor Charles; the last I design for myself, whenever it shall please God to call me from this life." After this mandate had been issued, Philip removed the bodies, designed for the mausoleum, from their ancient sepulchres, with all the funeral pomp and solemnity imaginable, and they were re-interred with the most awful services of mass and burial, at which Philip assisted in person. At the conclusion of the ceremony, a monk of the order of St Jerome, which was that established at the Escorial, delivered a funeral oration on a text from the Prophet Ezekiel, "O ye dry bones, hear the word of the Lord."¹

¹ Clarke's *Letters concerning the Spanish Nation*, 1760-61. Letter 8th.

When Philip found his health beginning to decline, he made frequent excursions to the Escorial, in order to visit the Pantheon, and expedite some alterations and repairs which he had recently projected. It is said that Louis XIV. quitted the beautiful sojourn of St Germain, because the cloisters of St Denis, which contained the tombs of the kings of France were desecrated from it, and established himself at a distance, amid the deserts of Versailles.¹ But his contemporary, Philip of Spain, shrunk not from the touch of death's icy finger. Each time that he descended to the Pantheon, he fitted his body into the niche which was prepared for its final reception. Here, too, he attended the celebration of mass, and other religious rites—a chair being placed for him in the receptacle where his body was shortly to be enshrined.² Lady Fanshawe, who visited the Pantheon after the alterations had been completed, and about ten months previous to the interment of Philip, declares that this chamber of death “ was the most glorious place that it is possible to imagine. The descent is about thirty steps, all of polished marble, and arched and lined on all sides with jasper polished ; upon the left hand, in the middle of the stairs, is a large vault, in which their kings, and queens that have been mothers of kings, lie in silver coffins for one year, until the moisture of their bodies be consumed. Over against this is another vault, in which lie buried the bodies of those queens that had no sons at their death, and all the children of their kings that did not inherit. At the bottom of the stairs is the Pantheon, built eighty feet square, and is, I guess, about sixty feet over : The whole lining of it, in all places, is jasper very curiously carved, in figures and flowers and imagery ; and

¹ Volney's *Ruins of Empires*.

² Ludema, *Oracion Panegirico del Rey Felipe IV.* ed. Madrid, 1676.

a branch lustre for forty lights, which is vastly rich, of silver, and hangs down from the top by a silver chain, within three yards of the bottom, and is made with great art, as is also this curious knot of jasper on the floor, that the reflection of the branch and lights is perfectly there to be seen. The bodies of their kings lie in jasper stones, supported every coffin by four lions of jasper at the four corners. Three coffins and three headstones are set in every arch, which arch is curiously wrought in the roof, and supported by jasper pillars. There are seven arches, and one in the middle at the upper end, and over against the coming in, that contains a very curious altar, and crucifix of jasper.”¹

To this dormitory, at a period perhaps accelerated by mental suffering, the body of Philip was conveyed. “On the Saturday night after his death,” says Lady Fanshawe, “he was carried upon a bier hung betwixt two mules, on which the coffin with the King’s body was laid, covered with a covering of cloth of gold, and at every corner of the bier was placed a high crystal lanthorn with lighted tapers in it. He was attended by some grandees, who rode next after him, and other noblemen in coaches, with between two and three hundred on horseback, of whom a great part carried tapers lighted in their hands; this was the company, besides footmen.”² When at the Escorial in the year 1662, Philip had given a rescript adjusting the ceremonial to be observed at his obsequies, and settling some differences which, on similar occasions, had arisen with regard to precedence between the royal chaplains and those of the convent of St Laurence at the Escorial, particularly at the funeral of the Infant Philip Prospero.³ The body of King Philip was, of course, deposited strictly according to the forms he had

¹ Fanshawe’s *Memoirs*, p. 198.

² *Memoirs*, p. 223.

³ Monforte, *Honras*.

himself enjoined. When it approached the convent of the Escorial, the friars stood at the gate and asked the grandees who bore it on their shoulders, "Who was in that coffin, and what was their demand?" on which the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres, the *Summiller de Corps*, answered, "It is the body of Philip IV. of Spain which we here bring for you to lay in his own tomb." The Duke also delivered the Queen's letter as Regent of the kingdom, to testify that it was her Majesty's desire he should be there buried. The prior of the convent having read the letter, accompanied the body to the high altar, where it was for some time laid, till the Hieronymites of the Escorial had gone through the prescribed and appropriate ceremonies. When these had been duly performed, the Grandees again lifted the bier and carried it down into the Pantheon, where, as soon as they had entered, the prior demanded from the Duke the covering of the King's body as his perquisite.¹ After the corpse had lain for a due time in the vault, the prior deposited it in the niche adjacent to the remains of Philip III, and opposite to those of Queen Isabella. It was enclosed in a sarcophagus of porphyry, on which a brass plate merely recorded the name of the monarch whose dust it contained.²

The annals of modern history have left no memorial of a reign so unfortunate as that of Philip IV. Other sovereigns may have suffered more individually, and he himself beheld contemporary princes perish by the dagger of the assassin, on the field of battle, and on the scaffold; but never in a public and national view was reign so unhappy. The loss of Roussillon, Cerdeña, a part of the Austrian Netherlands, Jamaica, and Portugal, with the capture or plunder by the Dutch of the settlements in

¹ *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe*, p. 224.

² Clarke's *Letters*, let. 8.

the Indies, are miserable proofs of the imbecility of Philip's administration, and the decay of martial spirit among the Spanish people. But the diminution of territorial possessions was the least evil of his reign. The decline of trade,—the depopulation of the chief towns,—the disorder in the finances,—and the insurrections in the provinces, particularly Catalonia, rendered Spain, during half a century, more wretched than it had ever been since the first invasion of the Moors.

If the ministers of kings be alone responsible for the acts of their masters during their lives, posterity often demands from the memory of the monarch, with stern exactness, a long and severe reckoning. For much of the national calamity Philip must be held accountable. He was clement, indeed, and benevolent, and loved his subjects with paternal affection. Amid disaster he displayed a fortitude which never was surpassed; and he showed all the resignation of his grandsire under misfortunes far more fatal than the loss of an Armada. Nor was he by any means destitute of understanding and intelligence. Lord Clarendon, who was admitted to a long and important audience in the year 1649, says, "that after the formal part was over, the King asked many questions, and discoursed very intelligently of every thing, so that his defects proceeded only from the laziness of his mind, not from any want of understanding."¹ But in this voluptuous indolence he was so sunk, that he entirely resigned the reins of government to favourites, who frequently deceived him, or abused his confidence. From time to time, when struck by the reproaches of conscience, or alarmed by some signal disaster, or excited by the voice of his people, he made a feeble effort to throw off his languor, and to guide with his own hand the helm of state: but, soon led away by his long indulgence in sensual gratifications, he re-

¹ *Hist. of Rebellion*, b. xii.

lapsed into his former listlessness. Hence, though he loved his subjects, he was neither beloved in return, nor respected, because they knew that he never laboured or exerted himself for their felicity. Hence, too, the grantees sought not to merit, by useful services, the favour of a king, who only judged of their deserts through the medium of others. They became, like their master, feeble and voluptuous. The indolence which had so long prevailed in the Court, soon infected the people, till scarcely a spark remained in the nation of that dignity, constancy, and valour, which, in the days of the Emperor Charles, rendered Spain the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.

But though utterly deficient in the qualities of a monarch, Philip was graced by many of the accomplishments which shed elegance and dignity on private life. The Count-Duke, indeed, had early inspired him with a relish for literature and the fine arts, and for every thing that might abstract his mind from the concerns of government. He was thus thoroughly imbued with a taste for painting, music, poetry, and all sorts of dramatic exhibitions. Many volumes of his compositions are preserved, it is said, in the Royal Library of Spain, as also translations of Guicciardini's History of Italy, and Luis Guicciardini's Account of the Netherlands, with an elegant introduction from his own pen.¹ He is likewise reported to have contributed to the Spanish theatre some plays and interludes under the name of *Ingenio de esta Corte*.² However this may be, his passion for the theatre, and the expense incurred in dramatic spectacles, directed the attention of the Spaniards to all that concerned the stage. Lope de Vega, who survived fifteen years after the accession of Philip, was uni-

¹ Pellicer, *Origen y Progresos de la Comedia en España*, p. 162.

² Lord Holland's *Life of Lope de Vega*, vol. i. p. 82. Sismondi, *Hist. de la Litterature du Midi de l'Europe*, t. iv. p. 209-10.

versally held in the highest estimation, and the brilliancy of the comedies of Calderon was aided by all the novelty and magnificence of scenic decoration. The ostentation of the Court outlived the defeat of armies and loss of provinces. Pellicer has left us a full description of the splendid dramatic festivals exhibited for the recreation of his Majesty in 1631, in the gardens of the Count of Monterey, adjacent to the Prado, and by the Count-Duke Olivarez on the eve of St John.¹ At the same period, those celebrated wits Velez de Guevara, and Quevedo, who has been styled the Voltaire of Spain, infused life and spirit into the court and palace of Philip. The grace and facility of the former introduced him to the confidence and familiarity of his sovereign, and procured for him the situation of a chamberlain in his household. The latter was for some time one of the royal secretaries, and formed the delight and admiration of the Court, till some satirical verses, in which he had allowed too free a vent to his caustic genius, gave bitter offence to Olivarez, and drew down the vengeance of that vindictive minister.

Louis XIV. patronized the fine arts in France because he thought they conduced to the glory and splendour of the monarchy: but his contemporary Philip IV. encouraged them because he was himself an artist, and, like Charles I. of England, loved the arts for themselves. Before his accession to the throne, he had successfully studied design, and had become a considerable proficient in drawing, under the instructions of the painter Mayno.² Sensibly alive to the beauties of art, he not only shed over it a golden patronage, but he distinguished its followers by that condescension and familiarity which artists in those times regarded as the best rewards of genius.

Soon after his accession to the throne, Rubens, having

¹ *Origen de la Comed. en España*, part 1. p. 175, part 2. p. 167.

² Palomino Velasco, *Vidas de los Pintores*.

come to Spain under the protection of Charles of England, was engaged by Philip to execute a series of appropriate paintings for one of his hunting seats in the neighbourhood of Madrid, which had recently been completed.¹ At a subsequent period this Flemish artist passed nine months at Madrid in the character of envoy from Brussels, and during that time was employed in finishing several of his master-pieces for the royal palace at Madrid, and in copying some of the chief performances of Titian. During the stay of this eminent painter, Philip bestowed on him the honour of knighthood, and appointed him a gentleman of his chamber. At his departure he received many distinguished marks of the royal approbation and favour, and among others, a ring worth 2000 ducats. But the arts have been chiefly indebted to Philip, on account of the noble patronage which he extended to Velasquez. About two years after his accession to the throne he sat for his portrait to this great master, who was at that time an inmate of the house of his minister Olivarrez; and so pleased was Philip with his performance, that though he had now been delineated by all the chief artists in Spain, he declared, that the representation of his royal figure should in future be solely entrusted to the pencil of Velasquez. He was shortly afterwards appointed the King's painter, with a large salary, and suitable mansion for his residence. He was then made usher of the chamber, an office of great rank and honour, and a painting room was allotted for him in the palace, where, at leisure hours, Philip often repaired, in the same manner as the Emperor Charles had resorted for his amusement to the apartments of Titian, and Philip II. to those of Cöello. It is even said that the King received him into his strictest confidence, and frequently advised with him on affairs of the greatest delicacy and importance. He also accom-

¹ Cumberland's *Anecdotes of Painters in Spain*, vol. i.

panied his royal master in most of his journeys through the provinces of Spain. He attended him to Aragon on one of the expeditions he undertook with a view of quieting the tumults in Catalonia, and to the Isle of Pheasants, when he went to ratify the treaty of the Pyrenees. In the year 1648 he was despatched on a special political embassy to Pope Innocent VIII, with a commission at the same time, to purchase statues and pictures in Italy, for the royal collection. Contemporary with Velasquez, and next to him in merit, Alonso Cano, who, like Michel Angelo, excelled in painting, sculpture, and architecture, having fled on account of some offence from Madrid to Seville, was brought back by order of the King, and not only pardoned, but nominated chief royal architect, and teacher of the fine arts to the Prince Balthazar. Francisco Zurburan was likewise in high favour with Philip, and after being long employed in embellishing Buenretiro, the Casa del Campo, and other royal residences, he was appointed King's painter, on the death of Velasquez. The retired and studious habits of the diffident Murillo, the tardy development of his genius, and his attachment to his native country, which detained him almost constantly at Seville, prevented him from partaking so liberally of the regal bounty as his merits entitled him; but he, too, was employed by Philip to paint several historical pictures, of which the subjects were prescribed to him; and, during his short stay at Madrid, he received some testimonies of his Majesty's consideration and kindness.

Naturally fond of the fine arts, Philip had also become an excellent judge and critic, under the tuition of Velasquez. The taste of the sovereign spread through the court; and the distinguished patronage which was extended to eminence, but was always withheld from mediocrity, encouraged artists to attain in their profession that supreme

excellence which was sure to call forth the royal bounty, but without which no reward could be expected from the refined and discerning taste of Philip.

Not satisfied with merely fostering the exertions of native genius, Philip was at the utmost pains to assemble the richest treasures of art from all quarters of Europe. The Count de Castiglio, when Viceroy of Naples, made a valuable collection from the exuberant stores of that kingdom. It was by the special order of Philip, that the *Madonna del Pesce* of Raphael, in which Tobit offers a tribute of fish to our Saviour and the Virgin, was brought from Naples to Spain, where it long shone a chief ornament of the Escorial. Some of the finest paintings which had belonged to Charles I, were purchased for Philip at the sale of the effects of that distinguished connoisseur. Among these was a virgin and child by Andrea del Sarto, —our Saviour washing his disciples' feet, by Tintoretto, —and a holy family by Raphael, on beholding which, Philip exclaimed in ecstasy, "*O Perla mia*," (O my jewel), whence it has ever since borne the name of the *Perla* of Raphael;¹ and is said in fact to exhibit, in their highest perfection, the learned composition—the nobleness of design—the correctness of drawing, and all those various excellencies which characterise the productions of that transcendent master.

Nor was this accomplished monarch without some of the minor and negative virtues of private life. In diet he was most regular and abstemious; he took but a small quantity of food, and seldom varied its quality. Though ruling over the land of Sherry, Malaga, Val de Peñas and Paxarete, he altogether excluded wine from his table, and in place of it, he used cinnamon water, of which he drank twice in the course of his repast.² He usually eat alone,

¹ Swinburne's *Travels*, vol. ii. letter 43.

² Zanetornato, *Relazione del Governo della Corte di Spagna* (Cos-

and apart from his queen and family ; but attended by his physician, and by his gentlemen of the chamber, who were all grandees of Spain. His extreme punctuality in all arrangements for the disposal of his time, and the precision with which their respective duties were allotted to each of his domestics, rendered his service light. But, with all this household regularity, he was extremely improvident, and spent his revenues without consideration. For example, during the stay of the court at Buenretiro, which is immediately beyond the walls of Madrid, though the park is within them, the royal household demanded double allowance for their rations, on pretence that this palace was a country residence. Some one, in order to get quit of this claim, advised the king, that the park-gate towards the city should alone be kept open, and that which leads to the country shut up. But the king considered this as a subterfuge, and, in consequence, incurred an additional annual expense of 40,000 reals. He bestowed on one of the sons of Don Luis de Haro 50,000 pieces of eight, for having arranged to his satisfaction a comic representation or *ballet*, which was got up for the entertainment of the ladies of the palace and household. Each royal bull-fight cost 60,000 reals, and the festivals and stage-plays exhibited during the rejoicings for the birth of Philip Prospero, occasioned an expense of 800,000 pieces of eight. He had also three grand and stated hunts in the course of the season, each of which, it is calculated, cost 30,000 crowns ; and all these sums were chiefly wrung from his poorest subjects, as the higher orders were in a great measure exempted from taxation.

King Philip was always elegantly attired, and on somopoli, 1672). Zanetornato was the Venetian ambassador to the Court of Madrid, from the year 1558 to 1561, and his *Relazione* was drawn up by him for the information of the Senate of Venice.

lemn public days he appeared loaded with gems, and usually arrayed in the splendid garb of the order of the Golden Fleece. This personal decoration formed part of his great study, to maintain his royal dignity, of which he was peculiarly jealous. In prosecution of this plan, he also invariably preserved an assumed and sustained gravity.¹ Every movement, when he did move, was regulated with a view to appear dignified and venerable. So afraid was he of diminishing the respect of his subjects, by condescension or familiarity, that he seldom spoke to the gentlemen of his chamber, who attended him at his meals, though they were all grandees of Spain. He generally made his wishes be comprehended by signs, and he has been known to pass a whole week without once opening his lips.² Yet Mad. d'Aulnoy says, that though seemingly so cold and grave that he was hardly ever seen to laugh, he was in reality the pleasantest of men; and Sir Richard Fanshawe was informed, "that he was merry enough where and when the ermine cloak of his royal gravity was laid aside." He encouraged the gayest dramatic spectacles, particularly the *Comedias de Repente*, which correspond to the Italian *Comedie dell'Arte*; and all sorts of farces, ballets and interludes flourished under the patronage of his Solemnity: but neither the repartees

¹ His gravity was otherwise accounted for in Spain, by a popular superstition. Philip was born on Good Friday, and it was believed that those who came into the world on that day, whenever they approached a burial-place, in which any one who had been murdered was interred, or passed a spot where a murder had been committed, saw the apparition of the deceased, all bloody, and in the same condition he happened to be in when he was slain. Now it was thought that the terror of the many ghastly visions which Philip had thus seen in his youth, had given him a habit of casting his eyes upwards, and had imparted a solemnity to his general demeanour. (D'Aulnoy, *Voyage d'Espagne*).

² Zanetornato, *Relazione della Corte di Spagna*.

nor gesticulations of the most fantastic Gracioso could ever extort a smile. In fact, Philip seems to have possessed a sort of grave Cervantic humour: *Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit*; and his reputation for this species of wit is evinced by an absurd report, which at one time prevailed, that he was the author of Don Quixote.¹

Though thus abstemious in diet, and grave in demeanour, Philip was much addicted to promiscuous gallantry.² He is said to have had at least thirty-two children, not entitled to bear the name of Infante,³ all of whom entered into religious orders, or were maintained as private individuals, with exception of Don John of Austria. There was a little cabinet in the palace of the Pardo, which he called his Beloved, where he was wont sometimes to entertain himself with his mistresses, among whom were numbered the Dutchess d'Albuquerque,⁴ and the sister of the Marques of Mortara.

In person Philip was of lofty stature, and his presence

¹ *Lettre de G. Mayans*, ap. Gaillard, *Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, t. vii. p. 383.

² The He-goat stalks before the herd,
With larger horns and longer beard:
How oft are men with looks beguiled—
Can one so reverend be so wild?

³ Zanetornato, *Relazione*.

⁴ “C'est dans les bosquets de Pardo,” says a French traveller, “que Philippe Quatre trouva le belle Duchesse d'Albuquerque, sa maîtresse, dans les bras du Duc Medina de-las-Torres: on montre le berceau, où, sans un page, il les eût poignardés tous deux.” (Langle, *Voyage en Espagne*, t. i. p. 36. 2d edit.) I however doubt this piece of traditional scandal. We have seen that the Duke of Medina de-las-Torres crossed the king's love for the fair Calderona, and had he again thwarted him with the Dutchess d'Albuquerque, it is not likely that he would have been so great a favourite towards the close of his reign.

was majestic.¹ His features, except the Austrian lip which he had inherited, were small and delicate, and his complexion fair and florid. Cespedes, a historian who wrote in the commencement of the reign of Philip, and describes him as he was in youth, says, that he had a fair silvery skin, blue eyes, a commanding brow, a bland and propitious aspect, a voice agreeable and sonorous.² To judge from his pictures, if he wanted that air and manner which, in the portraits of Charles V, evince the spirit of a prince born to lead armies to the field, and to aim at universal monarchy, he was free from that mingled expression of cruelty, pride, malice, and dark dissimulation, assembled in the lines of Philip the Second's revengeful and hypocritical countenance. His visage, in short, distinctly enough bespoke his character. Like that of his father, it was mild and pacific, and betokened a temper gentle and clement, and a mind which, though it might possess sufficient fortitude to endure, was destitute of talents to contrive, or resolution to execute.

An inscription on a monument erected to the memory of King Philip, in the royal convent of the Incarnation at Madrid, has happily enough seized on the favourable points of his character and temper:—


Religione superos impense coluit—
 Pietate subjectos benigne excepit—
 Clementiâ offensos perhumaniter absolvit—
 Constantiâ labores æquanimiter exalavit.³

The death of Philip IV, such as he was, became an unspeakable calamity to the Spanish nation, now left to the

¹ “ El Rey nuestro señor es el primero (dixo el Coxuelo). Qué hombre està! (dixo la mulata.) Que bazarros bigotes tiene! y cómo parece Rey en la cara y en el arte.”—Velez de Guevara, *Diablo Coxuelo*, p. 110.


² Cespedes, *Histor. de Felipe IV.* lib. ii. c. 1.


³ Monforte, *Honras*.



government of an infant child and an unpopular queen, full of passion and prejudice, and without talents or experience, whose dissensions with Don John of Austria during a long minority, completed the ruin of Spain. It indeed appeared at the close of the reign of Philip, that his kingdom had fallen as low as it could sink ; but neither nations nor individuals can ever reach such a depth of misfortune but there still remains an abyss which lies far beneath it.

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